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Short deck. Features participation aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" in the Syrian conflict depressing
Material posted: Publication date: 17-12-2015
Intense combat training aircraft carrier, "Kuznetsov" it means an early exit into the Mediterranean Sea to the shores of Syria to strengthen our group videoconferencing. But even at full staffing cruiser Air Group is unable to significantly influence the course of hostilities. The intensity of the work, "the Syrian" aviation group videoconferencing is continuously growing and the beginning of November, it seems, has reached its limit. The basis for such a conclusion may serve not only these "reliable sources" from the circles close to the headquarters of aerospace forces and statements by officials of the Ministry of Defense.

In the sky it is not enough, on the earth it is close

In particular, Press Secretary MO major general Konashenkov has declared that the Russian planes operating in Syria, have passed to a new way of operations - to flights to the fighting task not as a part of groups, and odinochno. The similar step can be the certificate of that possibilities of grouping of the Russian aircraft in Syria do not suffice for the decision of all volume of fighting problems. It is necessary to notice that it is a compulsory measure, instead of more perfect way of actions. After all flights in groups (a minimum in pair) are caused by necessity to raise fighting stability of planes, and in case of  destruction of a board to create more favorable conditions for evacuation of crew from a conflict zone, especially if it has occurred over territory of the opponent. Even in the most critical initial stage of the Great Patriotic War when our aircraft was insufficiently, in overwhelming majority of cases planes operated at least with steams. In Syria transition to single flights only is partly defensible absence at terrorists of possibility to counteract our planes at their work from the big heights.

This measure testifies and that command clearly understands: it is obviously not enough available aviation grouping to break a course of operations in favour of armies of the lawful government and in short terms to crush bands. However escalating of fighting structure of our grouping VKS is interfered by some factors. First of all it is necessary to note obviously insufficient operative capacity of air base "Хмеймим". Today our aviation grouping uses for basing also airdrome around Syrian Tartusa (where the point of material support of the Navy of the Russian Federation is deployed). Its further strengthening will demand expansion of system of basing in Syria that in present conditions is problematic. Other important limiting factor - potential of system of supply. The available structure of aviation grouping, seemingly, is limiting. At last, its escalating will demand expansion of corresponding system of land maintenance, forces of protection and defence of an air field network. More numerous contingent of ours VS is for this purpose necessary. And it with high probability will lead to occurrence of losses that is absolutely unacceptable first of all from the sociopolitical point of view.

Alternative to base "Hmejmim"

Expansion of shock grouping out of the Syrian territory can become one of the major directions of a solution of a problem. Use of forces of the Russian Navy is in this respect rather perspective. Experience of blow in "Calibres" from water area of Caspian sea has shown not only efficiency of a rocket complex, but also expediency of application of fleet against stationary objects of YOKES. However attack cost has appeared rather high - more than 10 billion roubles. And stocks of such weapon in the Russian arsenals are limited. Anyway so effective and effective blows did not repeat, though it would be quite logical to show to the whole world fighting possibilities of our distant and strategic aircraft with use of rockets H-55 or it similar. There are three variants. The first - to strike blows from bases in near-Caspian regions of Russia by planes Tu-22M3, Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombs of free falling with approach to the purpose over territory of Iran and Iraq. With the second - to involve for destruction of positions of insurgents ship artillery. The third - to involve against terrorist formations of "the Islamic state» deck aircraft.

The first variant formally looks the most realistic. Iran and Iraq for certain will pass our planes, blows from the big heights will make their impregnable for insurgents of the YOKES, the adjusted rear maintenance in own territory will allow to operate with limiting intensity. However judging by that it is not made yet, despite obvious necessity, there are the serious reasons, not allowing to involve our distant and strategic aircraft. Possibly, the main things from them are three. The first - a lack of the high-precision weapon which basically goes to the aviation grouping already developed in Syria. The second consists in low efficiency of blows by bombs of free falling on dot objects - there are bases to believe that planes of distant and strategic aircraft are not equipped by system SVP-24 yet. The third reason consists in inadmissibility of appreciable victims among the peace population which are inevitable at the big dispersion of bombs.

