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The deployment of troops and delivery of new Russia
Material posted: Publication date: 19-06-2014

As mentioned in a popular article about the"cunning plan of Putin", history of Russian policy towards Ukraine if something is characterized by, first and foremost, the terms inconsistency and pragmatism. Attempts to deny this reached ridiculous like the excuses of the reasons for the defeat of Russia in 2004, that allegedly to the "orange revolution" there is no consistent foreign policy towards Ukraine was not conducted. This desire to shield the mistakes of his superiors, stupidity even more than ignorance, for not understanding the reasons for previous failures, it is extremely difficult to count on success in the future, so that such propagandists rather have a "General line" a disservice to the spirit of the propagandists of the late Brezhnev period, more fluctuations along with the party line, even if the understanding of the party line, not as such.

In fact, the current behavior of Russia, with all the strangeness and incomprehensibility of this approach to others, just typically, including in terms of the ambiguity of this behavior.
When from Russia need to merge the new Russia, or conversely to rush to her defense, as a rule, beyond these issues leave the previous experience, which largely determines such a boring lot of ambiguity of what is happening.

1. The coup in Kiev was unexpected for the Kremlin as well as the speed of the collapse of the regime of Yanukovych that Russia indirectly supported, both politically and economically.

2. In the course of subsequent events, Moscow has successfully used a welcome opportunity to overcome the Crimea, thanks to the junta and the officers who ingeniously planned combined special operation to rout the Ukrainian groups in Crimea without firing.

3. On the wave of the euphoria of victory, the Kremlin is seriously thinking about the fact that the Crimea can not be limited and became interested in the idea of new Russia/South-Eastern Federation, when several regions of Ukraine or part of Russia or become the main independent of Ukraine and dependent on the Russian state.

4. In support of this idea were thrown considerable organizational and informational tools, this implied and even openly stated (including Putin himself) that if anything, Russia will not hesitate to bring troops to protect "their". The peak came at the end of April, when the number 24 in the Kremlin on the movement of mechanized columns junta seriously discussed the issue of troops.

5. The decision however was not accepted. Junta troops took, and the pressure from the West increased dramatically - sanctions were not a direct threat. but they had a huge potential risk for the Russian Federation despite all the jingoism in the spirit of "Yes we have these sanctions, we are..." It was fully understood by the Russian Federation by the end of April.

6. From the end of April I went to the revision line of conduct when the March jingoistic propaganda and euphoric dreams "but we a couple of days before the river will come", was replaced by a realization that not everything is so simple and the time for unimpeded military intervention to some extent has already been lost. It happened in an operational aid, which the USA and their satellites started to provide his puppets, which is why the folding of the new government after the coup was faster than it was supplied in March 2014. Coupled with weak organization of Pro-Russian forces in the South-East (the reasons for this are discussed in the article "Cunning plan" Putin), Russia was faced with the necessity of more active intervention in what is happening, as the junta with the help of the Americans were gaining strength faster than disparate Pro-Russian groups, operating without an overall plan, a single coordinating center and a coherent information strategy. During April, while Russia complacently watched the slow development of the situation in the Donbass, the junta was able to suppress open speech in Nikolaev, Zaporozhye and Kharkov. On may 2 came the Odessa Khatyn and when it remained without consequences, in Kiev understand that Russia at this stage, the troops will not enter, and that was the trigger intensify the ongoing counter-insurgency operations (in the course of it both sides have killed more than a thousand people). This transition from readiness to send troops on April 24 before the actual descent on the brakes the mass murder in Odessa, laid the groundwork now so popular thesis of the "Putin merged".

7. At the time of transition from the position of direct support of the uprising in the Donbas to indirect support volunteers, weapons and information cover, the March propaganda since "our Crimea" from the sharply positive, began to play a very negative role - many people sincerely believe in what Putin said and what was promised to the rebels of new Russia, and even the Crimea has not warmed the hearts of patriots.

8. The change in policy of the Kremlin began to cause cognitive dissonance. As is known from love to hate one step. The idea that the new Russia can take to prevent or her death, for many unacceptable. Naturally there is a desire to find someone to blame, and Putin here because the promises made, is one of the first targets. Therefore, the change of policy in respect of new Russia leads to the destruction of Patriotic consolidation, the Kremlin was able to achieve after the annexation of Crimea. In the Patriotic environment began to Mature in the mood based on the assertion that "Putin had betrayed". After the well-known statements by strelkov, the mood broke out when a part of the Patriotic society poses the question - or enter the army or Putin is a traitor. That's so primitive, but this is just pure essence.

