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Some results of the reform of the Armed Forces
Material posted: Publication date: 17-11-2012

The weekly "military-industrial complex" continues in its pages the subject of army reform. The author of this article participated actively in the drafting of the monograph "Reforms in circles or waste of money", published by alumni and professors of the Military financial and economic University.

The first decade of the twenty-first century clearly demonstrated that the "color revolutions", new forms and methods of warfare, or so-called network-centric warfare require the government and the military leadership of our country rethinking and a transformation of the theory and practice of building the Armed Forces and their application in new conditions. Therefore, the objective need for reform.

According to military researchers, in the history of our state seven times was carried out transformation of the military organization and more than 15 times reformed Armed Forces. And always reforms were very complicated, responsible and difficult process.

The condition of the aircraft by 2008 was characterized by the following generalized metrics:

  • the share of connections and military units of constant readiness: divisions – 25% of teams – 57, aviation regiments – 7;
  • the number of military towns to base – over 20 thousand;
  • the number of Armed Forces – 1 134 000 servicemen, including officers – 350 thousand (31%), warrant officers and 140 thousand (12%), soldiers and sergeants on contract – about 200 thousand (17%);
  • the equipment with modern armament, military and special equipment – three to five percent;
  • the number of officers in need of housing, more than 100 thousand people.


Main directions and activities

The leadership of the state and the Ministry of defence in September – December 2008 was adopted a number of decisions for the task of creating a mobile, equipped with advanced equipment, well-trained Armed Forces. The main areas of reform were identified:

First. The translation of all the formations and military units in the category of constant readiness.

Second. Re-equipment of the armed forces with modern weapons, military and special equipment.

Third. Professional military training, development of new programs for their training, the creation of a modern network of military schools.

Fourth. Processing of the basic documents regulating the use of the armed forces, to ensure consistency of forms and methods of warfare with the requirements of modern war.

Fifth. Increase of material incentives for military work, the solution of the housing problem.

The main large-scale events on the development of prospective image of the army of the new Russia, according to the chief of the General staff Nikolai Makarov, were conducted in 2009-2010. As a result, the Armed Forces created a new image set with a staff strength of one million soldiers and Junior officers share in the total number of officers 68 per cent.

In the framework of implementation of the first reform implemented the following main activities. Out of the existing divisions formed three brigades of nearly 5 thousand to 6.5 thousand people: "heavy", "medium", "light". To heavy are tanks and most infantry brigades. They have high impact strength and durability, and focused on the confrontation with similar highly equipped tactical units of the enemy. "Average" teams equipped with armored personnel carrier, intended for conducting combat operations of varying intensity, including in the specific conditions of the city, mountain, wooded mountain, wooded area, etc. "Light" brigades equipped with off-road motor vehicles and are intended for use in cases where the use of "heavy" and "medium" brigades is impossible or impractical.

Have changed approaches in mobilization deployment: mobilization lifted the load with the commanders of military units and formations of constant readiness to concentrate their efforts on raising the combat readiness and their implementation as intended. Questions complete mobilization formed on wartime connections and the military units took over the district managers. Directly responsible for their formation began to fall on the heads of training centres and universities.

All connections, statements by individual officials of the defense Ministry, were the units of permanent readiness. This has reduced the preparation time to accomplish combat tasks to several hours.

In order to bring the structure of the Armed Forces to the new military threats on the basis of six existed from December 1, 2010 established four strategic commands (military districts) - Western, southern, Central, Eastern, with the subordination of the fleets (flotillas), air force command and air defense and all of the formations and military units stationed on their territory, with the exception of strategic nuclear forces. That is, at the strategic directions established interspecific grouping of troops and forces.

In order to improve the stability and efficiency of the management raznovidni groups of troops (forces) in the district and army sets formed teams that need to be equipped with modern information and telecommunication means and systems.

As a result of the changes, according to Nikolai Makarov, made during the lecture for the leadership of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus in 2011, the General staff was freed from duplicating functions and became a full-fledged strategic planning body that organizes and manages the aircraft while performing assigned tasks. The main command of the Armed Forces to concentrate their efforts on the construction of types of armed forces, organization of combat training, training of officers and Junior specialists, formulate requirements for new weapons and military equipment, the planning of peacekeeping activities.

