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"Nuclear gambit" Russia, is it possible to win?
Material posted: Publication date: 07-05-2013

Before the war, during meetings and conversations with A. Maurois Winston Churchill, discussing the recent work, made the following observation: "In your place I would write only one thing, that France has too few aircraft". According to the memoirs of the classics of the biographical genre, in that moment of the English Premier struck him as not clever and even not quite adequate person.

However, later, he complained about the assessment. After 70 days after the meeting the Germans entered Paris /1/.

Currently, this story is remembered primarily because in modern Russia "the nuclear factor" as a tool of ensuring security and of status in the World-system plays the same role as once the planes for France.

Today, the "nuclear factor" is increasingly at the center of the Russian (and international) politics. The "international background", in which he must appear, at the present time is extremely unfavorable for the adoption of far-reaching disarmament decisions in the field of nuclear weapons that Russia is pushing. This is due to the following factors.

First, after the start of the active destruction of the West Yalta-Potsdam political system the essence of the new world order is the state of "global turbulence". The world-system is, in the language of synergetics, in "mixing layer". And if the development of international relations, as stated, is on the path of globalization, in this case, theoretically, from a scientific point of view of possible different ways of reaching the global world, including and not necessarily leading to "peace of America." Perhaps the emergence of regional "attractors" for which the possession of nuclear weapons objectively is an important factor in maintaining its geopolitical status /2...19/.

It is obvious that the presence of such a devastating weapon in the hands of another state in itself is a great immanent threat to the national security of Russia. The only lasting guarantee of security is your potential "nuclear deterrence" - even if at this time, States do not consider each other enemies.

Second, the collapse of the Bretton woods system, the emerging collapse of the "Washington consensus" and economic crisis has led to the fact that the main tool the U.S. government in the international arena – the dollar, not backed by gold, is supported exclusively by military might, regularly sagastume in different parts of the world, which reinforces the above incentives to acquire nuclear weapons.

Third, serious destabilizing factors in the international situation that Russia needs to consider in its nuclear policy, are changes in NATO in the direction of the globalization of its activities.

After the adoption of the new strategic concept of the Alliance objectively increase the incentives for horizontal proliferation" of nuclear weapons, which many countries in the periphery and semi - periphery of the World system, the only means of ensuring its national-state sovereignty in the face of active-aggressive "centre" (the West).

As the modeling of global economic processes /2....4, 17, 18/, the Western economic system in conditions of market competition can stably exist only with a constant infusion of additional resources from outside. That is for the stable existence of such a system requires the existence of a periphery from which to extract cheap resources.

In these conditions, modern NATO is a tool of maintaining the stability of the system "center-periphery", which can only exist in the Western world. These are the new functions of the Alliance. In fact, NATO is the Union of the States of the Western world that make up the center of the World-system, for a military operation of the periphery. However, to perform its functions the Alliance will have in changing the conditions of forming a new balance of power in the military field, the occurrence of the condition, which many analysts define the concept "insurgent Asia" /46/.

Fourth, significantly exacerbated the negative global processes related to the cyclical trends.

As shown by studies of the dynamics of global processes the most difficult for Russia in geopolitical terms, if guided by structural similarity with previous cycles, is likely to be the period of 2014 – 2025/2...4, 31..33/. The upheavals of this period, you must prepare now. First and foremost, to prepare an adequate means directional influence on participants in interstate conflicts, including potential strategic and regional deterrence and de-escalation of conflict.

Fifth, there is an obvious weakening of the role of the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT), which objectively reflects the state of crisis of the system of international legal regulation, resulting from the collapse of the Versailles-Washington model of the world political system (which ended the Second world war), and then start dismantling the West of the Yalta - Potsdam system.

Sixth, currently, we are experiencing a situation where the weakening of dominant (USA), hoping to maintain its position on the world stage, has increasingly resorted to direct military force and organize areas of instability. The financial dominance of the United States by American strategists increasingly connected with the need to have overwhelming military power. Recall that in recent years the US military budget is comparable to the total military budgets of all other countries of the world.

American researchers L. G. Badalyan and V. F. Krivorotov [54] who developed the theory of technocenosis, give some convincing arguments in favor of the current situation, the world system and the level of globalization are very close to those which occurred in the early twentieth century when the weakening of dominants (UK) to hold on to the lead, maintained tight militaristic policy, pitting their competitors and thus leading to a world war.

