With distrust and some fear look, we have to strengthen the people's liberation army of China. Threat is felt from increasing its technical equipment, a large, but poorly equipped Chinese infantry, is not of major concern. We got kind of used. It is implied that the real threat can only represent those units of the Chinese army, which are armed with comparable technical level weapons.
Can sometimes give the impression that the PLA is a rough analogy of the Russian army, armed with slightly different weapons, but just a big number. This is not entirely true. Not only in weapons and numbers, but also what can be called the tactical tradition. Will not be a discovery to say that the tactics used depends not only on what is written in the statutes and other governing documents, but also from habits to fight in one way or another. These habits are formed historically, during wars, which are armed a specific country.
In the case of China is quite unfairly forgotten, which is still easily armed in their bulk of the Chinese infantry used to the conduct of the war in terms of the technical superiority of the enemy. During the war with Japan, the Chinese civil war and especially the wars in Korea, such a situation was normal for the PLA.
The purpose of this article is to try to perform, as best they could easy Chinese infantry to successfully attack in full the technical superiority of the Americans in the Korean war, including analyzing the experience of action in a relatively similar conditions of other armies. This will allow a more comprehensive approach to assessing the potential of the PLA, and will also outline potential options for action if the Russian army will have to fight in terms of technical superiority of the enemy.
General description
Military literature is quite stingy on the description of the tactics of the Chinese light infantry in the course of successful battles against the Americans and their allies in the winter of 1950/1951 years in Korea.
The available information is too General in nature. So in the military-historical research under the guidance of S. S. Lotikovo indicated that the Chinese offensive were mainly at night, had the troops on a broad front without the Express massing of forces and means on the main axis, the transition to the attack is often made without fire preparation, was used the effect of surprise, the advancing troops avoided movements along roads and open terrain, simultaneously with the onset of the main forces in front of the troops, using the gaps in the enemy's defenses, bypassing his part from the flanks and rear and seeped into the depth of the defense, to attack artillery positions and command posts, disconnection, control and operation of the rear. It also indicates that due to difficulties with the supply operation was carried out on small depth and lasting from five to nine days.
The war in Korea 1950-1953, Saint Petersburg, Poligon, 2000, pp. 234-236.
Not much more American sources. It also indicates that the Chinese troops escaped the movement of troops along roads to attack stealthily, they crept to the American positions for the subsequent sudden throw, carried out the attack, combining a frontal attack with a simultaneous rounds, with most of the forces were allocated to bypass.
The Chinese communist forces in Korea, p.58, 60-63 http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/historic/hist_c2_pt1.pdf
Nothing particularly Chinese in such descriptions no.
Give some indication of the part of the 2nd current Russian Combat Statute for the preparation and conduct of combined arms combat in the part relating to the attack in areas with an insufficient number of roads and in such conditions was the Korean war).
- In the marshy area of the attack is carried out along the roads, combined with the rounds, the coverage and the extensive use of groups of infiltration (infantry units operating on foot) - p. 334 - In the marshy area in the summer of the personnel of mechanized infantry units may come on foot without firing communication with the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) that move in a pre-battle order with respect to the available destinations. p. 338 - Offensive in the mountainous areas being along the ridges, valleys and roads with wide application bypassing units. Crawl and reach the enemy in combination with the attack from the front are the most effective actions in the mountains – p. 341 the mountain infantry units of the hard to reach areas attack the enemy on foot. Depending on the situation, infantry units can advance on foot without firing connection with the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (BTR) – 347 - In the North and winter in inaccessible areas of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) moving on the roads. Dismounted infantry units when the deep snow comes skiing. – p. 332.
The General tactical idea is obvious – once the terrain gives warnings to move off the road, then you need to use Hiking encircling forces.
The General scheme of their offensive operations against columns of the enemy, being on the road, can be described thus:
1) to be the area where the action of heavy machinery off-road impossible, and the number of roads is not large and where movement of equipment of the enemy will be Willy-nilly limited to a thin thread of the road.
2) Is a stretch of road where you can put a comfortable defensive position, which at least for some time to stop the advance head units coming on the way of the enemy. Another option is to tie down defending enemy attacks from the front.
3) After snare advanced units of the enemy, bypassing a large Hiking groups (battalion level and above) go out in the stretched flank of the enemy column and at the same time in several places, cut the road, forming forest debris, barricades of captured equipment, blasting the roadbed, forming deep craters, etc., and create fire barriers. Simultaneously with the action of bypassing large groups, along the entire length of the road small units (platoon level) make constant raids for the introduction of the enemy in confusion concerning the place of concentration of the main efforts and pooping.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.292
4) After the formation of the "boilers" are scattered along the road, they are constantly attacked, forcing the armies to expend ammunition faster than it can be replenished.
After wearing down the surrounded enemy's attempts to destroy the "boilers" one at a time. In the result the enemy has a choice – either sit in defensive stance and waiting for outside help or to exit back off the road, throwing heavy equipment, but bringing people to either immediately break back on the road. In any case, the initial attack is thwarted. Yet the aim of the attacking forces – not to engage in self-defence, and to move forward. If initially the enemy was defending – he is forced to retreat.
Tactical features
For the purposes of further discussion it should be emphasized that such a jammer units is walking and acting mostly off-road.
To illustrate, give a rather lengthy quotation from the book S. V. Anchukov "Secrets of the rebellion-war Russia at the turn of the century":
"Remember the teachings with the 54th motorized rifle division, Leningrad military district in the area of Alakurtti when our company to confirm the calculations the task was "really crawl imaginary enemy" on the route of 20 kilometers. Then it was fashionable, no teaching was carried out without maneuvers to bypass and reach the enemy. A big fan of such experiments were the generals, including chief of staff of County General Toshkov. Was no exception and the mentioned exercises. Instead of three hours Rota for MTL-BV (tracked armoured vehicles) day crept through the swamps, broke all the logs for self-recovery and profit to "the finish" - the exercises ended without us. It is in terms of training and combat environment.