In 2010 was formed a unified system of material-technical support of troops (forces), including complex base of logistics as integrated logistics centres, managers of all types of supplies and transport at the scale of a military district (fleet). Military unit rear and technical support are summarized in brigade logistics support. At the same time began the transition to service fleet vehicles of companies that perform the repair of weapons and military equipment belonging to open joint stock company "Oboronservis." Several functions in support of troops (forces) was given to the enterprises of civil sector of economy in terms of outsourcing: maintenance and repair of equipment, provision of staff meals and bath-Laundry services, transportation of cargoes, bunkering (refueling vessel with fuel and engine oils) ships of the Navy, the airfield complex-operational service of aircraft, refueling of automotive vehicles through a network of gas stations, operation of municipal infrastructure.

The new system of basing of troops (forces) involves 184 military town (from 80 base) with the placement of personnel in the Armed Forces totaling more than 700 thousand.

In order to optimize the system-based aircraft of the armed forces carried out the reformation 31 aviation base of the air forces of eight air bases. For mobility, firing capabilities of troops were created aviation base of army aviation.

The implementation of the second direction – re-equipment of the Armed Forces with modern weapons, military and special equipment were the most challenging. Priorities for the Armed Forces defined the strategic nuclear forces, means of aerospace defense, aviation, space systems, reconnaissance and electronic warfare, communications, automated control systems, which are included in the approved State program of armaments for 2011-2020.

For implementation of the State armament programme provides a 19.2 trillion rubles, almost four times more than the program 2007-2015 (4.5 trillion rubles). The main features of the new program are significant resources being invested in R & d (about two trillion rubles), improvement of strategic nuclear weapons: the development of land-based missile groups and the modernization of strategic aviation, Tu-95 and Tu-160 (two trillion). The program includes the development of new weapons and military equipment: new heavy liquid Intercontinental ballistic missile to replace the obsolete ICBMs RS-18 and RS-20, promising aviation complex distant aviation (prospective Russian strategic bomber).

Planned activities to improve the quality of equipment of the Armed Forces allows us to set goals to achieve by 2015 the welfare of the Armed Forces with modern weapons and military equipment – 30 per cent, and by 2020 up to 70 percent or more.

The implementation of the third direction of the reform of the Armed Forces professional military training, development of new programs for their training, the creation of a modern network of military schools, required a reorganization of the military education system. From 1 September 2011 the military-educational institutions MO of the Russian Federation has commenced training of officers with higher military operational-tactical training and high military operative-strategic training on programs of additional professional education. The Ministry of defence of the Russian Federation started to apply common approaches to the training of civil and military schools: officers of primary care began to prepare programme of specialist training, and in species the academies and the Military Academy of the General staff of the Russian armed forces on programs of additional professional education, professional sergeants – at educational connections and military units, schools of sergeants and higher educational institutions of the defence Ministry, on the programs of secondary professional education. In 2009 this training was launched in six universities of the Ministry of defense of Russia, including in the Center of sergeants training (Ryazan), in 2010-m – in 19 higher education institutions, in 2011 24.

The network and capacity of military educational institutions was given in compliance with the modified parameters of personnel order. As a result of the activities created military educational-scientific centers of the Armed Forces, escalated the number of military academies and universities, the total number of higher military educational institutions has been reduced from 64 to 16.

A task as creating attractive conditions of military service increase the proportion of contract servicemen. As a matter of priority, it was planned to recruit contract soldiers and units stationed on the territory of the Chechen Republic, the shipboard Navy, brigade of special purpose, military posts of sergeants and positions that determine the combat capability of military units, as well as positions of specialists, providing training, operation of complex and expensive weapons and military equipment in the air force, the strategic missile forces and Space forces. In 2012 it was supposed to be in the Armed Forces 268,1 thousand, and in 2013-m – 425 thousand contract employees.

The need for the implementation of the fourth direction – processing of the basic documents regulating the use of sun, has been adapted to the changing nature of contemporary and future armed struggle. These documents are compared with previously existing entail a greater volume of strategic deterrence, and destroy critical enemy targets.