In a changing world, Russia was embroiled in the "Big geopolitical game", where nuclear factor objectively plays the role of the "heavy pieces". This is due in part to the fact that nuclear weapons and especially the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) are "disciplining" factor of conflict, impeding the transition to large-scale war. The possession of such a tool gives not only a high geopolitical status, but also the possibility of effective conflict management.

Can Rossi, while in besubjected state, if not win, then at least to draw the game? Today in the affective component of social consciousness, including the basic elements of the system of making military-political decisions introduced a provision stating that the game "geopolitical chess" in the United States created a "program champion level", giving America an effective victory, and that "to oppose such a program no one wants and can't."

And if universal this provision? After all, it is quite obvious that even if Russia for some reason and would not play with the U.S. geopolitical "Grand master match as equal opponents, there is always the possibility to play by different rules, for example, arranging USA "tournament in Vasyuki," or "changing the game". Instead of "great chess games" (Brzezinski) Russia can play a "political poker." And serious nuclear capacity at its rational use can substantiate this behavioral strategy.

However, it seems that the "great chess party of the USA" the Russian side is in a state of "political zugzwang" (when all the moves are bad). This conclusion can be drawn, for example, from the analysis of the process of preparation of the concluded Contract on reduction of offensive arms (start Treaty) and the discussion of the relevant ratification law in the state Duma.

Appears to be last but not least this unfortunate result can be explained by the high content in our so-called "expert community" of people who believe the purpose and meaning of their activities "professional love" to the West. Sorry, seen the presence of evidence that they are often unable to "put on the smart needle" a certain part of the "basic elements" of the Russian system of decision-making in the military-political sphere.

In the basis of "conceptual mainstream" in which "stalkivaetsya" the Russian foreign (defense) policy, is either primitive manilovism, or a peculiar variant of the "neo-Trotskyism" that "demobilization" behavioral strategy ("no peace, no war, and disband the army – read Russia "denuclearizing").

Even the most superficial analysis of the position of perezagruzka", which appears, to a certain extent determines the decisions in the nuclear field, allows to make a conclusion that put forward in 1960, Thomas Schelling (waiting for the plane at the Washington airport), the criteria for the effectiveness of US policy in the field of arms control still set the direction of political thought not only in the United States, but their "friends" abroad.

It is impossible to get rid of the impression that all so-called "new approaches to nuclear arms control" (see, for example, /48/) for all the verbal smokescreen, with them, have their ultimate goal is the realization of the aspirations and attitudes (including those attributed to one of the former presidents of the United States) about the need to "pull Russia "nuclear teeth" and act in this direction as long as nuclear weapons it will be no more", because: "there is No better opportunity to direct resources to national security, than to contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons, science and industry of the former enemy. There is nothing less intelligent and foolish for the United States, than to miss the opportunity."

Conduct a detailed analysis of the arguments of the proponents of "nuclear zero" or substantial limitations on Russian strategic nuclear forces and tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) is quite boring and useless thing. For a long period of time by them as the mantra is repeated the same set of provisions about the futility and uselessness to Russia the possession of strong capabilities of strategic nuclear forces and tactical nuclear weapons.

In General, when studying the works of many "experts" (from Iskan, IMEMO, the Institute of contemporary development, etc.) comes to mind the thought expressed by S. Clemens in the story "Old times on the Mississippi": "In science there is something exciting, some far-reaching conclusions, it can be done, based on the most insignificant grounds" /47/.

It's hard not to notice that employ "denuclearization" control mechanisms target audiences based on application of the techniques of deception and manipulation.

It should be noted that proponents of nuclear disarmament is not particularly saddled with the development of sufficient reason, we believe the basis of the generated information frames for the organization of influence on cognitive and affective components of consciousness basic Russian basic element of the system of making military – political decisions, and society as a whole. And, most surprisingly, that they often "work".

If you skip all the "quasivoluntary" arguments "supporters of nuclear disarmament through a conceptual sieve, the most of them is to abandon the strategy of "containment" and the transition to a strategy of "appeasement" opposing "actors" inter-state conflicts (see, for example, /48/).

