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Object Mina f-10
Material posted: Publication date: 12-06-2013

Object radio-controlled mine f-10 is designed for detonation of high-security objects, the decision on the destruction of which must be taken in the usual manner at the time of leaving the area your troops or later, and which shall be destroyed only upon the occurrence of special circumstances.

In the picture to the left shows the control unit (left), aka Apparat F10 and decoder (Apparat A). Last out of the box and laid in front of her. To the right of the battery. They are connected to the power cord.

Picture from national Museum of the Finnish national context (Valtakunnallinen Viestimuseo) Riihimaki (Riihimaeki). Picture provided Jouko Kuisma.

From the author. Simply put, these mines miniroots such objects, which are generally undesirable to destroy at least due to the fact that in the case of imminent return, then it will create more problems to your troops than the enemy now. I.e., the command wants to be able to destroy the object just in case and then if it's clearly appropriate.

Such objects can be large bridges on the highway, dirt roads, Railways, viaducts, roads under overpasses where the diversion is impossible or very difficult, tunnels, dams, waterworks, railway stations, pumping stations, tank farms, airfields, command and control flights, hangars, repair shops, fuel containers , electric powertrains of large power plants (water and steam turbines, generators), industrial facilities, mining facilities, nodes and radio telegraphic communication, public buildings, suitable for accommodation of staff and establishments of army of the enemy, for use as barracks.

Structurally, mine is a control unit able to receive and process the received radio signals and to issue electroimpulse, can detonate up to three electric detonators, and with the use of special intermediate block splitter 36 electric detonators. The mass of the explosive charge depends on the size and nature of the destroyed facility and can range from a few tens of kilograms to several tons ( according to experience).

From the author. The most important thing in mine subversive thing is to have the opportunity to make work at least one detonator. And you can paste it in charge of any mass, up to several tons.

The controls can be located together with the charge (charges) or at a distance of 50 meters, and for each of the three charges is separate electroexplosive line.

The unit f-10, together with the decoder signals (A) and battery power Packed in to a box the size of 40х38х28 cm and weight 35 kg., which in turn is placed in a rubber bag). This box is set inside the object where it is comfortable is usually at a depth of 2.5 meters. At a distance of from 0 to 40 meters from the box is a wired antenna length of at least 30 meters. Its location and direction is dictated by the radio conditions, but in General it can be buried in the ground to a depth of 120cm., or placed in water to a depth of 50cm. or imbedded in a brick wall to a depth of 6cm Antenna connects to the unit f-10 feeder (waveguide) of length up to 40 meters.

From unit f-10, there are three two-wire cable electroexplosive chain. They can be up to 50 meters. It is desirable that the length of all three electroexplosive chain was approximately the same to avoid a big difference in elektrosoprotivleniya branches. To the ends of the cables joined by electric detonators inserted into the EXPLOSIVE charge.

If the phone connects to BIS, you can only have one cable of the three. His device is unknown but we can assume that he has his own powerful enough power supply and relay driven unit f-10.

To power the radio circuitry mines (units of f-10 and A) requires a operating voltage of 12 volts and an anode voltage (the heat of the anodes of tubes) is not less than 95 volts. This greatly limits the combat operation mines. In the mode of constant work intensity of radio tubes time combat operation is only 4 days. Therefore, in the composition of the mine introduced a clock mechanism, which provides only periodic connection of the heat. If mode is 2.5 ( two and a half minutes, the heat is on, two and a half the heat is off) then the term combat operation mines increases to 20 days. If you set the mode 5 (5 minutes the heat is on, heat is off 5) the term combat operation mines is increased to 40 days. Is the upper limit of the term combat operation mines.

However, if a mine operates in the mode of constant intensity, the signal for the explosion must be submitted for a duration of 1 minute, mode 2.5 - 6 minutes, and in mode 5 -10 minutes. In addition, in order to save power supply and the receiver will turn every 5-6 minutes 12-15 seconds. This regime drives a second clock mechanism, which pozabotitsja from the same batteries every 3-4 minutes.

Furthermore, Mina can have the device self-destruct by using delayed fuse EHV (up to 120 days), the time ten-days ' looper, watch looper tridtsatipjatiletnego, time fuse CMV-16 (up to 16 days), time fuse CMW-60 (up to 60 days),

The sounds of movements are significant telltale sign of mines. So, the naked ear can distinguish the ticking of the clock mines laid in the ground from a distance of 5-10 cm from the ground placed on masonry with 20-30cm. Clicks watch winder with 15-30cm. and 60-90cm. If you use the German removal firm Elektro-Akustik, the ticking of the clock is captured from a distance of from 2.5 to 6 meters, and the clicks of a winding from a distance of 6-8 meters.

