A Navy without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse
Material posted: Publication date: 05-11-2018

Proud reports about the rocket attacks from the Caspian sea and delivery of the fleet of new ships and submarines to hide from the public the real state of Affairs in the Russian Navy, which will soon be described in only one word – disaster. And well, if this disaster does not result in military defeat, proportionate Tsushima.

From the time of Nicholas I from the Navy periodically have problems with the doctrine of use and awareness of the personnel of the usefulness of what they are doing and why exist. Superimposed on each other, these two factors lead to the fact that the fleet begins to exist outside of any clear and valid strategic concept, "grow by itself" and to develop according to the principle "where the curve will take out", regardless of what enemy to him (if that) will have to face.

The result of problems at best was futile losses that the fleet had to wear to complete the set tasks, the last a bright example of which was his participation in the great Patriotic war. The Navy played a very important role, but the price paid is too high, and the damage done to the enemy by his actions, could be much more.

In the worst case, the Navy was faced with the enemy, the confrontation with which he was not ready completely, the latest example being the participation of the Navy in the Russo-Japanese war. Throughout the war, except for some fighting, the fleet has been in the minority, and was lost almost entirely that, in addition to loss of life, caused a giant political and economic costs.

Consider the position of the Navy now. From the time of Admiral Gorshkov, the main striking force of the Navy at sea are submarines. From Gorshkova, however, together with them "were" more powerful, and Maritime missile-carrying aircraft — MPA. About it later, now go to the boats. How powerful is our submarine fleet? If he could protect Russia against a hypothetical attack from the sea, carried out a strong opponent?

Unfortunately, to answer this question positively will not work. Currently in the Navy twenty-two multi-purpose submarines and nuclear submarines armed with antiship cruise missiles (submarine with ballistic missiles are not included in this number). Twenty-third – "Kazan", was recently released for testing and is not yet combat-ready. Of the twenty-two of these submarines reported to be in the fighting line, actually in service only ten. Twelve boats are in various stages of repair and modernization, and the prospects of their return to duty is very vague. The state of the Russian military ship repair industry, unfortunately, does not allow to accurately predict the dates on which repairs and modernization of submarines will be completed. While supporting combat service ships getting old and sooner or later, will also require repair, and upgrades they need now.

Moreover, the existing in service submarines are much smaller than U.S. submarines, and in the noise, in the detection range of underwater targets, and means of self-defense systems, sonar countermeasures, and, unfortunately, the torpedo armament.

For a long time in the trade press, mainly, in the newspaper "military-industrial complex-Courier" publishes articles describing the situation of the Navy in torpedoes, and in part of the state of the submarine fleet. For example, "Sea underwater impotence. The newest submarines of the Russian Navy armed with Antiques" or the latest "What to ask "Ash". This article contains an interesting piece which is worth quoting, and worth paying attention to:

"In the management of 57 Scud (Severomorsk-3) served as an intelligent officer. He entered the Academy, there is "penetrated" in the subject Window. Their views on it, I expounded again, when studying in the Academy when I was in it for about a month as the Chairman of the State. Commission for the examination of students 6 (aviation) Department. Then this officer served in the Department of PLV staff of SF. He himself is constantly "asking" for outputs at sea, collecting information on the "Window". Several times, on the go, we talked in the headquarters of the fleet on the same topic.

After about a month after the next gathering of SF ships, he "caught" me at the exit of the hall, which hosted a regular weekly planning of the fleet and was asked to look at his analysis. Went to him room, where was spread by numerous diagrams and tracings. So much detail "paint" to make it clear that he did a great job, i.e. analyzed tracings of the movements of all of our boats participating in the fee-hike, "transaction" means, HPE all foreign aircraft in the area of operations of naval forces.

Was 10 PL: 4 — diesel and 6 — atomic. Each boat was "cut" a large area from which it is, for security reasons, you shouldn't have to go without a team. But, inside the area, its place could be any ("commander's decision"), i.e., arbitrary.

