Theorist of Russian military counterintelligence
Material posted: Publication date: 09-07-2019
You can and should talk about the Russian theoretical school of military counterintelligence. If not always flawless on the form of presentation, depth of content and scope of coverage of the research problem, obscure and avoid widespread publicity, but still – school. School with a capital letter. It was and is.

The practices of counterintelligence – renowned masters of the agent combinations, tenacious operatives-"the skorokhvatov is a retired", recruiters and developers, their visionary leaders or, on the contrary, the losers are not always successful "victims" from the security services, whose name is associated with loud failures, are well known. Their names that is called for hearing. Scientists, whose intelligence and theoretical calculations owe their results of the practice, often remain in the shadows and oblivion.

A prominent theorist of Russian military intelligence, established its fundamental scientific basis, namely, the methodology of knowledge of the enemy, is a General of infantry Vladislav Klembovsky Napoleonovich.

A hereditary officer and a gentleman, he was born 28 Jun 1860 in Moscow in 1877 he graduated from the 1st Moscow military school, in 1879 – 3rd Aleksandrovskoe military school issued a warrant officer in the Izmailovsky life guards regiment.

After graduating in 1885, Nicholas Academy of the General staff in the years 1885-1886 serves as an officer of the General staff at the headquarters of the XIII army corps of the Moscow military district. In 1887-1889 serving enfranchised command of a company of the 1st Nevsky infantry and then the 2nd Sofia infantry regiment. Military service inexplicably combines with active scientific activity, being the translator and editor of "the International military-historical library", published in seven volumes in the publishing house of V. A. Berezovsky.

The tendency Lemovskogo to the military science observed: August 4, 1890, his second to the Tver cavalry cadet school for teaching military science. Unlike the service immediately in the ranks teaching gives you unlimited improvement of professional knowledge, reach a different level of analysis and synthesis as applied to the needs of military practice. The question is that not all of this opportunity can and want to use it. Klembovsky wanted and was able.

ON THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

It was during the period of teaching in the formation and positioning Lemovskogo as a military intellectual, there is a significant breakthrough, instantly created him a proper reputation and recognition. In four years not so long ago turned thirty abroad officer managed to prepare and publish two profound works that have received positive feedback in a military research environment: "the Secret intelligence service (military espionage)" and "Guerrilla activities".

The analysis of the content published in the 1892 book "the Secret intelligence service (military espionage)" suggests that V. N. Klembovsky is the founder of the theory of Russian military counterintelligence.

The basis of the small in volume but rich in content of the monograph were the works of foreign and Russian generals, historians, lawyers and philosophers: Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Martens, Lavale, of Vattel, Bluntschli, Marmont, Leer, Maslovsky, Sukhotina, Suharevskaja and many others.

Guided by the principle "it's Hard to learn only from experience", the author based on a rigorous, careful, thoughtful and creative analysis of the practice of warfare outlined his vision of the theory of the operational environment, highlighting its main elements: information about the armed forces of the enemy; information about location of the theater of operations; data on the population of the enemy; information about the economy the military the enemy.

Here Klembovsky follows the key axiom of Clausewitz is "the enemy form the basis of every idea and every action in war." You must know the organization and the number of the armies of the enemy, the weapons, equipment and uniforms of the troops, the training, the methods of combat operations, material security, health status, command structure, morale, mobilization order, a plan of military action.

V. N. Klembovsky emphasizes: "the army Commanders need to embrace the whole theatre of war, to know everything that happens not only on the front of the enemy, but further into to its headquarters, inclusive. It is clear that they will have to send spies...and spies selected, i.e. skilled, experienced and well-versed in military matters."

Sources of information about the enemy Klembovsky divided into official and received through secret agents.

The author cites a variety of facts from military history of Ancient Greece and Rome, the Middle ages, armies of Richelieu, Mazarin, Frederick the Great, the Russian army of the mid-and late nineteenth century as examples of successful or unsuccessful use of spies. Considerable attention is paid to the review of the practice of espionage during the Napoleonic wars, during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 years, and during the relatively recent Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878; highlighted the fact that "Russians are very little used spies".