Besides a box with Executive devices (devices f-10 and a), and the food, and the staff of BIS in the set of mines included two devices connected to the management station explosion . Are the phones "Woswol" and "Salma". With the help of the apparatus "Woswol" radio crime wave device f-10. The device is "Salma" is used to amplify the signals generated by the unit U, which is with him in the General mailbox. These two phones may not be used for blasting a few minutes as they adjusted precisely to the particular instance of the mines and re can't.

Tactical and technical characteristics of mines f-10

The type of mine.............................................................................................. high-explosive radio-controlled object
Corpus................................................................................................... metal
Weight box with actuators.............................. 35 kg.
The mass of the EXPLOSIVE charge................................................................................ tasks is determined by the destruction of the object
The length of the box with actuators............................ 40 see
Width drawer with actuators....................... 38 see
The box height with actuators....................... 28 see
The range of radio control explosion.............................................. up to 600 km.
Length of radio waves................................................................................ 25-120m.
The Fuze-anti-handling devices........................................................... EHV, CJ-10, CJ-35, CMW-16, CMW-60
Application temperature range............................................. -10 --+40 deg.
Time combat work........................................................................... 4-40 days
Self-destruction/self-neutralization.................................................. Yes/no
Otvlekaemost Yes/no
Obezvrezivate............................................................................. Yes/no

As radio transmitter control explosion can be used for Soviet military radio station divisional, corps or army levels. According to German data this radio station Waggon (communication range up to 500 km), RAF (communication range up to 300 km), RUS (communication range up to 150 km), Z Is A (communication range up to 120 km). According to the Soviet data on 22 June 1941 the Red Army had operational radio link RATH output power of 1 kW. and by communication range up to 600 km, RAO KV output power of 400-500 watts and a communication range up to 300 km, SSR-f power output of 40-50 watts and a communication range up to 30 km away. All three stations worked in the range of 25-120 meters, i.e., short and medium waves. In addition, could be used and broadcast radio stations. According to German sources, in which they refer to Soviet instructions, to control the explosion could be used in the frequency 1094.1-1000, 1000-922.8, 922.8-887.7, 857.5-800, 750-706.7, 667-631.3, 631.3-600, 568-545, 545-521.8, 521.8-500, 480-462.1, 428,6-413.8, 444,4-428.6, 500-480, 706-667, 800-750, 268, 245, 172 and 130 kilohertz.

Reliability min f-10 it was insufficient because one object is recommended to install two or three unit f-10.

Found in the sources there is no description of a system for encryption and decryption of signals for actuating radiomenu. But in separate comments, the German memo for captured Soviet mines a person familiar with one of the Soviet system of the sixties (Dmitry N.), comes to the conclusion that these two systems are similar.

Here is how he describes the system of the sixties and compares it with the system 41 of the year:

"To ensure the selective call device has a conventional mechanical tuning fork. Signal transmission from one foot to another is only possible if the frequency exactly matches the resonance frequency of the tuning fork. Ie the second side of the tuning fork swinging only at resonance and this vibration causes the current output device. The fork looks just like a normal music, only fit in a matchbox. The tuning fork swinging the coil wound directly onto one of its legs. The second foot on the sensor is fixed, a variant of the contact of the contactor. It triggers the normal relay or "walking the seeker" (SHEA). SHI was used in old telephone exchanges. From this follows the obvious conclusion that the command "Fire!" was formed by feeding in a sequence of several distinct teams across multiple tuning forks at each of which worked a normal relay or "walking the seeker" shifted by one step. An indication of such sound means such tones of command were many. Swinging fork almost instantly (about 10 periods of oscillation signal, i.e., much less than a second), the duration is 4 sec. was chosen to eliminate triggering on random splash of team colors at the operating frequency. Typically, the delay provided by the charging of the capacitor, i.e. when the signal after the tuning condenser is charged gradually, passing the signal only when you have the right tension. If the next signal of the set of commands didn't come in time, the capacitor is discharged gradually, the relay "releases" and the sequence of commands is necessary to dial again. Thus the command "Fire" (assuming that the forks had two) should look like "тон1-тон2-тон1-тон2-тон1-тон2" with a certain number of transitions. After activation of the first relay from the first relay the second tuning fork was connected to the output of the second tuning fork, then the third relay to the output of the first tuning fork, etc. Could be done differently, but the meaning was like that".

Finnish specialist Jukka Linen relative to the device f-10 writes: "...the Fuze operates on the principle of the three series-connected tuning forks , which vibrate with a triple audio signal (used autovie ringtones Kharkiv and Minsk civilian radio stations)..." .

