Research of critical infrastructure becoming a priority in many countries of the world, and primarily in the United States, where the level of development of information technologies and modern simulation modelling complexes is constantly rising. Among the goals of such studies highlight the protection of national critical infrastructure and organisation impacts on the objects of the enemy. Thus the main task is to identify the key objects (or their combination), the impact of which can have a most negative effect on the sector of the economy, a key resource or the entire infrastructure, as well as the evaluation of the consequences of such exposure and to develop mechanisms to mitigate these risks.
However, one of the main difficulties in identifying the key critical infrastructure until recently was the lack of a clear mathematical apparatus, which is not allowed to form quantitative measures of vulnerability of objects. This probably can explain the fact that the basis of most of these studies lay the method of expert evaluations for the mandatory availability of information about the possible damage the "reference object" or the development of special scale factors risk ("unsafe") such.
A striking example of such work is the model developed by the specialists of the Department of homeland security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of defense, which is based on the method of determining the priority of the objects of key collections of the military-industrial base (The Asset Prioritization Model - arm). Its essence lies in the calculation of the index of riskiness of an object depending on the object rating scale categories of factors and the importance of this factor.
The main drawback of such models is that research is usually carried out without taking into account the connectivity of its constituent objects. At the same time without the recording and analysis of network components in each sector of critical infrastructure (economic, financial, energy, etc.) is very problematic to provide sufficient adequacy of the model object исследования2. To eliminate the drawbacks in the United States began the formation of a whole cluster of research organizations involved in the development of modern mathematical models to study critical infrastructure.
The research organization. Study and analysis of critical infrastructure is a relatively new phenomenon. This question began to attract attention only at the end of the last century. It was the events of the middle 90-ies (the terrorist attack in Oklahoma city in 1995, the publication of the findings of the report of the scientific Committee of the Department of defense on information warfare in 1996)3, and the total computerization of control systems and control of various sectors of critical infrastructure has significantly increased the importance and necessity of such research.
So, in July 1996, Executive order of the President of the United States No. 13010 "About work to study security vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure from cyber and physical threats" were formed Commission for the protection of critical infrastructure in the U.S. President (President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection PCCIP)4. The Board's first report published a year later. Despite the fact that the report had not identified direct threats to national security, it pointed to the importance of the relationship components of critical infrastructure including energy, transport, emergency services, banking and financial, telecommunications sector and other vital resources.
In may 1998, the lights went out in the presidential Directive No. 63, "the Strategy of the joint efforts of the US administration and the private sector in protecting critical infrastructure." She determined the purpose and tasks of ensuring the protection national infrastructure from intentional attacks, and was accompanied by administrative decrees of the President No. 13130 "On the National Council for critical infrastructure" and No. 13231 "On the protection of national critical information systems." In accordance with these documents began forming centers of information exchange and analysis (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers), and the national Council for critical infrastructure (National Infrastructure Advisory Council - NIAC). At the end of 2001 was created the national center for the analysis and simulation modeling infrastructure (The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center NISAC), and in November of 2002 established the Department of homeland security (DHS), which was entrusted the General management of the activities to protect national infrastructure from various threats.
National center for the analysis and simulation infrastructure NISAC is under the direct leadership of the office of infrastructure protection and risk management the U.S. DHS (Department of Homeland Security's Infrastructure Protection/Risk Management Division), providing the Ministry and other bodies of state management capabilities of simulation, analysis, critical infrastructure, assessing their interdependence and vulnerability. The center also integrates the activities of the national laboratories at Sandia and Los Alamos on the development of modern complexes of modeling and identify potentially vulnerable critical facilities инфраструктуры5.
In addition, as part of the U.S. Department of energy from September 2003, a working group of the visualization and modeling (The Visualization and Modeling Working Group - VMWG). It is designed to increase the capacity of the Ministry to conduct a quick and comprehensive analysis of possible emergency situations in the energy sector. The group applies the most modern information technology, geographic information system, a database of accidents in the energy sector. 6
Fig. 1 Interconnected system space combat
The U.S. defense Department formed a working group of technical support (The U.S. Technical Support Working Group - TSWG), organizing and coordinating research work on the search and development of methods and technology required for the organization of the fight against terrorism. One of the most important activities of the group is to develop a universal tool for modeling the interdependencies of critical infrastructure and identify the most critical and vulnerable.