In the first and third day of finding the forces in the sea as "Andenes" ("Mila") flew one Orion, which is flying on some "broken" route, went back. The clever officer, after analyzing it, i.e. "imposing" on the map the route of the "movement" of "Orion" and obtained PL tracing their actual location for a period "of flight" "Oriono", made a clear conclusion that using a "Window" or something "other", but both times all ten "turning points" of his actual track, were exactly over the actual place (time of flight) all 10 (!) boats. Ie for the first time in 1 hour and 5 minutes, the second is 1 hour and 7 minutes, single plane "covered" all 10 PL. According to this officer, he had seen that Orion came out, without any tacks, exactly on the beach, throwing a single buoy, usually with a Wiz ("control") and went on further.

Because I wrote that before this incident, had little faith in this "phenomenon", but probably not us and the Americans, but this theme "brought to mind".

These are the words of Lieutenant-General V. N. Nocerino, former commander of the air force and air defense of the Baltic fleet, who served in the Soviet Northern fleet, where occurred the events described. And the theme of a "Window" is developed in the Soviet Navy technology enabling aircraft to carry out radar search in immersed (underwater) position of submarines in the formed by them when driving, perturbations of the surface environment (radar tracks like "footprints" on the surface of the water, which leaves a deep running submarine). Described in the quote event occurred in 1988 year, at the end of the cold war.

The Americans, judging by their activity and how from the late 80-ies acted their anti-submarine aircraft, ahead of the USSR and to massively introduce this technology in the design of their base patrol aircraft. And this largely explains the phenomenal efficiency of their search of action, which was described by Lieutenant-General Sokaren. Moreover, there are signs that since the early 90-ies, the Americans have mastered the methods of detection of submarines hiding under the ice. Fiction? One of the "fathers" theme "window," the pilot protivolodochnyi with the Pacific fleet, Alexander Semenov claimed it in plain text. Unfortunately, Semenov defected to the side of Ukraine and now a potential enemy. We can only be glad that he didn't need to apply their knowledge and experience. And this, alas, is not fiction; in proof that at the time said Semenov, it is necessary to quote another officer of the Navy, the most experienced of protivolodochnyi, commander anti-submarine ship, captain first rank A. E. Soldatenkova:

"...my friend Sergei, commander anti-submarine helicopter KA-25 Northern fleet shipborne, went on another training flight over the ice field. He repeatedly complained to his beloved wife that when flying over the ice fields regular filters helmets of the pilots of the Navy is not enough to protect the sight from severalcountries the ice surface. Beloved wife has taken an incredible effort, but the birthday of Serge got polarized goggles of French origin, used by pilots in the Canadian Arctic Airlines (Air North).

Here he is flying in these glasses over ice field and detect visual contrast (relative to the rest of the white field) a circle of very large diameter. Do not seem to understand what kind of optical phenomenon. The cockpit glazing polarizes the light, the filter of the helmet contributes to the polarization, plus branded goggles. But suddenly, almost in the center of a giant circle of cracked ice and is shown cutting our nuclear submarine!

...When driving SUBMARINE submerged the desired depth of immersion is held horizontal rudders, which are controlled by the boatswain or autopilot. Accuracy of retention of a given depth speed within ±5 meters. That is a giant mass of metal (from 6000 33800 tons) performs vertical oscillations at depth, and along with the weight ranges and its gravitational field. Part of the gravitational field of the hull of the underwater vehicle, the registered measuring devices tension on the surface of the water, on the boundary between two media – water and air. Remember the excitement on the surface. This part of the gravitational field at some level of our tension comes into resonance interaction with the surface layers of the sea water and air. The interaction produces orientation of the salt domains in the upper layers of water and air (as it is known at the surface of the water in the air has a high concentration of salt water droplets), which leads to summation (a kind of modulation), the voltage of their electric fields. Hence the circular or elliptical shape of the figures on the radar screen. And already summarized the interaction of electric fields with the electromagnetic field from the antenna of radar stations (absorption or reflection) leads to the appearance of circular and elliptic effects on the screens of radar stations.

The opponents wonder why the ring effect is found around large vessels or ships? They, too, have a gravitational field? The answer is that the volume of the zone of interaction of the gravitational field of a surface ship with a strength required for resonance interaction with salt water spatial is too thin because of the angles of intersection of the vectors of the field strength close to 90°. In these volumes there are no conditions for resonant interaction with the electromagnetic field of a search radar, especially if they are of any other frequency range. For surface ships the effect may be short-term when they are drowning (death).

Thus, quite by accident a frequency range of over-the-horizon radar target designation system “of the Sea” was chosen so that at these frequencies showed the interaction of the total electric field of the surface of the salt domains of sea water, shimmering modulated gravitational field of large underwater objects, with the electromagnetic field of the search radar.