The Germans quickly developed very reliable methods of neutralization of radioline. On September 30, 1941 on the front off the manual Wa Pruef 7 vom 30.9.41 with a description of the methods of struggle with Soviet radioline. In particular it says:

"1. Disabling. Oscillations of audio frequency (between 150 to 700 Hz for 5 seconds) can display two working sets of forks down. However, the prerequisites for this are: 1.the fact that the reception frequency is known, 2. the fact that the battery devices have high voltage, ie what has for long been in the mode (12 volts minimum operating voltage of 95 volts anode voltage).

2. Blocking. The excitation can be prevented parcels unmodulated signals at close to the transmitter frequency. Produced both radio distorted sound then controls the low frequency part of the device, whereby the excitation is prevented. Testing on the ground was conducted using 100-watt radio transmitter on frequency 705 kilohertz (unit XXXIV) with the following result: the Initiation of an explosive device could be prevented with the help of these transmitters at a distance of about 3-5 km, if the frequency interval was not more than 3 kHz. When using a more powerful radio transmitter block would be possible in accordance with that also a larger range of frequencies and over large distances. For these tests we used the modulation of the transmitter is reconstructed from the captured property. In the modulation contains 3 sound frequencies that change when you use different key".

A. Shirokorad in his article "Tanks-cyborgs" and editerror" in the magazine "Popular mechanics" for 2005 says that the first combat use of radiomenu f-10 took place on 12 July 1941. In a building in the village of Strugi Krasnye (75 km North-East of Pskov) before his remains were laid three radiomen f-10, each of which contained 250 kg of explosives. Supposedly this building according to the intelligence headquarters was occupied by the German 56th mechanized corps, which was destroyed in the explosion. Managing the explosion was made from a distance of 150 km from the Gatchina Park. However, the commander of the 56th mechanized corps of General E. von Manstein in his memoirs of this fact is not confirmed. Pass by his attention such an event would hardly have been able, as he in his records mentions each case, the death of each of the ranks of its environment in the initial period of war. And from his records, it follows that KP corps in those days was in Soltsy, 80 km South-East of Strugi Krasnye.

In the same article A. Shirokorad accuses Red Army that explosions of radiomen, which had begun 24.9.41 (5 days after leaving Kiev) the destruction of the store "Children's world" on Khreschatyk, was further destroyed the whole center of Kiev. And destroyed by him the objects which could hardly provide for the occupiers of immediate interest. The cinema & shantser, the circus, the "continental" hotel, the Conservatory, a number of houses together with their inhabitants the inhabitants of Kiev. And allegedly these explosions led to German reprisals, as they say, Germans thought that all this destruction is the work of Soviet saboteurs. You might think that the Germans behaved the same way if the sabotage was not. But how then to explain the German repression in those places where no land mines, the Red Army did not set at all? And how then to understand the fact that the Germans by this time knew that he radio-controlled mines?

And Shirokorad the crown of the senseless crimes of the Bolsheviks against the capital of Ukraine is the explosion of radiomenu 3 November 1941. Dormition Cathedral of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.

What can you say about it. The deadline to combat work radiomenu of 40 days. Therefore the last explosion of radiomen in Kiev could occur not later than October 28, since Kiev was abandoned by Soviet troops on September 19. And the Cathedral blown up on 3 November. So, who would and would not blow up the Cathedral, but it could not be radiomenu. In addition to Kiev pass was not planned and, therefore, it is unlikely that the Soviet miners could be available to them the time to prepare the city for such large-scale destruction. For example, the mining of Kharkov took about three weeks and it took the efforts of five engineering battalions, two companies of train crews and specrate.

It is bad when a person, claiming to be the military historian, political and ideological predilections fog your mind. To blow before the Foundation of so great and very strong building, which is the Cathedral of the assumption, required to work not less than the sapper squad 5-7 days and about a ton of EXPLOSIVES, distributed on dozens of points. To take such inappropriate use of the very scarce specialists and the consumption of large quantities of explosives in conditions, when there are far more pressing problems, hardly anyone would agree.

This is indirectly confirmed by these lines from the German document (Merkblatt ueber russische Spreng - und Zund - mittel, und Minen Zuender) Tr.180: "you Should pay attention that all discovered yet long-range ignition except for one were not in public buildings and homes." This document is dated 1 January 1942.

Maybe I incorrectly translated from German? Well here you have this quote in German: "Auffalend ist, dass bisher alle ausgebauten Fernzundgeraete nicht mit Ausnahme einer oeffentlichen gebaeuden in ind Haeusern ausgebaut wurden." .