Imagine that the route would be 2-3 groups of Rangers with rocket launchers and sniper rifles. For 56 officers and soldiers of the regiment 1 MSR 251 this trip would be the last. 56 people would be numbered among the missing, and the huntsman would get a rich booty. ... Such decisions with "the extensive use of bypassing units" was the sea. ...On the same exercise regiment 251 convoy stretched for 15 miles on the Northern route Kandalaksha-Alakurtti. This despite the fact that only 50-60% of the equipment and armament was removed from the Park." "[In] a thaw followed by a light frost when returning from other teachings in the headquarters of the 111 division of the ... with the battalion reached Sortavala 12 hours, the last 40 of 200 kilometers (from lakhdenpokh'ya to the point of dislocation) column crawled for 7 hours at an average speed of 6-7 kilometers per hour. It thus cleared the way, if the only column of cars of the raised passableness. On the same exercises in error "guide" when reading the card column of the battalion were at an impasse. Trucks and trailers were literally carried on the hands, lost four hours.
Late deployed the communications division. Connection in full was not half a day. Imagine that the neighborhood was a mobile group of Finnish skiers. Obviously, when the division commander did not wait for would never and loss of control would be at least relieved of duty. Without special equipment, for example armored bulldozers, there was nothing to even think to break away from a motorway or road directions. If mehwassi were still able somehow to move the country roads, the columns of the headquarters of the regiment and higher units and parts of the rear literally scored the road stretched for miles, were and still are a great object to attack small maneuverable [sabotage-intelligence group] with light weapons."
Problems for bypassing units creates not only the use of technology, but even horses. Describes an attempt to use horses when moving off-road sabotage/guerrilla group "Krasnyi Onezhets" M. I. Zakharov: "the inexperience of a command of the detachment took with him a convoy of five or six horses. All the Luggage was loaded their horses, and went light. For it then paid in full. In many places, for the baggage had to clear the road, through rivers and wide streams to establish some crossing. ... [Next time] acted smarter, train with horses is not picked up, loaded duffel bags."
Gnetnev K. V., "the Secrets of the forest war. Guerrilla war in Karelia in 1941-1944 memories, photographs and documents"; Petrozavodsk, Publishing house of the "Island", 2007, p. 55, 56
Action Hiking encircling troops off the roads inevitably leads to the fact that they are armed can only be that can carry people.
Finnish Colonel Ekman, whose troops participated in the blockade of Soviet 176 and 289 rifle divisions during the fighting in Ilomantsi district (Karelia) in 1944, proposed for operations in the forested terrain to abandon even the machine-gun mouth and transform them into regular infantry to increase their mobility.
Pasi Tuunainen, The Battle of Encirclement at Ilomantsi in July-August 1944, is an example of the application of the idea of Cannae in the Finnish Art of War, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Volume 19, Issue 1, April 2006, pages 107-122
Even a few modified guns "Maxim", which was armed with a Finnish machine gun company, for operations in forest terrain seemed too bulky.
However, the need for bypassing units operate on foot and carry all by yourself makes their use, at least at first glance, the set of tactical confusion. The analysis of possibilities of application Do that can make light-armed infantry, against the enemy, with all the variety of heavy weapons, even bound to the road. At the slightest attempt to attack this lightly armed infantry must be simply swept away by heavy weapons fire, which she countered nothing.
Consider the examples of successful attacks of the light infantry, which operated off-road.
The first attack radioadiga detachment of cadets, International military school in January 1922 during the civil war in Karelia on the position of the "white Finns" in the village of Kimas-lake. The detachment consisted of 136 people. Armed squad had rifles with ammunition, 200 rounds) and six (according to others nine) light machine guns (with ammunition 600 rounds). Each had one or two garnet. The cargo of food for six days. Total weight of each cadet was 16 pounds. Were no roads on the forest trails and virgin snow. The squad regrouped in the order of battle at a distance of one kilometer from Kimas-lake. The attack occurred on the front for about 3 miles. The enemy had discovered the approach of the students, only when they began to rise directly to the village itself, located on a hill. About company of the enemy, not being able to deploy your forces opened indiscriminate fire from the yards and Windows. The shooting lasted about 20 minutes, by 9 a.m. the enemy positions were captured.
Toivo Antikainen: the Life and heroism; Petrozavodsk, Publishing house of the "Island", 2008, p. 19, 21-23, 28, 29
Obviously, this sung later in the novel by Gennady fish, "the Fall of Kimas-lake", in the film "For the Soviet Motherland" the boy managed to "red Finns" only because "the white Finns the attack was sudden.
Whether "white Finnish" guarding a little better organised – failure of the attack with heavy losses for the attacker would be provided.
The second example belongs to the Finnish war.
We will talk about the attack of the 1st battalion 27th infantry regiment of the Finnish army in the night of 1 January 2, 1940, aimed at splitting of the column of the Soviet 44th division on the road route, near Suomussalmi. At a distance of about 350-370 meters from the positions of our troops, stationed along the road, was a low ridge, roughly parallel to the road. For ridge, the Finns have launched a chain of two companies (the Finnish company was a little less than 200 people), the third company of the battalion remained in reserve behind the ridge. The front of attack was about 450 meters. On the flanks was set at 6 Maxim machine guns during the infantry attack was supposed to fire on sections of road on either side, isolating, thus, the attacked the station. The attack began around midnight, a silent rapprochement of our positions. Finns in General did, our combat Outpost, located about 50-60 meters from the road was shot without much noise. At the moment of throw Finns on our basic positions on them opened fire, several of our chetvertnykh gun emplacements, but the Finns were already too close, and the fire from them went over the heads of the attackers. Attacking Finnish infantry was armed mostly with pistols, machine guns and grenades.
William R. Trotter, Frosen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940; Chapel Hill, North Carolina, Algonauin Books of Chapel Hill, 2000, p.115, 163-165
The situation is generally similar with the first example - Quad machine gun could sweep away the attacking "white Finns". The attack failed because preserved the element of surprise.
