There is a new and transformation of known laws of war. There is a need for new principles of military art, new forms of military-political confrontation, including new forms of warfare.

For a time after the second world war we lost: a 45-year-old global "cold war" with the United States of America; 9-year-old regional "undeclared war" in Afghanistan; military defeat ended a 2-year "restore constitutional order" in Chechnya. This statement requires clarification on two items: 1) whether or not the "lost"; 2) what wars, operations and battles lost.

First: whether "lost"? The purpose of the war — the defeat of enemy forces or the mastery of its territory, and the post-war world. Victory is the achievement of the objectives of the war. Therefore, the hallmark of victory is the consent of the opponent or forcing him to peace on certain conditions. Based on this, the obvious answer to the question, who wins in the global "cold" war, in Afghanistan or in Chechnya.

The armed Forces in all cases remains an instrument of state policy. This tool must always be intact, and be able to perform the work assigned to him. In recognition of the defeat in the "cold war", in Afghanistan and Chechnya is now profitable and do not need anyone except the army. So, first of all, the Russian army, we need the analysis to understand the military reasons for the defeat.

Second. What wars, operations and battles lost. From the point of view of the existing theories of military art, no. None of the Soviet division of the Western group of troops of the former potential enemy is not defeated. None of the Soviet battalion, not to mention the shelf was defeated in Afghanistan. In Chechnya, in General, supposedly all the fault of the interior Ministry and the FSB, and the army fulfilled its task. However, dozens of elite divisions of the Western group of forces legally attributed to irretrievable losses. We withdrew from Afghanistan without seeing the victory. The military ended with the defeat of the Chechen campaign.

"The cold war", we identified through the concept of physics, "undeclared" war in Afghanistan — through the concept of diplomacy, "restoring constitutional order in Chechnya" — through the concept of rights. So what are the war operations and battles we lost, in terms of the military art?

Current understanding of war and armed struggle, as well as the existing system of operations of the Armed Forces does not answer these questions. This means that these lesions are related to, among other things, a lack in the theory and practice of our martial art appropriate forms and methods of warfare, as well as other types of against the use of armed forces in non-combat means.

Russian martial art up to the present time does not recognize other major types of combat actions besides attack and defense, even when the fight against the sabotage (of irregular armed) groups or perative becomes operational-strategic scale and is the main subject of fighting associations, connections and parts of Armed Forces.

We still do not fully understand the nature and content of the fight and lead us with our geopolitical rivals.

It is possible to continue to believe that we have not lost a single battle nor a single operation in these wars. After all, no psychological operations, as one of the forms of waging the cold war, nor of special operations (actions), which according to the views of our former opponents, in fact, the main form of fighting in Afghanistan, our military art was not, and is not, and therefore had nothing to lose. Opponents thought otherwise.

It's time to recognize his omission in this area of military Affairs. But to access the meaning and importance of special operations as forms of armed and other struggle is impossible without understanding of the nature and scope of the wars and armed conflicts.

Military actions still define us as the actions of the armed forces to defeat the enemy on land, in the air and on the sea, and the purpose of the Armed Forces — the defense of the Russian Federation with the use of armed struggle. Accordingly, the purpose of the land forces — repel the invasion of the aggressor and the retention of the occupied territories, the defeat of groupings of enemy forces and mastering its territory. And the purpose of the airborne forces — maintain the same fighting, but in the rear of the enemy. And in all cases the destruction of manpower and equipment of the enemy in open armed confrontation with the enemy — in battle, battle or operation is the only means of achieving victory.

This approach to the choice of goals, means and methods of achieving military-political goals in the current context is anachronistic. The battle ceased to be the only means of achieving victory. Understanding, and hence the solution to these problems is possible within the theory, which has to be developed, a theory of special operations.

The goal of special operations, their objectives, methods of implementation, types of special actions — must be known to the wider Russian public.

Armed struggle always and unconditionally considered to be the primary deciding contents of the war, its main form. The primacy of the armed struggle denies the possibility of achieving a decisive military and political objectives in the war through the use of other forms of opposition. It causes unreasonably hard necessity of application of means of armed violence to achieve the goals of the war.

Fight to the death in the defense or, overcoming the enemy fire, to seize the offensive in turn required a different skill, a different logical organization of the confrontation. Given the power of modern weapons, similar methods of warfare, and in fact — the methods of mass bloodshed — developed countries are not allowed today. Other methods are required and ways of achieving military-political goals.

In the theory of military art there is a change of paradigm of the military-scientific thinking associated with major changes in the system of priorities and values of human society, the humanization of the armed struggle. Change the structure, logical organization, methods and means of military-political confrontation, reveals a different understanding of the concept of war.