9. In fact, back in February, no accession of new Russia was not planned and close. After the annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin decided that in the same makarom can be attached and the new Russia, but underestimated the resistance the US. After the pressure exerted, the Kremlin was forced to hide their manifested ambitions and return to the familiar for 23 years of "independence", the tactics of maneuvering when at least publicly had to endure even an obvious insult and humiliation. But the asserted claims in the new Russia, gave Russia a certain inertia, when amid the growing pressure from the United States, there have been informal action to ensure that the new Russia has not choked once. The result is an informal channel of assistance which together with the help of ordinary citizens and volunteers, created new States emerged from the wreckage of a material base. In the end, Russia's actions on the background of the punitive operation is reduced to provide a minimum level to continue the uprising, but it was clearly not enough for a military victory over the junta. In the second half of June, the situation became quite heavy and from the DNR is already open came the statement that if Russia will not increase the assistance and do not enter the troops, a project of new Russia will be destroyed.

10. Despite the huge losses of the junta in manpower and equipment, a ring around the DNI and the LC began to shrink, as the junta was able to build a sufficient number of manpower and equipment, to start attempts to create the encirclement around the nucleus of the uprising. At this stage, the advance of the troops of the junta has been slow, but the risk of the strategic environment is maintained. It is one thing to hold the town, and another thing to protect the open space on the border, which are highly vulnerable to air strikes. This risk is fully understood and the Donbass and the Kremlin, which leads to a simple plug-making or discharge of new Russia or the deployment of troops. The plug is formed by that intermediate option of informal support makes it possible to maintain resistance, but promises of victory, which is already open to say those who are now fighting in the Donbass. The options in the spirit of "waiting for winter, and there's the junta will squeeze" does not work because there is a risk that the DNI and LC will not live until winter. As mentioned earlier, both options - and to send troops, and the recognition of the inevitable defeat of new Russia are for Russia a whole range of extremely unpleasant consequences of which are now painfully choose in the Kremlin.

The deployment of troops and delivery of new Russia

Speaking of troops, it should be clearly understood that the most favourable moment has passed - they can be introduced without significant resistance in March-April, when but a few scattered detachments of the fascist insurgents, the junta had virtually no serious countermeasures, because the army is in a fully decomposed condition. The invasion really would lead to the promotion of the Russian army to the Dnieper river, the disarmament of the greater part of the army units of the former army of Ukraine and the defeat of a few of the junta forces on the Left Bank. In the context of the weakness of the junta and a power vacuum in the South-East, the Russian army could provide the necessary territories under the new Russia, after the virtual elimination of the Ukrainian army on the Left Bank, chance to beat all this by the military junta simply did not exist. Thus, there would be a division of Ukraine along the Dnieper river. In Kiev would sit the current puppet government (even weaker and even more dependent from their sponsors and fascist radicals), and Kharkiv would be sitting in the same government dependent on Russia.

No guerrilla war there would be close - the war in the Donbass showed very low combat training fascist militants, which even with American uniforms and equipment provided to the Ukrainian army, fighting just disgusting. In March-April for guerrilla war simply did not exist the material-technical base and did not have the proper number of people.

Relying on the army and special units, as well as created on top of the army of new Russia, any potential resistance choked pretty easy, especially since most of the population of new Russia would have sat at home and watched it will all end - if we even mass murder his little touch, attempts to separate the Nazis to raise it to fight the new Russia would be even more fruitless. The fight against Bandera would be legalized organizations like the "hold" and a variety of volunteer squads that Russia could arm the same way as do the Americans and the oligarchs, is arming its punitive battalions.

In the end, there would be a weak state in the spirit of Transnistria, best RF from the point of view of policy and prestige, but extremely burdensome from an economic point of view to the actual destruction of the hopes to "join the West".

By the middle of June the opportunity was missed. Now we are not talking about the new Russia, and for the salvation of the DNI and the LC, and the prospect of new very vague. If from a military point of view, the defeat of the junta groups in the Donbas maximum weeks (the fighting qualities of the Ukrainian army, even in the battles with militiamen frankly not very high), in connection with the defeat of the resistance on the Left Bank, is complicated by the creation of new state structures in the conditions of overcoming the consequences of terror and repression, which will increase the load on the army and the FSB, and the risks associated with the guerrilla war and terror increased as from April, fascist organizations have become more structured and gained additional supporters.

