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On the development of Soviet military art in the period of the battle of Moscow and battle of Stalingrad
Material posted: Publication date: 31-01-2013

Study of the development of the art of war the red Army in the battles against Nazi troops in 1941 – 1942, is relevant. And Moscow (30.09.1941 – 20.04.1942.), and Stalingrad (17.07.1942 – 02.02.1943). the battle in the great Patriotic war and the second world war entered the history not only of the Soviet Union and its red Army, but also the entire world community.

In the battles near Moscow thwarted Hitler's plan of "lightning war", the capture of the capital of the USSR Moscow, the beginning of a decisive turn in the war in favor of the Soviet Union.

The defeat of Nazi troops at Stalingrad marked the beginning of radical change in the course of the great Patriotic and the second world war, radically changed the whole course of the fighting.

"Stalingrad was a new and incomparably higher stage of warfare" (History of the second world war vol. 3 (ed.1961), p.66).

In the course of defensive and offensive combat operations, improved the Soviet military art in the planning and preparation for the operation, management, methods of combat actions of troops and their military, logistical and logistics. Grew talented with acquired combat experience of the young commanders of fronts and armies, commanders of corps, divisions, brigades and more Junior staff. Gained experience of management of the State Defence Committee and GHQ chaired by I. V. Stalin. Improved work of the General staff. This allowed the Rate for the first time during the defensive battles at Stalingrad to make the decision, together with the General staff of the red Army and taking into account the views of the Military councils of fronts to plan, prepare and, from 19 November 1942, successfully carry out a major counter-offensive to encircle and destroy the main grouping of the enemy at Stalingrad (more than 330.000 soldiers and officers – 22 divisions and 160 separate parts).

It is not only the art of war, this military science.

Here is how it is written in the history of the great Patriotic war of the Soviet Union volume 3 (ed. 1961), p. 65:

The Stalingrad counter-offensive in its conception and implementation is the greatest contribution to military science, its further creative development. It has enriched the art of war a classic example of modern offensive operations with decisive purpose, culminating in the complete elimination of large enemy forces by its environment, destruction, and captivity".

History of the military art knows a few examples when the destruction of large enemy forces was achieved by way of the environment. More than two thousand years ago the Carthaginian army under Hannibal, with 50 thousand soldiers, surrounded and destroyed in the famous battle of cannae (Italy) the Roman army under the command of Varro in the population of 69 thousand people. Since "Cannes" were considered the highest example of leadership art. Many generals throughout history have tried to implement the "Cannes" in the struggle with the enemy. Especially the German. They considered themselves "masters of Cannes.

Hitler's generals wanted to carry out "Cannes" in the struggle against the red Army. During the offensive in 1941 – 1942, German troops conducted several large operations in the environment: in the area West of Minsk, to the southwest and to the East of Kiev, in the areas of Vyazma and Bryansk, West of Voronezh, Southeast of Kharkov, and in other places.

On the seventh day after the outbreak of war, 28 June 1941 German fascist troops surrounded three armies in the area West of Minsk. And in September of the same year to the East of Kiev is surrounded by four Soviet armies of the southwestern front. And if a significant part of the warriors 3, 10 and 13-the Western front armies is derived from the environment or left the guerrillas in the South-Western front the situation was more complex. Tens of thousands of soldiers and hundreds of commanders and political workers 21, 5, 37th and 26th armies heroically died in an unequal struggle. A significant part of soldiers and commanders, among whom were many wounded, not able to escape Nazi captivity.

Nazi command has announced in the press that the German troops captured in the center of Kiev 665 thousand prisoners. According to our data, before the beginning of the Kiev operation in the South-West front there were 677085. By the end of the operation remained 150541 people including soldiers of the 40th and 38th armies, not once in the environment, parts of front subordination and the rear. Big losses were suffered by the staffs of armies and fronts. Killed the commander of front, Colonel-General Kirponos, M. T., head of the front headquarters major General V. I. Tupikov, a member of the Military Council of the front M. A., Burmistenko.

No less deplorable was the situation in October 1941 in the area of Vyazma, where he was surrounded by part of our four armies (10, 20, 24 and 22). And in the area Southeast of Kharkov, in may – June 1942, when, instead of the success of the Kharkov offensive operation, 6-I, 57-I army (commanders Lieutenant General A. M. gorodnyansky and K. P. Podlas) and the group army major-General L. V. Babkin was surrounded by enemy troops and in the bulk is eliminated. Both died of the commander, the commander of the army task force and Deputy commander of South-West front Lieutenant General F. Ya.

In the battle of Stalingrad, none surrounded by German soldiers and officers of the encirclement failed. Only 42.000 sick and wounded Germans were taken to the aircraft. The rest were killed or captured by Soviet troops.

Army group "Center", having superiority in forces and means, planned to surround and Moscow. And then kill and surrounded, and the city itself. But the resistance of Soviet troops and residents of Moscow did not allow the German-fascist barbarians to do it. The desire to surround – confirms that the environment is the highest sample of the defeat of the enemy.

We can assumethat the first true example of "Modern Cannes is the operation to encircle and destroy the main grouping of fascist German troops by the red Army at Stalingrad 19 Nov 1942 – 2 Feb 1943

What questions should we pay attention to studying the experience of development of the art of war the red Army in this and in previous operations.

First of all, the wisdom of the plan and the process of its planning.

The idea of the offensive originated in the course of fierce defensive battles. The first outline of a future offensive operation was developed in a Rate in August 1942.

This was the period when the enemy had already crossed the don river in the lower and middle reaches, captured Rostov, Yeisk (120 km South-West of Rostov), Sal, walked to the Kotel (~ 120 km South-West of Stalingrad), were fighting on the last defensive line of Stalingrad. August 23, 1942, reached the Volga on the Northern outskirts of the city, and from the South – Sarpinsky lakes.

This is the period when workers Stavka and the General staff of the red Army and their leaders, given the miscalculations in the planning of military operations in 1942, realizing the need for urgent action, given the opportunity, looking for the right version to defend Stalingrad and the Caucasus. It was clear that the fall of Stalingrad is the signal for a Declaration of war by Japan and Turkey against the Soviet Union that could lead to the loss of our state of war. The exit was one – to hold Stalingrad, to save power and deliver a powerful blow to the enemy to defeat.