Attraction of the Russian ships for artillery attacks is impossible owing to that all coastal line of Syria is supervised by armies of the lawful government and our tools to get to insurgents of YOKES are simply incapable. And fire possibilities of fleet are not so great to give appreciable support to armies on a seaside direction.

For what prepares "Kuznetsov"?

It is necessary to involve only our unique heavy aviabearing cruiser (TAKR) «the Admiral of fleet of Soviet Union of Kuznetsov». Preparation for ship sending goes to Syria at full speed. It is obvious on character of its activity last weeks and proves to be true the information from authentic sources. Preschedule conclusion TAKR from planned average repair and active combat training in the sea with intensive flights of aviagroup testify that in the near future it will be directed to East Mediterranean and will join operations. Thereupon it is important to estimate, what contribution can bring our cruiser in the decision of a problem of defeat of formations of YOKES, is how much capable to raise fighting possibilities of the Russian aviagrouping.

The main thing and unique tool TAKR in struggle against YOKES is its aviagroup - Su-33 and MiG-29K/KUB. From various sources it is known that now in its structure in an airworthy condition of 14 Su-33 (seven more stored), 10 MiG-29K and two MiG-29KUB. Total - 26 cars which can be involved for blows on objects of YOKES. In 279th ship istrebitelnom to an aviaregiment there are eight Su-25UTG. This educational attack plane has no aim equipment, blocks of a control system of the weapon, balochnyh holders and pilonov, gun installation, therefore for conducting operations it is not necessary.

By 1995 on the Soviet stocks it was possible to prepare ten front pilots for work from a deck of our aircraft carrier. Further preparation of new experts and maintenance of their qualification were conducted rather ogranichenno. On the middle 2000, by data from authentic sources, in Russia remains about eight persons having skills of flights from a deck of "Kuznetsova". With the beginning of real revival of ours VS the great attention began to be given to combat training, including to increase in number of pilots of the ship aircraft, capable to carry out flights on Su-33 and MiG-29K/KUB from deck TAKR. However soon after end in May, 2014 of a distant campaign of "Kuznetsov" has been put on planned repair, flights from its deck became impossible. Nevertheless a military management, well realising importance of ship aircraft for protection of interests of Russia in remote regions and understanding high probability of retraction of the country in the conflict in Syria, has taken measures. As a result by this time it was possible to complete with serviceable planes aviagroup "Кузнецова" in full. But the problem with pilots remains. The matter is that their preparation demands essentially bolshego time, than usually, - on development of specificity of flight from a deck even at the skilled pilot leaves not less than two years of special trainings. Possibly, for this reason ours TAKR, leaving today to Barents sea, actively fulfils runway operations. Taking into account told it is possible to admit that after an intensive course of preparation of flight structure the aircraft carrier can leave to coast of Syria, having the fully completed aviagroup - both cars, and flight structure.

The cruiser will suffice for a week

Radius of actions of planes Su-33 and MiG-29K/KUB - one thousand kilometres (at flight with additional fuel tanks) - allows to strike blows to objects of "the Islamic state» on all depth Syrian TVD. The ship stock of aviation fuel makes 2500 tons. The authentic open data about quantity of units of aviation means of defeat had onboard the ship is not present. Presumably their stocks (on the basis of the data on the American aircraft carriers) make 1500-2000 units in lump of 1000-1200 tons. We will estimate a had resource of aviagroup of the ship. On fuel (taking into account 10-15 % NZ and allocation of 15-20 % on helicopters in interests of safety of the ship and aviagroup) is 350-400 samoletovyletov, and on the weapon - only 250-300 (at the full expense of a unit of fire in each departure).