Given the sanctions that will inevitably follow the introduction of troops, the economy of official stagnation is dumped into the system recession that without a modernization model of economic development can not be overcome (according to the official statements), even in peacetime. In conditions of ongoing war, it will mean the preservation of the existing economic order, including the inevitable economic downturn, which will overlap more and the cost of waging war.

At the same time Russia finally thrown out of "their club" along with our obsession Yeltsin-Putin liberals fit in "blessed the Western world" close to the high road of civilization. It turns out that 23 years the country was engaged in to put it mildly nonsense, trying to climb where it was not expected and in the end it all boiled down anyway to a struggle for spheres of influence with all the same enemies. though not in Central Europe, and borders with the Belgorod region. Lee said someone behind this policy?

However, the situation caused by the invasion in much less favorable terms than 2 months ago. Re the movement of troops to the border amid a sluggish reaction to the absolutely irresponsible behaviour of the junta (who believes that Russian troops would not dare - warranty apparently give the Americans, hence the absolutely insane acts of violence) is in fact a tribute to public opinion, which requires the invasion. Symptomatic recognition Markov that if the Russian media will show the situation in the Donbass in full, then we might have a riot with the requirements to enter the army, speaks that the Kremlin still tries to save the solution space, not choosing one of the options, although I understand where leaning public opinion. On the one hand there is financial assistance, on the other hand it is not enough. There are "silent polite people" who do not Shine, but just not enough - special forces can not fight with the regular army.

Media on the one hand the duty to show the crimes of the junta, on the other - understate the degree. The meetings are held, but because of their power to organize practically, the result is compared with the rallies in Crimea, is obvious. While this policy continues - the solution space is narrowed. Gunmen have recently indicated that in fact the time goes.

In a number of conspiracy theories based on the belief in "Putin's plan", it is believed that this is the correct behaviour, because the US is supposedly beneficial to involve Russia in the war in Ukraine and reap the benefits of this war. But the problem is that the US has achieved a strategic victory (about the difficulties and problems of the United States in the Ukrainian question - in a separate article I will write) in February and will skim as in the case of retraction of Russia in the war in Ukraine, and in the case of draining of novorossii. In both cases, Russia will incur certain losses - in people, in economy, in politics. Of course the main purpose of the United States in the Ukrainian issue is the weakening of the Russian Federation. This is the standard behavior of the imperialist powers. United States as a strong imperialist power trying to weaken a competitor's creating problems for him near his borders, while at any of the selected scenarios, Washington will receive your gesheft. The US is not so important, will remain under their control all of Ukraine minus Crimea, or only half of Ukraine is a resource, which is now actively used by prefixing the RF challenges associated with the inevitable losses, the weakening of the Russian Federation.

So as the Russian troops to Ukraine since April has started to shrink, intensified punitive operation (with the blessing of the US), which every day destroys the consolidation of society which arose in Russia after the Crimea, because there is cognitive dissonance between the euphoria of March-April and the reality of may-June. Part of society is already beginning to ask tough questions, that is quite satisfied with US, thus making up for his mistake with the loss of Crimea. This of course does not mean that Russia will have its own "Maidan" as the gloomy prophesies Shooters. There is no developed economic conditions, but if the junta will be able to drown in blood the DNI and the LC, the consequences for Russia will be as catastrophic as drawing with a long guerrilla war of the Left. A significant part of the Patriotic camp (Putin believed that) finally make sure that the "power-betrayed" and the recoil of the current right-conservative discourse, which builds Volodin.

In case of any unrest in large cities, these people will support the slogans associated with the change of government, as well as the liberals seized power now permanently stuck together in a narrow layer demshizy, this part of the Patriotic society becomes a breeding ground not for the "Maidan", and the senseless and merciless Russian riot. That is, the forces that the Kremlin itself was released in the course of its rotation to the right, for it will be hostile and dangerous close to the nationalists, creating a potential threat. In fact, it will be a blow to the base of the regime, that convinced Volodin. It's not a question of falling ratings - you can always draw. It is a question of the destruction of the ideological dimensions, for passing the new Russia, the Kremlin with his own hands hacked the concept of "gathering lands" and "protection of compatriots", because in the Patriotic minds will inevitably ripen the idea is to begin to protect compatriots and to collect the earth, we must first clean up the Kremlin traitors. This does not mean that they will go to storm the Kremlin of forces they have there are none - but in the case of aggravation of the socio-economic situation in the country, this ill-concealed dissatisfaction will climb out.

