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The reverse side of military reform
Material posted: Publication date: 11-02-2013

With the last days of last year I happened to read publications which were highly appreciated "the outcome of the military reforms of Anatoly Serdyukov". The authors suggest a new defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to support initiatives shot the head of Department and continue, only slightly adjusted, most of the initiated reforms.

However, in search of Serdyukov's reform initiatives, it became clear that he was not able to manage the performance of even the tasks assigned to him by the Supreme commander. And every it initiative and voluntarism turned out in the end, the prejudice to the Armed forces, the scale of which today, is still not defined.

The new Minister, gradually understand the activities of its predecessor, undoes his decisions one by one, trying on a number of positions to deploy the army and Navy to deserticola condition. After all, even the most stubborn advocates of reforms Serdyukov acknowledged that he executed them by trial and error. And blame... not just the military, allegedly failed to develop a civil Minister at least some concept of the reform. Like, we had to take most crucial decisions, guided almost by intuition. Alas, both that and another – an outright speculation.

 

Pay for a positive future

In January 2007, a month before the appointment of Serdyukov as Minister of defense, in the conference room of the 1st house, the defense Ministry held a military-scientific conference of the Academy of military Sciences. Speaking at a presentation the President of the MSA General of the army Makhmut Gareev recalled that the President of Russia Vladimir Putin at a meeting of the Russian security Council in June 2005 has put the military scientists the task of creating a new Military doctrine. Her achievements and were asked to discuss at the conference. Gareev said: "the Need of developing a new version of Russia's Military doctrine arose from the fact that after the adoption of the existing doctrine in 2000 have been significant changes in the focus and content of the tendencies of development of geopolitical and military-political situation, the nature of threats to defence and security of the state. Clarified the tasks facing the Armed forces and other troops of the Russian Federation".

Recently, the newly elected President Vladimir Putin himself confirmed that the purpose and direction of development of the Armed forces were indeed formulated back in 2005, long before Anatoly Serdyukov headed the defense Ministry. However, argued the final version of the Military doctrine of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 5 February 2010. And when you read the text of the new doctrine, then realize that large pieces heard almost word for word at the conference of the MSA in January 2007, the reports of the army General Mahmut Gareeva, then chief of the General staff army General Yuri Baluyevsky and other speakers generals. Although all the provisions of the Military doctrine prescribed kind: "the Main task of construction and development of the Armed forces and other troops – bring their structure, composition and strength into line with predicted military threats, content and nature of military conflict, current and future tasks in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and wartime, as well as political, socio-economic, demographic and military-technical conditions and potential of the Russian Federation". Characteristic of any conceptual development of digital uncertainty and allows now intercessors Serdyukov to talk about started they are deep transformations in the Armed forces. Meanwhile it made when innovations are of a different nature.

"For war you need three things: money, money and money again," replied the Marshal Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio to Louis XII of question about the necessary preparations for the conquest of the Duchy of Milan (1499-1500). The catch phrase reminded the observer of "NEZAVISIMAYA Gazeta" in the Council of veterans of the military financial-economic service (SWFAS). This organization is now the most powerful community of experts on problems of war economy. So they argue that the revelation of Trivulzio generally expresses the main principle of military construction and the existence of any army.

Today for anybody not a secret that during the 1990-ies the needs of defence in our country was satisfied on the residual principle. For the first 10 years of the new Russia for the fleet was not built a single ship in the army received units of military equipment, the air force – one aircraft per year. The number of homeless officers exceeded 170 thousand SWFAS Experts with figures in hands prove, that in any year that dramatic decade was not made in the defence budget. Performed by about 30%, then 50%, then 70%. And in the end of the twentieth century year budget under article "national defence" in General fell to a record low. Then due to high inflation and what happened in 1998, the default will give for comparison a few indicators in dollar terms. In 1994, defense spending was approximately 13 532 million. In 1999, approximately 3470,5 million.

And then, as we remember, the Armed forces of the Russian Federation was replaced by the commander in chief – the post handed over to Boris Yeltsin, and was attended by Vladimir Putin. And already in 2000 the volume of financing of the Russian army more than doubled, reaching approximately 7480,2 million. listed in the full rouble amount to the Ministry of defence. To exceed the level of appropriations, is scheduled for 1994, was succeeded in 2004. Due to the fact that the defense budget increased every year by 20%, maintained its share in GDP is about 2.7% and fully played it.