Obviously, light infantry simply can not suppress the enemy fire with heavy weapons. On a success it can only count when you use the effect of surprise. When tying a long battle light infantry, with, usually, only carry ammo myself, will be forced to quickly leave the battlefield. Occurs clear question – is it possible seriously to expect that the systematic attacks of the light infantry it has as systematic use will be obtained by the suddenness of the attack to succeed. At first glance – it is simply impossible. Too easy to exclude the possibility of a sudden attack to the proper organization of the escort. And even if one or one or two times this attack to happen, the opponent will understand and react to danger.
Systematically to achieve success with the help of surprise seems impossible. The second misunderstanding is due to the fact that the enemy is in control of the road could quickly shift reserves, including armored vehicles, to the scene of the attack. Even if the attacking light infantry manage to capture a section of road and to set up a barrier to shoot down it should not be too difficult.
In the winter of 1941/42, the Germans kept the thin thread of highway, while in the vicinity of roads in the forests were our troops, as follows. They cleared the road so that on both sides arose the snow, the trees, comes sometimes up to three meters. In some places they poured water, and they were iced over, becoming an obstacle not only for infantry but for tanks. The ramparts defended the road from observation. The highway moved special mobile teams – infantry on motorcycles and in cars, armored vehicles and tanks (assault guns). The infantry were transported to ski and if necessary an action off road can quickly take advantage of them. The roads ran patrols, besides villages, were along the road, turned into strong points.
As an example, following can be part of the tactical reserve of the Germans: a company of motorcyclists-skiers-ski engineer company, a few self-propelled assault guns, and 8 reconnaissance armored cars (around Naschekino, February 1942). In another case, the German counterattack against нашего1092 infantry regiment, to cut the Warsaw highway to the North Podberezie 26 January 1942, was carried out by German infantry supported by 4 tanks and 3 armored cars. How effective can be the action of mobile reserves, armed with heavy equipment, says at least one example of what cavalry group Belov, who had 28 thousand people, including five ski battalions, in January 1942, could not ride the Warsaw highway. Only for short periods of time she was able to capture small sections of the road. Their retention was not yet ended a very limited supply of artillery shells cavalry group.
Colonel General P. A. Belov, "For us Moscow", Moscow: Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of defense, 1963, P.177, 178, 181, 186 Ilyushechkin A. A., mosyagin, M. P., "Zaitseva Mountain: a Chronicle of the tragedy (February 1942 – March 1943), Magadan Publishing house "Wild North", 2008, p. 10
Rouse, E., "Tank warfare on the Eastern front", Moscow, Publishing house "AST", 2006, p. 165, 172, 175
A certain similarity is the situation, which was surrounded by the Americans during the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944.
The district of schönberg (Schoenberg) on an area of about ten by seven and a half miles was surrounded by about 9000 American soldiers from 422го and 423го 106 regiments of the division, as well as parts of other units.
The Americans at first did not lack ammunition. Was surrounded by wooded hills. The road was controlled by the German 293 infantry regiment, one artillery battalion and 668 OST-battalion of former Soviet prisoners of war. Along the road the Germans had strong points with a single 88mm cannon each. The reference point could be enhanced dual anti-aircraft guns.
As a mobile reserve used the tanks, including those captured from the Americans. Besides, the Germans attacked and surrounded by troops, which led to a quick depletion of ammo and surrounded. Several attempts of Americans to move controlled by the Germans the road to get to his own, failed. In the end, most American soldiers surrendered.
Charles Whiting, Death of a division, and London Plymouth, Clarke, Doble and Brendon Ltd, 1980, p. 83, 92, 94, 106, 107, 108, 113
Finally, the third misunderstanding lies in the fact that a captured piece can be arranged firing artillery or air attack. They will inevitably sweep away the light infantry of the way. It is a widely known technique for ensuring transactions columns technique called moving artillery "rifts".
In simplified form it can be described as follows: One group of artillery takes place ready for immediate opening fire on the enemy, if the attack on the convoy. Another group moves together with the column. As the column is removed from the first artillery group. Therefore, before the release of the column from the zone of effective fire of the first group, the second group stops moving and takes a position to open fire. After that first removed from their positions and catches up to the column. So as you move the group is constantly changing. At any point in time until the column is moving, the artillery group, ready to open fire. In cases where detachment of the artillery group from the column with subsequent catching of it the column is not valid (catch-up group can be attacked in time of the Dogon), the March is organized so that artillery units could reach the head of the column, ahead of the remaining vehicles in the convoy. There they set in readiness for firing. Is removed from the position they start when they are approached the end of the column, and then attach the column to the tail. After that, artillery group immediately started overtaking the rest of the equipment column. Thus, they are always together with the other parts of the column and may be protected by them from the middle attack.
In fairness it should be noted that artillery and air cover requires a well-functioning guidance. The guidance in no - or maleoriented terrain (e.g. forest or mountain), which often attacks and are not so easy. Each platoon in the artillery and/or avianation will not give. However, though belatedly, but the light infantry, the attacking column, almost always can be brought down the fire of the heavy weapons that a infantry have nothing to oppose. When the American command decided to retreat from the area Chancancode reservoir, the Chinese barriers on the road were cut down essentially one tank. He just drove up to the barrier and fired until, until razgovarival the road. After emerging from the environment of the American convoy continued its movement.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.237, 275
Rebuttal
It would seem that everything is clear – light infantry can't successfully cut the road, which is controlled by the adversary, having sufficient number of heavy weapons and ammunition. However, this inference is often refuted by combat practice. About the impossibility of a "constant surprise"
As a result of the winter of 1950/51. in Korea the us army had undertaken a detailed study of the action of infantry and use its weapons.