What kind of failures are we talking? Inspired by the success of the Moscow counter-offensive at the first stage, the Rate and the General staff believed that the enemy is "breathed out" and the Red Army has the opportunity to go on the offensive over the whole Soviet-German front. On 5 January 1942 at the meeting of the Stavka with the participation of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) decided on the transition of the red Army in a General offensive. January 7, issued a Directive assigning tasks to front. As of January 10, troops sent a guidance letter on the methods of organization and conduct of the offensive.

Presented to the commanders of the fronts of the approved plans, but not enough agreed. The interaction between the fronts was bad. The fronts of the Rate distributed to Strategic reserves – the newly formed eleven armies. Large armored units (tank and mechanized corps), we were not. No fro NT has not received a sufficient number of forces and equipment to complete the task. The overall superiority in forces and means was the enemy. The offensive on all fronts failed. It was premature. Rate tried a similar mistake to avoid.

The initial version of the plan was limited. He called for the strike from Serafimovich and West of it into the flank of the enemy grouping that broke at Stalingrad, one of the front (two or three armies, and three or four tank corps).

Increasing the tension of the situation did not allow at that time conceived operation.

Taking into account the views of the Military Councils of the fronts of the plan specified. Planned encirclement by counter-attacks only the enemy that entered the city. But creative thought worked deeper.

In late September, the Stalingrad front was renamed into the don (commanded by Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky), and the South-East of Stalingrad (commanded by Colonel General A. I. Eremenko). 29 Oct between Voronezh and don fronts formed South-Western front (Commander General-Lieutenant N. F. Vatutin).

In the final version of the plan, based on careful study of the enemy, its defenses, operation, conventionally called "Uranium", is characterized by its sense of purpose, boldness of design and the huge scale, approved in October, 1942 (Scheme №1)

The offensive was conceived as a strategic operation three fronts – South-West, don and Stalingrad. It was developed simultaneously on a 400-kilometer front. Soviet troops took in a pincer movement of enemy forces within a radius of about 100 kilometers. To the greater number of troops to surround the enemy.

The red Army had to break through the defenses of the enemy, to defeat his forces North-West and South of Stalingrad, and then, advancing on converging lines, to reach the area of Kalach – on-don- Soviet to encircle the 6th and 4th Panzer German army, to create internal and external front of the encirclement, to destroy the surrounded and to develop the offensive to the West.

An important issue was the choice of the direction of the main blow, sections of a breakthrough of enemy defenses, the creation of groups of troops to break the defense, moving groups for the development of the offensive and encirclement of large groupings of the enemy.

According to the plan adopted by the Stavka, the Soviet troops, breaking through the defense on the flanks of the enemy, took the shortest paths in its rear, thus cut off from its main supply bases from a significant part of reserves located in the depth of the defense, broke off communication. Strikes where the defense was most vulnerable. This place was the stations, which operated the Romanian troops, the fighting capacity of which is inferior to the German, and the front of their defense compounds was stretched.

Were taken into account at the same time that our troops had bridgeheads on the right Bank of the don river and West of the Sarpinsky lakes, with which the troops will attack during the breakthrough of defense, and the shortest path to meet the goal of encirclement of the enemy.

Equally important was the availability of the train paths necessary for the creation of groups of troops, their support and supply.

Great creativity was shown by the commanders of fronts and armies during the selection of a breakthroughon the basis of the set objectives and the enemy's defense, given the conditions of the area.

South-Western front, which had a total length of over 250 km, set the task: to break through from the bridgehead to the West and South of Serafimovich and near tot the defense of the enemy and completely destroy him at the site of the Fish – Kletskaya. This site had a length of 95 km. In the area to break through the defense impossible. And to completely destroy the opponent. Front commander identified areas of breakthrough for each army based on their close interaction, as in the breakthrough, and the development of the offensive. The width of the sections of a breakthrough were determined by the army commanders in coordination with the commander of the front in such a way that, proceeding from presence of forces and means of their opponent, the strength of his defense, it was possible to create the necessary superiority for a successful breakthrough of enemy defenses and develop the offensive.

To the beginning of the operation the Soviet troops on all three fronts did not possess any significant superiority in forces and means. The number of people the forces were equal: we 1005000 fighters, the enemy is 1011000. 1.3 times our forces outnumbered the enemy tanks (894 to 675), at guns and mortars (13540 to 10300). And aircraft, our troops were inferior to the enemy in 1.1 times (1115 aircraft to 1216). (WILLOW T. 3 (ed. 1961), p.26).

On the directions of the main attacks , the Soviet command managed to create a significant advantage, in manpower and in technology by skillful rearrangements. For example, in the 21 th army SZF was superiority over the enemy: – the entire front of the offensive army in 1,4 times, on the main line 3 times, artillery all along the front in 2.4 times, and on the main line 4.6 times. The same pattern in the concentration of forces and means on the sections of the breakthrough was in other armies.

In creating a decisive superiority over the enemy in forces and means on the main axis was clearly shown a high level of military art of the Soviet command (IFS, vol. 3, (ed.1961), p.26).

The creation of such a superiority over the enemy depended not only on the increased talent of the higher command. His success was secured dedicated labor of the Soviet people, managed under the guidance of the State Defense Committee to be evacuated in June and November 1941, 1523 industrial enterprises, including 1360 military, to restore and to build their work. In the period of the battle of Moscow they were given the products. In 1942, produced 24700 tanks, 25400 combat aircraft, 127100 guns, 230000 mortars, including rocket launchers ("Katyusha"). It is possible to create two percussion groups: the North-West and South of Stalingrad, rich arms, military equipment, personnel, to provide them with fuel, ammunition and other materiel. All that was required promptly to deliver to the destination. And did it again working people.

In the Stalingrad battle for the first time in the history of the red Army, massively applied the armored and mechanized forces. (Scheme №1, №2), Especially during the counteroffensive and the offensive. Just participated in the battles: tank corps (TC) – 10, mechanized corps (MC) – 6, separate tank brigades (TRUNC) – 14 and 3 separate tank regiment (TNA). 83 % (of fought the entire Soviet-German front) tank and mechanized corps involved in the development of a counter-offensive. To the beginning of the counterattack Panzer corps only had 4 boxes – 3 (60%).