In the highest state leadership in that period there was a strong belief that extremely launched the state of the Armed forces can correct only one way – to systematically and significantly increase investments in military organization of the country. Following this simple rule, the defense Ministry, then headed by Sergei Ivanov, were not only able to conduct some neat structural changes in the army, to reduce, by 2007, its population up to 1 million 134,8 thousand people, but also outline clear, understandable directions of development of the Armed forces. Under the decision of tasks of further defense spending were increased in 2007 by 22% and reached an unprecedented level of RF in 831,9 billion rubles But this was not the limit: the next, 2008, to the military allocated 1040,8 billion rubles provided for the growth of the defense budget as much as 25%.

It is the increasing military expenditure was the main prerequisite for promotion to the post of Minister of defence top Manager, the head of the Federal tax service, Anatoly Serdyukov. Openly stated that he, as a professional financier should ensure maximum efficiency of use of funds allocated to the implementation of the planned reforms of the Armed forces. However, Serdyukov has done exactly the opposite: tried to adapt the army to modify your device at a comfortable and familiar system of management of financial flows.

 

Authors and performers

Almost the greatest achievement of the team Serdyukov in the so called new image of the army presented a radical change in the structure of the Armed forces. As if, under strong pressure from civil Minister military decided instead of six military districts go to the division of the country into four districts. Those, to explain Gareeva, during the war, become operational-strategic command (OSK) – "the West", "South", "Center" and "East". Each of them created interspecific grouping of troops and forces, driven by the optimized three-tier system (district–army–brigade). By the way, the elimination of cumbersome motorized rifle and tank divisions with 12-15 thousand people who allegedly did not show itself, nor the Chechen wars, or the five-day war 08.08.08, is also issued for the achievement of Serdyukov and his chief of General staff Nikolai Makarov. Why, because instead of "obsolete" military units were formed brigade at high readiness a number of only 3-4,5 thousand. Moreover, to be admissible the size and stripped down of all Armed forces up to 800 thousand troops instead of the originally zaslavskoe and called the optimal 1 million. All is justified by the significant reductions in running now... the armies of NATO countries.

But let's fairly look at some facts. The four Main command on four strategic areas existed in the USSR from 1979 to 1992, when they were abolished Boris Yeltsin. The desire to revive the interspecific grouping of troops under the auspices of the strategic commands of the Russian commanders was evident in the first half of the zero years. In February 2006, the Minister of defence of the Russian Federation – Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov publicly declared that the defense Ministry studied the possibility of the transition from regional command to regional commanders, and that from 2005 to 2007 carried out the appropriate experiment in the troops and staffs. At the same time Ivanov said: "the positive results of the experiment from 2008 to 2010 are planned on an ongoing basis of the regional command "East", "South" and "West". In the fall of 2007 in the framework of the already deployed large-scale studies have been conducted command-staff exercise "East-2007". His experience was the final evidence of the expediency of transition of the Armed forces to another structure.

Apparently, the results of the CPE has turned positive, as a doctrine directing the chief of the General staff army General Yuri Baluyevsky was particularly persistent in promoting structural adjustment. However, he was a consistent supporter before, when we first started work on a new Military doctrine of Russia. Continued to insist on its speedy implementation and after a year of joint work of Serdyukov still persuaded the President to release from Baluyevsky chief of the General staff and put in subsecretary of the security Council. So today we can safely say that the four operational-strategic commands called military districts in peacetime, was due to the concerted efforts of Baluyevsky.

The new chief of the General staff army General Nikolai Makarov and defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov had also planned to withstand their predecessors the timing of the formation of the USC – by the end of 2010. And added to the original intent of the fourth OSK "the Center" was a direct result of institution at the initiative of Ivanov and Baluyevsky experiment. This was in line with the approved by the President in early 2010, the new Military doctrine of Russia, which says: "the Russian Federation considers an armed attack on a member state of the CSTO as an aggression against all member States of the CSTO and will carry out in this case, the measures in accordance with the Treaty on collective security". In General, for communication with the armies of the Central Asian republics is intended primarily OSK "the Center".