In the fifth directions of reforming the Armed Forces increase material incentives for military work – efforts had been made for the provision of housing for servicemen, laid the basis for the improvement of material incentives for military work and their subsequent implementation from 1 January 2012.

However an independent, objective analysis of real, not declared the results of the reforms of the Russian Armed Forces, what lead up to the country with a great love of all three or four of the head and especially the chief of General staff and defense Minister, shows that many tasks were far from their implementation and have not achieved the desired results.


The experience of others not for Russia

Military reform Serdyukov – Makarova, which was held in 2008 -2011 years and the completion of which triumphantly announced at the beginning of 2012, hardly can be considered successful because it did not answer a number of fundamental issues. The reform was conducted without broad coverage of its goals and objectives in print, without discussion with the scientific community and even after its end are a mystery, the criteria under which was created a new image of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

It is not possible to objectively evaluate the ability of SA to perform their tasks.

There is no substantiation of expediency of transfer of all military divisions, including the category of constant readiness on a team basis.

Incomprehensible system of strategic reserves to create layered groupings of the armed forces.

Is not defined and carried out specific measures for the optimization of the systems of rear and technical support.

A significant reduction in officers, especially the military authorities, has already resulted in the loss of professional staff and reduce the effectiveness of management at all levels (from the Ministry of defence and the General staff to the military districts and brigades).

It seems that conducting military reform, defense Ministry have largely copied the American experience (forms and methods of military actions, the statutes and regulations, the percentage of officers in the Armed Forces, etc.).

Is often cited the experience of military campaigns of a multinational force led by the U.S. in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and, finally, in Libya and stated that the Armed forces of Russia should go to war in the same ways, to agile action in the broad bands, to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy, to bypass and block the pockets of resistance.

But how can you compare the military capabilities of the USA, the coalition of NATO member States and countries subjected to their aggression in the end of XX – beginning of XXI century? Owning a large number of long-range precision weapons (WTO), the absolute superiority in the air, at sea, in space, in management (communications, navigation, reconnaissance, EW, ACS), NATO forces, fighting against the armies with outdated weapons and military equipment, could easily implement network-centric methods of control of troops (forces), attack a zone beyond the reach of the weapons of the defenders almost without loosing troops (forces), to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy, in a short time drastically reduce his morale, hit the system of state and military control, the objects of vital activity of States during times of peace and in a short time to conclude the military campaign, then getting to the post-conflict settlement.

Russian military science, analyzing the experience of these wars, believed such ways of action perspective and made conclusions and suggestions on how, in what direction should develop weapons and systems of control of troops (forces) in the armed forces. The only question is how much it costs for the state and will provide our military-industrial complex development and creation of modern and advanced weapons.

In addition, our science does not exclude the operation of "Decent wages" (12 July – 15 August 2006) Israel against the forces of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which for some reason don't like to remember our reformers. She was a shining example of effective asymmetric action in the fight against a superior enemy. Well-trained and highly equipped modern army of Israel were unable to perform the tasks, fighting against weak current terrorist sabotage and other guerrilla methods, showed high morale, ability to conduct propaganda (information confrontation), and suddenly introduce a significant amount of rocket systems of volley fire (Israel considered them "Katyusha" with rusty rails and obsolete ammunition).

It should be noted that the tasks of the U.S. armed forces and our army is radically not the same. The U.S. and its NATO allies for decades are, as a rule, offensive military action outside its territory, always have the initiative in the war, fighting with a weak opponent. Therefore, their experience is not typical for us. First and foremost, we need to ensure the protection of its territory and therefore, in the beginning of the war will have to conduct defensive actions against a stronger, fundamentally different at each theatre of the enemy.

Of course, in the beginning of the war the military, including defensive activities may be highly maneuverable nature. But the character of the armed struggle was, in the First and in the beginning of the Second world (great Patriotic), and in contemporary armed conflicts. So objectively the armed struggle between opposing forces are approximately equal and saves the character position, not eliminated the problem of break (overcome) defense, development, success and other forms and methods of fighting.

Thus, carrying out military reform and creating a new image of the Armed Forces, developing advanced forms and methods of their application, need to evaluate deeply the military-political situation, the potential enemy, who might have to fight in different theatres. And because in the short term to equip the army and Navy is unrealistic, need to look and asymmetrical methods of performing the tasks of the Armed Forces.