Separate tank brigades, regiments and battalions were attached to combined arms armies and operated in conjunction with infantry. The defense defended the frontiers, struck counterattacks, acting from ambushes. Often fragmented. In the offensive to ensure the promotion of the infantry, destroying enemy firing points. In the battle of Stalingrad separate tank brigades, regiments, battalions operated centrally under the leadership of their commanders, working closely with the infantry. By companies in infantry regiments could be heard as it was near Moscow.

Tank and mechanized corps were used as mobile teams (PRTs) armies. Here for the first time began to create and apply mobile teams. In the 5th tank army (Commander General-Lieutenant P. L. Romanenko) PGR consisted of two tank corps (1st TC, 26 TC) and one cavalry corps (8 CC). The 21st army (Commander major-General I. M. Chistyakov) in the PGR had 4 TC and 3 guards. KK. It is in the South-Western front. And in the Stalingrad front in the 51st army (Commander major-General N. And. Trufanov) acted in PGR 4 MC and 4 CC. In the 57-th army (Commander major-General F. I. Tolbukhin) as the mobile group operated 13 MK. Mobile teams have successfully solved the problem they decided to rout enemy reserves, surrounded by its main groups and creation of internal and external front of encirclement.

26 TC 5-th tank army, seized in the night of November 22, 1941 the only surviving bridge over the don river at Kalach on the don, renamed the 1st guards Donskoy tank corps (commander, I. G., Rodin).

4 TK (A. G. Kravchenko) 21st army had crossed over on the bridge, November 23, 1942 the United in the Soviet (article Krivorozhskaya) 4 MK (V. T. Wolski) 51-th army and 13 MK (T. N. Tenascin) 57-th army successfully pushed the enemy to the North in the encirclement, got the name "Stalingrad". This is the first time in the red Army.

Creative was the implementation of the defeat of the enemy in the defensive zone of the enemy a large extent, with a depth of 5-8 km, consisting of two positions, each with one or two lines of trenches and 3-4 bunker (earth-fill timber emplacements) on 1 km of front. The South-Western front, the breach carried out in the five narrow sections to break up the defenders of the enemy on the part of the interdiction maneuver. While surrounded by two Romanian corps, captured 27,000 soldiers and officers and three generals. Retreating from this area of the zone defense the enemy scattered groups of troops no resistance.

The same method and received the 51st and 57th army of the Stalingrad front. At the front is 45 km they broke through the defenses at four sites, defeated the 1st, 2nd and 18th infantry divisions, surrounded and captured 7000 Romanian soldiers and officers.

It should be noted that the breakthrough of the prepared defense of the enemy was not the only way to ensure success in the transition to the offensive. In defensive battles North-West of Moscow, 1st Shock, 20th, 16th and 30th of the army 3 Dec struck counterattacks on the advancing enemy, who , on 5 December escalated into a counteroffensive. The same thing happened to the South-West of Moscow. The counterattack of the 5th and 33rd armies 3-4 December, we broke through the enemy North of Narofominsk escalated to the offensive without the time, effort and funds for breakthrough of the prepared defense.

In defensive and offensive battles at Stalingrad examined the question of the organizational structures of armored and mechanized forces. In the first period of the war we after the disbandment of the mechanized corps, established before the war, and the disbanding armored divisions due to lack of tanks, participated in the battles of the independent tank battalions and regiments. Of the battalions began to form tank brigades. In Stalingrad I arrived as part of the 84th tank brigade as a tank commander in the 200th tank battalion. The brigade had two tank battalions (200 TB 201 TB) and mechanized infantry battalion. Such organization of the brigade lasted until the end of 1943. From February 1943 served in the 277-th separate tank battalion, which was part of the 31st tank brigade had its own Flag and seal. In April – may 1944, the tank brigades were reformed. Composition: three line tank battalions (1st, 2nd, 3rd TB) two tank companies (in the company of 10 tanks). Had two tank battalions of three companies. Ex 277 and 278 th OTB reformed into the 1st and 2nd TB, the newly formed 3rd tank battalion and a motorized battalion machine gunners (IBA). The brigade 65 tanks and special forces.

22 July 1942 when the fighting at Stalingrad was in the area between R. Chir and river don, during the retreat of our troops commenced the formation of the two tank armies. On the basis of the 38th army in the area South-West of Kalach on the don – the 1st tank army (TA 1): two tank corps (160 tanks) and one rifle division. Commander major General K. S. Moskalenko. On the basis of 28-th army 4th tank army (TA 4), one tank corps (80 tanks) and one rifle division. Commander major-General V. D. Kruchinin.

Not after forming, the army struck two counterattack against the coming enemy troops: July 27, 1 THE from the area of Kalach-on-don in Severo-the Western direction, July 28, 4 THE from the area Trehostrovskaya in a westerly direction. Having moved up to 35-40 km, they are deblocked two infantry divisions of the 62nd army, surrounded by German troops in the upper-Buzinovka, stopped the enemy offensive to the South along the right Bank of the river don and to the East, which allowed our troops organized a retreat, to gain a foothold on new lines and disrupt the enemy's attempt to seize Stalingrad.

However, due to the lagging infantry divisions, poorly organized artillery and air support, the task had not been fully implemented. Influenced not complete the staffing of the formed armies, the lack of experience of the management of tank armies, the organization of interaction, combat and logistics. All learned, acquired practical experience.

In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad participated the 5th Panzer army. In its composition except for two tank and one cavalry corps had six infantry divisions. Those infantry divisions that broke through the enemy's defenses on the main line with the help of the armored corps, far behind and from the tank, and cavalry corps. A large part of the infantry divisions was conducted jointly with the compounds of the 21st army fight for the environment, the destruction and capture of the Romanian part of the 4th and 5th corps until November 23, when the movable connection completed the encirclement and created the inner and outer front of encirclement. To manage these armies difficult. And the 1st, 4th, and 5th Panzer army in the battle of the task is completed. But experience has shown that to include in the tank armies of the sedentary infantry division is impractical. They impeded the maneuverability, complicates the management.