If the purpose of the laboratory work, and special groups, DHS, and the Ministry of energy of the country is the protection of national infrastructure, scientific-research organizations of the defense Ministry, in addition, solve the problems on the study of the critical infrastructure of the enemy in the interests of the organization impact on it. So, management of advanced studies of the U.S. DoD (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency - DARPA) oversees the development of a special system of decision-making "Integrated management system" (Integrated Battle Command), designed to assist commanders in the preparation and conduct of future joint and coalition operations, based on the achievement effects (Effect-based operations)7 in all areas of the battle space, which is seen in the form of an interconnected system composed of political, military, economic, social and information spheres (see Fig. 1).
Research laboratory of the air force (Air Force Research Laboratory - AFRL) is also developing analytical models that allows joint forces commanders to prepare and to make decisions. The aim of the laboratory is to simulate and analyze the enemy as a large complex system, understanding key relationships, interdependencies between objects, and identifying the most vulnerable, the impact of which will achieve the desired эффекта8.
A large complex system and research methods. According to foreign analysts, critical infrastructure is an array of tangible assets, production facilities and delivery vehicles, classified by various секторам9. The total number of objects in all sectors of critical infrastructure and key assets of the United States, subject to protection, is significant: farm - 1 912000; enterprises for the production of food - 87000; dams - 8000, the reserves of fresh water (Federal) - 1 800; hospitals - 5 800; settlements - 87000; of the enterprise - 250 000; power - 2 800; airports 5 000; bridges - 590 000; oil and gas fields - 300 000; ports -5 000; chemical production - 66 000; government buildings - 3 000 etc. all these objects United by ties of different nature.
In "Autopsy, understanding and analysis of vzaimosvyazei critical infrastructure"10представлена the following classification of interrelations between critical infrastructure: physical, cybernetic, geographic (topological), logical.
In the works of other foreign авторов11 meets specified classification:
Physical - defines the engineering interdependencies between objects. For example, the failure of power lines leads to de-energizing of the building and shutdown of all electronic equipment inside of it.
Information dependence on information exchange (information flow) between objects. For example, the failure of the Supervisory control and data acquisition (Supervisory control and data acquisition - SCADA) will not be the direct cause of shortages of electricity. First, there will be loss of control of the network elements, and only then, you may experience overload or emergency situation, that will lead to a disruption of the supply system.
- Geospatial - interdependence is the result of a co-location of infrastructure components in the area. For example, flood or fire disables all placed on the area of natural disasters the network objects.
- Procedural (political) - like interdependence occurs when any change (the incident) in one of the components of the infrastructure, and entails the impact on other sectors. For example, the collision of the aircraft with the world trade center towers led to a halt of all air traffic in the United States for more than 24 h, and flights of business aviation was discontinued for more than 3 days.
- Social - this interdependence can be expressed through social factors: public opinion, public confidence, fear, etc. Even if the infrastructure there is no physical relationship, the effects of events in one can influence the other. Similar effects (interdependence) can be short or delayed. For example, the events of 11 September 2001 led to a gradual decline of the airline industry, the decline of the aircraft manufacturing industry and tourism business.
Thus, according to some foreign экспертов12,13, critical infrastructure is a big complex system, characterized by the following attributes:
- unlimited number of variable objects and system settings;
- difficult to predict the behavior of objects with lots of relations.
In modern foreign литературе14 large complex system (depending on scale) is divided into complex (Complex Systems), metasystems (Systems of Systems) and enterprise level (Enterprise Systems).
