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Karabakh. An implicit threat
Material posted: Publication date: 06-04-2016
The war in Karabakh poses a threat to a new level for our interests in an extremely complex region of the Caucasus. And it is not even in the war, and its possible implications.

It should be noted that the war of the beginning 90-h years ended extremely indistinct: the unconditional military defeat of Azerbaijan did not lead to political capitulation and recognition of Karabakh's independence. The culprit was the notorious "peaceful settlement", which became a feature of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space and which in all cases of its application only swept the problem under the carpet. In all cases the unconditional military defeat of one party conflicts led to the fact that the defeated had to accept the terms of the winner. He has always been given the opportunity to crawl, to lick their wounds and be made to future conflict.

Karabakh is one of the pending conflicts, which could not explode again. He and exploded. The question is why now — interesting, but only just. While both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the unrecognized Karabakh with growing discontent belonged to the vague position of the Kremlin, which froze the conflict, extending it to infinity.

In the least favorable position remains Azerbaijan. Karabakh according to the results of military victory created a buffer area around its ("root"), actually occupying seven districts of Azerbaijan. The logic is quite reasonable — the perfect position to exchange the occupied territories for eternal peace. Such conflicts are solved that way. However, the Minsk settlement of the 94-th year (Oh, this Minsk, some symbolic place) recorded the status quo and translated this process into endless bickering. The mediation of Moscow was very vapid and careless nature. So much so, that in late spring of the 11th, at a meeting in Kazan on Karabakh the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan were surprised to learn that the Russian side (as mediator and organizer of the meeting) until the end brought the approval of the expert documents. There was nothing to discuss. The level of Russia's relations to his duties just seemed egregious. The meeting was held in vain, and the parties clearly came to the conclusion that much sense in this kind of settlement is simply no.

The situation on the contact line has always been very hectic, people were dying, shootouts wore regular character, so that the aggravation was inevitable. The initiator of it beyond doubt and in all scenarios was the Azerbaijan — Karabakh Armenians have a very good position, occupying the buffer area, so the first number to play them absolutely without meaning.

The current war is quite an objective reason, which is characteristic for all countries involved in serious internal crisis (and Azerbaijan hit him, as, indeed, all oil-producing countries). Small victorious war to cover internal problems and to rally the country around the Father of the Nation, the tree of liberty, blood of patriots and the like. Any military victory speech, no doubt, is not. However, rational considerations still present: sudden onset of can afford to take some territories, after which Azerbaijan can agree to the entreaties of international mediators to stop the fighting. The task of the mediators, paranoid adhering to the principle of the peaceful settlement in any, even the most absurd form, is the belief of the Karabakh cease in such a case the fire. So a certain logic to the actions of Aliyev, of course, exist.

Worst of all, if the Aliyev's plans will not succeed: then to the internal crisis is added and a small but very disappointing defeat. And then his regime will noticeably begin to SAG and stagger, although the margin of safety it is still quite large.

In this case, the Azerbaijani democracy, to put it mildly, is not. The opposition in Azerbaijan is squeezed out in the field of marginal groups, and therefore any scenario of change of power will have either the apical or the destructive demolition of the entire structure with the coming to power of the marginals together with betrayed the Leader part of the current item. Nothing unusual — all "color revolutions" are the same scenario. All dictatorships and oppressive regimes have nothing to oppose to this scenario. And no riot police will not help, not help against incompetent foreign policy "Iskander", which do not need to laugh.

Best if we change Aliyeva? No. Not because he's good, but because until relatively Azerbaijan conducts balanced policy, having let weak, but nevertheless sovereignty. "Color" revolution always focused on hard binding a new entity to a single external source of power, and we always know — what.

However, there is another dimension of this war. And also external. The US suddenly yesterday voted (though somewhat vaguely) about the fact that the Karabakh problem should be addressed on the basis of the right of Nations to self-determination. While on duty were spoken and words about the inviolability of borders, but most importantly, the Armenians heard — there is an external and very powerful player who can break the deadlock on the long-standing issue: international recognition of Karabakh. Not attaching it to Armenia but the recognition. And if so, on the background of colorless and futile mediation of Russia, which freezes the second decade of the conflict, Armenians have a chance for a significant breakthrough.

This trick can the U.S. solve the problem of the reorientation of Armenia towards Russia, and, as a bonus — to create an explosive situation in Baku with the prospect of a color revolution and creating a far less independent, and are tied to the us puppet regime. Having opponents in the region, Russia and Iran, the US gets a powerful foothold, and most importantly — access to the Caspian sea basin and petroleum deposits of the region.

For all this it requires only four steps: the war in Karabakh, Azerbaijan's defeat, the recognition of Karabakh by the USA (albeit with a million reservations) and "color revolution" in Baku. The first step has been made, the second one almost completed, so half way is passed. Just 4 days.

However, the timing is not the best election situation in the U.S. always creates difficulties for large-scale operations. Party and clan-based struggle makes US policy significant fluctuations in this period, is, therefore, complex combinations are much worse sonorous but meaningless mediapirate such as the elimination of Osama bin Laden. However, the threat of a sharp turn in the situation in this extremely important region is very high.

No wonder, by the way, Iran has expressed readiness to help Azerbaijan — Iranians instantly figured out all the dangers and came to the conclusion that the defeat of the Azeris will be for them to have very serious consequences, so it is best — to the detriment of its relations with Armenia not to lose Aliyev, although not to allow him to succeed.

The issue with Russia more difficult. Emotional and meaningless TV shows, and explicit Pro-Armenian bias in the promotion do not allow to predict the real steps of our foreign policy. Until it bends again and again to the previous approaches is to restore the status quo without solving the problem, that is what is already does not suit either Armenia or Azerbaijan. In such spineless positions the US a serious chance — and it is unlikely they will try to implement it.

Anatoly Nesmiyan


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