By the beginning of the battle of Kursk decided the typical composition of a tank army, two tank, one mechanized corps and special forces. Tank and mechanized corps were not constant. Newly formed in February – March 1943 5th guards tank army (Commander Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov) had in its composition of 18 TC 29 TC and 5 GW. MK. In the Prokhorovka battle army conquered another two tank corps (the 2nd and 2 guards. TK). In the battles on the right Bank Ukraine in 5 GW. SHE had three Panzer corps (18, 20, and 29 TK) and sometimes 7 MK 8 or MK. In the Korsun-Shevchenko operations during the offensive in 5 GW. SHE had three Panzer corps (18,20 and 29 TK). And if you hold the external front of encirclement of army subdued infantry corps and airborne division. In the Byelorussian operation "Bagration" in 5 GW. THAT was only two tank corps (3 GW. TC and 29 CC).

The composition of armored and mechanized corps was established. Panzer corps: three tank and one motorized rifle brigade. In a mechanized three mechanized and one tank brigades and special forces.

Highly maneuverable combat actions showed tank and mechanized corps without divisions in their structure, but in close cooperation with the combined armies in the development of a counter-offensive at Stalingrad in December 1942 and in the defeat of centrogenic enemy groups. They were advancing rapidly into the depth of the defense, dismembered enemy to pieces, surrounded and destroyed it, cut communications and seized the airfields. 24 tank corps of the southwestern front in five days moved 240 km, 24 December 1942, captured and Tatsinskaya airfield with planes, cut the railway Dashing the battle of Stalingrad and threatening the coverage of the left flank of army group "Goth" of the enemy. 24 TK is converted into the 2nd guards Tatsinskiy tank corps.

The commander major-General V. M. Badanov first was awarded the order of Suvorov II degree.

In the second phase of the battle of Stalingrad occurred a counter-battle in the defeat of centrogenic groups of the enemy – and Kotelnikovo Tormosina. (Scheme No. 2)

On the morning of 12 December 1942, Nazi troops went on the offensive South of Stalingrad from the area of Kotelnikovo along the railway Tikhoretsk – Stalingrad. The composition of the Kotelnikovo group were: 57th – tank corps (23rd, 6th, and then the 17th Panzer division). One of only 6 TD in its composition had 200 tanks and self-propelled guns. First formed in German Nazi army tank battalion heavy tank T-VI (tiger). Besides the remains of four infantry and two cavalry divisions of Romanians, as well as the individual units of the German field gendarmerie. This group was moving at 45 km in the direction of the encircled German troops at Stalingrad and continued to advance.

Taking into account the current situation, the Stavka decided to defeat first centradenia enemy group, then deal with the liquidation of surrounded by 6 And 4 and THAT of the Germans. 5th Shock army strengthened the left flank of the southwestern front to eliminate preparing to attack Thermosensory groups. To eliminate the Kotel groups in the composition of the Stalingrad front passed intended to participate in the liquidation of the encircled enemy 2nd guards army (Malinovsky). In it consisted of the 1st and 13th infantry corps and the 2nd guards mechanized (K. V. Sviridov). Army reinforced by the 7th tank corps (P. A. Rotmistrov) and 6th mechanized corps (S. I. Bogdanov). After unloading, having 200-280 km March in winter conditions on the road, 2 HS. army Dec 24, went on the offensive. At the same time regroup and then resumed the offensive and the enemy's main tank forces of the group of "Goth". There was a fierce counter-fighting major compounds. 2nd guards. the army broke the resistance of the enemy and began to move in the direction of Kotelnikovo. Special success had the troops moving. 7 TK, bypassing knots of resistance, traveled more than 120 km, 27 Dec reached the area of the Kotel to the rear of the enemy, defeated him at the reserves and the rear, seized the airfield with the aircraft and the 29th of December took possession of the city. Continuing a successful offensive 7 CC and 6 MC for Dubovskoye, and 13 MK and 3 guards. MK on Zimovniki, these highly mobile joints have threatened the communications of the entire Kotel groups.

7th tank corps for bravery in the battles against the Nazi invaders, for the resilience, courage, discipline and organization was transformed into the 3rd guards Kotel tank corps. The corps commander P. A. Rotmistrov promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and assigned the Bid to form a new 5-th guards tank army.

2 GW. MK in the center Top. Kurmoyarskaya crossed to the West Bank of the river don, and advancing 50 km, struck from the South blow Thermosensory group that contributed to its defeat.

The successful promotion of the four tank (17, 18, 24 and 25 TC), one mechanized (1 GW. MK and 5-th tank army of the southwestern front in a South-easterly direction, four mechanized (2 TS., 6, 13 and 3 guards.) buildings and one tank (7 TC) of the Stalingrad front in the South-West direction in close cooperation with the combined armies, cavalry corps, artillery and aircraft in a short period of time to eliminate centradenia enemy group and by 31 December 1942, to push the outer front is surrounded by up to 320 km North-West to 240-120 km to the West and South-West.

Improved techniques and methods of combat operations at the tactical level.

The successful execution of military tasks infantry division, regiment, battalion in the attack largely depended on the construction of combat formations, proper use of tanks, employment of artillery and their interactions. When the breakthrough was used two build battle formations of the divisions and regiments. There were reserves. During the development of the offensive in the operational depth of the regiments were sent the avant-garde battalions and intelligence. And divisions – the forward detachments consisting of reinforced regiment.

In tank and mechanized corps in the vanguard were sent a reinforced brigade. Her front was advancing, pursuing the enemy, reinforced battalion. As exploration ahead of removing the visual connection was fighting razvedat (one) – tank platoon (three tanks) of tank battalion. From infantry (mechanized) battalion – reinforced high-mobility platoon. When meeting the enemy vanguard battalions knocked him down or bypassed. This achieved high rates of progress and ensure the main force from surprise attack.

The success of the counter-offensive of our troops at Stalingrad contributed to the sudden onset. It was achieved by the secrecy of preparation for attack, disinformation of the enemy, masking the movement and concentration of troops and other activities. The counter-offensive of our troops near Stalingrad the enemy did not expect. For him it was the suddenness. The success of the advance of troops toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the intention to seize Stalingrad, to involve Turkey and Japan into a war against the Soviet Union to finally defeat the Red Army and the victorious end to the war clouded the brains of Hitler and his generals to such an extent that they even thought about the possibility of a dangerous turn in the course of the fighting, which occurred at Stalingrad. Let the Nazis and their intelligence.

