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Struggle philosophy
Material posted: Publication date: 25-09-2014

The Russian military and the defence industry are looking for ways to neutralize the superiority of the traditional "probable partners" in control and communication systems. One of the priorities is the development of electronic warfare (EW) designed to deprive the enemy's advantage in the information sphere and even turn against him, distorting the transmitted information.

"The" managed to interview the designer of the equipment of electronic warfare Yuri Majewski Ivanovich — Deputy General Director for R & d the EW equipment of the Concern "Radioelectronic technologies" (KRET). Despite the traditional secrecy of this subject, our interviewee answered a series of questions about the Russian EW systems, the philosophy of their development and improvement.

"": How well do we imagine the possibilities of modern Western radar and guidance systems? Is there a guarantee that the EW system can suppress the enemy radars in the event of a conflict?

We are working to advance. We have to predict the development of systems "from the side", to build on all their work. Acting on the 2025 program, we need to know what the enemy might be in 2030. There are various forecasting methods, and developing the future systems, we model as the enemy it is conditional 2030. Of course, there remains some uncertainty, and we put in our complexes the excess of opportunity, is able to parry this uncertainty.

If we talk about the guarantees... the Possibilities are verified by the practice. We create the systems, check them out, work out, take into account the errors, re-create, etc. And operation is very important for us, as in Russia, and abroad, where we provide our equipment. Because very different conditions: geographic and likely opponent.

This is the only reliable guarantee, we constantly check in practice how it works.

What are the key parameters for EW? How accurate is the view that everything depends on the signal strength and the width of the covered frequency range?

We have moved to digital methods of processing and generating signals. Thanks to the miniaturization you can do system that overlaps the entire range in communication systems and radar systems — previously had to produce specialized systems for each range.

In addition, there was a concept of non-interference. Modern means of detection and processing allow to obtain an exact copy of the signals. And we can generate a similar signal by changing the parameters that we need, for example, in its structure. Now it is not necessary to apply violent suppression, interference close to the entire screen. Sometimes it's easier to get a signal, disassemble it, change something and back.

What is the role of EW systems in the increasing "digitalization" of battle management? If a stalemate is when the growth possibilities of control and communication systems and EW capabilities overlap?

No, this situation does not add up. The fact that each control system is a set of relations. Our task, the task of the REB is to find these connections, some cut, some of them, not working, get rid of corrupted information. Figuratively it can be compared with a coin toss in cash to the accountant, who will have to recount the whole night to sort out the problem.

Although the problem is. How to identify the most important goals to not spend the extra resources? I get the flow of signals between different objects and have the objects to select the ones for me the most important — regardless of whether it is about detection, management, communication etc. Our methods allow, and while that side improve management tools, we are improving electronic warfare.

And what is more important? It is necessary to fight in the first place? The AWACS intelligence planes, a connection, something else?

For any use of weapons first of all necessary detailed information about the enemy, about how he distributed on the objects of their groups, groups, groups, etc. it All depends on the moment, from what stage of the conflict we're in. In the initial stage may matter most "AWACS", and then, for example, can leave staff infrastructure, system of information transfer. There is no fixed schema, conflict is a process that develops under its own laws.

Back to the evolution of EW systems. What is the duration of the life cycle of the system and what transformations it goes through this cycle? Recently I spoke with representatives of the United shipbuilding Corporation. For them the main problem — the timely updating of electronic equipment, including electronic warfare. Term — 5-10 years, although the ship serves as a platform for many decades. What is your assessment?

Ship builders are right. I would even say that the life cycle is 4-5 years. Earlier, we created a specialized system, the defense demanded a service life of 15-20 years. But electronics are developing too quickly. We shall therefore proceed to model blueprints. The basis of the system, the platform may serve 20 years, but we do standardized mounting and interface modules, which allow us to improve the equipment, changing not the whole complex and individual units. Put a new block, with new opportunities.

That is, we turn to a standard tire of sharing data?