The essence of war has not changed. War, still, as in the times of K. Clausewitz, is "an act of violence intended to compel the enemy to fulfil your will." Changes occurred in the content of war and ways to achieve goals. Currently, from the totality of the essential features of the war, the transition to the use of means of armed violence is regarded as a distinctive we have a single sign of the concept of "war". In the result outside of the distinguishing features of the war left other areas or forms of violence — information, cultural, economic, financial, ideological and other methods used to achieve decisive military-political and other objectives without the use of direct armed violence.

A violent change in lifestyle of the nation no longer associated only with the external or internal armed violence. Military threat at the present time should be correlated not only with the use of armed violence, but also with the use of war as a way of achieving military-political and other purposes, war as a massive organized violent attacks in various areas of human activity. However, the right identification of violence belongs to object of influence.

In modern conditions of geopolitical confrontation is conducted in the following forms:

• the war with the use of means of warfare;
• war using non-combat means;
• armed conflict;
• the conflict with using non-combat means;
• natural competition.

War is large-scale organized violent massive impact on the state, nation, social or ethnic group with use of means of warfare and or non-combat means to achieve decisive political, military, economic, cultural, and other purposes. In war there can be used different forms of struggle: information, armed, economic, financial, diplomatic, cultural, and others.

Conflict — the forcible interference with the use of means of warfare and (or) non-combat tools with limited objectives, not reaching the proportions of war with the sudden change in the opposing sides held their previous policy.

Natural competition — the use of the subjects of geopolitics mutually acceptable ways of influence on each other. It is the recognition of the rights of another subject on the right, similar to his own, and maintaining daily activities in the life of the state, nation, social or ethnic group. Natural competition, the natural state of mankind.

Knowledge (information) replaces force as a criterion of natural selection. The focus of the knowledge (information) is defined by morality. The level of knowledge (information) — formation. The ability to implement the knowledge (of information) — mental condition.

The most General law of war, the previously determined dependence the war only from its political goals, was transformed into the law according to the purposes of war, of the war and its prosecution.

The achievement of the goal in the war identificireba as a victory; method of warfare, the path, the way to achieve victory. Therefore, it is not the defeat of the armed forces of the enemy or the mastery of its territory and forced to make peace on certain conditions, the achievement of the desired postwar is a distinctive sign of victory.

Fundamentally, the purpose of action in any confrontation, including military, can be achieved in two ways: by overcoming the resistance of the enemy or the deprivation of his ability to conduct the struggle. The predominance of a particular method in the content of the confrontation defines the method of achieving the goal.

Overcoming the resistance in the war with the use of means of warfare (armed conflict) is carried out by means of open armed clashes of the parties. Depriving the enemy's ability to resist and to fight in General — to undermine the military, informational, economic, scientific-technical and moral capacities through special actions.

In the war (conflict) using non-combat means, and also natural rivalry goals are achieved by deprivation or limitation of the ability of the ability of the enemy (opponent) to the further conduct of the struggle.

The main types of action to overcome the resistance of the enemy in armed combat are the attack and defense. Offense and defense can go from one to the other and are inherently homogeneous: the object of immediate impact they are groupings of the armed forces of the enemy. Hence, offensive and defensive, and other ordinary combats, battles and operations belong to the first, or conventional methods of warfare. This is the method set out in the relevant constituent parts of the Russian theory of military art and virtually absolutized.

The types of action to deprive the enemy the ability to conduct struggle is inherently heterogeneous, as are objects of his immediate impact not only military but also political, economic, informational, scientific-technical, moral, cultural, demographic and ecological potentials of the enemy. A set of actions to reduce these potentials belongs to the second method of achieving the goals to specific methods of warfare. This cultural struggle is understood as violent action (opposition) regressive or progressive goals in science, education, upbringing, art, language, traditional religion and way of life.

Structure of the special action is complex and diverse, how complex and diverse the world itself. Each of the capabilities includes a huge number of different structures and components, ensuring the development and stable functioning of society, the state and its armed forces, both in peacetime and in wartime, and which may be subject to the impact.

The use of the armed forces is an important part of warfare by special methods. In conditions of natural competition increases the importance of other forces and means used to achieve the objectives of the special method. Preparation and conduct of the war by a special method, like the war in General, as well as the successful opposition to him is possible only at the highest state level with the use of all state and public structures.

The world "cold" war, which lost the Soviet Union, represented, by exact definition of resident Fund national and international security L. I. Shershnev, the first world information war.