The data about limiting intensity of flights from a deck of ours TAKR is not present now (for all history it never operated with full aviagroup with the maximum intensity). By comparison to the American and British aircraft carriers taking into account differences of technology of start (at Americans katapultnyj, at us ramp), power installation and number of attendants it is possible to assume that limiting daily intensity can make 35-40 samoletovyletov, that is 1,3-1,5 on the car a day. It means that at intensive application of aviagroup TAKR will spend a unit of fire and fuel for planes during seven - nine days then refuelling is required to it. And if to fill up stocks of aviation PETROLEUM PRODUCTS in the sea it is possible from the tanker with completion of stocks of aviation arms there will be problems - now the Russian fleet has no the ships of the complex supply, allowing to do it in the sea. Unique existing in the Navy of the Russian Federation such ship "Berezina" has been deduced from fleet structure in 2002 and utilised. Therefore "Kuznetsovu" after a week of intensive operation should or go in Tartus, or if it appears unacceptably for any reasons, to follow back on Council of Federation - after all pass through Bosporus and Dardanelless for it it can appear impossible (the exit of "Kuznetsova" from Black sea in 1992 has been interfaced to the considerable difficulties of legal character caused by the international status of these passages).

"Drying" we will leave on a pier?

Possibilities on defeat of the land purposes at our ship planes it is essentially separated as among themselves, and in comparison with available as a part of grouping VKS of Russia in Syria. First of all it is necessary to notice that deck planes are not equipped by system SVP-24 yet. In operations against the sea purposes it, being calculated exclusively on static objects, has the limited value, and problems of defeat of land objects in this case always were considered as the minor. Therefore first of all doosnashchenie system SVP-24 we passed planes of the front aircraft, which work we see in Syria. Thereupon it is necessary to recognise the limited suitability for blows on an infrastructure of YOKES of planes Su-33. Optimised for the decision of problems of air defence of ship groupings in the sea, on the land purposes they can apply to blows only uncontrollable ammunition: NURS (80 units of 80-mm С-8 in four containers on 20 rockets, or 20 units of 122-mm С-13 in four blocks on five rockets, or four 266-mm С-25) and bombs of free falling in calibre from 100 to 500 kgs in lump to four-five tons (taking into account restriction on weight for launch from a deck). Application NURS assumes drawing of blows from small heights at removal from the purpose no more than 1500 metres that does these planes vulnerable for PZRK Islamites, and it is unacceptable on political grounds. Bombing from the big heights leads to considerable dispersion of ammunition. Thus, these cars can be used or for support of other shock planes (that while is irrelevant, judging by a situation in the sky of Syria), or for blows on the vulgar purposes located out of settlements. The last also is improbable. That is Su-33 of the essential contribution to fire defeat of gangs of YOKES cannot bring.

There are 12 MiG-29K/KUB. These multi-purpose planes have the big possibilities for drawing of blows on the land purposes. Their control system and arms applications allows to use new samples of high-precision aviation means of defeat - rockets H-29 and Х-25, corrected bombs of incorporated bank-500Kr and incorporated bank-500L. On a departure such plane can take two - four rockets or two corrected bombs. Accordingly under favorable weather conditions and visibility, and also ought tseleukazanii it is capable for a departure reliably and with split-hair accuracy to kill one-two object of insurgents.

The available quantity of cars of this type allows to carry out every day to 20 samoletovyletov. But then for high-grade use of a resource of these planes within a week-one and a half onboard TAKR should be an order of 250-350 high-precision ammunition which, seemingly, at Russia are not present today. Therefore possibilities of planes will be limited by presence of arms. But even if to assume that ours TAKR will equip with demanded quantity of the WTO, for a week it can destroy an order of 120-160 typical purposes. In comparison with results of actions of the Russian aviation grouping in Syria it about 15-20 percent from its greatest fighting possibilities.

That is potentially our Navy the only thing TAKR is capable not more often than an once in half a year (taking into account necessity of return on Council of Federation) within a week-one and a half to raise fighting possibilities of grouping VKS of the Russian Federation in Syria on size which will not allow to affect a course of operations essentially. Such is a result of quarter-century suffocation of fleet, in particular losses of four of five domestic aircraft carriers.

Konstantin Sivkov

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