Why, then, did not come to court the new Minister Baluyevsky? Why his achievements are now categorically attributed to tandem Serdyukov–Makarov and stubbornly repeat the stories about them started military reform? The answers to these questions to the columnist of "NEZAVISIMAYA Gazeta" gave the experts SWFAS. If in crisis 2009-m and post-crisis 2010, the rate of growth of defense spending of Russia, for obvious reasons, declined, respectively to 14% and 7%, in 2011 they again went back to the usual 20%. Then in 2012 reached a record 1.9 trillion. RUB, having increased in comparison with the previous year by 22%. The money was given more and more, of course, under a thoroughly thought-out reform of the army. But using them in different ways saw Baluyevsky and Serdyukov. In 2008 he won the point of view of a senior officer. Although now he will have at least to explain the discrepancy between plans and results.

The distortion of the initial intentions of the reform was more distinct as the time to praise the three-tier system of command and control: district–army–brigade. Note that the initiator of increasing the number of brigades in the army was the same army General Yuri Baluyevsky. However, he considered it necessary to have in the organizational-staff structure of troops and brigades, and division to solve a variety of combat tasks, for different theater of operations. Besides, two months after discharge from Baluyevsky chief of the General staff happened the August war in South Ossetia.

Okonfuzilos on the first day of the war with the command of tactical group formations and units involved in operation, the defense Ministry has become obsolete to justify the alleged organization of the divisions. In the end, it was decided to transfer the entire army to the brigade structure and to completely eliminate divisional unit. It was argued that in fact the reduction to a minimum the number of levels of operative and tactical control greatly simplifies and speeds up the passage of commands. Although a good military experts initially saw the futility of that argument. After all, the last decade was developed and began to develop the troops in the automated control systems that create a unified command-information space from the higher authorities to individual soldiers. With the full application of ASU any team regardless of the number of management levels and the actual feed point may optionally be reported directly to the soldier on the battlefield in a matter of seconds.

According to experts, a civilian Minister in this case is very cleverly taking advantage of the known method of management: turn your failures into steps to success. Change the military structure in the interests if to improve the combat capability of the army was covered by the desire to accommodate her under his control system and financial management. Not the demands of combat readiness of steel to determine the notorious "new look" Armed forces.

 

Military money in his hands not to give

Here's how this mechanism explained the Chairman SWFAS the General-the Colonel in resignation Vasily Vorobyev, who headed in the 1990s, the Main Department of military budget and financing MO RF, and zero – Military financial and economic University. He said: "In September 2009, the Minister of defence signed the order No. 1034, which on the basis of military structures was a system of legal entities in the form of Federal budget-funded institution (FBU) and their branches. Previously, the military unit due to the nature of their functions did not have the status of a legal entity. But they decided to embed in the system, stipulated by Russian law for all civil public institutions. The same order was reduced to three (instead of four or five) number of levels to make budgetary allocations to recipients. It is possible to reduce the number of managers of budgetary funds in 2.4 times, recipients of budget funds – in 2.8 times. Military structures were called "FBU/h 00001" and "branch FBU/h 00001". A year later, in June 2010, the Ministry of defence has decided on the formation of territorial financial bodies (TFO) support of troops (forces)... the subjects of the Russian Federation. Them and locked all FBU. From 1 January 2011 from the States military units everywhere have been excluded, the financial authorities and all officer positions of financial-economic specialties. Account in the Federal Treasury bodies of the military parts open longer. Was created, essentially, a civilian three-tier system of management of financial flows, independent of military structures, building relations with relevant commanders and chiefs on the basis of bilateral treaties and in fact deprived the military of the right to control the budget allocated in fact to their needs".

Parallel to the formation of an independent financial bodies during 2009 was in the process of dissolution 23 divisions. They were replaced by December 1, 2009, 39 were created by the deployed brigades – 4 motorized rifle and tank 35. Generated under three levels of finishing of budgetary appropriations rigged, has formed three levels of control military structures.

"But the beginning of 2011 showed that commanders, many commanders and chiefs were not ready to accept a new system of financial support, says Colonel-General Vorobyov. – Leaders of military units could not efficiently solve their tasks without having access to the resources providing that new structures often without explanation just tore".