A complex system is an open system (local scale) are closely related objects, which eventually evolyutsioniruet and changes its behavior depending on the running of internal processes and external conditions and воздействий15. There is planned and random structural changes. Information on the interrelationships and interdependencies of objects in the system is incomplete, it is difficult to predict their changes and behavior patterns without the use of special mathematical tools. Complex systems include spacecraft, nuclear power, magnetic resonance imaging etc.
Meta - form of integration integrated Autonomous систем16. The full operation of the metasystem is determined by the sum of its parts that can exist independently from each other. This is nothing like the synergies (system) when the unit is more than the sum of its parts. Examples of the meta-system of missile defense (Ballistic Missile Defense System BMDS), the global navigation and positioning (Global Positioning System - GPS), etc.
Enterprise-class system is a comprehensive system of strategic scale, which can be attributed to the Internet, the global information control network (GEUS) MO USA (Global Information Grid - GIG), the critical infrastructure of the state.
Thus, the critical infrastructure of any state is not that other, as a large complex system on a strategic scale (BSSM), which is a combination of a significant number of элементов17 different types, United by ties of different nature and having a common property (appointment, function) that differ from the properties of individual elements of the whole population, and requires the development of special research methods.
The theory of Clausewitz to network architectures. The theory of centers of gravity Clausewitz is still an integral element in the development of modern concepts and plays an important role in the preparation and conduct of operations. This theory allows us not only to develop methods to identify critical points (centers of gravity) of the enemy's infrastructure, but also to define possible ways of influence on them.
The center of gravity as the basic term has long been used in military-theoretical research leading foreign countries. German military theorist and historian Clausewitz was the first to discuss and create a theory, which was that the centre of gravity is some "Central point" of the armed forces and the state, around which everything вращается18. On the other hand, in the "Understanding centers of gravity and vulnerable elements"19 noted that "the Central point" of relevance to the armed forces of the enemy, can be both physical and moral, and to be at the strategic, operational or tactical level.
The doctrine НАТО20 the center of gravity is described as the potential or place of the state, alliances, combat formation or other types of groups are concentrating their capabilities to achieve freedom of action, physical strength (power) and willingness to fight. Fellow, Institute of strategic studies of the College of the Holy US Echevaria in his "Centers of gravity Clausewitz is not what we think"21 gave a somewhat different definition. Unlike previous researchers, he claimed that the center of gravity is a centripetal force that binds together the disparate components of the armed forces of the enemy. But if you apply a comprehensive approach to study the factors that tie the disparate parts together, you can find the center of gravity of the enemy.
Fig. 2 Unstructured network (a), self-organizing with two centers of gravity (c), self-organizing network type "small worlds" in which there are no obvious centers of gravity (b).
College staff Royal Swedish armed forces Varden in "Centers of gravity in military operations"22 used a similar approach. He agreed that the enemy should be studied as a system composed of a diverse number of interrelated objects. The underlying object of such a system is energy of different types: physical (people, buildings, communication systems and weapon) or psychological (willpower and the ability). And if you have the opportunity to send a special flow of energy in the Central part of this system, all of it can be destroyed or disabled. Warden also noted that in such a system, built from a certain number of objects, United by a network typically has several key effects which can result in entire system failure.
Nevertheless, the number of such centers of gravity are small, which is justified by the theory of self-organizing networks (scale-free network) Alberto Барабаши23. He mathematically proved that large network structures (e.g. Internet, social networks, etc.), that seemed to be unstructured, that is random, actually have a complex internal organisation and are self-organized with a few key "hubs"24, or centers of gravity (see Fig. 2).
In accordance with his theory, any unstructured (Poisson) network under the influence of a set of well known rules and laws, first and foremost an economic and social character, after a certain time (after some number of iterations) takes appropriate structure, without any external influence organising around the most valuable or important nodes.
American mathematician determined that the number of bonds (valence or degree) of any node self-organizing networks obeys power law distribution, showing that the proportion P(k) of nodes in the network having k connections to other nodes, is proportional to (1/k)n, where the value of the exponent n typically varies between 2 and 3 (see Fig. 3). Similarly, critical infrastructure can be represented by a network connected in a certain way connected to her objects, among the most important of which is limited.