One of the conclusions is worth quoting: "a Very high percentage of the most important clashes took place in such circumstances that our [American – ed.ed.] artillery could not cause significant damage to the enemy, directly stifled on the line of our infantry, in addition to partial interdiction of a supply of support and partial closure of escape routes. ... Recognition of the enemy occurred at distances from 15 to 150 meters from the main resistance line is too close and too late to organize a successful use of artillery. This is partly due to a lack of patrolling and guarding, although these errors are not more chronic. ... In short, we do not have the required number of soldiers, and the ones we have do not have unlimited physical strength, to patrol, to guard and build fortifications, to such an extent to make defensive positions Eighth Army relatively safe from surprise attacks. [my italics – ed.ed.] Our infantry takes the situation for what it is, and psychologically focused on the battle with Communist Chinese troops at short range, not really waiting for assistance from heavy weapons support"
S. L. A. Marshall, Commentary on infantry operations and weapons usage in Korea, Winter of 1950-51, it was; Chevy Chase, Maryland, Operations research office, The Johns Hapkins University, 1951, p.6, op.CIT.by: http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/reports/index.htm
It should be assumed that the role played by multiple, and often simultaneous attacks in different places along the road.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.111
During the successful Chinese army action in Korea in the winter of 1950/51. of course, there were failed attacks on American troops.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.78, 83, 89
However, to be equally well prepared to repel attacks on any road segment at any time fails. A number of attacks are successful.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.109-110
During the retreat of the Americans from Chancancode reservoir, the Chinese managed every few hours to break through to the road and disable the machine that has blocked the movement of the rest of the American column.
Max Hastings, The Korean war, Basignstoke and Oxford, Pan Books, 2000, p.187 Road cut.
The consequences of such a cutting can be difficult for inadequately linked to the road troops in comparison with the size achieved offensive success. The captured position can be an one company and supply to lose an entire division. As if "easy" was not to bring down the barriers to cut the enemy road, it takes time, due to the victims losses in technology and, most importantly, the consumption of ammunition and other materials. The fight requires huge consumption of ammunition. From the "notoriously unsuccessful" attacks the same need to fight, expending ammunition. And if the road is cut in one place, then in another, the attack groupings of troops, marching along the roads, to become difficult. The regularity of attacks aimed at cutting the road, makes the switch from continue the attack, maintaining the only communication open. The possibility of successful self-defense does not mean the ability to continue the offensive. If light infantry, operating off-road, can maintain the intense fighting, she's in a state of "starvation" to force tied to the way of the enemy to retreat, even if not defeating him.
About guns one should dwell on artillery. It is quite "greedy" for ammunition.
In conditions, when traffic on the only road supplying constantly interrupted, to ensure the regularity of supply of projectiles becomes almost impossible.
During the fighting in the area Chancancode reservoir artillery of the Americans (except, perhaps, mortars) has ceased to play any appreciable role to the end of the first day of fighting due to exhaustion of ammunition and cold, the effects of which on shells and guns dramatically reduced accuracy and rate of fire of artillery.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.134-135
Another problem was that the attacks of the Chinese infantry units occurred simultaneously with attacks on artillery positions, in which the latter were forced to defend themselves, and not to support other units.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/30-2/30-2_CON.HTM Russell A. Gugeler, Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea, CMH Publication 30-2 CHAPTER SIX Chosin Reservoir
The combination of the constant raids of small parties in the road and periodic attacks by large forces, make it difficult to determine when you need to use artillery to their full potential, and when to limit the consumption of ammunition. Ideally, when the difficulties in the supply of shells to do so: if the attack is significant powers to pounce on the attacking fire if small – art.the fire is not news, even to fend off infantry. But the fact of the problem is to determine how serious the attack at the time of the attack – not the easiest task for people struggling for their lives. Plowing shells of empty seats – the inevitable. All this is forcing the artillery to limit the consumption of ammunition, which greatly affects the efficiency of its use.
About the aircraft Mentioned above however does not explain how the Chinese could keep the barriers on the road from attacks by U.S. aircraft. It was a lot of opposition in the air during the most successful Chinese offensives it is almost not met, and problems with her supply of bombs, containers with Napalm, and shells did not have any. The forest in the Korean mountains are not everywhere continuous. In many places between the road and the mountains the area was open.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/30-2/30-2_CON.HTM Russell A. Gugeler, Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea, CMH Publication 30-2 CHAPTER SIX Chosin Reservoir
Nevertheless, the defeat of the Chinese American 2nd division about the retreat from Kunuri (Kunuri) and squeezing the U.S. marine corps from the area Chancancode reservoir was under continuous bombing by U.S. aircraft of the Chinese positions.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.102, 121
The answer to the question as it was perhaps not so difficult – the Chinese just kapalis.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.135, 364
And dug in despite the twenty degrees of frost. As a slight digression, note that the Americans in the same circumstances were made out of tin cans semblance of shaped charges and undermine the upper 30 cm of frozen soil.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.155
After cutting through the frozen upper layer, the further passage difficulties have been presented.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/30-2/30-2_CON.HTM Russell A. Gugeler, Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea, CMH Publication 30-2 CHAPTER SIX Chosin Reservoir
Aircraft the Americans have made a large number of sorties to support their troops when they were surrounded in the area Chancancode reservoir. The role of the support that it provided directly by the bombing and shelling Chinese troops and in terms of supply cannot be underestimated. But to provide this support, so that Americans can move forward, or at least, not to retreat – that aircraft could not do.