However, the main when it was a secretive training of the counter-offensive of our troops. And planning. And training.

Three months with great effort moved daily trains from the East of our Motherland, the Soviet Union towards Stalingrad.

Three months in a Soviet labor and the military people who participated in this task, know in which areas and what to concentrate troops and military equipment and the necessary goods. But to the enemy this information is not leaked. To the credit of the Supreme command. In this merit and high patriotism of our dedicated, loyal to his Home people.

In preparation for the transition to a General offensive of the red Army in the winter of 1942, the Supreme command has taken decisive steps to generalization and development of the troops combat experience during the counter-offensive near Moscow.

In the policy letter Rates from 10 January 1942, setting out the conclusions based on the experience of the counter-offensive, and has revealed serious operational and tactical deficiencies in the actions of the troops. It was stated that one of the reasons for the slow breakthrough of the tactical zone of defense of the enemy is dispersed Soviet troops in certain areas and the use of artillery only artillery barrage. Rate ordered to abandon the uniform distribution of the divisions of the front, demanded to establish the main directions of the strong shock troops, and from the artillery preparation to begin the artillery attack, that is, to keep the fire of infantry and tanks to the final breakthrough of enemy defenses. The letter gave advice on a massive use of artillery and tanks and the organization of interaction between the armed forces of the full depth of the offensive.

22 January 1942, Stavka issued an order in which he demanded tank brigades and separate tank battalions in combat, as a rule, apply in full force and in close cooperation with infantry, artillery and aircraft. The order was forbidden to enter the tanks in combat without preliminary reconnaissance and the commander's reconnaissance. This order marked the beginning of massive use of Soviet armored forces.

The development of best practices was carried out in military schools in the preparation of the commanding personnel. Courses to improve officers and officers, courses of training of young specialists. In February 1942 in the system of universal military training has begun to establish special Komsomol-the youth division, which was preparing fighters, tanks, machine gunners, snipers and mortars. They were the reserve of the army or went to the front, where the best method was studied and improved the combat experience.

New short schools for training primary officer ranks began to be established in the beginning of the war. Heavy losses of aircraft on the ground and in the air, losses of tanks, artillery, and personnel, including commanders of primary (tank, plane, gun, platoon) required them with quick replacement. To prepare in a short time able for combat commander was only possible from a man with secondary education. After being drafted into the Red Army on 28 July 1941, many graduates zolotonis'kyi pedagogical school, including me, sent in the newly formed 2nd Kharkov tank school (2 of the hit), relocated in October 1941 in Samarkand, Uzbek SSR. School trained tank commanders and tank platoon. Training period of 6 months. In connection with the emergence of a new tank T-70 instead of T-60) our training period was extended for another 6 months. We, the students, learned new combat formations tank platoon, tank company and tank battalion in the attack. The novelty lay in the fact that the commander was determined for the battle order of the company and for the military order of the battalion. Until then, their place was ahead of that led to bad management and to rapid loss of commanders of companies and battalions. The commander of the platoon in battle lines along with linear tanks. After graduation, on July 28, 1942 a large group of young officers-soldiers sent to Gorky automobile plant to the tanks. I was appointed commander of a tank platoon (three tanks). The condition was this: the student who graduated from school and passed the state exam without "triples", received the military rank of "Lieutenant" and could be appointed platoon commander. And who got on the state exam at least one "three" that were assigned the military rank of Junior Lieutenant and was assigned as a tank commander. On arrival, as part of March a company in the 84th armored brigade command brigade commander, Commissioner and chief of staff) I as the commander of a tank platoon has not approved and offered to go to Gorky again to the tanks. Young (not yet 19), had no combat experience. I asked him to appoint me as the tank commander to the brigade to leave for the front.

Request approved. So I ended up in Stalingrad.

In the first part of this article highlighted the most important issues in the development of the art of war the red Army during the offensive. For the new creativity is most apparent in the offensive battles and greatly contributed to our success.

The battle of Stalingrad lasted six and a half months. Four months of them defensive battles (17.07 – 18.11.1942.).And in the city they lasted more than five months ( 23.08.1942 – 31.01.1943. 23 августа1942 14 Panzer corps of the 6th army of the Germans reached the Volga river on the site : Latoshinka Market and the battle for the Northern part of Stalingrad. Stalingrad declared a state of siege . January 31, 1943 the commander of the surrounded in the Stalingrad group of the German troops field Marshal Paulus took an ultimatum to surrender and stop resisting.

I had the opportunity to participate in the fighting in Stalingrad. Impression sad. After unloading on the train.d. station 50 km to the East of Stalingrad, the 200th tank battalion 84th tank brigade came to the Volga. The town, stretched for 30 km along the Western Bank of the river was burning. Night on the ferry, crossed and took up defensive positions. The firing position of my tank T-70 150 – 200 m North.-Zap. the fence of the Stalingrad tractor factory (STZ). the river Volga is 1.5-2 km behind. In front of the left flat open field. Next is a residential township traktorozavodskom. In front of a tank rare shrub, 200-300 m depth – separate houses. There are already German. 30-50 metres in the trench in front of our troops. But red is not visible.

It was the left flank of the 84th tank brigade, defending the Northern part of Stalingrad at the turn of the tractor factory, village of Spartanovka, Market.

Daily bombing. Frequent attacks of the enemy to acquire the tractor factory, to go in this direction to the Volga, to divide the 62-th army and destroy it. Given that the 62nd and the 64th army defending Stalingrad, was already cut off from their troops from the North and South, and that the relationship is all military and material support was carried out only over the Volga, it is possible to understand the complexity of retention in the city.

23 and 24 August the enemy struck at Stalingrad in a massive air strike. A city with 600 thousand population turned into piles of rubble. 400 thousand residents evacuated. The rest worked in factories, went to the militia, battalions of fighters of tanks, preparing engineering boom, joined in a military unit of signalmen, snipers, nurses. Especially girls. The city was defended by red Army soldiers and working people in close interaction.