Fig. 3 Power-law distribution of the valence of the nodes self-organizing network
The centers of gravity in each sector of critical infrastructure are formed according to economic laws, the laws of social development, evolution and other rules, allowing the once flat objects to form self-organizing networks. It is the emergence of such centers of gravity Clausewitz leads to self-organization networks and its effective functioning. In theory, if we identify the node with the most connections, which we find most valuable and important object of the entire system. That is, we find its "center of gravity", which has, according to Clausewitz, a number of attributes:
critical capabilities (Critical Capabilities) is the ability (power) of the object, which make it crucial in the context of a particular scenario, situation or problem;
critical requirements (Critical Requirements) - requirements, tools, resources, methods or ways of action that allows the object to reach the critical;
- a critical vulnerability (Critical Vulnerabilities), the most vulnerable need or a composite element, the output of the system which will not allow the object to reach the critical opportunities or to complete the task.
Thus, for the study of critical infrastructure needs to know not only the number of its objects, but also their interrelation and interaction. These are the objects for which the mathematical description is necessary to know their structure, and studying graph theory. Perhaps that is why almost all modern simulation models developed in the United States and other foreign countries, the main approach to solving this problem is to develop appropriate methods using graph theory that allows to visualize complex relationships between objects and to develop mathematical expressions to describe the level of interaction and interdependence. In this regard, critical infrastructure, as a large complex system on a strategic scale (BSSM) can be represented as a weighted directed graph whose vertices are objects and edges the relationships between them.
Obviously, we build the scheme of critical infrastructure will contain a huge number of different types of objects and relations between them. To resolve this issue, use the methods of upper and lower level optimization. At the top level, this is achieved by minimizing the number of sectors involved in the study. For example, in Fig. 4 shows the hierarchy and vzaimosvyazei 11 секторов25 in accordance with their importance reflected in the "National strategy for the physical protection of critical infrastructure and key facilities" (The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets) 2003 года26.
Fig. 4 the hierarchy of the 11 sectors identified in the "National strategy..." in 2003 and their vzaimosvyazei (example)
As the figure shows, all sectors are classified into three levels. Sector upper (third) level dependent on the lower (first and second) and the second from the first, which is fundamental.
Selected for the study sector are subjected to more careful examination. Depending on the tasks and nature of vzaimosvyazei objects for each sector developed technological or functional diagrams. In further optimization studies on the lower level (minimizing the number of important sites) involves consideration of the consequences of the law Парето27, the main of which are the following:
important factors few, and trivial many - only a few steps lead to important results;
- most of the effort does not produce the desired results;
- most successful event due to the action of a small number of high-performance forces, and the most trouble due to the action of a small number vysokodekorativnyh forces.
A screen copy of the results of the CIMS model (energy sector in the region)
A screen copy of the results of the CIMS model (substation)
Thus, the problem of determining the key objects, the impact of which can have a most negative effect on the sector or on the entire critical infrastructure, must be carried out with obligatory implementation of the following requirements - the desired result is possible and therefore need to reach with the minimum efforts.
Modeling. As noted above, one of the most common deficiencies that do not allow precise examine critical infrastructure, is the impossibility of a complete understanding of all the interrelationships and interdependencies between its объектами28.
Simulation, as one of the types of mathematical modeling is becoming a real tool for understanding and proper examination of critical infrastructure, which is БСССМ29. The main effort in this area is aimed at creating моделей30 accurately simulates the behavior of critical infrastructure and to determine the relationship between its objects and to identify the most vulnerable.
The simulations can be used different methods (agent modeling, discrete-event, dynamic), and the choice of any of them depends on the specifics of the studied infrastructure and objectives of the study.
One of the most striking examples of modern simulation models (agent simulation) is a "System modelling of critical infrastructures" (Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling - CIMS) developed by the national laboratory of Idaho. Funding was provided by the U.S. Department of energy and the research laboratory of the air force.