"Anti-aircraft" properties of the barriers on the road
It should be emphasized that Chinese barriers on the road, often, were not. Moreover, they have not always included the mining of roads, damaged by explosions or forest debris. The road is mostly blocked by the Americans themselves, or rather, damaged American equipment.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.335 David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.551
Even in cases when the road is barricaded by the trunks of trees, the soldiers directly at the dam was not.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.28,29,30
For example, on a 16-kilometer stretch between Koto-ri Koto-ri) and Hagaru-ri (Hagaru-ri) by the Chinese was created nine forest debris, in close proximity to none of whom was Chinese positions.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.145
Barriers were primarily fire.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.231
Parallel to the road on the slopes of hills, the Chinese have built trenches and Bunkers which were firing from small arms and mortars at anything that moved on the road.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.383, 384, 387, 388, 390
In many cases, the position was set in advance. During the advance of the Americans up, they found a large number of positions that are considered abandoned.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.18, 28
The Americans some time free "passed" through them by the Chinese. Often, the position of the Chinese machine guns were located at a considerable distance from the roadway.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.30, 290, 292, 329
Although in many cases the Chinese position was located at 100-150 meters from the road, and in some cases closer.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/30-2/30-2_CON.HTM
Russell A. Gugeler, Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea, CMH Publication 30-2
INFANTRY IN BATTLE CHAPTER FIVE, Artillery at Kunu-ri David Halberstam,
The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.453
"Anti-tank" properties of small arms barriers Yes, the above barriers were not able to prevent the passage of tanks, as well as to provide complete obstruction of the road for the Americans. Use the Chinese hand-held antitank weapons (bazookas) in the environments of American troops was sporadic because of his lack in significant quantities. Although, of course, there were exceptions, for example, when the head tank American tank company, led the column unlock, and repair and recovery vehicle, ran into mines on this site, that road to avoid them was not possible. The resulting "tube" was subjected to heavy fire from the Chinese shelters on the slopes and, despite their intense shelling from tank guns could not suppress the Chinese positions. After the exhaustion of the supply of ammunition for tank guns, the Americans retreated.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.140
The ineffectiveness of firing 90mm tank guns on Chinese screens was not an isolated case.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.336, 341
When shooting from machine guns at long range do not just guaranteed to hit a moving target. However, as shown, partially passable barriers was enough to force a technically superior enemy to retreat. This is due to several factors. Any connection, including armored vehicles, supplied by trucks, which are being destroyed by small arms fire and mortars.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.551
No matter how invincible would not be tanks without ammunition and fuel, they are not much navoyuesh. The effectiveness of the us tank guns against Chinese barriers significantly limited by the fact that the tanks could not long to stay on the road. Some had to move. Time for shelling Chinese positions on the hill was limited. A stopped tank would either completely lock up driving on the road or to create conditions for the significant slowdown in speed, making the truck much more vulnerable. The length of Chinese barriers were significant. The road was blocked off, not a minor diversionary divisions, and regiments and even divisions.
For example, the retreat of the 2nd American division of Kunuri (Kunuri) is passed through the "fire corridor" several kilometers long.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.449
And the total number of machine-gun Chinese machine-gun positions was estimated by the Americans in 40 units.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.515
While in one place an American tank freely shoots in the mountains, in another part of the mountain freely shoot at American trucks. When passing through the Chinese "fire corridor" in addition to the losses in manpower and trucks has been handling units.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.451, 453
http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/30-2/30-2_CON.HTM
Russell A. Gugeler, Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea, CMH Publication 30-2 CHAPTER SIX Chosin Reservoir
The mechanism of increasing ungovernability is not complicated. First, small arms fire and mortar with equipment brought down the radio antenna. Secondly, with the defeat of one truck, the staff who was on it, distributed on multiple machines running behind. Often in machines of other units. Machines that picked up the soldiers lagged behind the columns of their units. As a result, as you move through the barrier unit more and more mixed (people and equipment). Finally killed the commanders, many of whom traveled in open jeeps.
The above mentioned 2nd American division after the passage of the Chinese barrier in the next two weeks could not restore the fighting capacity.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.515, 456
To show the performance of Chinese barriers, it is possible to result such figures: in one of the companies that passed through this barrier, from 170 people down to 10, in one of the battalions of 600 about 140.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.456
Even in those cases where barriers are successfully brought down, very slowly. So, during the withdrawal from the area Chancancode reservoir 2 December 1950, the Americans shot down three of the barrier and restore one blown bridge. Used aircraft and the above mentioned single tank. The promotion was only a few kilometers. It took a day of battle. All this time the convoy of Americans has been under fire from Chinese small arms.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.273-276
Another example of the speed of overcoming obstacles on the road. To fill with snow, tamping it, a single funnel on the road, specially made by the Chinese, in the presence of a bulldozer, the Americans took 45 minutes.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.378
Faulty assessment of the Japanese failures Relative neglect of circumventing the tactics of light infantry, in part, may be due to the presence of historical examples where such tactics have not worked at all.
The most typical technique – the action of the Japanese army in the middle and the end of the second world war. In the beginning of the war the brilliant successes of the Japanese army during the war against the British in Malay and at the initial stage of the war in Burma and New Guinea, as well as against American-Filipino forces in the Philippines, has largely been associated with the use of the tactics of encircling Hiking groups.
"Jungle Warfare" from Intelligence Bulletin, November 1942 http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/intelligence-report/jungle-warfare.html
“Japanes Jungle Warfare” from Intelligence Bulletin, April 1944 www.lonesentry.com/articles/intelligence-report/japanese-jungle-warfare.html
“Ground forces (Japan)” from Intelligence Bulletin, September 1942 www.lonesentry.com/articles/intelligence-report/ground-forces-japan.html
“The Burma campaign” from Intelligence Bulletin, November 1942 http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/intelligence-report/burma-campaign.html
“Japanese Warfare as seen by U. S. Observers” from Intelligence Bulletin, May 1943 http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/intelligence-report/japanese-observers.html
“Comment on Japanese by British Soldier” from Intelligence Bulletin, September 1943 http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/intelligence-report/japanese.html and other publications on the same website
As a consequence of its very high efficiency, cutting roads, when entering Hiking encircling troops in the rear, began to turn for the Japanese, almost an end in itself.
“Japanese offensive Tactics” from Tactical and Technial Trends, no.32, August 26, 1943 www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/jap-offensive-tactics-doctrine.html
Rearing itself can trigger.
Still the fear of encirclement – understandable phenomenon and to disregard the psychological factor is quite impossible. Neither the British nor the Americans at first were not ready for systematic use by the Japanese encircling tactics of foot troops. The intensity of the Japanese this tactic was so sudden that at first to oppose anything from the American-Filipino forces and the British was bad. However, sooner or later the enemy "gets used" to such actions.
It happened with the enemies of the Japanese army. Yet, to attribute the failures of the Japanese in the middle and the end of the second world war on the tactic itself is wrong. The problem was different.
The Japanese paid great attention to the planning and execution of the maneuver to exit the road at the rear of the enemy, the choice of the attacked plot, but very poorly organized direct assault on the road.