For example. The enemy's attack on STZ reflect: the left flank of our tank battalion and Traktorozavodsky (militia fighters and workers). His infantry was not. At the same time before each attack to the tank have been used by the young man from the factory (13-15 years old) and warned that the Germans are preparing to attack. The plant worked and lived fathers and sons, and occupied by the Germans – the whole family. These young guys, knowing all the moves, entrances, sheltered places, who knew how to wield weapons, and intelligence. Sometimes had snuck in the location of the enemy, obtaining valuable information. So was and in other plants: the Barrikady, Red October.

In the fighting I from his tank destroyed three tanks and two guns of the enemy. Accounting destroyed the infantry of the enemy, together with Traktorozavodsky I had.

13 Sep 1942 the German fascist troops began the assault on the city. (13 divisions, 3 thousand guns and mortars, 500 tanks, 1,000 aircraft). A very difficult time. But our soldiers kept. They found new methods and forms of tactical combat with the enemy. Fought for each plant, for each residential block for a house for an important node or point defense. Railway station 13 times passed from hand to hand. Mamaev Kurgan a few times. Pavlov's house J. f held, surrounded by twelve soldiers of the red Army eight nationalities, which caused the enemy much trouble.

Our soldiers even passed in counterattack. One of them had the opportunity to participate and me. The infantry battalion was required to possess three houses, 1.5 – 2 km North.-Zap. tractor plant. My T-70 (tank commander Lieutenant Feng, A. f, the mechanic-driver senior Sergeant Svechkarev I. I.) was given the task to keep the fire levelingbuy rifle company in acquisition of two-storeyed house of barrack-type type. 27 fragmentation 45 mm shells I sent alternately to all Windows first and second floor. When our infantry crept nearer to the house, the signal rocket stopped firing at the Windows and sent two more rounds into the group of Germans who had fled to the house to help. And our hands with a cry of “Hurrah” burst into the house, finished off the surviving enemy soldiers and took possession of the house.

A small part of the residential quarter was released. This forced the enemy to temporarily stop the attack on the FTZ and to transfer part of their units in this direction.

Returning in order to his tank company, we I. by Svechkarev picked up on the street left without a crew for our tank company and had it towed over this it to its location. During the fighting the commander of the infantry battalion, praised, and my company commander senior Lieutenant I. K. Sinitsa has promised to provide our crew with the award.

Described the episode on mastering the house – it was one of the methods of fighting in the city. Commanders of formations and units refused to counterattack the whole parts. The shelves were created assault groups, small in number, strong blow, quirky. In this case, there were three assault groups, each consisting of a rifle company and a single tank.

Many new things were used in combat operations and in the management and combat support.

To make it impossible for the enemy to bomb our front in the 62nd army minimized the distance between Soviet and German troops To throw grenades). The headquarters closer to the front edge.

Due to the lack of tanks in combined arms formations and units in the city used them spread out over one or two cars in important areas, like fire spots, or included in the assault team. In addition, workers STZ repaired tanks, produced 170 towers with cannon and machine gun and referred them to the cutting edge for installation as firing points.

Distinctive features of the combat employment of artillery in the period of defensive battles was its massive use and centralized control of artillery fire. Created army artillery group, which were located on the Eastern Bank of the Volga river and fired on the enemy with indirect fire. To repel attacks of enemy infantry and tanks was created frontline artgrupp. Manage the commander of the artillery of the 51st army, major-General of artillery V. P. Dmitriev (After the war, in the fifties, he served in the BVI). Anti-tank artillery and small-caliber mortars acted with assault teams in combat formations of infantry and tank units. The observation posts of the commanders of artillery units and was located beside the offices of the infantry and tank units.

Innovation in the fighting in Stalingrad was a sniper's movement. Each shelf created by groups of hunters-snipers. Only in the 62-th army had 400 snipers. They destroyed more than 6 thousand of the Nazis.

Proudly celebrated the heroic deeds of the Komsomol members and youth in the defense of the city. For heroism in the great Patriotic war, Komsomol organization of Stalingrad was awarded the order of red banner (ist. The second world war vol. 2, p. 451).

An important step in the development of the art of war the Stavka was the organisation of combat and logistics troops and the population large, having great strategic importance in the city of Stalingrad, covered from three sides and pressed by the enemy troops to the great Russian river Volga. This provision was carried out by forces and means of the Volga flotilla under the command of rear Admiral D. D. Rogachev and the lower Volga river shipping company. Military units and tens of thousands of men and thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, food and other property transferred from the left Bank of the Volga in Stalingrad. Evacuated from Stalingrad civilians, thousands, and in the difficult days – tens of thousands of wounded soldiers and commanders. The 62nd army small group of movable field hospital No. 689, is located in the basement, in the period of fierce fighting daily medical care provided 600-800 wounded and sent them to the left Bank of the Volga river.

Navy supported ground combat fire. And in the most difficult moments, when the enemy broke through to the Volga, and surrounded by factories, homes and other important points, our soldiers fought an unequal battle, the Volga military flotilla in the night transported the entire division to restore the situation. At the end of September – beginning of October through the Volga forwarded six divisions and one tank brigade.

On the night of 14 and 15 September transferred to Stalingrad, the 13th guards rifle division, commanded by major General A. I. Rodimtsev. She's on the move drove the enemy from the town centre, and on 16 September stormed Mamaev Kurgan. Here the enemy troops driven back from the Volga.

On the night of 17 October, the ships of the Volga flotilla ferried over the Volga in Stalingrad 138-th infantry division of Colonel I. I. Ludnikov that the move counterattacked the enemy, liberated by STZ and installed in the area of the plant "Barricades" communication with the parts of the 37th guards. and 95th infantry action.

In these two examples tracked close cooperation of the land forces of the 62nd army major-General V. I. Chuikov and the 64th army of major-General M. S. Shumilov with the Volga military flotilla.

The last example I remember specifically. October 14 was the day of the fiercest fighting during the whole period of the defense of Stalingrad. In the morning after a powerful artillery preparation, the enemy launched an offensive with forces up to eight divisions at district factories. The main blow was delivered in the direction of the tractor factory by the five divisions and more than 180 tanks. Enemy aircraft on this day produced more than 2 thousand sorties. In the afternoon of October 14, enemy troops came to the area North of the stadium FTZ and engaged in battle in the shops of the plant. And исходу15 Oct captured STZ and left in the area to the Volga, cutting off from the main forces of the 62nd army of its compounds. These compounds are combined in a group and under the command of its commander Colonel S. F. Gorokhova and Commissar senior battalion Commissar V. A. Grekov took defensive positions in the area of Market-Spartanovka (1-4 km northeast.-Eastern. STZ) and held the district until the end of the defensive battle.

