Recent events related to exchanges of gunfire between Turkish and Syrian troops, has led most analysts to talk about the possibility of introducing Turkish troops into Syria to protect its territory from possible attacks by the Syrians. According to our estimates, such a scenario is the least likely for a number of reasons.
The first aspect is that the Turkish army, which, of course, their total power is beyond loyal to President Bashar al-Assad's troops, is not willing to repeat the Iraqi scenario, and even more to build a safety buffer on the adjacent territory. Such action without the relevant resolution of the UN Security Council, despite any steps diplomatic support from the allies of Ankara in NATO, will still be regarded the same UN as an act of international aggression. A single shell hit Turkish territory cannot be considered as a permanent threat to Turkey's national security, whatever the arguments in this regard are not available. To prove the connection between the activity of Kurdish militants on Turkish territory with the position of Damascus to the Turkish side will be difficult, and, moreover, tie into a knot bombings in Turkey and the existence of the camps of the Kurdistan workers party (PKK) on the Syrian territory.
It is possible of course to carry out "a La Iraq" raids for solving short term goals, but immediately here comes a delicate moment. Such a policy will unambiguously cause the outflow of the majority of the oscillating Kurdish population in Northern Syria, the PKK, which has in this region a strong influence. In this scenario, in the eyes of virtually the entire Kurdish population, the opposition fighting against the regime in Damascus, will be associated with the Turkish army, and that means the end to any attempt of the opponents of Bashar al-Assad to reach out to the Kurds. Moreover, a very significant part of the "Sunni" parts of the Syrian army would react to such an intrusion is very wary. The primacy of the principle of "territorial sovereignty" driven through the head of a Syrian soldier and officer constantly, and he is not an empty svym, despite his religious affiliation. As, however, and for the majority of the Syrian population. For this reason, a significant part of the intellectual elite of the country categorically rejects foreign military intervention.
Second is the unwillingness of NATO allies, and especially Washington, to the script of open military intervention in the Syrian conflict. A "script buffer" is disguised military intervention because permanent deployment of the Turkish military on Syrian territory implies their constant clashes are inevitable losses and, of course, the response. USA at present strongly constrain Turkish partners from open military actions on the Syrian track. It takes into account the possible use of chemical weapons Assad in the event of a direct threat to his regime from potential intervention. Of course, this constrains and Ankara from a large-scale military intervention.
In addition, in Washington miscalculated the negative consequences in connection with the above-described reaction of the Kurds. Plus a completely unambiguous response to this the leader of the Iraqi Kurds M. Barzani, who previously helped their Syrian brethren, and in the case of the Turkish invasion, of course, this support will strengthen. This reaction of the Iraqi Kurds does not suit Washington, which has embarked on a strategic Alliance with Erbil, "soothing" Turkish partners supply drones and attack helicopters "Apache". Ankara in the event of an invasion actually puts an end to their attempts to negotiate with the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan "on good neighborhood". And this, most likely, will lead at best to a "neutral position" of Erbil in relation to the activity of the militants of the PKK. To fight in such a scenario Turkey will alone, as to expect any support from European partners in NATO do not have.
This activity is another that should deter the Turkish government from intervention. Invading Syria will objectively weaken the forces of the Turkish security forces in other directions of counteraction to Kurdish separatists, primarily in Iraq. Will be minimized and the cooperation in this sphere with Iran, which is highly valued in counter-terrorist units of the Turkish security forces.
And, of course, the situation with the internal opposition, which already uses this point for criticism of the government. In the event of any complications the situation that can go "according to plan" dramatically weaken the position of Prime Minister and leader of ruling justice and development R. Erdogan.
In this situation, the most likely way to "save face" is to confine light shelling Syrian territory and to adopt a non-binding resolution of the Turkish Parliament "about the possibility of using armed forces abroad." What, in fact, been done.
Tags: assessment , Syria , forecasts