Forgot about the ravines...
Material posted: Publication date: 12-11-2012

The change of leadership of the Ministry of defense of Russia our correspondent says one of the leading military analysts and former intelligence chief of the Airborne troops, the Chairman of the Central Council of "Union of paratroopers of Russia" Pavel Popovsky.

- Summary of the reform of the army under the leadership of Serdyukov – a pile of criminal cases about large plunders. Your opinion about the scandalous resignation of the defense Minister.

- Problems Serdyukov has accumulated over five years. I mean the problems in the Ministry of defence, and to, primarily, personnel selection. It is simply framed and framed seriously, and he apparently did not monitor the situation as it should have been done with such a huge budget.

To outsource all the service for it is a state within a state (!), and there it was necessary to appoint strict control. But as such control bodies of the Ministry of defence was not, and public bodies in the Ministry of defence didn't look. Here it happened that they felt the impunity. I think that all these thefts happened sometime in the last 1-2 years, respectively, when the conditions for them.

- When uncovered the fraud there are reports and official reports about the first results of a direct military reform. You're talking about?

- If to speak about the military reform, it was, without doubt, necessary. If we talk about the reform strategy, that is, of course, the invention is not Serdyukov, and this is the highest leadership, and this is a common global trend. In the direction in which the reform was carried out, – it is, in General, have been copied to some extent with the American patterns. The American army, I believe, effective. But as always execution have left much to be desired – it was smooth on paper, Yes forgot about the ravines.

There is still one major obstacle – over the years the decision was made to transition to a one-year term of service. It coincided with the population decline, demographic pit, as they say. The result is abysmal now widely advertised combat-ready brigades practically equipped. At least, most of them combat-ready and combat-ready. I just know the situation – some teams are staffed by only 55-60%, and operational standards it is considered that this part of the units NOT combat-ready. Not even "moderately useful", and generally unfit for combat!

I know cases when the position of the driver (though not in the Navy) is just a "body" that eyes have not seen the tank and the lever is not sitting, and recorded there just to fill the staffing unit, staffing cell, and to calculate that the crew has. And that actually?..

And there are such cases. Exercises that were performed the last time the team was assembled from around the County, had been preparing for two months, has shown in fact – in Russian "show" is staged, and then gave back all collected for their part, where they have been for a while invited. This is not the case!

- VDV looks like an outlier against the backdrop of global reductions in the Armed forces...

- A lot of problems with Airborne troops. I mean, how many problems? Problems in airborne less than in the Armed forces, because here, the command was in place and stopped and somehow smoothed the decisions that the General staff had imposed and Goma imposed.

In fact VDV now, as the operational merger, as an independent group of forces capable of conducting military operations and to form the command post, – it is not. There are simply a few divisions, and operational integration – no. The army, fortunately, preserved. And then, the educational arm of the service involves a training of officers and training, but these military educational institutions of the airborne forces were withdrawn. So they now have no training center or school. What branch of service without the skills that it needs to cook? This is one of the hallmarks of the armed forces. All need to be corrected. And the sooner the better...

Isn Ryazan school took airborne?

- It is part of the army.

- Wow... we Are confident that with new leadership the situation will change for the better?

One way or another, even given the mistakes, I can repeat that the overall strategy of military reform, its concept was chosen correctly. However, further there were kinks in the "as you wish, warden", boating and all with the same brush without knowing the details, not realizing that the Armed forces are so multifaceted, multilayered, complicated mechanism, its under the cube cannot be equated.

- The situation in the Caucasus is stable but tense, but not beyond. Troubled by tradition in Dagestan and other republics. The problem of the conflict with Georgia has not withdrawn from the agenda. Assessing all this, tell me, what are the military threats facing Russia?

- If we talk of a great military threat, I think that it is on the agenda today is not worth it. A local conflict has now become a method of promoting national interests and are widely used by all leading States of the world. Local conflicts is the way of initiation of internal conflicts, a way of promoting their national interests and world order in their own way. And there is no guarantee that will not occur again the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict or not polyhnet in Central Asia.

Again, local conflicts became more frequent, only bound to increase. So here we must keep the powder dry. So just to deal with such sporadic problems and need to have quick, mobile troops, like VDV. As operational capability, rather than as a combat arm even.

- Paul Y., returning to the change, comment on the dismissal of the leadership of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces and generals in the rank of Deputy Ministers of defence.

- While I will not speak about specific personalities. But on the whole, I think the fault that has occurred, the chief of the General staff and the General Staff here to a greater extent than Serdyukov. He is not a specialist, he did the configuration that was planned, and all the details – planning, clear detail – it is a matter of the chief of the General staff Main organization and mobilization Department, Main operational Department, etc., all this big machinery.

What Serdyukov? He needed to improve the Finance, it and configuration on the improvement of the finances lined up. But control over this configuration which is attached to the army, no. And here is the result. I'm afraid I do not exclude that he himself will suffer.

Thank you for the interview.



Tags: assessment , Russia , armed forces