One of the main reasons that caused our defeat in this third world war, is the omission of the law, which has yet to learn — the law according to the course and outcome of the war, the ratio of information capacities of the warring parties.

There is a new type of war in which the armed struggle ceded their critical place in achieving military and political objectives of war, another kind of struggle — information. In zavisimosti from the subject to the impact of information warfare includes two types:

• information and psychological warfare (impact on personnel of the armed forces and the population), which is conducted in the conditions of natural competition, i.e. always;
• information technology fighting (impact on technical means of reception, collecting, processing and transmission of information) that goes on during wars and armed conflicts.
• The transition from war with the use of non-combat means to the war with the use of means of warfare is determined, as a rule, the transition to information technology struggle.

General provisions of the theory of special operations

The theory of special operations — a system of knowledge that describes, explains and predicts categories, laws and principles of warfare by special methods. The theory of special operations — further development of the theory of deep operations, the idea of "active front in the enemy rear".

Its essence consists in complex influence on the whole depth of the rear area of the enemy means of destruction, the formation of special purpose, air (sea) troops, forces and means of psychological warfare in order to deny the enemy the material and (or) the moral capacity to fight or sharply limit its ability to conduct the struggle.

The possibility of complex effects on the objects throughout the depth of the rear area of the enemy with decisive goals due to:

• the massive appearance of small, effective weapons and a sharp increase in damage caused by the application of special means;
• the massive use of helicopters, other special funds of the withdrawal of forces behind enemy lines;
• vulnerability of the objects in the backcourt;
• the increased dependence of forces and means of destruction in the immediate line of contact of the parties from the state of command and control and General support;
• technical capacity to implement large-scale information-psychological influence on troops and population of the enemy;
• low exposure of subversive forces if they defeat using conventional methods of warfare.

Classification of special actions

The basis for dividing the amount of the concept of "special actions" can be type, form, scale, special actions and other grounds.

The main indicator of the function of combat use of forces and means are the goals and objectives of their operational use. Depending on the goals and objectives of the special actions (sa) are divided into the following types, or types: sabotage, a sabotage, anti-sabotage, support, information-psychological, law enforcement, the Board of Directors for the organization and conduct of the armed struggle by a special method, the SD for the security of foreign States, search and rescue, specific and other.

Sabotage SD — steps to inflict direct damage to enemy targets in special ways and the diversion of forces and means of the enemy from other directions. SD sabotage involves the destruction or decommissioning of a nuclear attack, ground forces, air force, air defense, naval forces, command posts, operational equipment of the theater of military operations (TVD), industrial enterprises and other important objects of the enemy. The need to strengthen the protection of objects in his rear forces the enemy to attract additional forces for their protection and defense.

Sabotage and intelligence LED operations with the aim of obtaining all types of information in special ways (special intelligence).

Anti-sabotage (counter-terrorism) SD — actions on search, freezing, seizure or liquidation of subversive forces from the forces of special operations of foreign armies, and irregular (sabotage, terrorist, smuggling and other) groups, leading an armed struggle or using weapons against the Russian Federation or its allies, including bases, camps of their training. Due to the relevance of this type of special action, they will be considered in more detail.

The fight against subversive groups requires much more effort than fighting against regular units. What caused it? First of all, the fact that the actions of the subversive groups is not associated with the retention of any facility or site location and are free to choose courses of action. Before to destroy them, you must first create a solid encirclement, with each of the probable directions of their breakthrough or waste to create superiority in forces and means.

So, having a common 4-fold superiority over a saboteur in a room where there is a door, a back door and two Windows on the direction of his breakthrough or departure, the balance of forces will be 1:1. Having a common 8-fold superiority, the balance of power will be only 1:2. Anti-subversive fight in the village or in a wooded area requires 12 times the overall superiority in manpower and equipment.

The world experience of struggle against sabotage or guerrilla forces says that to successfully combat them directly in the area of action you want to create a grouping of forces and means combat potential in 7-10 times the combat potential of the commando formation.

Thus, the average rate increase needed in conventional forces and funds raised for fight against diversionary groups, equal to 8.

The experience, for the defeat of the troops as part of a company required the battalion, and for the defeat of the troops in the battalion — regiment. So throw elite anti-terrorist unit of the FSB in street fighting or in battle on the ground, to put it mildly, inappropriate. Subversive tactics of major terrorist groups must be confronted with the same subversive tactics of the special units of the Armed Forces with appropriate weapons, equipment and appliances.