In addition to purely economic complications in the life of the troops are having serious problems, and in fact in the military sphere. Candidate of military Sciences, retired Colonel Alexander Alexandrov explained to our newspaper: "the aggregate combat potential of these compounds (of the brigade. – "NG") corresponded to the equivalent of 12-15 divisions of permanent readiness of the pre-reform organization. In comparison with the composition of 2007 estimated combat potential of motorized rifle and tank troops in cash arming automatically decreased 3.5–4 times. Naturally, such a, so to speak, a "modern team" is not equivalent to "tactical units". In fact, in the system of command and control was formed nothing filled the gap between the army and the brigade of barely disguised arguments about the presence in the system of higher tactical connections".

A former commander of the 58th army (2003-2006) the General-Lieutenant Victor Sobolev said: "In the 29 th army, the management of which now occupies the former headquarters of the Siberian military district in Chita, only one team on the territory of Ulan-Ude to Belogorska – which is about 3 thousand kilometers of the state border. In the event of armed conflict with China the Chinese will be very difficult to find to capture or destroy." The General also pointed out that the two military districts East of China (Shenyang and Beijing) is the strongest of all the Land forces of the Russian Federation together. However, in the West the disparity is not in our favor. Thus, in the area of the CFE Treaty, the North Atlantic Alliance has 24 divisions and 254 of the brigade. This grouping can be reinforced by American troops, who, incidentally, also has not abandoned divisions. Yes, they reformed under the program of creating a "division of the XXI century", with a total population of about 16 thousand people and consisting, incidentally, of the... teams.

Well, for what, in fact, had taken all these administrative tricks? What is the true purpose of the withdrawal from the original intent of the reforms in the army?

"Today, no one will really say what happened to the tangible assets in billions of rubles in the reorganization of divisions into brigades, – the Chairman SWFAS Vasili Vorobiev. – In many places was not made the acts of receiving and transmitting signed by commanders, have not used any other transparent methods of transferring or scrapping of property of the liquidated vswobozdauschego connections, and the result is a lot of wealth simply "vanished in space". In the same mode decreased kvartirno-operational part of the garrisons throughout the country, when they came to replace the third-party OJSC, established to provide outsourcing services to the military".

Outsourcing in General has become now convincing evidence is not disinterested perversion of the original intention of the reform of the Armed forces. Columnist "NG" happened in the first half of the 1990s to participate in several military-scientific conferences where there have been proposals to transmit a third-party civilian organizations all types of economic support and service troops. "So we became, as in the American and European armies – dreamed the Russian military. – That we were engaged only in combat training". But the dream remained unfulfilled because of the same scarce funding of the army and Navy as a residual. Because third parties have to pay not as conscripts, waving a broom or cleaning potatoes in the dress in the kitchen. And at that time money even to fuel for its military hardware almost is not allocated, the classes are often held "Hiking in the machine".

Things changed fundamentally in 2006. The budget of military Department has reached a sufficient size to plan some previously unaffordable costs. But most importantly, Sergei Ivanov announced then about the gradual reduction of the term of service for conscripts – to one and a half years from 1 January 2007 and 1 January 2008. It became clear that for 12 months the conscript is not to turn into a full-fledged soldier, if not to relieve can perform many unusual functions and not to fill up all his time in combat training. About the need for early transfer of all kinds of economic support and service of military units to third parties started talking in full voice. Actually, this was one of the main objectives of Anatoly Serdyukov, as the adept Manager, for appointment to the post of defense Minister in February 2007. And it's been so fuck long-held dream of military... Today the whole country knows the details of a multibillion-dollar embezzlement in the holding "Oboronservis" and its sub-holdings of the "Slavyanka", "RG", "Voentorg" and other JSC, created solely for the provision of outsourcing services to the Armed forces.

The debugged scheme of "milking" the state budget has worked in almost all areas of military reform. The benefit of investigating authorities caught all new and new facts of abuse of unscrupulous reformers and businessmen associated with them. We can only wait and hope that the army caused damage to still be able to fully calculate and to compensate.

 

Oleg Vladykin

Source: http://www.ng.ru/nvo/2013-01-30/10_reform.html


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