During the war it was noted that the Japanese sacrificed a preliminary exploration of the object of attack in favor of a speed maneuver. In connection with difficulties of control due to the lack of communication and tendency to rely on the initiative of Junior commanders in the German style, Japanese attacks were often poorly coordinated.
The complexity of the organization of the attack at night (and it was at this time the charge of the light infantry had the greatest chances of success – the night is allowed to come closer to the enemy positions undetected, and reduced the effectiveness of his fire even more impairs the interaction.
The result was so that a General attack was broken up into a number of different attacks small units, and the effect of surprise was lost after the attack, the first of them.
This gave the opportunity to break attacking units piecemeal, focusing fire on one then on another group of Japanese soldiers. The need to retain control units entails a reduction of the distances between individual soldiers, to the point that you want to be able to reach the neighbor's hand. As a consequence, clustering of soldiers. And clustered groups are a good target for the enemy.
In the absence of radio communication between the units once ordered it was extremely difficult to change. So the attacks continued even after the effect of surprise was lost, that was not tactical, only resulting in unnecessary losses. Attempts to organize cooperation with the artillery was absent. In addition, the troops were often poorly supplied with food and had to eat what was collected for themselves.
Handbook on Japanes military forces 1 october 1944 War department
Technical Manual TM-E-30-480 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJA/HB/HB-7.html
To be fair to the Japanese, a part of the complexity is objective. In a dense forest (jungle), to withdraw any large unit on overseas deployment and deploy it in the chain (not to mention the allocation of the assault teams and/or groups of fire support), and even at night, and all this with the need to respect radio silence and just to preserve the surprise (noises in the night, far heard) is not only a complex and very difficult task. Forest – the area malagentia, and with limited visibility.
With the personal participation of the author of these lines, an infantry platoon couldn't pass the night in the forest and 100 meters, lounging on the two lost each other. Was worth a little gape one soldier (all the time I want to look under feet not to stumble) – ahead part of the unit was gone from sight. While trying to catch up, behind of the left in the other direction. When the error in the direction of the movement became obvious to turn around was worth the effort – advanced soldiers were already coming down, and those who were behind still continued to go forward. Instantly controllable relative to the column (commands can be passed in the chain) has turned into an uncontrolled mob. Fortunately it was only an exercise, and with the help of the PR managed to gather a platoon back.
In combat such an event would have entailed the loss of surprise and, consequently, a high probability of failure of the attack. Not to say that the Japanese tried to cope with these difficulties. They were sent ahead of the main divisions of a special group of soldiers who have paved and marked it with improvised means, the route, and attack by night sought up the slope to the top of the hill served as a common reference point. We also used the firing light rockets and tracer bullets for the objectives and boundaries of target areas. However, in General the Japanese failed to achieve the coordinated attacks. At first, their mistakes were not as noticeable. But then the allies had adapted to the style of warfare by the Japanese.
Let the Japanese and that based the bulk of the infantry were armed with rifles that need to reload manually after each shot. The chance of fast cast to reach the enemy and stab him with a bayonet by the Japanese was estimated as higher than the probability to hit the enemy's small arms fire during the shot. As a result, almost all the Japanese attacks were carried out without the suppression of enemy fire. For comparison, the Chinese troops in Korea had quite a lot of light automatic weapons that were allowed during the throw attack to fire on the move.
The General conclusion from the Japanese experience are quite obvious – troops must be prepared to carry out attacks in the dense forest. Easy workaround is only apparent. The number of "little things" that can result in the failure of this maneuver is rather large. Limitation on application Like any tactic, the tactic of "off-road" bypassing units, has its limitations on the possibilities of effective application.
1. One limitation is the density of enemy troops, located on the road.
The inability to ride Varshavskoe shosse cavalry corps Belova, mentioned above, is largely due to the density of the strongholds of the Germans along the road. We cite the following data: 50 km section of the Warsaw highway from Yukhnov to Miletina there were more than thirty.
Ilyushechkin A. A., mosyagin, M. P., "Zaitseva Mountain: a Chronicle of the tragedy (February 1942 – March 1943), Magadan Publishing house "Wild North", 2008, p. 10
Similarly, in the fighting in New Guinea the Americans to hold the roads every 400-500 meters organized reference point one or two platoons.
Some Japanese Defensive Methods, from Tactical and Technical Trends, N24, May 6, 1943 www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt09/japanese-defensive-methods.html
This means that the intervals between the reference points was covered by small arms fire, and any attempt to ride the road unavoidably was connected with the storm of a strong point.
However, the defense of the road thus requires to use a large number of people and resources. The Germans were aware that their fate is the 4th field army depends on whether they control the only artery of supply - Warsaw highway - or not. They have allocated sufficient outfit forces for its defense. However, to afford such "luxury" can not in all conditions.
We must not forget that the defense of the road - not an end in itself. Grouping of forces, which leads to the front fighting should be sufficient to enable it to get forward in the event of a front or stop attacking the enemy in the defense. Often had no command of the ability simultaneously to have a strong group at the front of the offensive/defense and a strong common strong points all along the supply chain. As a result, long sections of the road were forced to remain naked, which creates conditions for action of Hiking the traverse units.
In a sense, Finnish General counteroffensive on December 23, 1939 on the Karelian isthmus was partly based on the idea of cutting of supply roads, action off-road infantry. For example, 90 infantry division, standing directly in front of the Mannerheim Line, supplied by a single road, marching in many places through the forest. The temptation to cut in the rear of the division was too large. However, the number of our troops was that the General offensive of our Finns just didn't notice, mistaking it for attacks the individual RAID groups.
2. Another, similar limitation is the presence of a dense front that crosses the road. Forest or mountainous terrain impeded their education, but do not exclude it completely. If there are no places through which you can ensure supplies Hiking encircling troops without a fight, their actions have virtually no chance of success.
Hiking jammer units to implement. Of course, not as mechanized units, but still provide need. They need a replenishment of ammunition, provisions, food, you want to take out the wounded, etc. For their supply can be divided into two campaigns.