A particular case of the manifestation of the ring effect can be considered to change the polarization of sunlight reflected by the ice cover that was observed by my friend Serge during one of its flights have ice through polarized goggles Ice in all its hardness is composed of cool ice-salt inclusions, which affects the gravitational field of the submarine, which is under the ice."

Adding all the above, we have to admit that the ability to detect a submarine using radar and optical-electronic observation of the surface of the water or ice is a reality. And this reality, unfortunately, is completely negated modern Russian naval strategy.

We focus on submarines, ignoring the fact that anti-aircraft of a potential enemy "see" them under water and possibly under the ice. Not on all modes, of course, not always, and the search area is necessary as-that to choose, but the very existence of this possibility was supposed to get command of the Navy to radically revise their approach to military construction, in particular, to providing combat service SUBMARINES, their supporting surface ships and aircraft, including the ship.

In practice, it was and still is absolutely not true. The fact that our submarines are extremely vulnerable to basic anti-submarine aircraft of the enemy during the military construction as a whole is not considered. The fact that the boats of the enemy exceeds our SUBMARINES in stealth, detection range and the technical characteristics of torpedoes too. So for what is a huge public funds being spent on the submarine fleet? In order to then quickly sank with the loss of thousands of sailors and a giant means?

The situation is just creepy in its application to the sea component of strategic nuclear forces. It submarines with ballistic missiles are the most secretive component of our nuclear forces and the only holders of nuclear weapons, which in theory can be hidden from the enemy. In practice, it turns out that it's almost impossible...

So, when John Lehman, Secretary of the U.S. Navy in the Reagan administration, argued that our submarines would not have survived the first days of the war, if she were to begin, he was, apparently, not very far from the truth.

Some time ago, the Americans, keeping true sepulchral silence about their achievements in anti-submarine search has begun to declassify the materials related to this topic.

So, the network is now available the report "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES" ("Radar method of detecting submerged submarines") issued by the Research laboratory of the U.S. Navy in 1975. Though the area *.mil and closed to English-speaking users, a simple anonymizer allows you to download the full text in English. The report shows that the first Americans discovered the phenomenon of residual trace on the surface, visible in the radar range, even during the Second world war. Only by 1975 came to a consensus about what the effect is, and can be used. And after thirteen years was the reconnaissance flight of "Orion"...

In theory, again, naval aviation and surface ships would work as a shield to attack submarines, allowing them to turn around in relative security from enemy aircraft and from enemy submarines, but surface ships and naval aviation, the situation is even worse than submarines, and to help the boats they can not.

Let's start with aviation

With naval aviation the Soviet Union had a contradictory position. The Soviet Navy had a first class strike aircraft shore-based Maritime missile-carrying aircraft, armed with Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tu-22M various modifications, capable of carrying anti-ship cruise missiles – supersonic and subsonic. Later they added missile-carrying Tu-95K-22 – "long arm" of the Navy, able to strike at surface ships over any point of the World ocean. Their range and quality of avionics made them a truly global weapon (albeit with flaws). Reconnaissance aircraft were also at the highest level.

But in terms of anti-submarine aircraft from the Soviet Union was a failure – sighting-search system did not provide reliable search of foreign submarines, but discoveries such as aviation gave all same lot. The above-mentioned theme of a "Window" could change the situation, but alas, its practical results were obtained immediately before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after it the new search methods received the most minimal development. Carrier-based aviation of the Soviet Navy in a sense, just "not yet" to grow. Coastal assault aviation was good, but the fighter aircraft of the Navy experiencing a shortage of modern aircraft.

But even these contradictory achievements in naval aviation was completely lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Decreased significantly the composition of the ASW aircraft, and, most worryingly, for all post-Soviet years nothing really was done to create a new plane to replace the old be-12, Tu-142M and Il-38. Modernization of Il-38 variant 38N with the complex "Novella" is a half-measure, with extremely limited effectiveness, and the pace of modernization of the aircraft just depressing.

In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that we simply do not have anti-submarine aircraft. And this at a time when the total number of modern submarines from the US and its allies crosses well over a hundred. Position and no one thinks to fix: neither the command of the Navy, or the structure of the Ministry of defence have not shown serious interest in solving the problem.