For the city of Shirokorad is generally characteristic of very liberal treatment of historical events and facts. For example, it is the mining of Kharkov in 1941 attributes the NKVD, and what is curious is the fact that he gives the NKVD in the subordination of the General staff of the red army. And writes: "Thus began unique in its design and technical solution the operation of our General staff under the code name "the Trap", the implementation of which was entrusted to the NKVD. Encrypted radio signals for the Kharkiv land mines was supplied from the radio station RS-25, set on the outskirts of the town of Semiluki".

Well, let us turn to the memoirs of a man who was in charge of all work on mining Kharkov, and which are confirmed by documents. This is Colonel I. G. Starinov, who by the NKVD nothing had, as he served in the red army. The decision of Betting on a mining of objects of Kharkov was taken on September 19, simultaneously with the decision about leaving the city for October 25. The task of mining Kharkov Sterinova was set on 27 September 1941 the chief of the engineering troops of the red army, major General L. Z. Kotlyar on the behalf Rates. It set up an operational group starinova, fifteen officers of engineering troops, five specialist operational training Centre (CTC) and the company spazmirovannah CDWG, under the command of Weininger 2nd grade P. V. Yastrebova. All soldiers of the red army. The operations group were assigned to five engineer battalions of the red Army (Ospb 449, 531 Ospb, Ospb 532, 534 Ospb, 56 FIA) that are engaged in ordinary object mines with delayed action fuses on the railway, roads, bridges, station buildings, Kharkiv aerodromes (including the aerodrome Chuguev) and in workshops of industrial enterprises. In addition, for a mining railway facilities and tunnels object mines (bombs) were involved units of the 5-th and 27-th train crews NCO. The plan of the mining Kharkov was approved on 4 October the chief of engineering troops of the South-Western front, major General G. G. Nevsky.

As you can see, the NKVD had exactly nothing to do with the mining of Kharkov.

Specrate was installing radiomen, and only one type of f-10. Nowhere Shirokorad took the designation of radiomen "BEMI" and the name of the radio station RS-25. I, at least, not found in the nomenclature of engineering ammunition of the red Army even close abbreviations. And among radio stations of the red Army designation RS-25 is not sought. This specrate left Moscow on 30 September, arrived in Kharkiv at 18 o'clock on October 3. The convoy radioline under the command of Lieutenant Hanuka and Sergeant Sergeev arrived in Kharkiv on 6 October. Installation of radiomen began on October 13. Only available for 30 radiomen f-10. These mines were laid in the building of the headquarters of the military district, in Holodnogorske Usovo and the viaducts, at the Kharkov airport.

And only one single Radiolina was installed in a residential home. It is the house № 17 along the street Dzerzhinsky. It was a mansion of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party(Bolsheviks), and residents that have been so touching cares, Shirokorad, except the Member of the Military Council of the southwestern front N. With.Khrushchev in this house then you have not lived. Installing in the mansion radiomenu f-10 with a 350 kg EXPLOSIVE charge beneath the floor of the basement was engaged for two days (13-14 October) 6 people. Specifically - the Colonel Starinov, commander of specrate Weininger 2nd grade (can be equated to the major) Hawks, vortechnics 2nd grade (comparable to Lieutenant) Sergeant Leonov and Lyadov, Lebedev and Sergeev. On top of radiomen in the pile of coal was installed to divert the attention of the enemy ordinary object a mine with a delayed fuse, which was discovered by the German engineers who superintended the mansion on mining.

Only in Kharkiv was installed 30 thousand anti-tank and anti-personnel mines 2000 object mines with fuses slow-acting and about 8-13 radiomen f-10 (2-3 devices on a single EXPLOSIVE charge). The first radiomen the Germans discovered and defused Usovo on the viaduct on October, 28, moreover, the existence of such mines the Germans knew as their staging center interference in the day of the invasion of the Germans in Kharkov. It is authentically known about three disarmed mines f-10. One radioman was successfully exploded under the leadership starinova in 3.15 min 14 November, Voronezh broadcast stations, which are radiated power is 10 kW. It was mine in the house on Dzerzhinsky 17. Directly bringing mines into effect was carried out by Colonel Starinov, head of the Voronezh radio station F. S. Korzhev and senior engineer of the radio station V. A. Bespamyatnov. Was sent three signals. When the explosion killed the commander of the German 68th infantry division, major General George brown, who is no kin relationship to the designer of the rockets that Werner von Braun, according to Shirokorad, he had. Yes, and "commandant of Kharkiv and Kharkiv executioner" General brown was not. Only in early November, the 68th infantry division arrived in Kharkiv and became part of the LV army corps of the 6th army-General feldmarshala Reichenau. But until that time she was in Poltava in the composition of the LII army corps of the 17th army of General of infantry of Stulpnagel

Significantly also know about the explosion Holodnogorsko of the viaduct. Relative to other mines fairly accurate information.