By the way, these two hero Stalingrada in the postwar period, he served in Belarus: S. F. Gorokhov, head of personnel management of the BVI, and V. A. Greeks – a member of the Military Council of the district.

84th tank brigade (commander Colonel D. N. White) and her 200th tank battalion (commander Mr. M. S. Teslenko), in which I served, 14 and 15 October were heavy fighting in the STZ and North.

14 Oct 1942 in preparing the tank for battle I was wounded. I. I. Svechkarev brought me to the dugout, called a paramedic, who examined the wound, bandaged and told to look in the dugout: "you will come and take you to the ferry." It was late afternoon. Waited until morning. Anybody not coming. In the morning I came out of the dugout. Have a look around. The tank my not. Driver no. None of our no. Looked back, and there, by the train tracks under the cover of the wagons, standing loose, lie the Germans head towards the Volga. I was in their rear. Decided to slip in a span of 15-20 m between the cars. With a bandaged shoulder with his left hand injured with a gun in his right hand and two grenades in the belt of the suit came closer. The car has the right wheels and the left — two Germans. From 15 metres make a shot in right, then left and ran quickly between the cars toward the Volga. Lying in the defense of the third well.d. track our soldiers opened fire on the Germans that saved my life. The boat crossed the Disputed island, then on a pedestrian bridge on the East Bank of the river Volga. In medinvest crews bandaged the wound and sent to hospital at the station zhänibek.

Why the events of 14 October 1942 more detail? There are two reasons.

First. To fight in the besieged city, to keep more than two months of limited forces a small block, being in an environment with a lack of military and material security, and win – this is also a method of warfare in the city.

Second. In the presentations to the young students often ask the question: What's the reward I have for Stalingrad. Talking about the fighting in Stalingrad, I of youth explain that the main reward for me is that we in Stalingrad defeated and that I remained alive. Medal "For defense of Stalingrad", instituted on 22 December 1942, I was handed a Central Commissar in Minsk in 1979, after his dismissal from the Soviet Army. During the fighting in Stalingrad to deal with winning once, before, without waiting for victory. And after the battle of Stalingrad my driver I. Svechkarev awarded the order of the Patriotic war, 2 nd degree. In his award sheet (recommendation for award) are described, and events of the fighting, when we were the crew of the T-70 in August – October 1942 in Stalingrad.

My Stalingrad commanders 14 October 1942, he left me wounded commander of the tank T-70 of Lieutenant A. F. Fenya in the dugout of the Nazis to the wolves, and themselves (including my driver I. Svechkarev) left on tanks in new defense area. I learned about it in 1946, when he entered the Military Academy of BTV and HR only at the end of the first year of study found my file in the archives.

Presenting my battle of Stalingrad driver I. Svechkarev a government award, the leadership of the 84th tank brigade (commander Colonel D. N. White, Commissioner of the N.. Safonov) and 200th tank battalion (commander-major M. S. Teslenko) I was buried alive and personal the case was sent to the archive. It's a negative. But, unfortunately, also happens. And not forget about it.

Improving the art of warfare, means and methods of combat actions of the troops manageable. Without knowledge, the ability to foresee and without the sustainable management of new survives poorly. The fighting of the red Army against enough armed, with combat experience of the German fascist army confirms it. In the first period of the great Patriotic war, the loss of control led to trouble. In the battle of Stalingrad the management was reliable.

The treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 and the rapid advance of its troops into the country has forced the Soviet leadership to urgently adopt a number of measures to ensure conditions for the conduct of a protracted war and achieve victory.

One of the important measures was the creation of a new national economy, including the military, in the Eastern parts of the country due to the evacuation of industrial enterprises from the frontline, and new construction. An important event was the strengthening of the combat capability of the Armed Forces. To accomplish this, I needed a stable government and his army.

SNK (President of I. V. Stalin in may 1941) and the CPSU(b) (General Secretary I. V. Stalin – 1922) on June 23, 1941 created the Rate of the General Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR (July 10 – the Soviet Supreme Command headed by Stalin). And on June 24 – the Council for evacuation.

June 30, 1941 by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, SNK and the CPSU(b) formed the State Defense Committee (GKO), chaired by Stalin.

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR I. V. Stalin on July 19 appointed people's Commissar of defence.

In the period of the battle of Moscow on 25 October 1941 by decision of t-bills under the chairmanship of A. I. Mikoyan was created the special Committee on evacuation (instead of Council). 23 Dec 1942 – established the State Committee for unloading the well.d. stations and restore order in the movement of trains.

The centralization of power in the hands of Stalin allowed to thoughtfully organize the work of all State authorities – Executive, party and military – to create the conditions for lasting resistance to the invasion, treacherously attacked our country of the enemy, followed by its destruction.

On 25 October 1941 the SNK and the CPSU(b) authorized the Vice-Chairman of people's Commissars N.. The ascension:

"...to bring in Kuibyshev, the Council of people's Commissars of the USSR, to lead evacuees to the East of the Commissariat and above all people's commissariats: the aviation industry, Tanks, Weapons, steel, Ammunition and to ensure that in the shortest possible time was set in motion the factories were evacuated across the Volga, the Urals and Siberia" (IFS, vol. 2 (ed. 1961), p. 148).

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) A. A. Andreev, who was in Kuibyshev with the portion of the apparatus of the party Central Committee, the Politburo decision of 25 October 1941 was authorised to give on behalf of the Central Committee of the instructions and orders of the regional Committee of the Volga region, the Urals, Central Asia and Siberia on the organization of industry in connection with the evacuation of industrial enterprises in these areas and on agricultural preparations.

Centralized government under the Chairmanship of I. V. Stalin and to resolve other pressing issues of the time. This mobilization and replenishment of the Armed Forces, the creation of reserves, training of military and working professionals, the organization of the militia, guerrilla warfare, logistics, moral and psychological education, discipline and others.