But ASW aircraft though remains that can be upgraded. But MRA has been eliminated completely. In 2010, all remained in the Navy Tu-22M were seized from the Navy and transferred to the air force. Now the Navy just there is no tool for applying sudden massive attacks on military and Maritime links of the enemy, no strength, which in a "big" war can be redistributed between the theater, alternately reinforcing our scattered fleets. And of course there is no guarantee that VCS will be concerned about helping Navy – purposes with SCD in the great war enough without naval problems.

If the transfer of bombers in the air force has an excuse, in the end, these machines are no longer manufactured and really become "gold", they are really a few left, the actual destruction of his own fleet of fighter aircraft other than the crime not to be named. Five years ago the Navy had a large force of fighters, and, unlike the Soviet times, full of modern machines. The MiG-31 and su-27, repaired and in good condition. What happened? The fact that the command of the fleets simply ditched entrusted them with air units, without emitting even the kerosene for combat training. Suffice it to say that the fighter part of the Navy on the Kamchatka Peninsula in 2015 was completed not more than 30 hours per year per person – almost like in 90-ies. And this is when there was already a war in Syria.

The staff officers of the Navy openly, unashamedly, said that without the pilots and the problems they would be lighter and easier to serve. The result is a natural – 2017 the Navy take the fighter aircraft, and slowly but surely translate it "under the wing" of the newly created armies of VVS and PVO. First, it passed the Northern fleet, and in 2018 – Pacific. It certainly saved the air connection for the future, only debug need the level of interaction between surface ships and aircraft now will not work. However, before this no one did.

But American fighters from bases in Japan hung on the tail of the Il-38 over the sea of Okhotsk after each departure on the search for the SUBMARINE (in cases when a foreign SUBMARINE in the sea of Okhotsk was)! How was it possible in such circumstances to ruin entrusted to the air unit? But the Navy did it.

Relatively good things appear in the marine assault regiments. Shelves fly, train, have to adopt the new su-30CM. That's just the potential of this platform no one even tries to implement. If the Indian air force su-30 already allowed heavy supersonic anti-ship missiles "BrahMos", in Russia no one is trying to equip naval su-30SM with similar parameters "Onyx", although this solution would dramatically increase the striking capabilities of the regiments, and give them the opportunity to attack modern warships without entering their zone defense. But this, apparently, is no longer necessary, such work is not carried out, nor is there any indication that the fleet will strengthen the assault regiments tanker aircraft or AWACS. The main weapon of the assault regiments of the missile is a Kh-35 is a very good missile, but in the breakthrough of modern layered air defense ship, its range is not enough, you will have to substitute for the enemy's anti-aircraft missiles and the planes, too.

The new hypersonic missile "Dagger" is also visibly not interested in naval comrades.

In fact, from the naval aviation of the Soviet era left some lumps, and do not think that VCS who are forced to take more "Maritime" task, going to be the magic wand. Will not, because they over land enough work, and because the pilot of naval aviation — is a person with very specific training and skills that the pilot-wagon of videoconferencing to develop just once.

It is naive to think that in such circumstances the case that is primarily associated with the Navy (surface ships), are better. Do not go.

Currently in the ranks of the Navy for thirty-one ships near and far sea and ocean areas (excluding slow-moving ships that in the sea have not come out, but not yet decommissioned). In addition to the five project 20380 corvettes and four frigates (three 11356 and 22350 one), they all were laid in the Soviet Union. Of this amount, ten ships now under repair, including the only aircraft carrier.

In fact, at the present time, the Northern fleet can bring in a sea of five surface ships of the 1st and 2nd grade, including two cruisers, the black sea and the TFR and five frigates, Pacific – six, including one cruiser, the Baltic fleet – TFR single project 11540 and four corvettes of project 20380.

For comparison: in Japan, thirty-seven warships URO in the ranks and three helicopter ASW, France – twenty-three ships URO and full nuclear aircraft carrier.

We have, of course, still a number (less than thirty in the whole Navy) small anti-submarine ships small missile ships, missile boats and auxiliary ships. But they either can't act in a distant sea area without large ships, or necessary for the defense of coastal waters, or both. The same grouping of the armed forces in Syria, their is not much to protect, in close proximity to Hokkaido or Svalbard do not make war. The same new MRK project 21631, noting the launches of "Caliber" have very limited seaworthiness, and have no air defense, no money PLO, or at least torpedo protection.