But German document Merkblatt ueber russische Spreng - und Zund - mittel, Minen und Zunder. In it on page 180 provides a report of the staging Center interference on the interception and successful well killing of the signals of excitation of the mines in the town of X. (I assume we are talking about the city of Kharkov):

Frequency date Duration of packages of the signal
374 K-Hz 30.10 -6 minutes
392 K-Hertz 29.10, 12 minutes and 10 minutes
407 To Herz-14.11 -8 minutes and 18 minutes
407 To Herz-22.11 -27 minutes and 13 minutes
416 K-Hertz 6.11 -12 minutes
523 K-Hertz 31.10, 7.11 15 minutes and 2 minutes часа30
528-Hertz 28.10, 29.10 58 minutes
528-Hertz 10.11 4 hours 55 minutes
530 K-Hertz 25.10 10 minutes
532 K-Hertz 21.11 35 minutes
532 K-Hertz 22.11 46 minutes and 21 minutes
533 To Herz-7.11 16 minutes
533 K-Hz 14.11 1 hour 1 minutes
To 535-Hz 14.11 1 hour 25 minutes
538 K-Hertz 29.10 9 minutes and 25 minutes
583 K-Hz 30.10 8 hours, 28 minutes
583 K-Hz 14.11 3 and 4 minutes
585 K-Hertz 25.10, 29.10 20 minutes
585 K-Hz 30.10 6 minutes
611 K-Hertz 23.10 55 minutes
635 K-Hertz 31.10 5 minutes
647 K-Hz 14.11 19 minutes
647 K-Hertz 22.11 59, 38, 16, 18, and 6 minutes
652 K-Hz 14.11 5 minutes
730-Hz 29.10 55 minutes.

If we assume that each frequency corresponds to one Radiolina, it turns out that in city X. the Germans had successfully neutralized 20 radiomen, and is clearly noticeable that some of our radiomen tried to blow up several times, for Example, a mine with a radio frequency 585 tried to blow up October 25, October 29 and October 30. By date it is noticeable that the first attempts were undertaken on 25 October (day of leaving Kharkov), last November 14. Note that 5 December was the deadline expired combat operation mines, but it is obvious that Starinov had set the deadline on November 14. The Germans attempts after a mine explosion on November 14 was not recorded.

So successful actions of the Germans can be explained by the fact that no later than mid-September 1941 they got an instance of how a mine f-10 with the list of operating frequencies and power of signals, with the result that they were able to quickly organize a service of radio jamming.

An indirect confirmation of the fact that in September 1941 the Germans had copies of radioman f-10 can serve as a photo from the Ukrainian newspaper "Ukrainska the word" dated 21 October 1941. You can dispute the Dating of the picture - September 1941 (September 1941), you can challenge the spot of the picture, but the date of issue of the newspaper cannot be doubted, and that in the picture quite distinctly different German soldiers, no less than 40 boxes that are identified as a Soviet crates of TNT, and at least three three radiopotassium explosive devices f-10. This corresponds to the Instructions directing the installation to one mine 2-3 devices f-10

Interesting data about reports of the Finnish collector and researcher Jukka Linen. He writes that several radiomen was discovered by Finnish troops during the capture of Vyborg . They were identified in several bridges, large buildings, water tower and to port facilities. One radioman was discovered just thrown.

Fighting radioline in the city of Vyborg started 27.08.41 and ended 01.09.41 (on explosions, but not on countermeasures). At this time, there have been 17 explosions in the twelve. The first explosion occurred in the South pillar of the bridge near the village Kamennogorsk (fin. Antrea, Strait of Kuukauppi). On the bridge died three of the Finnish officer and two officials. They are not cleared, just stayed there. The most senior in rank of the dead was a major Taranna Tapio (Tapio Tarjanne), the chief military lawyer of the Finnish General staff. Following 31.08.41 was blown up the bridge over Saimenskiy channel (Saimenskij). Now there is a new bridge named "Bridge of Friendship". The same signal was to be blown up a railway bridge, but there 30.08 radiomenu found and removed. Interest in the event of Linnankatu (Linnansilta) that the Vyborg castle.

There in search of radiomen was a Finnish engineer platoon. Found nothing and asked the platoon to go up the tower of the castle to explore the town. When all the engineers were upstairs in the tower, blew up the two pillars of the bridge, stones were flying above the tower. The soldiers escaped from the tower, believing that she is the next object. But the destruction was limited to the bridge. Nevertheless the first radiomen managed to dig 28.08. the Northern support of the bridge in Kamennogorsk and Vyborg harbour found an unspecified radiomenu with a fuse. Only in Vyborg was established 25 radiomen f-10. They contained from 120 to 4500 kg of TNT. 17 of them exploded, and the 8 was able to neutralize and disarm when it became clear that mines are driven by an RF signal. The work was supervised by the captain of Sitala Lauri (Lauri Sutela). In the eighties the General he was the Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces.