22 June 1941, the day the German attack on our country, Prime Minister Winston Churchill expressed support for the Soviet Union in the war against Nazi Germany. And on June 24, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt – about the readiness of the American government to provide aid to the Soviet Union. In the difficult days of the battle of Moscow and the ensuing onset of Nazi troops in Stalingrad and the Caucasus has intensified the work of Stalin and of subordinate authorities for creation of anti-Hitler Coalition and mutual aid organizations in the fight against the fascist bloc.

29.09 – 1.10.1941 were the Moscow conference of representatives of the USSR, USA and Britain on mutual military productions.

January 1, 1942 in Washington, signed Declaration of the 26 States on the use of all military and economic resources of these countries to fight against the fascist bloc.

May 26, 1942 in London, an agreement was signed between the USSR and great Britain on the Union in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war.

12 June 1942 published an Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communique on the agreement to open a second front in Europe in 1942

The taken measures, the hard work of the Soviet people, skilled management provided training and successful conduct of the battle of Stalingrad. Her lessons improved military skill continued to develop the art of war in subsequent operations depending on the test conditions. The main direction chosen – improving the operations of the red Army to encircle and destroy the enemy.

A shining example of a good heritage is Belarusian offensive operation "Bagration". In the course of the inspection carried out the encirclement of the enemy and their elimination in five districts. In the district court is surrounded by 30 thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy forces of the two fronts (1 PF and 3 BF), in Bobruisk – five divisions with the forces of one front (1 BF), East of Minsk – more than 100 thousand forces of the three fronts (3, 2 and 1 BP) in the districts of Vilna and Brest – force of 3 BF and 1 BF eliminated garrisons and the remnants of the defenders troops of the enemy.

Only two of the environment carried out in the border regions (Vitebsk, Bobruisk). The rest in the operational depth. In the area East of Minsk in the 150-210 km from the former front edge of the defense surrounded and destroyed more than 100 thousand grouping of the opponent. The environment made the tank formations that took part in the battle of Stalingrad converted to guards and received first in the red Army, honorary titles: the 3rd guards Kotel (the former 7 PC) and the newly formed 29th tank corps 5th guards tank army, 2nd guards of Tatsinskiy (former TK 24) and the 1st guards don (former 26 TC) armored corps.

In the Belarusian offensive operation successfully applied mobile groups of the fronts and armies. They were further developed. The frontline of mobile groups was uniform and depended on the tasks. In the 3rd Belorussian front one moving group (PGR.) represented the 5th guards tank army (3 GW. TC and 29 CC) and the other mechanized cavalry group (KMG) Orlikowski (3 GW. KK and 3 guards. MK). In the 1st Belorussian front there were three mobile teams. One of them was represented by the 2nd tank army (left wing of the front). Other (center) – mechanized cavalry group (KMG) Plieva (consisting of 4 guards. 1 KK and MK). The third (left wing front) – mechanized cavalry group Kryukov (consisting of 2 GW. CC and 11 CC).

Not to mention manifested by the Stavka of wisdom in consecutive strikes on the enemy. Operation "Bagration" began on June 23, 1944, and July 10, 1944 went on the offensive 2 PF, July 13 – 1 UV, 17 July – 3 PF, 18 July – the left wing of the BF 1, 24 July the Leningrad front. This shackled maneuver of enemy troops, contributed to the successful conduct of the operation "Bagration".

Used method of dismembering the defenders and the retreating enemy to pieces and his environment smaller groups with the subsequent destruction, as it was during the development of the Soviet counterattack at Stalingrad in December 1942

However, the crown development of military science and art was the Berlin strategic offensive operation carried out by the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian, 1st Ukrainian fronts and the Baltic fleet. In the course of it destroyed by the environment, the dismemberment and destruction of 70 infantry, 12 tank and 11 motorized divisions, captured about 480 thousand soldiers and officers, seized more than 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 4, 5 thousand aircraft, 10917 guns and mortars.

Soviet military science and military art in the great Patriotic and the second world war won.

The decisive operations of the enemy on the Soviet-German front – an attack on Moscow and Stalingrad – were conceived in the form of encirclement and destruction.

However, despite the huge mass of troops, abandoned by Hitler's command, their greater maneuverability and penetrating power, these operations ended in complete failure. At Stalingrad, German troops were themselves the object of a Grand "Cannes" of the twentieth century, arranged them by the red Army.

Armed with advanced Soviet military science, the Red Army has debunked the military doctrine of the German generals, in front of which a long time admired the military experts of many bourgeois countries. "The battle of Stalingrad, had to admit görlitz (Ed. – the chief of the German General staff), – marked the beginning of the bankruptcy of the Nazi strategy was based on a illusion and considerations of prestige". (See. IFS, vol. 3, p.66).

We live in a different environment. Hence the struggle for the strengthening and protection of the state is different. The ways and methods of this struggle, the youth are studying in military educational institutions, improving in the course of military service. And rightly so. But we should not forget the experience of the former war, and acquired in the years of local conflicts.

The world situation is complicated. There is a struggle for supremacy in economic development, for supremacy in the management of the world.

A different kind of "Obama", "Sarkozy" and joined them, can not live without war, to live, because they do not know what it is, haven't experienced it for yourself (big or small). The "color" revolutions, "sanctions", the double standards, the continuing struggles of the former allies (USA, England, France, etc.) for supremacy in the Victory in the second world war, the imposition by military action of the "democratic" regimes acceptable to the United States and NATO – all this is the machinations of fascism we defeated in 1941 – 1945 years. And a good start to put in the battle of Stalingrad. Active and truthful coverage of events we must not allow the distortion of history and the revival of fascist actions. It was the Soviet people in the battle of Stalingrad under the guidance of a world leader and mentor of the time of Stalin marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the great Patriotic and the second world war, defeated fascism, and its main nest of Nazi Germany. The peoples of the world took the victory at Stalingrad as a symbol of greatness and invincibility of the Soviet state.

As written in the history of the great Patriotic war of the Soviet Union: "it Will be decades, centuries will pass and mankind will be appreciated to store in the memory of the great feat of the Soviet people, made them at Stalingrad."

 

Major-General in retirement A. F. Feng, participant of the Stalingrad battle (the tank commander, Lieutenant), Deputy Chairman of the Military science society at the State cultural and leisure institution "Central House of officers of the Armed forces of the Republic of Belarus"

Source: http://www.belvpo.com/22722.html

 


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