All other large ships naturally "stuck" on repairs that continue for years, and whose increasing time. The latest news from the – the flooding of the floating dock PD-50, which was the aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov", with a bulk carrier on the wall of the dock, and has not announced consequences. How this will delay the exit of the repair "Kuznetsov" and complicate the repairs of other ships and submarines, we can only guess.

Intensive exploitation of remaining on the course of the ships quite clearly will lead to almost complete the development of many of these resource around the 2020 year, before repair starts to come out standing there are now warships. In fact, the Navy may halve its already modest military group, and now the repair can not cope with existing volumes of work, after this the amount will increase to sixty percent, it will fail even more. Especially given the fact that some ships are already naturally brought "to handle", and work with them promises huge.


Consider the order

In the segment of small missile ships (project 21631 "Buyan-M" and 22800 "Karakurt") clashed with the inability to get the right engines. "Buyan-M" was designed by the German MTU, but they became unavailable because of the sanctions. Starting from the ship "Vishny Volochek", on the ship are Chinese diesels, but they are not needed for military applications technical characteristics that puts an end to the history of the series of these ships. However, once the U.S. withdraws from the contract on liquidation of rockets of small-and medium-range, meaning these ships still will not.

"Widow", which was conceived as a faster and more seaworthy counterparts "Buyan-M" with more powerful weapons and domestic diesel engines, remained without engines at all. PJSC "Star", which was to supply for these vehicles high-speed diesel engines М507 was simply unable to produce them. Such a rate that the plant makes engines now series "Karakurt" will be built ten years at least. This crisis brought even such sentences as the delivery fleet of vehicles with second-hand engines that undergo a major overhaul. I must admit that the reason for such tough decisions I have.

All the other larger ships also fell into the "trap" of PJSC "Star" for its subsidiary, "Star gear" is the only Russian manufacturer of gearboxes for marine propulsion systems. And the problem there is the same as that for diesel production. However, it has been studied, and launched in the series reducer factory with grief in half can do, let him long and slowly. But with new designs the trouble. Meanwhile, they are required to ensure that Russia could build the ships of a distant sea zone – frigates at least.

Note that earlier gearboxes for large ships supplying the Ukrainian enterprise "Zorya-mashproyekt", but after "euromaidan" and Crimea these deliveries become impossible. Impossible steel and supply ship gas turbines, but their production in Russia have been able to learn, but no gears, and the factory producing them, feels bad.

In the end, the construction of warships in Russia within a reasonable time are simply impossible.

All these unpleasant facts is imposed by the inability of the Ministry of defense and the Navy command to decide as to the doctrine of engagement, and type of existing and required for the construction of ships.

About the fact that huge money coming in is unable to protect itself, the submarine fleet, already mentioned, but this is only part of the problem.

Deprived the fleet mine forces completely. No modern minesweepers, unmanned vehicles, unmanned anti-mine vehicles and other needs for mine action technology is almost there. What is built depends on the products the "Stars" on one side or does not meet modern requirements on the other. Mining areas near naval bases will lead to the fact that ships and submarines will be there simply locked to 'clear' them out today, nothing. Just send mine fighting ship or multi-purpose SUBMARINES to "break" the corridor of human lives. Well, the British in the Falklands were prepared to do that, we wouldn't worse than them, right?

Similarly, no anti-submarine forces, able to ward off enemy submarines from our database. No corvettes SQUARE is sufficient, no notification system about the underwater environment of acceptable quality.

Just this year the Navy began to receive modern guided torpedoes (it could have been done many years ago), but the SUBMARINE crews need more experience of their application and the statistics of the firing is quite small.

Not carried out works on modernization of anti-submarine helicopters, although have good experience at the drop of hydroacoustic stations, but they are what is called "do not give a course".

About naval aviation already mentioned.

In these conditions, the Navy finds nothing better than to chase after chimeras.

Reason, a series of ineffective and unsuitable for combat "patrol" ships of project 22160. Their position as anti-piracy, but the ship of this displacement may not work in the Indian ocean – there is a risk that due to the rough sea, he will not be able to take back on Board their boats and helicopters with the Marines.

Arms for conducting anti-submarine warfare or ability to fight against surface ships, these ships do not possess.