Based on the comparison of legal acts of different States and declarations of international conferences, studies of foreign scientists, a lawyer Bluntschli and philosopher Montesquieu, the mapping of characteristics of espionage, the author examines well-established point of view on the actual definition of a spy, in fact, forms the basic conceptual framework of the science of espionage.

AGENTS OF THEIR OWN AND OTHERS

Another important merit of Lemovskogo is that he was able to propose a classification of agents of espionage, depending on their tasks, functions, methods of performing Rasizadeh, long-term use and motivation cooperation with the intelligence services. Classification in science, particularly the initial classification is of a fundamental nature for the science.

Classification on substantive grounds, or typology, is designed primarily for constant use in scientific and practical activities and involves splitting an existing subject, in the case of espionage on species in accordance with distinctive features.

Klembovsky klassificeret spies in eight species categories: voluntary, forced, simple, double, temporary, permanent, mobile, and stationary (local).

Motivation cooperation with the intelligence services of voluntary spies, the author divides into four kinds: the professional satisfaction and material; patriotism or hatred of foreigners; the bitterness of injustice, envy, political passions; base urges, greed, debt.

Forced spies – those who were previously subjected to intimidation and threats.

Ordinary spies are only one side double – both sides.

Regular spies are cooperating relatively long time and do a few errands, time – only one instruction.

"Two spies go in time of peace from your state to the next, and in time of war to penetrate into the area occupied by an enemy army... when you need to gather any information." After the assignments, they return to their places of permanent deployment.

Stationary, or local spies are always on the same area of land at the place of residence or work.

Messengers or couriers spies in understanding Lemovskogo, are not considered.

The author devotes considerable attention needed to spy the qualities of which are among the most important he identifies honesty, loyalty, observation, cunning, intellectual development, resourcefulness, the ability to transform, resilience, courage, bravery, composure, tenacity, knowledge of the language and customs of the population of explored States, sociability and ability to win.

Vladislav Napoleonovich puts forward the idea of formation and practical application of mass intelligence network strategic, operational and tactical levels, when spies in the enemy at the same time sending the leaders of the different competence – the army commanders, commanders of corps, divisions, regiments, the captains of the vanguard. He writes: "No part of the troops can't do a single spy because, first, such a long work is not under force to one person; secondly, the extracted information is not sufficiently full; third, if the spy does not possess quite true military look or, even worse, if it is not definitely reliable, that his testimony can be trusted only when you confirm them from other sources, including the reports of the other spies; cash several spies who do not know each other, and sent from different places gives the means to compare their reports and reduces the possibility of error".

Apparently assuming that quantity inevitably grows into quality, the author notes that specify the rate of the number of spies is impossible: "the more reliable spies, the better."

Klembovsky highlights the complexity of control "spying" and makes demands to the personality of the head of the intelligence, acumen, skill, prudence, caution (preferably an excess of caution than its lack), innate tact, people skills, the ability to exploit all human weakness, effort, consistency, experience. The main requirement is an indispensable knowledge of the personal qualities of all subordinate spies, their suitability to perform a particular task.

Pledge the same to complete the tasks successfully lies in the careful instructing of the spies until a special instruction. It is necessary to observe three rules: to tailor the difficulty of the task with the abilities of a spy; do not spray the attention of the spy, and give him a well-defined task; not to dedicate the scout in the reconnaissance plans of the organization.

Considerable attention is given to methods of communication of razvedochnaya with their spies. They are divided by the author into optical signals; conditional written reports; encrypted reports; the use of couriers.

Separately say about the use of double spies, which, according to Lemovskogo, "can only be used to deceive the enemy," as "reading double spy has no price". Generally, in his opinion, with double spies "should be treated with extreme caution and skillfully; if the head of the spies has no skill in this, it is better not to keep double spies."