Calculations show that in case of equal military potentials of the parties is enough to bring behind enemy lines 5-7% of the forces for operations in special ways, to deprive the enemy of the concept of the boundary between the front and rear. In General the equality of fighting potential of the output of one of the parties in the enemy's rear only 6 percent of its forces for action in special ways will force the other side to attract to combat them, half of their forces and means.

With a certain amount of commando units operating behind enemy lines in special ways, there is a critical ratio of forces and means of the parties, in which the opposing side to conduct combat operations in the usual way is impossible, because the rear area is also a field of fighting. While the "field of hostilities becomes equivalent to space combat without a front, flanks and rear...".

Exactly field of operations, and not field of combating crime or individual gangs in the rear of his troops. Here is the section of the anti-sabotage functions in the struggle between the FSB and the interior Ministry on the one hand and the army on the other.

It is the field of fighting we had in Afghanistan and Chechnya, the Americans in Vietnam.

You should not wait for attacks in the us controlled area and then to reflect them, trying to surround the enemy where he isn't, but to actively seek out and destroy the irregulars in their field of activity. The most effective means of countering the tactics of subversive groups have the same tactics anti-sabotage forces special forces.

To such conclusion came the American guide, analyzing the war in Vietnam, and under the personal patronage of President Kennedy has created its own special forces — "green berets". The same conclusion was reached by the Soviet leadership after the analysis of the war in Afghanistan, increasing the number of special forces consisting of 40 Army from 100 to 5,000 people during the war. But after its completion — almost disbanded had combat experience of the brigade of special purpose.

Auxiliary LED efforts to increase the efficiency of means of destruction aviation, rocket troops and artillery, as well as to ensure compliance with other task forces and services in the enemy's rear.

Information and psychological diabetes — actions to changes in the desired direction of behavioral and emotional attitudes of servicemen and the civilian population of the enemy (country or area of destination) on certain military-political and other issues, and countering the propaganda of the opposing side, which is conducted among its own troops and population.

Law enforcement LED action to protect the constitutional order and state system of the Russian Federation, property and rights of Russia and its citizens abroad, ensuring the implementation by Russia and the foreign state of its responsibilities for the protection and observance of human rights in respect of Russian citizens and the actions of the Armed Forces for the execution of judgments of international and Russian law enforcement agencies. SD law enforcement provide a fundamentally new understanding of the purpose of the Armed Forces.

"A thief should sit in jail," demanded the American Themis, and the capital of the independent state of Panama was torn airborne parts, marine corps and special operations forces, and a popularly-elected President Noriega was captured and put in jail in Miami. Mind you, they're not the police of this city, and US forces conducted a special operation. And no one shouted that used aviation, artillery, other powerful means of destruction. And we have a terrorist, a bandit on the road, he Deputy Prime Minister what sort of "government" that kills hundreds of people in Russia and feel safe...

In the legal action also needs to be protection of the economic, financial and other national interests of the Russian Federation in the armed conflict zones and other dangerous places.

The armed Forces must protect the business. Force is providing Russian entrepreneurs are at the level of "friends" on cars with machine guns. The American "friends" came to look at his gas station in the middle East on aircraft carriers and amphibious ships and staged "desert Storm". It is possible to envy, the need to learn. Now a lot of talk about replacing the law of force in international relations on the force of law. It is time to implement this requirement in military construction.

SD on the organization and conduct of the armed struggle by a special method — action (aid) on the formation, training, support, security and military use of irregular forces and other resistance forces behind enemy lines or in territory controlled by the enemy, in the interests of resolving the tasks of the Armed Forces of Russia or the Russian Federation as a whole.

Last war in Chechnya was already 90% lost as soon as the column of Federal troops entered the territory of the Republic. In Chechnya there was a sufficient number of sensible people who, with some assistance and support could be the power to change the situation in the right direction.

SD security of foreign States — actions on strengthening of groupings of troops and forces of the allied States in case of threat of aggression from outside, to aid in the armed struggle for internal security, as well as Advisory activities.

Search and rescue SD — action, the purpose of which is the release of prisoners of war, as well as the search and return to the location of their troops or to another safe place of servicemen, other citizens of the Russian Federation, seized as hostages in zones of armed conflict, missing in action or forcibly held outside of Russia for other reasons.

Many months of violent deduction in Kandahar Russian pilots showed the helplessness of the security forces at the real ensuring the rights of Russian citizens. Do we have a power structure, able to organize and conduct an operation similar to the us special operation to free the hostages in Iran? There is no such structure. Although this structure — special forces — is needed. Every citizen of the Russian Federation, while abroad, should know and feel that for him, if necessary, plead not only the Embassy staff, but his army, his air force, his fleet.