In addition, Ukraine will be finally lost to any Russian projects in the post-Soviet space, becoming the support base for anti-Russian and Russophobic policy of the USA and their satellites, and serious Pro-Russian forces there in the coming decades should be expected. The deployment of NATO troops on a temporary or permanent basis, it's just a matter of time. When something is not believed that the American planes will patrol the Baltic skies. Ukraine in this respect is no worse, especially considering the actual participation of Americans in the war in the Donbass. If the escalation in relations with Russia bases in Ukraine will have a mode which it will provide is already installed in Kiev.

Of course, the huge influx of refugees from the territory of Donbass, will create additional economic and social problems, with them on the territory of the Russian Federation to infiltrate Nazi agents, which will operate in the framework of the plans of the Nazis for expansion in the territory of the Russian Federation. To tear something from Russia, they of course can't, but go to terror on the territory of the Russian Federation is. Fascism is war, and passing it to Ukraine, you can only get a small reprieve, the struggle has already directly on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Also complicating the issue of Crimea, for providing control over the Donbass, the junta will be able to step up intelligence and sabotage activities on the territory of Crimea using the agents of the SBU, the militants of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and radicals from the Majlis. Of course with the support of the Americans. The Crimea will create maximum difficulties, although at this stage to take it from Russia without nuclear war impossible.

The bottom line

To date, the decision to send troops or drop of Novorossiya (in exchange for the Crimea, or because of pressure from the West) is not accepted. The Kremlin still tries to sit on two chairs are leaving, and the space between them the efforts of the US and the junta increases. To choose one way or another have, because the current trends on the fronts of the DNI and the LC, in the short term, the question may arise of their military defeat, that all parties to the conflict can be interpreted as defeat of the Kremlin. And the Kremlin will either have the power to change the situation by force (in the worst edition), or to re-swallow the humiliation in the Ukrainian question, resigned to the victory of the United States, consoling himself with the fact that even though the Crimea was snatched (with black sheep even a tuft of wool).

In fact, the whole choice of the Kremlin, it is a choice between two very unpleasant things, so fluctuations of Putin and his administration are clear - in addition to the various advantages (from their perspective) each option carries with it very many challenges. But the lack of choice, in fact, the worse those decisions, as or the surrender of new Russia (after many months of heroic struggle) or troops (against the already organized enemy) - what ultimately it will come down - will bear a heavy imprint of the lost time and the accumulated consequences.

In my opinion, the variant with activation of force support somewhat more likely than the surrender of new Russia, because the delivery of novorossii from my point of view will be for Putin actual crossbow, and as the events of 2011-2012, Putin is not suicidal.

As it is, will see in the coming weeks - all will depend on whether the junta to take by force one of key cities - if such a situation arises, decisions on the deployment of troops or discharge of new Russia will have to take circumstances make. But the Kremlin is no stranger to act according to circumstances in respect of Ukraine.

PS. Some believe that there is nothing to discuss plans of the authorities, "supposedly first become Putin, and then criticize" to paraphrase the arguments of the series "First bring", they say people occupying state positions know better what and how. Nevertheless, the study of history shows that even persons occupying very high state positions sometimes are very distant idea about what is happening.

In 1963, Kennedy liked to lead the exchange in 1914 between the two German leaders on the causes and the extension of the war. The former Chancellor was asked: "How did it happen?" and his successor replied: "Oh, if only I knew!"

"If our planet, said Kennedy, is ever destined to be devastated by a nuclear war and if the survivors of that destruction will be able to overcome fire, poison, chaos and catastrophe, I would not like to, one of them asked the other: "How did this happen?" and got an incredible response: "Oh, if only I knew!"

(C) Barbara Tuchman "guns of August"

In this respect, I would not like in a couple months to hear the question, "How will the new Russia that doomed?" and the answer is in the style of "Oh, if only I knew".

Boris ROZHINA

Source: http://rusvesna.su/recent_opinions/1403195008


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