First, relatively "Finnish" is that the "bypass" on the road can only be so deep that you can carry out normal supply. As an example, the maximum length of the "bypass" for winter conditions in forest areas of Northern Ladoga the Finns was estimated at approximately five kilometers.
http://www.winterwar.com/Tactics/FINtactics.htm
In winter, the Finns widely used pumps-scraper, in which "harnessed" one or more skiers for the transport of ammunition, machine guns, mortars, food and evacuation of wounded. "Off-road" provision was carried out also through snow roads the shed. Laid them this way: first, there was the skier behind him breaking through the snow a few soldiers breaking their legs crust on the paved trail horses dragged the sleigh, at first empty, then loaded, then Protessilaos sled with a log, which made a furrow in the center of the road, and then went to the site (snow plow), followed by several more sled lined the road and finally, the road is sprinkled with sleigh with a tank of water.
Finnish military newsreel Jatkosodan Katsaukset Hyökkäävät Kamerat Puolustusvoimat Estittää Katsaus 40
The second approach to logistics can be called "Japanese-Chinese".
The troops pushed forward as far as human endurance allows. To the extent that troops no longer supplied with food. Japanese army troops often were given the order to find food themselves in the course of movement. While the war was in the relatively densely populated areas (e.g., Malay) the execution of the order was possible.
In the course of a Burmese company, in areas with sparse population, distance from supply bases in some cases led to starvation among the Japanese. Extremely cold winter of 1950 in Korea, Chinese troops were not supplied sufficiently by the heating means. Moreover, to avoid detection from American planes, they were forbidden to build fires.
The number of frostbitten from the Chinese was great. According to the American sources, the Chinese were a simple approach to solving the problem frostbitten – they just continued to participate in the fighting.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.510, 432
But not oblegchit supply, no supply of ammunition to fight is not possible.
Even if the combat units of the infantry get to break into the rear of the enemy, but the units of supply and reserves can't get through the front, the failure of the entire operation by cutting the road are inevitable.
During the fighting against the us-Filipino troops on the Bataan Peninsula (Luzon island, Philippines, on 15 January 1942 the Japanese were making the rounds of the positions of the 1st regular division of the enemy at the "impassable" mountain forests (jungle) and block the supply road on the ridge, Mauban (Mauban ridge). Attempts to knock off the roads fail. The entire defensive line of the American-Filipino troops on 22 January 1942 rolled back. The Japanese take a similar maneuver against the next line of defense the Americans, they again get to spend in the enemy's rear their units, but this time the Americans get to close the gap in the front line.
Cut off from supplies and reserves, was in the rear of the enemy Japanese troops during the period from 23 January to 17 February 1942, destroyed in the so-called "Battle for the boilers of the environment" (Battle of the Pockets).
3. Finally, the tactics of encircling encircling Hiking groups does not work if you cut off enemy units manage to keep the terrain sufficient for the organization of supply air, at least a method of relief supplies by parachute. - Held areas should not be too small, given that the wind blows discharged on parachutes cargo to the side, and the possibility of reducing aircraft over territory controlled by the enemy is limited. Attempts to attack light infantry in an environment where they do not lead to the exhaustion of the ammunition the defenders, lead to large losses of the attacker reaching the goal.
It happened in boachi PR Chipinge (Chipiongni)13-15 February 1951 during the Korean war and from 5 to 23 February 1944 during the Burma companies in the so-called "battle for the base logistical supply"(Battle of the Admin Box) .
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.542-545, 444 www.burmastar.org.uk/arakan_victory.htm
To sum up, the above restrictions only confirm that the tactics of Hiking bypassing units is not a miracle technique, inevitably leading to victory. Yes, under certain conditions, it can allow lightly armed infantry, to operate against more well armed enemy. However, the quantitative factor, as usual, is important.
To put an equality sign between this tactic and the action of small-scale sabotage (guerrilla) groups can not. Technical superiority is tied to the way the enemy plays his hand. It reduces the ability to make mistakes in the planning and implementation of actions of light infantry. Punishment for mistakes made light infantry in "bypassing units", better armed enemy can be much more damaging than errors in the equivalent actions of armed actors. On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the difficulties and limitations of tactics bypassing units.
Yeah, so to fight harder and more inconvenient, however, when no choice, to fight and achieve success. During the Korean war, the American command disbelief in the possibility of a successful action easy Chinese infantry with full domination of the Americans in the air, played a role in the unwillingness of Americans to confront at first the Chinese army.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.370-371
The technical superiority of the Americans in conjunction with such unbelief, for some time, turned the technical superiority to the disadvantage of tying troops to the road. Because only one counter-heavy equipment was not enough, the Americans began to create an infantry group "off-road" actions to fight the barriers of the Chinese light infantry.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.265 http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/30-2/30-2_CON.HTM Russell A. Gugeler, Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea, CMH Publication 30-2 CHAPTER SIX Chosin Reservoir, p.54
Probably, this is regarded as the main conclusion of the study the tactics of encircling detachments of light infantry. The Chinese army during combat actions with a high degree of probability that it will be widely used tactics Hiking bypassing units operating in an inaccessible for military equipment of the area. Tactical solutions to counter this tactic, lets not go deep into forests, swamps, mountains private, light infantry does not exist. Some aspects of the tactics
For completeness, consider certain factors which may be important when taking action Hiking encircling troops.
1. Traffic jams are a Significant help to the attacking light infantry have the most conventional tube the enemy on the road. The mechanism of their formation does not differ from the causes on which is formed the tube on the streets in peacetime.
Everyone thinks it is their task of the highest priority and urgent, or your identity are most important, and so seek to push "their" technology forward as quickly as possible. The attempts of overtaking the total of the column. Of course part of these attempts is unsuccessful, but integrated in the column are not obtained immediately. In the result, the equipment clogs the lanes. Someone can stop the car at a gas station for maintenance or to rest in the uncomfortable for the rest of the movement.