In this latent (hidden) parameter of the proposed behavioral strategy is the PRICE of peace. And the price starts gradually sounded. From Russia require saying "it is necessary to share". It may seem incredible, but the claim of M. Albright and D. Cheney has supported Russian "liberals" publicly to talk about the possibility of a joint management (with the developed world powers) the resources of Siberia. And if someone this scenario may seem impossible, including from the international legal point of view, recall that the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the Russian Empire. And that in 1884 signed the relevant international Convention containing principle of effective occupation". From this it follows that if a country is not able to effectively manage its resources, it may be introduced external control. In those days, he has legitimized the colonial system, tomorrow may prove the legality of the seizure of Russia's exclusive rights to control its own resources.

The main thesis of the Pro-Western lobby is that de supposedly "democratic" West will never attack Russia and, consequently, its efforts in the field of nuclear weapons superfluous (redundant). This thesis represents one of actively introduce into the consciousness of the Russian society of archetypes. He vividly describes the wretchedness of the conceptual foundations of the "liberal vision of the world picture".

Quite obvious and requires no proof that the West has no "taboo" on the use of military power. And, on the contrary, the whole practice of international relations over the past 20 years shows:

a) about the complete withdrawal of the West from the Westphalian system to the concept of limited national sovereignty, when it is all about the West (America is the world's Sheriff);

b) the active involvement of the factor of military might of NATO in the solution of foreign policy issues, until the direct armed aggression.

I would like to know whether the Pro-Western "experts" use the services of "the astral world" and before they brought the knowledge that the West will always be "white and fluffy" in the future will limit the scale of use of military force? And anyway, what's direct military attack on Russia? According to the treatise, "sun Tzu", it is "the worst of wars /49/. The West has long been based on theories have Legal Garth on indirect action /50/ and learned to use power factor indirectly as one of the elements of the mechanism of "external control".

Indeed, why would he attack (or even to exert direct military pressure on Russia, if it can be "soft" control in the "D.C. consenus" through established consortia "agents of change", a permanent liberal bloc of the government, etc.

But, if Russia will come out of besubjected state, it will form a powerful strategic actors, the West may not hesitate to use "power factor" as it has always done.

All these factors determine Russia objective grounds for preservation and maintenance at the appropriate (quantitative and qualitative) level of grouping of strategic nuclear forces and nonstrategic" nuclear weapons (NW regional containment) as the most important components of the system of means "directional influence" on participants in interstate conflicts of high intensity".

This is especially important because the lessons of history and especially the events of recent decades have taught that international law as a tool to safeguard the interests of the country and, in particular, its security is not worth a penny if there is no armed forces able to defend convincingly.

The insistent desire of the West to dismantle the Yalta-Potsdam political system and the collapse after the collapse of the USSR) was formed after world war II the World-system, open a "Pandora's box" with unprecedented consequences. This raises the obvious question – what are we going to meet? However, from the analysis of the foreign policy of Russia the impression that our leadership may become a victim "syndrome Sidonia appolinariya", ie, not to see looming overhead threats.

This conclusion leads, in particular, developments in recent years related to the implementation technologies of external "institutional" control Russia "retract" it in the process of "denuclearization" on the basis of steady and gradual reduction of its nuclear potential.

In modern conditions, Russia should not decline, but capacity strengthening of strategic and regional deterrence. It is important to remember the statement of N. Machiavelli: "...the sacred weapons, which is the only hope." Otherwise Russia again, as in the XIII century, is destined to become a "damper-sink, which dissipates the energy of the onslaught "rebellious Asian" in Europe.

In this context, the demobilization and mobilization of forces, constituting the country's defense capabilities, can provide a associated with Russia in the future "big war".

In light of the above it is interesting to note a historical precedent associated with one of the first (known) facts of the implementation of the containment strategy due to the conspicuous increase of the military potential of the state. In the XVII century, Armand Jean du Plessis – Duke de Richelieu made the first Europe wide mobilisation of military forces in peacetime (at the time of the war in Europe was mostly a "standby force"). This allowed him to avoid involvement of France in the thirty years war (in unfavorable conditions) before 1635/34/.

Russia to in accordance with plan No. 19 quietly watching the fire from the opposite shore" /35/, we must remember the lessons of history and to have the appropriate military capabilities, including nuclear capabilities, vanderwoude is natural for its people desire. Moreover, it is important under the above conditions to the West to use the stratagem No. 20 /35/ "sacrifice plums (i.e., Russia) to save a peach tree (Western civilization)".