The CIMS model is a simulation system that combines geospatial information and a four-dimensional (spatial-temporal) effect. By simply pressing it allows you to quickly change the state of the system under study, quickly adapting to changing environment. For effective interaction of the operator with the program there are a number of possibilities:
- create a specific event script to trigger alarm events after a specified period of time;
- selection and management status of individual objects and links between them (with one click, the user can simulate the failure of bridge, power plant, etc.);
- introduction of additional events during the operation of the model for the opening and display of the cascade effect.
As noted above, in addition to ensure that the critical infrastructure of modern simulation models are used for the preparation of the decision to defeat the infrastructure of a potential enemy. The customer of such works, as a rule, is the Ministry of defense. For example, funding the development of hardware-software complex "Athena", developed by "target techno-logic" (On Target Technologies), first carried out through the research laboratory AFRL, air force, and later DARPA (Department of advanced studies of the US DoD) and the joint strategic command USSTRAT-SOM, which had to deploy the tools of the model at the end of 2006.
A screen copy of the result from the model Afina
Model - a software tool developed for analyzing large complex systems on a strategic scale (including political, military, economic information sector), as well as to identify interdependence and vzaimosvyazei their elements. It provides a graphical interface with the ability to display of detected objects, relationships between them and determine the degree of their interdependence. In addition, the model is integrated with GIS.
This software tool uses the method of Barlow (Barlow) to determine the horizontal coherence of the elements with weight coefficients, the method Waerden (Warden) - for the opening of vertical interdependence, etc. According to American experts, the integrated application of these methods allowed the development of mathematical apparatus for research of any scale (infrastructure, cities, countries and regions) with the aim of identifying vulnerable targets (centers of gravity Clausewitz) and the issuance by them of data targeting.
Despite the diversity of methods used, the basis of most simulation models is graph theory, where objects are represented by vertices. Such vertices may belong to two large groups - the producers and consumers; thus one vertex at a time can perform both of these functions (see Fig. 5.). The chart shows that the performance of the consumer object Np depends on the level of health of the source object Nj and a combination of both the level of security already as a consumer. The level of health can be expressed through the criterion of utility (value) of the object, production volume or other metrics.
Fig. 5 the Count of functionally interrelated network
In the study of critical infrastructure as a large complex system on a strategic scale in foreign countries are widely used special software and hardware, for which the degree of interdependence of critical infrastructure, presented as a graph, transformirovalsya in a matrix of connectivity. For example, one of the research institutes of Canada uses a matrix of connectivity of the six sectors identified as critical national infrastructure: state administration, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, the emergency службы31.
After the graph construction and the formation of the matrix of connectivity of critical infrastructure there is a need mathematical descriptions of the complexity of the interdependence of its objects. For example, in the model CIMS32 various sectors of infrastructure represented by graphs in which vertices are objects and edges the relationships between them.
Mathematical description of the degree of connectivity of critical infrastructure necessary for the implementation of the search chain bounce in all related sectors and predicting failures N-ro generation. These chains, potentially resulting from multiple inter-dependencies of various nature, form an arc between the sectors of infrastructure or facilities.
After the mathematical description of the interdependencies of critical infrastructure, is searching for the most vulnerable, the impact of which can have a most negative effect on the entire infrastructure. This solved a number of tasks, whose total number may vary depending on the purpose of the study and analyzed BSSM.
Search key objects, the impact of which can have a most negative effect, the study of critical infrastructure is not limited. This is only the first step, and then, as a rule, are assessing the vulnerability revealed in the "centers of gravity" using the engineering method of constructing the fault tree, transforming it into an event tree that allows to determine possible vulnerabilities of infrastructure, as well as their variations. A fault tree is a binary tree with all possible logical events for each potential failure. It is the tree of refusals and events allow you to formulate and develop possible measures for protecting or effects of critical and vulnerable infrastructure. The result of the formation of the tree of events is a list of the vulnerabilities, which is used as initial data for the calculation (using the laws of Boolean algebra) of the probability of their occurrence, as well as the formation of the histogram of the probability of failure.