Where to focus

Decision on formation of four military districts (joint strategic commands) instead of six, on the elimination of divisions and the formation of teams, their uniform distribution in the territory of the country from Kaliningrad to Kamchatka and Sakhalin, on the establishment of mixed bases (a total of eight on the vast territory of Russia), the radical restructuring of the system of complete mobilization, logistics and others seem not deeply reasoned and convincing. At least none of the leadership of the Ministry of defence and the General staff did not try to do it. At all levels, but only by the reformers, these solutions are presented as a great achievement of the military reform.

Of course, the creation of inter-service groups of troops and forces under the control of commander of the military district (joint strategic command) is necessary. But this idea is not new. Even under the old military-district division of the territory of the country, which, incidentally, almost coincides with the administrative division (Federal districts), the question of granting district status operational-strategic command, which is defined in the regulations of the military district. However for a given concrete solutions in the new environment is not enough political will. When the chief of the General staff Yuri Baluyevsky deeply studied a question of creation of regional commands combining troops (forces) of several military districts and fleets, were conducted experimental strategic learning, in the Academy of the General staff was an interesting scientific conference at which there were different points of view. In fact, these ideas, transformed, form the basis for the creation of the joint strategic commands.

The only "deep" reason for only four counties put forward the idea that we had six districts and seven army commanders, and therefore had no complete County government. We now have 10 army commands four military districts. Apparently, there is an opportunity to create competition between commanders for the positions of Deputy commander and commander of the district.

Second reason – the presence in the Armed Forces of the four associations air force and air defense, so each of them must be subordinate to the district – is not convincing. If you follow this logic, then tomorrow in the case of a decision on dissolution of associations air force and air defense will have to liquidate and military district. Who prevented us to deploy in each of the six military districts corresponding to the formation of air force and air defense, assuming that the value of the aerospace sector in contemporary armed struggle steadily increases?!

The area of responsibility of the newly formed military districts and armies is so great that to have effective control of troops and forces is very difficult. Moreover, the grouping of troops (forces) are not independent. In any case you have to regroup with other TVD to increase it.

Given today's realities with military transport aviation and the availability of rolling stock (railway platforms) in JSC "Russian Railways", such regrouping of troops (forces) are a huge problem. According to the experience of exercise "Zapad-2009" rearrangement of one brigade on the territory of Belarus at a distance of 1,000 miles took five days. And this is without exposure to the enemy. Calculations show that in the far East (from Moscow to Vladivostok 9228 km) transport of one crew on the TRANS-Siberian railway can take up to 2.5 months, and taking into account possible acts of sabotage potential enemy normal functioning of this railway will be broken even before the outbreak of hostilities.

In view of the above, it is impossible to destroy the system of mobilization deployment of military districts. Of course, it should be reformed. How? You need to think deeply and discuss with the scientific community, bodies of military management. Heads of training centers and military educational institutions (of which there are only 16) to solve this task in the required amount and with high efficiency can not. Contain on strategic directions in peacetime groupings of troops (forces) required for war, in constant readiness in that the amount is unreasonable and expensive.

The disbanding of divisions and creation on their basis of brigades of permanent readiness was justified by the defense Ministry of the need to increase the mobility of troops (forces) of their level of operational and combat training. Goals are definitely good and to challenge them does not make sense. But there are no scientifically based judgment about unconditional benefit introduced Brigadier principle of manning.

In this task there is no sequence: division of the left in the Navy – the mobile branch of the army and strategic rocket forces. And if the strategic missile forces with more or less clear, their abandonment of logic in the Navy there. The assessment of the commander of airborne troops Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, the divisional structure is a traditional, proven practice, the organization that developed and control system, and system components. Considering that each TVD, the enemy will be different, he must confront the troops (forces) with the appropriate organizational structure.

For example, on the Eastern theatre need not mobile team, and a strong division, possessing great striking power and high fire capabilities. The approval of the army General Nikolai Makarov that the firing capabilities of the newly created teams are not inferior to the divisions, is far from the truth.

Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev came to the following conclusions: "motor rifle brigade – the main connection is a new image of the Russian army in its combat capabilities, the number of combat units does not differ from disbanded regiments – the same three motorized rifle and tank battalions, artillery and anti-aircraft divisions. They are created on the basis of one of the regiments disbanded divisions. In division four such regiments, including one tank. 39 combined-arms brigades (deployed 100 combined and special brigades in the Ground forces) combat equivalent is less than 10 divisions. Less because in division there is artillery and anti-aircraft missile regiments and a tank battalion. Troops simply did not manned. In our supposedly million-man army at present a huge shortage – more than 20 percent, about 200 thousand people. So, brigade are at best only partially Bogatova as their composition.

Is very low and qualification of personnel. Conscripts serve one year. The call extends over several months. Many recruits come to the army with body mass deficiency and before you start training, they have to fatten up in hospitals. The situation is even worse-educated conscripts: young men come into the army, often with two or three classes, and sometimes even illiterate. In these conditions qualitatively to prepare specialists, which determine the combat capability of units: tipper-OFS-operators, drivers of tanks and combat vehicles, artillery, anti-aircraft gunners, scouts, signallers, is not possible. Organizational structure of teams than with the regiment more bulky, in fact it is a regiment with a divisional set of units of maintenance and service, which significantly complicates the management team, even in peacetime, during exercises, I'm not talking about combat conditions. Many times convinced of it in practice".

If we carefully analyze the threats to military security of Russia, the most difficult situation develops in the West and the far East.

In the West the army with innovative contactless forms and methods of use of the latest capabilities. Due to hit Europe pacifism the probability of collision with NATO is unlikely. But risks are not the statements of some politicians and power deployed in Europe groups, which optionally can be reinforced. In the area of the CFE Treaty (on the European continent), the North Atlantic Alliance has 24 divisions and brigades 254. Their weapons 13 thousand tanks, 25 thousand armored combat vehicles, 15,5 thousand artillery systems. This grouping can be reinforced by American troops. In the means of combat support (administration, communication, reconnaissance, navigation, EW) the advantage of the armed forces of NATO on the Russian armed forces is much higher than in humans and the "glands". Their General excellence is such that we should be talking not about the times, and on orders of magnitude. With this in mind, you do not need a special evidence that Western military district in its current composition is unable to reflect the impact of opposing groups.

But in the West a greater threat than forces group, are a constant and growing opportunities for conducting information warfare. Rapidly developing information technologies already allow US armed forces to master the techniques and methods of such a war. However, published on the website of the Ministry of defense of the "Conceptual views on the activities of the Ministry of defence of the Russian Federation in the information space" does not answer the question of how to counteract the information war, what means and methods are used to conduct information warfare. Unfortunately, today there is no task, no relevant scientific institutions on conducting research in this important direction.

In the East, two military districts (Beijing and Shenyang) from the seven available in the PRC, the strongest of all the Land forces of the Russian Federation together. And considering that in the Eastern military district combined-arms formations not more than one-third, this excellence even higher. China over the last 20 years has bought Russian fighter jets su-27, su-30, SRCT "Thor", s-300 and other military equipment, all was copied without a license and produces large batches, no selling abroad. And apparently, it is no accident that in Soviet times, this theatre was located the largest grouping of troops (Feb, Toph, Utilized, etc.) with the presence of many units of permanent readiness, and its governance was carried out by the Rate of troops of the Far East. It is surprising that even this historical example clearly ignored by modern reformers. It reasonably follows from the statements of Lieutenant General Sobolev, "In the 29th army, which now occupies the former headquarters of the Siberian military district in Chita, only one brigade from Ulan-Ude to Belogorska – which is about three thousand kilometers of the state border. In the event of armed conflict with China the Chinese will be very difficult to find it, to capture or destroy... Not funny".

To a certain extent, capable of solving problems of the troops of the southern military district, in case Georgia will try again to use force to restore control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as support to internal troops of the interior Ministry in the fight against separatist groups in the North Caucasus.

Troops and forces of the Central military district in solving problems in Central Asia within the CSTO will also be able to fend off attempts by the Taliban (after the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan) to spread its influence in Central Asia. Moreover, the number of troops in these districts, according to some military experts, clearly excessively to counter the threats that exist to cover their tracks.