In 2005 he was still alive. Found devices were shipped in Helsinki, analyzed by experts and by 2.9.1941 year were issued corresponding instructions on rules of treatment and neutralization of the Soviet radiomen. So, it was revealed that the radio signals used pre-war autovue music ringtones are the Kharkov and Minsk broadcast radio stations (of melody that filled the air between the two programs). Finnish experts have picked the tune, which was played in the same range of sound frequencies. It was the melody of the Karelian folk dance "Saekkijarven polkka". Within two months (the time limit with a full stock of the batteries of radiomen) in Vyborg on the radio frequencies of the Soviet radiomen continuously melody sent from military radio transmitters, which distorted possible radio signals of the Soviet radio transmitters.

This is how radiomen in a letter to the Finnish General staff from 3.09.41 G.:

"The device three elements of power supply:10 volt to the bulbs, 60-volt on the anode voltage and 15 V for the voltage for the receiver. All elements (tubes) cold type and appearance 10-volt 5-10 amp. In all tubes, the filament current of 85 milliamperes and an anode flow rate of 16 milliamps. In General, the fuse consists of: 1) 8-tube radio, 2) a clock mechanism. 3) fork-selector. 4) relay ignition. Approximately 4 first lamp is high-frequency amplifiers, a fifth indicator, the following two amps for the low frequencies and the latter is the relay for lamp ignition. All the devices with factory default setting to a wave 410 meters ( 715 kilohertz) . All lamps identical, at 1.2 volts triode, factory mark PB 108. The clock mechanism includes a receiver every 5 minutes for 15 seconds. The plant clock mechanism is made automatically through the elements of the filament. The device can be set to accept every 2.5 minutes. Accordingly, the maximum period of 1 month ( 2.5 min) - 2 months ( 5 minutes). Fork-selector consists of a special tuning fork with the electrical contacts. When transferring the well-defined tones is formed a contact ( in the same device measured colors consisted of 25, 350 and 600 Hz). The tuning fork sealed in a Nickel-plated box. Replacing the box, you can change the colors. As for the ignition relay, it will work, if within 15 seconds, the receiver will receive 4 high quality signal in low tones. The relay is powered by the element of the filament (10 volts). In addition, in each device there are mercury aneroid, the purpose of which is not identified and the charge will self-destruct in a tin box." Were later found radiomenu configured to frequency 645 and 464 kHz. "

A very effective way of detecting radioman was digging ditches metre depth around the suspicious object as a mine had a thirty-metre high antenna, which was buried to a depth of 50-80cm. around the object. And the Finns and later the Germans for this widely used prisoners of war. Information received, the Finns promptly shared with the Germans. It is likely that this timely information helped the Germans quickly and correctly to organize an effective struggle against the Soviet radioline.

That our rudimenary used and powerful broadcast radio station saying these are the lines from Merkblatt ueber russische Spreng - und Zund - mittel, Minen und Zunder relative radiomen in Kharkov: "In the course of two different days the Russians of signal transmission at different wavelengths were passed in such a volume that the transmission power 100-watt radio transmitter was not enough to suppress ignition signals of interfering transmissions. In these cases, the interfering sound was transmitted at wavelengths less than 600 kHz using a 1.5-kilowatt radio transmitter, the waves are more than 600 kHz with 2 parallel-connected 100-watt radio transmitter working at the same time. The fact that an unusually strong signal transmission of Russian was on these waves that lie in the wavelength range found in the city of X types of devices room XXIV, XXVIII, and XXXI, and that during the period of an interfering transmission no explosions occurred within the city, allows us to assume that a) the Russians ignition signals transmitted to such devices which have previously been removed from objects explode or b) a particularly strong interfering transmissions laid many explosions were prevented on the territory of the city." .

It is worth noting that in Kharkov the conventional object mines with delayed action fuses gave much better results. So, in 315 the object of mines on the railroad 5-th and 27-th train crews, the Germans found only 37, and managed to defuse only 14, and 23 had to undermine. The rest worked on the objectives.

From the textbook "Engineering troops" in the middle of 1940 in the reform process of the engineering troops of the red army was planned within each combined-arms army to have among other engineering parts of the separate company of technology of secrecy (Roth CBT). However, the author knows of only one such military unit. It is a separate company spazmirovannah RVGK., who was involved in the mining of Kharkov.