Often, a simple suspension of movement shall entail the clustering of machines. And when mobile reserve need to be rapidly deployed to the scene of the attack, he could not Balk the enemy's resistance, and in traffic of their own trucks. Theoretically, this problem can be solved easily – organized the commandant's service, but in practice this is very difficult task. On the road to face a large number are not subordinate to each other people with different personalities and understandings of proper behavior. And not immediately get to resolve all conflicts, and while they are solved in the road traffic jams. Traffic jams can be not only tactical, but also operational factor.
During the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in winter 1944/45 year (which took place mostly on the roads, sandwiched by thick forests and hills) they were one of the reasons for the loss of pace of the German advance from the beginning of the counteroffensive. The delay in the promotion of military parts due to the mixing of military equipment with the transport supplies (including horse carts) ranged from half to two days. This partly determined the failure of the offensive in General.
Herubel Michel, La bataille des Ardennes, Decembre 1944-Janvier 1945, Paris, Presses de La Cite, 1979, p.97 2.
The time of the attack
The Chinese, in accordance with the principles of Mao TSE Tung, carried out attacks against convoys of the enemy in the time of his move forward.
Max Hastings, The Korean war, Basignstoke and Oxford, Pan Books, 2000, p.169
In itself, the presence in the movement of large masses of troops decreases, their organization, and often makes mutual support between different units is difficult.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.15 3.
The target of the attack
An important role for the successful outcome of the attack is the choice of which units to attack the attacking light infantry.
During the company in Malay, the Japanese often as the victims of the attack were chosen artillery unit or the supply unit.
Japanese Warfare: A Summary Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin, N16, May 20, 1942 www.lonesentry.com/manuals/japanese-warfare/japanese-ground-forces.html
Such units often have inferior ready for combat at close range than the infantry or tank units, and the tactical benefits of their defeat promises more.
4. The intensity of the fighting in the head of the column of the enemy is essential to the success of the attack of light infantry, cutting of roads can have a degree of relatedness of the battle of head units, the leading front fighting on the road.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.501
If the fighting of low intensity, from head units can take reserves on knocking down the barriers.
So, one of the reasons for the failure of bypass the two battalions of 139 infantry division positions of the Finns in the lake Tolva-yarvi, in early December 1939 during the Finnish war was the fact that at the moment of our parts (in the night from 8 on 9 Dec 1939) in the rear of the way to supply the Finns, nor the next day, while the Finns fought against our flanking detachment, the front position of the Finns were not attacked. As a consequence, the Finns were able to withdraw from the front part of the forces to counterattack and throw our flanking squad on the road.
Bair Irincheev, Slandered the victory of Stalin, Moscow, Eksmo, 2009, pp. 151-152 5.
Infantry movement off the roads
In order for the columns of infantry when driving off-road is not scattered, on the way you can leave the commandants, which indicate where to go, thus removing the risk of loss of direction in cases when something goes hitch.
Eric Hammel, Chosin: heroic ordeal of the Korean war, St.Paul MN Zenith Press, 2007, p.266 6.
Supply
During the war in Korea, the most significant limitation for the Chinese army were able to supply troops on the front line. Despite the fact that the conditional average Chinese soldiers demanded the transportation of 4-5 pounds per day, and the us about 27 pounds, that the whole Chinese group demanded 2,500 tons per day, and only one American division 600-700 tons, the implementation of the supply was extremely difficult for the Chinese.
Max Hastings, The Korean war, Basignstoke and Oxford, Pan Books, 2000, p.162
China's car supply column suffered great loss of American aircraft. In some periods, losses from U.S. aircraft among truck drivers exceeded the casualties among combat units.
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean war, Basingstoke and Oxford, Pan books, 2009, p.510
Truck drivers because of the noise of the motor did not hear approaching enemy aircraft. That would somehow counteract the constant raids on all the hills along the roads were placed posts. As soon as the posts heard the sound of approaching planes, they were shot let us know what you need to get out of the way to the shelter.
Max Hastings, The Korean war, Basignstoke and Oxford, Pan Books, 2000, p.205
In principle, along the roads of supplies you can build a frequently located sheds. After the signal of the aerial observation posts, the drivers of hot cars under canopies. Although the pilots can see the tents, but too many of them and determine which of them are cars not possible. Probombit entire length of the road is not real, so the bomb falls at random. Damaged sheds immediately restored. However, the Chinese used a more simple method – the transport was carried out at night. Nevertheless, the trucks could not deliver the goods directly to the advanced troops. A significant part of the cargo at the final stage, supply lines had to be transported by porters. Here are some figures to imagine how lifting this kind of transportation. - A Chinese porter carried an average of approximately 35 – 45 pounds of cargo. - The Japanese soldiers carried with them a supply of food for 7 days, and the total weight of their cargo was approximately 25 kilograms.
Some basic tactics of the Japanese, from Tactical and Technical trends, No. 33, September 9, 1943 www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt09/tactics.html -
According to the French experience of the war in Indochina for the removal of a wounded man required, given the change of bearing, about 16 people.
Marc Dem, Mourir pour Cao Bang: le drama de la route coloniale N4, Albin Michel, 1978, p.68 7.
Debris on the road
Device for removal of tree debris on the road preferably placed immediately around a sharp bend in the road or crest of a hill, so that the enemy fire of the guns from a distance couldn't break that blockage. Under this conditions the tanks or utility vehicles need to drive to the close proximity of the dam to sweep away from the road. This allows you to better organize the defense of the dam.
Modernity and historical experience
Of course, from the time when Hiking encircling troops last mass used in shirokolistvennyh the fighting took a very long time. However, as the change in the level of technology will affect the tactics of encircling Hiking groups – it is difficult to assess. On the one hand, due to the increasing proliferation of surveillance night, including those mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles, the achievement of surprise Hiking bypassing units becomes more complex.
On the other hand reduced the need for surprise. The saturation of the infantry portable complexes ATGM and MANPADS, significantly increase the firepower of the off-road infantry, and progress in the development of positioning systems reduce the need is always in large groups when traveling. Unpredictable manner on the effectiveness of this tactic may affect the lack of air supremacy, the party against whom use these tactics. Yet the undisputed reason to write off the actions of the encircling detachments of light infantry in the archive is not available.
Andrey Markin
Tags: tactics , Special Forces