Quite obviously (and this has already been said) that a world without nuclear weapons will not be safer. Without addressing the major social, economic, political and humanitarian problems that are Central in international conflicts, encouraging States to war, the emerging world without nuclear weapons is unlikely to be stable. At the time, on the proposal of Mikhail Gorbachev on global nuclear disarmament by 2000. Brzezinski said: "This plan for the device in the world, suitable for conducting conventional war.

In the current state of Russia, if she's going to play "eterniagames," i.e., agreeing to further cuts in their strategic nuclear forces and to negotiate the reduction of its tactical nuclear weapons, risks defeat in the "big geopolitical game" and to be discarded to the periphery of the world system.

Studies of the dynamics of global processes in World - system are conducted on the basis of mathematical modeling, show that to maintain its leadership of America is only by organizing new radical change in the geopolitical parameters of the leading countries. The "speed" of such changes provides, as will be shown, only large-scale war /36, 51, 52/.

These findings are consistent with one of the concepts of the theory of international relations – the concept of "transition of leadership" (according to experts, it most adequately explains the "true root cause" of the beginning of the First world war), according to which a country loses leadership, "has to attack first" /36, 51, 52/. It seems to us that in the last decade and a half, this was the concept, only in a modified version, United States and applied in practice. Thus the essence of American modification is that the attack is not the applicant, and the other state, the choice of which is determined by the "price issue". Thus, if at the time with the help of Yugoslavia and Iraq, the Americans tried to solve the smaller ("subheadline") problems with this, "the big bet" need to be already appropriate a "big partner". In our opinion, it is "denuclearized" Russia is more suited to the role of such "involuntary partner" for a new redivision of the world, which, of course, is realized at its expense.

Therefore, to a priori exclude such a scenario, Russia must retain its nuclear capability, and at a level that will be guaranteed, under all conditions of possible nuclear conflict with the United States, to ensure the loss of American geopolitical leadership. You must preserve at all costs our gradually weakening, but still "politically effective" nuclear fist. Be sure to save. At least as long as we can come up with an appropriate alternative, non-nuclear instrument guaranteeing the futility, for the United States, the new "military" division of the world at the expense of Russia.

Accordingly, Russia needs to be fully optimized nuclear activities, including an adequate response under various disarmament initiatives.

Indicated the adequacy of means including the transition to the non-verbal foundations of decision-making in the military-political sphere. Generated proposals (position) must be the result of interdisciplinary research and quantitative analysis of alternatives to take into account the effect of the possession of nuclear weapons the combined power of the state.

This is especially important because it becomes quite clear that the actions undertaken by USA today and in the future measures to limit strategic nuclear forces is merely a political reflection of the real upgrade process is "technologically obsolete" weapons. The proposed measures on disarmament and arms control have as their ultimate goal is not so much limiting the scope of military-technical competition of how many translate it to other dimensions of military-technological space.

The American military don't have to worry about do not overdo it if their policy in disarming.

For this American administration in the early 1990-ies as one of the main principles of the national security strategy was adopted the so-called "reconstruction," involving the preservation of infrastructure of strategic offensive forces (SNA) and the defense industrial base, ensuring US leadership in critical technologies and the accumulation of strategic materials /53/.

Analyzing the effects of reducing the nuclear components of the strategic offensive forces of the United States, it is important to note that the United States is largely technically ready for rapid reduction voegeding potential. Despite the (temporary) reduction in geopolitical race" with China (due to a limitation of their strategic nuclear forces) America has the ability to relatively quickly restore your "geopolitical status" and make a "breakthrough" in military capability due to the implementation of the results of the new "microevolution" in the military, allowing to significantly strengthen non-nuclear component of strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as to implement quality (unprecedented) leap in the capacity building of the General purpose forces. Russia (and China) lags behind the United States, most likely forever.

Thus, in considering the question of the influence of nuclear disarmament on strategic stability, it is necessary to note the following. The concept of the power of intimidation is deeply ingrained in the system of political and cultural values of the West. What is happening currently in the US, the search for functional equivalents of nuclear weapons through the so-called conventional weapons in the context of maintaining the traditional paradigm of deterrence is offensive and leads to destabilization of the situation in the world.