In the next stage are developed the algorithms of risk assessment, the meaning of which is to determine the resources needed to ensure safety (impacts) the most important of the identified critical infrastructure. One of the main conditions is the compliance with the criterion of "cost - effectiveness", and the key problem is how to choose the right ways and means to protect the organization or impact.
Despite the variety of applied methods in most simulation models is graph theory. In addition, the widely used knowledge of the theory of centers of gravity of the German military theorist and historian Clausewitz and self-organizing networks mathematics Alberto Barabasi, interbranch balance of economist Wassily Leontief, simulation modelling, algebra of logic, probabilistic assessment etc. this approach allows to conduct a comprehensive analysis of critical infrastructure to identify its most important elements, the possible vulnerabilities and risks of the withdrawal of entire sectors of the system.
Thus, at present, in foreign countries have developed a huge number of models, used to study ship systems, University campuses, large electricity distribution networks, waterways and more, and the main goal was their integration into a single hardware-software complex which will provide the heads of the relevant units of management opportunity to make an informed and correct decision by getting the answer to the question "what is necessary to protect or hit and how much it will cost (effort and resources)".
1 Barannik L., Klementyev, S. "organization of the security of critical infrastructure in the United States." Foreign military review. - No. 8. - 2009. - C. 3.
2 the Complexity of interaction between elements of critical infrastructure and the importance of understanding reflects the incident that occurred on 19 July 2001, when the train of the 62 tanks carrying hazardous chemicals, derailed in the tunnel on Howard street in Baltimore, USA. In addition to the disruption to rail and road transport, was cascading destruction of infrastructure. So. the incident was damaged: pipe water main with a diameter of 20 inches, there was a flooding of the tunnel to a depth of three feet, resulting in a failed system of distribution of the business district of the city of Baltimore; the fiber optic cable that led to the disruption of telephone stations, information and postal services, including the telecommunications company WorldCom Inc., Verizon Communications Inc., the Hearst Corp. In New York City, Nexlel Communications Inc., and the newspaper the Baltimore Sun.
Furthermore, the destruction of railway communication had consequences for the States of new Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, new York and Maryland in the form of a delay in delivery of coal and steel.
3 Fast Analysis Infrastructure Tool Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC).
4 Executive Order. 13010. Critical Infrastructure Protection. Federal Register. Vol. 61. no. 138. July 17. 1996. pp. 3747-3750.
5 Los Alamos National Laboratory, http://www.sandia.gov/mission/homelandyprograms/critical/nisac.html, http://lanI.gov/orgs/d/nisac/.
6 National Energy Technology Laboratory, http://www.netl.doe.gov/onsite_research.
7 the Term "Operations based on the achievement effects" (Effect-based operations) is a conditional concept. In 2002 it was introduced in practice by specialists of the joint command of the unified forces of the U.S. armed forces during complex activities for the development of advanced methods of combat use of troops (forces). In future, the term has not found practical application in the governing documents of the joint staff of the JCS
8 Federal Business Opportunities, http://ww.fbo.gov/spg/USAF/AFMC/AFRLRRS/Reference%2DNumber%2 DBAA%2D06%2D07%2DIFKA/SynopsisP.html.
9 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. 2002 Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy and Implementation. Available online at http://www.iwar.org.uk/cip/resources-'pdd63/crs-report.pdf.
10 S. Rinaldi, J. Peerenboom, and T. Kelly. "Idenlifying, Understanding, and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure lnterdependencies". IEEE Control Systems Magazine, IEEE, December 2001, pp. 11-25.
11 D. D. Dudenhoeffer. M. R. Permann. and M Manic. "CIMS: A Framework For Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling And Analysis." Submitted to Proceedings of the 2006 Winter Simulation Conference, L. F. Perrone, F. P. Wieland, J. Liu, B. G. Lawson, D. M. Nicol, and R. M. Fujimoto. Piscataway, New Jersey: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 2006.