Intelligence and counterintelligence are generally a single and indivisible process, so V. N. Klembovsky particularly recalls that "it is important to have good spies, but more importantly not to allow his troops to enemy spies." In his opinion, "the disclosure of the enemy's spies is the responsibility of the gendarmerie units, consisting in the army, and his own spies." The author gives a variety of positive and negative military-historical examples of revelations of spies and methods of working with them starting with Ancient Greece and Rome and ending with the little-known facts the times of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-ies.

As a cornerstone of intelligence work V. N. Klembovsky sees the retention rate intelligence: "the head of the espionage has to be the one and the same person, why, and oversight of the spies and the results of the activities will be much more effective".

A significant place is given to the analysis of moral aspects of intelligence in General, than the opposite points of view known to philosophers, lawyers, historians and commanders, among them Vattel, Montesquieu, Pascal Fiore, Machiavelli, Napoleon, Carroz, Bujo, Martens. The dilemma of "moral – immoral" in relation to espionage work allowed Klembovsky on the basis of the doctrine of state interest Machiavelli, who claimed that to protect the Motherland from the enemy by any means. And espionage in this case is not an exception.

THE STAGES OF A CAREER

Career Lemovskogo, not only the combatant commander, some hundreds, but also the theorist and which unit further has progressed, but at the same time, consistently, without jerks and rapid jumping through mandatory job level: staff officer in the management of the rifle brigade; battalion commander; chief of staff of the division.

From 30 June 1901, Klembovsky – the commander of the 122nd Tambov infantry regiment, which participated in the Russo-Japanese war. In the fighting in Manchuria was twice wounded and shell-shocked, and after recovering returned to the front. For military distinction was awarded two combat medals, promoted to the rank of major-General.

October 21, 1904 – the chief of staff of IV army corps of the Vilna military district, February 4, 1906, appointed chief of staff of X army corps of the Kiev military district.

In 1908, claimed as military theorist, chaired the Commission for drafting the new pension regulation, in 1909, working as part of the Committee organizing the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the battle of Poltava.

29 Jun 1912 was appointed commander of the 9th infantry division of the X army corps with production in the rank of Lieutenant General.

In the initial period of the First world war from October 13, 1914 – commander of the XVI army corps 4th army South-Western front, November 4, 1914 for bravery and courage was awarded the order of St. George 4-th degree. 17 Sep 1915 became General of infantry and, on 13 December 1915 appointed chief of staff of the armies of the southwestern front.

Alexei Brusilov after the appointment on 17 March 1916 commander of the armies of the southwestern front wanted to see Lemovskogo at the head of the 8th army. Did not work, was appointed cavalry General Aleksei Maksimovich Kaledin. Klembovsky remained chief of staff of the front, played a prominent role in the planning and implementation of the famous Brusilovsky breakthrough. Later Brusilov in his memoirs, said: "Klembovsky, despite some of its shortcomings, was it sensible, smart General, quite capable of independent high command positions".

For a high command position thing did not: in October, 1916, V. N. Klembovsky was appointed commander of 11th army of the southwestern front. 20 December 1916 he again on the usual staff work as assistant to the chief of staff of the Supreme commander, where he enjoyed exceptional confidence and support of the chief of staff Mikhail Vasilevich Alekseev.

After the overthrow of the monarchy from March 11 to April 5, 1917, V. N. Klembovsky was the acting chief of staff of the Supreme commander, however, confirmed in office was not. 31 may 1917 appointed commander of the armies of the Northern front.

Provisional government and Kerensky trusted Glembovskaya so much that were willing to give him virtually all power in the army. 28 Aug 1917 commander of the Northern front General Klembovsky sent the following telegram: "Interim government You are appointed Vreede Supreme commander leaving You in the Pskov and retaining the post Glucosea. I suggest You immediately take the position of General Kornilov and me immediately to tell about it. The Minister-President Kerensky".