So again, the question arises about the benefits of the new start Treaty for Russia in the right direction, that is, about the feasibility of substantial reductions in nuclear weapons, which is a quite effective means of directed action for the participants of inter-state conflicts of varying intensity.

However, in the process of learning it (as well as the ratification of the "Resolution of the Council and consent of the Senate...") conceptual provisions for the conclusion that most (if not the primary) threat to the Russian system of strategic restraint is a danger that the modern Russian-American relations again, as in 1990-ies, may represent a triumph of optimism over reason. As you know from the course of victimology (criminal psychology), this provision is one of the basic archetypes of thinking of the victims of fraud.

In light of the above, the authors consider it necessary to clarify in the proposed work a number of fundamental issues related to the new disarmament agreement, which, in our opinion, hidden not only from the Russian public, but also from the "decision makers" in the military-political sphere.

Briefly focusing on the question, the following should be noted.

The first "secret" of the new start Treaty is that deep cuts in the sphere of strategic nuclear forces are a destabilizing factor of the system of strategic stability.

Only experts know that one of the "paradoxes of adrenoguenitalny"carefully concealed not only from society but also from the leadership of the country, is the fact that there exists a"nuclear threshold of stability". It is characterized by the decrease in the level of nuclear capacity is below a given threshold decreases crisis stability. Publicly it was stated by a group of well-known scientists of the RAS (A. I. Ageev, V. S. Kurdyumov, G. G. Malinetskii) in "designing the future, the crisis and ideas S. P. Kurdyumov" /55/.

To quote from this article, supporting the raised position.

"In fact, parity in strategic arms, which ensured a century of peace based on the ability of each party to apply a different restraining damage at any stage of the conflict. It saves each party from the temptation of such a conflict to start.

However, assume that in the process of arms reduction, even a symmetric, reciprocal and controlled, reached some critical threshold. In addition, each side can inflict unacceptable damage in a first strike. But can't do it, causing back. And then there is the temptation to strike first...

In fact, there is a reflexive game: "I know that the enemy knows that I can't answer if he would attack first. Therefore, it considers, of course, that I, wanting to defend his country, preparing for the first blow. So, rationally speaking, he should strive for such impact or to prepare an ACE in the hole" to non-nuclear means of warfare, which are able to provide the same strategic objectives, etc."

A simple mathematical model of Lanchester, which is usually set out in courses of mathematical modeling, gives a critical threshold of about 1,600 warheads" /55/.

Thus, in the new start Treaty we have actually reached such a threshold. And here arises the problem of stability of the Russian deterrence capability regarding destabilizing factors, which is unclear as it was taken into account when concluding this agreement. At least in our opinion, the Russian side at the conclusion of the start Treaty in the end, departed from the position expressed by our management in April 2009

In the context of sustainability the second "secret" of the new start Treaty is that contrary to the statement of soderjaschiesya the preamble, proposed measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations..." do not enhance the "predictability and stability".

Explain extended position.

Experts identify the strategic stability of the two concepts of crisis stability and arms race stability. The former implies that the situation is stable, even when in a crisis situation each of the opposing parties lack strong incentives for applying the first nuclear strike. In the second case, the stability is assessed by the presence of incentives for increasing its strategic potential, not only due to the increase of potential of strategic nuclear forces, but also by strengthening the non-nuclear components of the strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as the capacity of General purpose forces.

The mechanism of action stabilizationzuyetsya crisis to the next. If the strategic forces of any of the opposing parties have sufficiently high assets (controlover) potential, but is vulnerable to pre-emptive strike of the enemy and, moreover, "attractive" for applying on them the first strike, strategic (crisis) stability is violated.

From the above it follows that the conditions of maintaining strategic stability strong influence capable of exerting "external destabilizing factors, which primarily include the existence ABOUT the territory of the country "types of cell" fighting with "normal weapons", which may be caused by damage in combat and an information management means strategic nuclear forces, technological breakthroughs that significantly improve controlului potential of one of the parties, coalitions of nuclear States when they use a single operational planning, etc.

As destabilizing factors can occur also "hidden parameters" of the Contract, the most significant of which are the "return potential", a number refundierung the requirements of the Protocol and apps (such as, for example, the requirements for telemetry), etc.

Returning to destabilizing factors, it is also necessary to note the following.