12 Keating, C, Rogers, R., Una!, R., Dryer. D.. Sousa-Poza, A., Safford. R.. Peterson, W.. Rabadi, G., 2003. "System of Systems Engineering)), Engineering Management Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3.
13 Jackson, M., 1991. Systems Methodology for the Management Sciences. New York: Plenum.
14 Introduction to functional dependency network analysis. Paul R. Garveyl, Ph.D. and C. Ariel Pinto2, Ph. D. The MITRE Corporation and Old Dominion University P 2009, The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved. Published and Used by MIT ESD and CESUN With Permission Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited; 08-0418.
15 White, V. E., 2006. "Fostenng Intra-Organizational Communication of Enterprise Systems Engineering Practices", The MITRE Corporation. National Defense Industrial Association (St Petersburg as). 9th Annual Systems Engineering Conference, October 23-26, 2006. Hyatt Regency Islandia. San Diego, California.
16 Keating, P.. Sousa-Poza, A., Mun, Ji Hyon. 2004. "Syslem of Systems Engineering Methodology". Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering. Old Dominion University, ©2004, All rights reserved.
17 Item - some material object systems have a number of important for its functioning properties, the internal structure of which irrespective of the purpose of the study.
18 Clausewitz, C-V (1832). On War. Swedish translation by Mertensson. Buhme och Johansson (1991). Stockholm, Sweden: Bonnier Fakta Bokfurlag.
19 Strange. J. Iron R. (2001). Understanding Centres of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Research paper.
20 NATO (2003). Gudelines for operational planning.
21 Echevarria A, J. (2003). Clausewitz''s center of gravity it's not what we thought. Naval War College Review. Vol. LVI. No. 1.
22 Warden, J (2004). Centers of gravity in military operations. Preliminary draft. Royal Swedish Defence College.
23 Ted G. Lewis (2006). Critical infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security. Defending a Networked Nation. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California.
24 Here and further, the hub means the key node, providing a connection for all users of the network and without which the network cannot function or its capabilities will be severely limited. "Hub" is both a hub or a multiplier of the capabilities of individual tools connected to the network, while providing a synergistic effect. In accordance with the theory of the German military theorist and historian Clausewitz this "hub" is the center of gravity of the network (grouping).
25 currently, the US allocated 18 sectors of critical infrastructure, which is reflected on the official website of DHS www.dhs.gov.
26 Ted G. Lewis Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security. Defending a Networked Nation. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey. California. 2006.
27 the Pareto principle, an empirical rule introduced by the sociologist Vilfredo Pareto. in the most General form is formulated as "20 percent. of efforts give 80%. result, and the remaining 80% of the effort - only 20%. result." Can be used as the basic principle for the optimization of any activity: selecting the right minimum of the most important actions you can quickly get a large part of the planned full effect, and further improvement is not always justified.
28 Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling: A Survey of U. S. and International Research. P. Pederson, D. Dudenhoeffer. S. Hartley, M. Permann, August 2006.
29 D. Mussington, "Concepts for Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Protection: Relating Y2K to CIP Research and Development". RAND: Science and Technology Institute, Santa Monica, CA. 2002. p. 29.
30 the Model is a combination of logical, mathematical, or other objects, links and correlations that displays with the desired or maximum achievable degree of similarity of some fragment of reality subject to study, and a description of all existing properties of the simulated object. Kurnosov V. Konotopov P. Yu, "Analysis. Methodology, technology and organization of information-analytical work". Moscow, 2004. P. 135.
31 M. Dunn and I. Wigert. Internationa] CUP Handbook, 2004: An Inventory and Analysis of Protection Policies in Fourteen Countries. Zurich: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2004, p. 243.
32 D. D. Dudenhoeffer, M. R. Permann, and M. Manic, "CIMS: A Framework for Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling and Analysis". Submitted to Proceedings of the 2006 Winter Simulation Conference, L. F. Perrone, F. P. Wieland, J. Liu, B. G. Lawson, D. M. Nicol and R. M. Fujimoto. Piscataway, New Jersey: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2006
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