I. G. Starinov in his memoirs indicates that there was of the Ulyanovsk military school for the training of specialists in the field of radiomicrophone, which in the mid-thirties, allegedly in the process of Stalin's defeat of preparations for guerrilla and sabotage actions was transformed into the school of communication. However, the list of Soviet military schools indicated that this city was stationed at that period of the Ulyanovsk tank training school, Ulyanovsk military-technical school and the Ulyanovsk military school of communication. Search of archives did not give any indication of the existence in this city of another military school. Also such schools are not detected nor in the list of military College of engineering troops (they do in all specialties of engineering troops only had four), nor in the list of military schools of the NKVD or NKGB. Most likely the Colonel Starinov just exaggerated. Could not exist such a important need in the officer personnel of spazmirovannah, in order to create a whole military school. Enough or give the desired number of engineer officers additional training on radio communication in the same Ulyanovsk school of communication or to retrain in the Leningrad military engineering school, a certain number of officers are specialists in the field of radio communications.

The States of the Soviet rifle divisions No. 4/400-416 dated April 5, 1941 it is evident that in a separate sapper battalion infantry division has a separate cocking device is a "Block" consisting of 1 officer, 5 NCOs and 28 soldiers. Armed with a platoon of 4 trucks. This platoon was intended for the installation of radiomen. Have there been staff in hull sapper battalions of the division radiomicrophone could not be determined.

The textbook "Engineering troops" mentions that on the Western front during the withdrawal of radiomen installed on important targets, since the second half of July (p. 167). In the preparation of the defense of Kiev (South-Western front) three platoons of spazmirovannah installed radiomen on the bridges across the Dnieper river (p. 169). About radiomicrophone in the North-Western front in the textbook is not mentioned.

To trace the use of radiomen in hostilities after November 1941 failed. Mention in the sources both Soviet and German are absent. However, in the tutorial it is mentioned that in reforming engineering troops in April 1942 were formed engineering brigade of special purpose in the composition of which had battalions of spazmirovannah. This battalion was assigned installation tasks managed (by wire) of minefields and telepass. However, with a very detailed description of the number and types mounted on all fronts of mines, nowhere we don't find radiomen (radiological, tuleuhanov).

From the author. With high probability we can assume that the Germans are very quickly found the most vulnerable spot radio min - radio command detonation, learned a list of possible radio frequencies and very quickly formed a unit of production interference. This unit of only 62 people, with 4 stavatti, 1 polutorakratnogo transmitters and 20 receivers have been able to reliably block radiomenu in a big city type of Kiev or Kharkov. The Soviet command apparently has not been able to abandon the idea of control by a mine explosion on the radio and kept such units until the autumn of 1943, when the Red Army was able to abandon the strategic defense.

Conclusions. The idea of the management of the mines by means of radio proved to be quite feasible, but the experience of the autumn of 1941 showed that radiomen have a very significant drawback - the simplicity and reliability of their block, and also a very limited duration combat operation. Hence, it is clear that this type of mines can find very limited use. First, they can be used so rarely, how the enemy would find it impractical to divert their radio equipment on a permanent electronic intelligence and intercept. Secondly, short term working capacity power supplies (maximum 40 days) significantly limits the use of radiomen time.

It's the same thing we see on the example of using radio-controlled mines and during the Chechen war. While Federal troops were not ready to confront radio detonators, the insurgents used them very successfully. But as soon as she started using even the simplest means of countermeasure, so the cases of explosions with radio detonators quickly waned and then stopped altogether. Moreover, the present level of development of electronics allows to automatically intercept and block any radio transmissions both in frequency ranges and for certain radii of removal, sectors and directions. No tricks will not allow the signal to slip, even if just to block the entire radio band.

After the Germans became aware of the Soviet radio-controlled mines type f-10 and this happened no later than early September of 1941, they had taken appropriate countermeasures.

To combat radioline in September 1941 when the training engineer special purpose battalion (spazmirovannah) (Pi.-Lehrbatl.z.b.V. (f. Mineure)) stationed in Hoxter on the Weser rivers (Hoexter/Weser), was formed by the demining company auditions (Pionier-Horchkompanie (Pi.Ho.Ko.). The name of the commander of this company could not be traced, but found that the company consisted of 4 platoons listening (Hocrhzuges), which was given to the groups of armies platoons.

The platoon consisted of 1 officer, 4 non-commissioned officers and 40 privates. The platoon had four divisions listening 1 St platoon (1. Horchzug). Commander Oberleutnant Dietrich (Dietrich). Attached to the army group North. 2.-th platoon (2. Horchzug). Commander Oberleutnant Oster (Oster).Attached to the army group South. 3.-the third platoon (3. Horchzug). Commander leutnant Polman (Pohlmann). Initially, the platoon was in reserve, was then sent to Stalingrad, where it was used as infantry and was destroyed in the fighting.

On the fourth platoon of reliable information is not available. Indirect data was attached to the army group Centre.