Why do they then built? Why spend the money?

Another megaspila is the ship of the project 20386. About it is already written, and potential technical risks in the project experts have found a huge amount. Some potential drawbacks of this ship is apparently fatal. The "Star" and this ship is deprived of gear. Reducer FP6 under construction, still exists in the metal, and it is unknown when it will be, shipbuilders now cautiously say that the powerplant for the ship might be ready in 2020-th year... and maybe not.

Anyway, no surrender of the ship to the Navy in 2022, the year or the bookmarks of the second building in 2018, is definitely not to be.

All this, however, did not prevent project developers and sub-systems to develop the huge budget allocated for the development and construction of this "wunderwaffe".

The development of the only series of ships, which Russia somehow could build corvettes 20380, stopped by the arbitrary decision of someone in the Navy. This is despite the fact that the modernization potential of ships not disclosed, and alternatives. New ships of this project are not included, a new, more fitted to anti-submarine warfare or having a more effective air defense modification are not developed. You can argue that these ships reducers have to wait for years, but, at least, can wait!

But the larger Russian ships, or may never build, or may be very expensive and slow, for example, the frigates of project 22350. Very powerful for its class and very expensive ships with a serious military power. However, this series of ships is also more will not be constructed, will be limited to four copies.

About such things as mercorella unification, and say no, probably, the feeling that we are not aware of the fact that it is at all.

As well as that, the development of marine underwater weapons, sonar countermeasures, sonar systems, and more, real work and production has long been replaced by ingenious schemes to develop budgets without giving back nothing, no prototypes, samples, etc. — only the reports development, falsified test reports, and endless restarts this process. Profit without production in pure form.

It should be borne in mind that at this time all of the above is imposed on the growth of military danger for Russia, that we have isolated theater, which you access by land (Syria), the fact that all of our serious opponents today – a country with a strong Navy, the sanctions do not allow to buy weapons components abroad, for the coming demographic crisis 2025-2030 years, when the army, Navy and ATT will have to compete for resource mobilization and people, to achieve the growth of the combat capabilities of the fleet will have without increasing costs...

This is actually the perfect storm, system, gone into the singularity, "a separation". All crises in peak form and at the same time. The collapse of the fleet, a complete collapse of everything that it still holds.

That is the future of the Navy in the near future.

Survive the Navy? Not a fact. But the worst thing would be if at this moment you will have to use the Navy in combat. Tsushima seems a small river cruise on the background of what can happen in the next few years. Moreover, in order to "hold", we will not necessarily fall into conflict with the US: break the system so unstable as the Russian Navy after 2020, the year will almost every more or less developed in the Navy against the country.

Who is to blame that all this is possible?


Someone flawed, someone turned a blind eye to the shortcomings of some and the direct sabotage of others, someone this sabotage is carried out. And in the end we have what we have. Clearly guilty, the Military-industrial Commission, at least, all those who are in its composition are responsible for shipbuilding.

Guilty and FSB, because they do not follow the folding truly mafia clans in the defense industry, and the fact that the activities of some comrades at "acroplot" (we will not point fingers), "gives" foreign intelligence services.

What to do?

First, replace the people responsible for these failures, on the other. It is fundamentally important. All who was behind bringing the fleet "to handle" should go find another job.

Secondly, hard, with the announcement of objectives and setting deadlines, addressing all the above problems, not only in industry but also in the Navy. From the answer to the question "Why do we need a Navy at all?" and ending with the development of cooperation between aircraft and surface ships. From the restoration of competence in shipbuilding to restore order in the financing of the ROC naval subjects. By increasing the frequency of firing of the torpedo to give naval aviation a proper status within the structure of the fleet. With research exercises that are necessary to determine the shape and composition of the fleet of the future. With the improvement of the financing to the distribution of funds among submarine, surface fleet and aircraft.

With the necessary changes in the regulatory framework and sweeps those who are not willing or not able to work "on the result."

As quickly as possible — because time is already gone. No, and quite soon it will become obvious.

Probably, this time will not be able to do without the "manual control" from the President and Minister of defense, the crisis does not "resolve."

Otherwise, we will just have to wait another Tsushima and wait for her. And very soon.

Alexander Timohin

Source: https://topwar.ru/149232-flot-bez-korablej-vmf-rossii-na-grani-kollapsa.html