Thus, it should be noted that the created grouping and connections in the new organizational structure is not able on their own to reflect possible aggression on both the West and East of the country, but can solve problems in the South.

What to do in this situation?

There are two primary courses of action.

The first major effort to focus on the further development of the strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, in Russia's Military doctrine, officially declared: "In case of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons when threatened the very existence of the state..." it should also ensure the protection of "disarming" strike, not to be deprived of a willingness to retaliate with nuclear forces of Russia.

The second option is to concentrate mostly on strategic deterrence, including the prevention of military conflicts, maintaining the ability of the Armed Forces for early deployment in potentially dangerous strategic directions, their readiness for combat use. While in the West, need a strong formation and missile defense, able to reflect the air strikes, cruise missiles of the enemy. In the East it is advisable to restore the division to strengthen their reactive and other artillery.

Given the above, we need a clear national strategy, which would determine choices of military construction. Today such a strategy, unfortunately, no.


Personnel problem

What the reform was in dealing with personnel issues? Apparently, more negative than positive. Reduced the number of staff officer posts to 150 thousand (before the reform there were about 350 thousand), which is more than two times. A significant portion of those who were of the apartment, left the Armed Forces at once, and it's not the worst, but the most highly trained officers. They took the opportunity to resign due to the restructuring activities. Part of officers, up to the present time is at the disposal of commanders and superiors, waiting for the apartment. As a result a huge number of troops get the money, but do not serve and do not work. Liquidation of Institute of ensigns and warrant officers. It is clear that this category had a lot of problems, but solving it radically (by a principle: no man – no problem), were dismissed by experienced professionals, serving the complex samples of armament (Navy, air force, Space forces, strategic rocket forces, etc.).

The question arises: what motivated the reformers? It turns out that American experience. But let us give at least one example. The crew of the aircraft carrier "Nimitz" is around 3,200 people, among them officers – 203 (6%), the composition of air wing – 2840 people, including officers – 366 (approximately 13%). On the aircraft carrier is the command of carrier strike group (Aug) – 75 people, including 25 officers (one third). Who are the others? Untrained soldiers-conscripts? No, of course. This highly-trained specialists who are not officers, but who have higher education and successfully operating complex weapons systems, nuclear installations, navigation, etc.

It is quite obvious that before you cut officers and warrant officers (midshipmen) in the regular army, it was necessary to gradually increase the proportion of contract employees with appropriate education and also create the Institute of professional sergeants (which, despite the measures taken, almost never appeared). And generally these two processes are perfectly correlated: it was necessary to increase the number of trained specialists privates and non-commissioned officers and reducing officer positions. This process is not instantaneous and have been implemented in a planned manner on the basis of the chosen strategy.

The result of this reform was, as it turned out, the inability of the officers of the newly formed headquarters to organize and conduct operational training. So now we are talking about increasing the lifespan of generals and officers for five years, attracting already dismissed generals to assist in carrying out operational-strategic, operational and command-staff exercises, in the educational work with personnel.

The reform of the military education system has not appeared, scientifically-based state order for training specialists in military schools. In some universities the admission of students was drastically reduced, and some abandoned. For example, in the Military Academy of the General staff (WAGS) in 2009 accepted 16 students, in 2010-m – 11. Considering that after graduation, on average, before retirement, they are not more than 10 years, during this period BAGS will be able to prepare (under the current rules set) one hundred and fifty specialists. At the same time, there is no denying that the operational-strategic and strategic education, you must have the officers of the General staff, main staffs of kinds of armed forces, staffs of combat arms, military districts, fleets, commanders of associations. Simple calculations show that every year, the Academy should prepare at least 80-100 professionals.

In addition, the system of training of officers has not yet undergone any major changes (apart from the introduction of species in the academies and in VAHS ten - and six-month programs of additional professional education) and officers for the Armed Forces a new image of continue in fact to prepare on reduced, but old in their content programs. It is known that the more powerful weapons Arsenal, the wiser heads must be those who possess them. Hence, the system of military education must be brought into compliance with the requirements of the time and to entrust this task to professionals should.