The response from the General Lemovskogo, which obviously did not expect neither Kerensky nor his entourage, came to Petrograd a few hours: "From the Supreme commander received a telegram that I appointed in his place. Ready to serve the Motherland to the last drop of blood, can not in the name of loyalty and love for her to take on this job, as you are neither strong enough nor sufficient ability for such a responsible work experience in a difficult time. Consider the change of the high command is extremely dangerous when the threat of an external enemy of the integrity and freedom of the country makes it imperative that speedy action to raise the discipline and efficiency of the army. Klembovsky. August 28".

DEATH

In the first half of 1918, V. N. Klembovsky spent some time in prison as a hostage of the Soviet regime. After the liberation mobilized for service in the red army in the Civil war did not participate, focusing on scientific work. From August to October 1918, he held the position of Chairman of the Military-historical Commission to study the experience of world war I, and then had her lay member. In 1920 became part of a Special meeting at the Commander-in-chief of the red army.

Despite the loyalty and the willingness to cooperate demonstrated by a significant part of the tsarist generals and substantial prospects to improve the quality of military intellectual component of the new regime, a General distrust of the Bolshevik party, the KGB and the military counter-intelligence to "military experts" at that time prevailed over common sense and the need to use a unique media military thought for the defense of the state. This is fully reflected in the fate of the family Lemovskogo.

In December 1920, his elder brother major-General Arthur Oscar Klembovsky was shot by the KGB in Yalta, where he lived after the wounds received on the German front. In connection with the arrest of Arthur Lemovskogo in Yalta Cheka received a collective petition of residents of the surrounding streets with a request to release him from custody. To no avail...

Younger brother is a Colonel of the life guards Izmailovsky regiment Napoleon Napoleonovich Klembovsky under the threat of reprisals was forced to leave the country. Son V. N. Lemovskogo – military pilot Lieutenant Colonel George Klembovsky fought with the Bolsheviks in the North Russian expeditionary force, later emigrated.

In 1920, arrested himself Vladislav Napoleonovich, he was accused of belonging to counter-revolutionary monarchist organization "Union fidelity". In the documents of the Special Department of the Cheka stated that, "according to intelligence information, Klembovsky was entrusted with the General command of the uprising". Suspected him also in the support of the Polish army in the war against the Soviets. The investigation of his case led osbourneozzy Special Department of the Cheka J. agranov, who enjoyed the absolute confidence of Lenin and Dzerzhinsky.

It is unclear what you wanted to achieve with this campaign of intimidation performers from a man, long retired from the strategic analysis, planning and direct management of the troops, do not have even indirect influence on decision making at the headquarters of the red army and not support any contacts with representatives of the newly formed Polish state. What could help Klembovsky poles or other conspirators, even hypothetically? The logic of the accusers in this situation to understand, if only in isolation General they were not guided by considerations of a preventive nature.

To stand up for Lemovskogo tried Deputy Chairman of the revolutionary military Council of the RSFSR E. M. Sklyansky, chief of staff of the red army p. P. Lebedev, A. A. Brusilov. Later A. A. Brusilov recalled: "Lemovskogo... despite all my efforts... arrested so soundly that I had not seen. It is not released".

Sixty-year General long kept in prison without interrogation. The investigation took personal control of the Chairman of the Cheka, Felix Dzerzhinsky. In early July 1921 investigative file on Lemovskogo transferred from Agranova another employee. At the same time utterly exhausted and desperate Vladislav Napoleonovich out of sheer desperation went on hunger strike and two weeks after its commencement, 19 Jul 1921, died in a stifling jail cell in Butyrka prison. However, there is a version of the death Lemovskogo not because of a voluntary hunger strike, and as a result of his murder (execution).

The tragic death of the General left unnoticed, any reaction in Russia and abroad were absent. Not until he had...

Andrew Shavaev

Source: http://nvo.ng.ru/spforces/2019-05-24/10_1045_theorist.html

Tags: analytical work