German descriptions of the Soviet radiomen f-10 (initially it was assumed that these machines are manufactured in the USSR from the USA) was an 8-tube radio with a 30 meter wire antenna, Packed in a metal casing.

Close to the receiver located a 12-volt battery, which cable was connected to the receiver. In size and appearance to the receiver and battery were similar, but the receiver on the top panel not one but two connections. The receiver and battery are fit together in a sealed rubber bag, from which came out five lines (one antenna and four for connection to electric detonators of the explosive charge).

In the picture to the right shows the receiver and the battery extracted from the rubber bag. The box on the far left is battery power, to the right of its radio and over to the right a rubber bag, with wires coming out of it. On the receiver body are visible figures 6906-XXXIV. Which means the number 6906 unknown, but for the number XXXIV German Memo for captured Soviet mines and fuzes publication January 1942 indicates that this number indicates a conventional number of wavelengths at which the receiver operates. In the Memo, referring to the Russian manual, it is specified that a receiver with room XXXIV operates at frequencies 413.8 - 428.6 kHz. Receivers numbers more than XVIII was intended for especially long-range control by the explosion and had increased sensitivity.

In the German source indicated that in the bag, except the receiver and battery were placed booby trap fuse with a stretch action attached to the neck of the bag. This mine worked when trying to untie the bag.

From the author. Reception, in General, that is correct, but designed for poorly trained and careless deminer. It's too obvious. Any more or less prepared minesweeper will never open unknown device as do all normal people. He will try to sneak in a bag as otherwise it can look to the neck from the inside. Too well the engineers know their own deceit.

Also booby-traps were placed in the boxes of explosives, which consisted of the base charge mines (average about 1 ton of TNT). Mine was supplied with fuses of the stretch action that is triggered when you try to remove the crates from the mine chamber.

For receiving the control signal receiver supplied with a 30 meter wire antenna, which was placed under the relatively thin ( up to half a meter) layer of soil (brick, stone) or water. The antenna was stowed in a horizontal (or near horizontal) position and be sure in the direction where to go signal. It is easy to guess that in all cases the antenna was directed approximately to the East. Okapia suspicious object at a distance of 30 metres in the ditch two feet in depth, easy to detect the antenna and thereby to scan an object for the presence of radioline.

Taking a city or large object, perspective on razminirovanie, the Germans immediately included radios, radio communications, available in the platoon. In case you receive any radio signals at the known frequencies, radio operators immediately included transmitters who were jamming the control signals.

At the same time carried out a technical search of radiomen dyking objects, listening to so-called "Listening pomegranate" ("Horchgranate"). These devices consisted of a metal cylinder with a length of 40-50 cm is placed inside a highly sensitive piezoelectric microphone. He dug into the ground to a depth of about 0.5 m, and allowed to hear and to determine the direction of the sound of an electric clock in mine (these hours in order to save power include the power for 8 seconds every 3 minutes).

From the author. According to some indirect data (separate documents about this available) 3rd platoon listening in Stalingrad was used to search for and destroy Soviet radiomen, and to install the German radiomen. This is indicated by the following circumstances. First, a platoon of listening was sent to Stalingrad after the 6th army was encircled. Secondly, there is the report of the head of the Main military engineering management major General Kalyagina the Deputy Commissar of defence - the chief of engineering troops of the red army, major General Vorobyev M. P. that among the captives there was Nissin Alfred Hartman, engineer-constructor firm "Siemens-Halske", sent to the mountains. Stalingrad to set various time bombs and mines that are managed on the radio. He agreed to cooperate and show the installation location as radiomen, and other time bombs. Unfortunately, Nissin in a few days died of typhoid.

Any details about the German radiomen the author could not be traced. But what the Germans could be remote-controlled mine, there's no doubt. It is known that after World war I, the Germans experienced and highly successful radio control old battleship. In 1940 the Wehrmacht received remote-controlled tracked vehicle called Sprengladungtraeger (Sd.Kfz. 301). Often referred to as "B IV" this machine is controlled by radio, and as he neared the object, also radiocommande dumped near the object, a powerful explosive charge. After removal of the machine at a safe distance, the operator deflected the charge radiocomando. These machines were used in the fighting. So, in June 1942, it was noted the use of B IV in the storming of Sevastopol by two companies of a tank battalion 300 (1.Kompanie/Panzer Abteilung (FL) 300 and 2.Kompanie/Panzer Abteilung (FL) 300 ). I think that technically the Germans were quite able to have the radio control device of the EXPLOSIVE charge. Here it is necessary to submit a single radiocomando. need only the radio desired range. Thus, the use of radiomen the Germans in Stalingrad was possible.


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Yu. G. Veremeev


Tags: armed forces , AME

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