The confusion

Many ambiguities remain in the construction of the branches of the armed forces. In particular, there is no objective answer to the question: does Russia need nuclear aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers "Mistral" and for what purpose? If the warfare in remote areas of Russia areas, for combating piracy, it is understandable. What this means in the defense of their territory. Yes and they are applied independently, and not only in the shock troops. They need escorts, escort ships and supply vessels. The creation of Forces aerospace defense in fact was the arithmetic addition of the Space forces and the OSK VKO (the former Moscow air defense) and the prospects for future construction and development is unclear. There is no clear solution to afford fleets, preparing the infrastructure for their home. In addition:

  • the authority of the Ministry of defence and the General staff was left without a clear delineation of operational and administrative;
  • not achieved the consistency and implementation of the State program of armaments and state defense order in close conjunction with the plan for the construction and development of the Armed Forces, which together with the difficult situation in the military-industrial complex did not allow high rates to carry out re-equipment of the Armed Forces;
  • the state defense order for 2011, as recognized by Vladimir Putin, was actually disrupted;
  • do not allow the conflict of interests of the Ministry of defence (the buyer) and defense enterprises (seller) in the pricing of military products;
  • not formed an interdepartmental communications system of the Armed Forces and other elements of the military organization of the state in conditions of misalignment the degree of responsibility of other security agencies with the boundaries of the military districts, Federal districts of the Russian Federation (Federation subjects);
  • was not achieved the compatibility of management systems (especially communications and automated command and control systems/forces) military formations of different species and genera of the armed forces, other troops, belonging to the species grouping;
  • not defined steps to improve logistics support of troops outside the bases, in emergency situations and in other similar cases the use of outsourcing.

When you create a unified system of material-technical support brigade and the logistics base are concentrated in the district, in the armies for some reason the relevant authorities was not, though there is a Deputy commander for logistics support. Given that the army is the main operative Association, leading the fighting, logic in such a decision is not visible.

Radically restructured the system of military science, the number and staff number of research institutes was reduced, in the basic institutions established branches (which complicated management and had not improved the quality of scientific work). Most of the research institutes subordinated to the Military-scientific Committee, some of them ABOARD, which in turn are subject to the Department of education of the Ministry of defense. The main headquarters (the headquarters) types of aircraft and military branches responsible for the construction of their troops, are not able to carry out the scientific support for this crucial task. As a result of the reform of the scientific potential of institutes decreased (the number of doctors and candidates of science decreased in two and more times). And this at a time when the role of military science immeasurably.

It should be specially noted that the reform has not solved the critical problem is not improved the climate of relations in military collectives, the thinking of people in uniform and their mentality. The reform volitional, voluntaristic method finds its support primarily from the officers, because no one wants to ask their opinion. The prestige of the military profession is practically not increased, servicemen (in the bulk) there is no satisfaction of my service.


Mistakes can not be tolerated

Overall, despite some positive results of military reform: increasing military pensions, monetary allowances for certain categories of staff and others, its main results were less than spectacular and the declared aim to establish a mobile, equipped with advanced equipment, well-trained Armed Forces are not achieved. Apparently, this armed forces harm than significantly lost their ability at the appropriate level to solve problems of security of the state.

For the implementation of many thousands in number orgshtatnye and costly in financial activities "systematically" through trial and error and backroom agreements, uneconomic and often aimlessly spent huge sums of people's money. Billions to continued to go to payment of salaries to servicemen a long time (often years) to the disposal by the lack of housing, the creation and implementation of costly, uncontrolled commercial outsourcing system support and maintenance of troops (forces), abuse and illegal expenditures in construction and purchase of housing and in other cases, as is set out in the relevant chapters of this book.

The failure of military reforms is largely explained by the fact that the conduct charged completely untrained "professionals" who do not understand the essence of the reforms, completely alien to the objects and purposes of reform and is not responsible for the admitted failures of the state Armed Forces and state defense.

At the same time in the reform of the military organization and its Foundation – the Armed Forces not to make mistakes, because it affects the security, independence and integrity of the Russian Federation.

Alexander Rukshin, Colonel-General, head of Main operational Department of the General staff – Deputy chief of the General staff (2001-2008)


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