You are absolutely right. The modern level of development of electronics allows us to achieve a lot with programmed methods. For example, in the production of aircraft engines. Another version IS other features for the same hardware. And we must do the same. This is the main strategic direction. Important electronics should correspond to the level reached by the opponent, who cannot wait too catch up, but also increases its efficiency, and we must after him to catch, and in some cases overlap.

As far as EW devices allow to compensate for the lag in the development of control and communication systems and firepower? At what level are we relative to potential adversaries in this sphere?

Management efficiency we look through the conflict of two systems. Here the control system of the enemy, that our, and here's the conflict. The objective of each party — the destruction of opposing factions, the power of which is largely determined by the control system. We must focus on those tools that will allow us to quickly detect and recognize a target, get a lock faster and faster to destroy it.

And if the enemy has, say, a good intelligence system, with high range, then our task is to reduce this range to a degree to get first. If the enemy has a better system for disseminating information, we must act on it so that it was late, and we again would be first. EW allows to solve such tasks.

We have achieved good results and the number of simultaneous direction of the impact, and the level of algorithms. Otherwise it is impossible. We have to learn to counteract the developed control and communication systems, to create a means capable of compensating the successes of opponents. Fate makes us do the complexes of the appropriate level.

I am sure that in the conceptual design, concepts and ideas, we are ahead in implementation — where, but in some complexes, and aviation, and land topics occupied quite a high place. This is confirmed by including foreign exploitation. Customers often take our system against objects, about which we knew nothing, and the results are very good.

How is the development process organized? It is a discrete, recurring and ending with the achievement of certain stages or continuous? And one of the leading countries of NATO is our main opponent in developments who, besides the U.S., is the achievements in this area?

It is a continuous process, with continuous exchange of information — from the Academy of Sciences to the structures in different directions. The basis of all — prognosis and testing. Stop the process impossible. Critical feedback to the defense Ministry: we give a technical basis, ensuring that it is not worse than the enemy, but a complex exploit specific people, and we need to understand how they cope with it. Military officers often make such a demand: the right complex only needs one button to turn on/off. Well, we're trying to make. Finally, often the operating experience allows you to expand the boundaries of possibilities inherent in the design.

If we talk about opponents, then, of course, it's not just the US. Britain, France, Italy, Israel... each has its strengths. Israel, for example, develops an excellent means of suppression of homing of different types of radar, infrared, and combined...

USA create complexes of group protection, inhibiting means long-range radar detection of the enemy. The market is developed and competitive enough, but we have our own advantages. We have managed to create an integrated structure — Kret, a center of competences in the development of EW equipment, uniting businesses at all levels. We have great manufacturers of parts and components, fine designers.

A very important step for us was the acquisition of "Aviapribor-holding", the largest manufacturer of aviation avionics. This allowed us to increase substantially the level of our modular systems: aircraft instruments designers use these technologies in our work, we use them in our. The Association with "Aviapribor" greatly facilitated our work, including on accessories — ultimately we use largely similar sets of parts, just differently arranged for different tasks.

What can you say about the system of electronic warfare "Khibiny", which is installed, in particular, the su-34, and the EW systems of the complex T-50?

"Khibiny" is the serial system designed for group protection of aircraft from SAMS. But he continues to improve — including through miniaturization. Staying in the same dimensions, the same mass and the parameters of energy consumption, the system can obtain much more opportunities.

Another aspect is the electronics turning on a new generation, we reduce the weight and size, lightening the plane. You have to understand that EW does not exist by itself. If the perspective plane is distinguished by its low visibility, it is possible to apply a complex with the reduced energy potential, which opens up broad prospects for further improvement. This also applies to the T-50. A new generation of solid-state electronics, reduction of weight, dimensions, more compact arrangement on a plane... Although General solutions are not many, for each specific type of aircraft developed something of their own — depending on the restrictions on weight and size, thermal regime. To take the complex with one type of plane and put on another will not work. The problem is solved anew each time.

Recently, media reported about the flyby Russian su-24 bomber of U.S. destroyer "Donald cook" in the Black sea and the suppression of its detection systems. How these messages correspond to reality?

The effect was. The media have a lot to say, but the effect was. Correct.

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