In the proposed work (in addition to the often-mentioned systems "strategic" and so-called "non-strategic"), as the main destabilizing factors that represent threats to the strategic stability system on the expected duration of the new start Treaty, identified the following:

  • Developed in the United States the basic military technology of high speed supersonic and hypersonic precision strike weapons long-range in the "normal vehicle".
  • Developed and adopted for service in the US assault unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS) of various types, including platforms for missiles.

Assessing the impact of destabilizing factors, it is important to understand that not only heavy bomber and strategic aviation, but tactical aviation component of the U.S. armed forces modernizarea under the provision of the ability to defeat the"time-critical goals" and, thus, acquires the ability to inflict effective, including "environmentally acceptable" counter-force strike by Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

The integration of the technologies of hypersonic guided missiles (SD) air-to-ground design of tactical aircraft systems next generation supersonic velocity, flexibility-based (marine, terrestrial, and from unprepared sites), low visibility, great range and weapons load, will allow US to create the so-called "tactical level" of its armed forces effective and, most importantly, not subject to contractual limitations counter-force component. Technical characteristics of weapons systems lead to the conclusion that this component is capable of not only effectively hit targets of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia in the so-called "non-nuclear period of warfare (the "lower" rungs of escalation of the military conflict), but will be a "tactical" group, capable of applying a sudden counter-force and "decapitation" strike on Russian strategic nuclear forces and governments. Contractual limitations on the number of strategic delivery vehicles (i.e. potential targets) could further exacerbate this problem.

Russia does not have in the foreseeable future will not have similar capabilities (including the proximity to objects USA) tactical group strike weapons. Thus, there is an ever-increasing imbalance in the combat capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the USA associated with the neglect of the influence of developing basic military technologies that constitute the long term development impact of aviation and Maritime component of the General purpose forces of the United States. This has a direct impact on the provision of the deterrent functions of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia when making decisions on their deep cuts, including reducing the number of carriers.

In connection with the presence and development of non-nuclear components of the strategic offensive forces of the USA and acquisition of a significant counter-force capabilities of us General purpose forces (SLEEP) the following should be noted. An important deterrent function of nuclear weapons is deterrence technological arms race.

One of the consequences of the degradation of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia has become the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 1972, Further reducing the potential of the strategic nuclear forces can step up the creation and deployment of the US counter-force new systems.

Thus, as the unconditional imperative in the work of the conclusion is justified that the reduction potential of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and, in particular, snijenie media, in the absence of restrictions on non-nuclear component SNA (offensive and defensive) and counter-force capabilities, the DREAM of the United States, is a destabilizing factor, can be a source of new challenges and threats to military security of Russia and to push the United States to "trigger" a new arms race in the field of conventional offensive and defensive systems, with kontrolowany opportunities.

The third "secret" of the new Treaty is that its conclusion has no influence on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fight against "horizontal proliferation" is an attempt to deal with the consequence rather than the cause. The output from the "nuclear impasse" on the way to creating ever more sophisticated mechanisms of control is impossible. Humanity must change itself, first and foremost, it is one of the leading countries of the world.

War is not a technical problem, and it therefore cannot be solved by technical means, such as arms reduction, restriction or even destruction of certain species, the prohibition to use some tools. The story itself provides a confirmation of the extended position.

In this connection it is interesting to note the fact that before the 2nd World war, the conference on disarmament was in the League of Nations almost continuously.

The "Washington naval agreement", being a model disarmament Treaty has not prevented Japan in 1941 to attack America. That is, disarmament agreements are not in themselves capable of strengthening international security.

It is also necessary to mention another problem, indirectly related question.

Nuclear weapons, which is now actively "fight", there are "extreme" weapons of the 4th technological order. In the upcoming sixth technological way challenges and threats are becoming bigger and taking new forms.

In the development of nanotechnology and biotechnology to increase the potential of creating not only developed countries, but small groups of researchers the unprecedented force of arms and transferring it into the hands of the antisocial elements that may destroy or enslave humanity. Responding to this challenge cannot only be effective through the establishment of monitoring mechanisms, where we are heavily "denuclearization". Humanity needs to change itself and find adequate forms of organization of their life. And until that happens, there will be including the threats associated with the presence of the "nuclear factor", which is impossible to fend off any Treaties, Summits, etc.

 

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V. Kovalev, S. Malkov, G. Malinetskii


RELATED MATERIALS: Defence and security