Specific actions, peacekeeping actions, the other actions of Armed Forces in armed conflict zones and other dangerous places to bring humanitarian aid to foreign countries, disaster management, restoration of civil administration, carrying out quarantine measures.

Other CD — action that the decree of the President of the Russian Federation or Directive of the Minister of defence can be classified as special.

The most important criterion for the classification of special operations is their scale.

Scale special actions may be strategic, operational and tactical. Unlike conventional warfare, the main indicators of scale which are spatial and temporal indices and the composition of the groups of troops and forces, a key measure of scale special action is their goal.

Strategic objective specific actions provides a result of combat use of forces and means, the achievement of which leads to fundamental changes in the military-political and strategic environment, promotes the creation of favorable conditions for the use of the strategic groupings of the Armed Forces in the first operations, the continued successful conduct of war or the conduct of strategic operations.

Operational objective specific actions designed to achieve such a result of combat use of forces and means, which will lead to a dramatic change in scenery in the band of the fighting (the area of upcoming combat actions of front, army or corps or contributes to the successful fulfilment of combat tasks.

The purpose of the special tactical actions designed to achieve such a result of combat use of forces and means, which will lead to a dramatic change in scenery in the band of the fighting regiment, or division will contribute to the successful fulfilment of combat tasks.

Each of these goals specific actions, as can be seen from their definition, has two levels. On the first level target of the special actions is limited to the promotion of associations, connections and parts in the fulfilment of combat tasks. At the second, higher level, special actions are playing an independent role in achieving strategic, operational or tactical objectives.

The principles of the special action

The principles of special operations — a position that reflects objectively existing laws of warfare in a special way. These principles include:

1) the correct selection of special objectives, defining specific tasks and ways of their implementation. The infrastructure of the enemy's rear includes a huge number of different objects providing functioning of the state and the armed forces of the enemy. Therefore, reducing the ability of the enemy to resist can be achieved by disruption of one of its supporting systems. This, in turn, implies the multivariate objectives of the special action. The ancient Chinese General and military theorist sun Tzu so explained this principle: "the best of the Best need to conquer an army, not fighting. Therefore the best war is to break plans of the enemy; in the next place — to break his alliances; next is to split his troops. The worst is to besiege the fortresses".

In the last Chechen campaign, we chose the worst — undertook to storm the fortress of Grozny. Were there any other options for military and political objectives and ways to achieve them? Of course, Yes. Under them there are appropriate military technology — special operations.

2) the Concentration of efforts against the most weak or vulnerable points of the enemy. This can be management system, supply fuel, ammunition, communications of the enemy, the discontent of the population by war or other areas in the structure of military-political confrontation. If the conduct of conventional warfare attack on the enemy at his weak spot is a desirable attribute, then the conduct of special actions impact on the most vulnerable spot is a necessary condition of successful and effective special actions.

3) Disorientation of the enemy as to the real situation and forced the enemy to the scattering of efforts. The art of war of all countries recognize the principle of concentration of forces and means at the decisive point and at the right time. The third principle of special actions — his opposite. The basic requirements of the third principle — not to give the enemy realize their desire for a decisive focus, confuse him, to wrest the initiative by forcing him to throw the forces and means on protection of objects in the rear, to deny the possibility of free movement and use of objects of infrastructure, to create in the enemy's rear a second front of armed struggle.

4) Avoidance of open armed clashes with the enemy, acting on the directions of least resistance. Even the largest single special event, but led to losses of part of forming a special purpose, its significance can not be compared with many small, but unpunished attacks on enemy targets. The loss of even one person for a group numbering a few people seem to be very tangible and often means the deprivation of an expert in a particular field. However, the systematic attacks on the enemy, a constant expectation of enemy losses let a few people or military vehicles inhibits their morale and depletes material resources. Attrition of the enemy — that is the main requirement. Therefore this principle requires that the actions of forces and means in special promotions or surgery were not associated with retention or mastery of the area or object for a long time. "Surprise attack and immediate withdrawal" — that is the main rule tactics of the special units.

5) Decrease the effectiveness of the means of destruction of the enemy. The principle requires to impede the combat use of forces and means of aviation, air defense, missile and artillery troops, other forces and means to defeat the enemy. An example is the actions of the Afghan Mujahideen in the use of MANPADS, especially in terminal areas. The use of air defense special methods made it extremely difficult to combat the use of aircraft by Soviet troops.

6) Increase the effectiveness of weapons from their troops and forces. Special forces operating behind enemy lines, must be leveraged to increase the effectiveness of the actions of aviation, rocket troops and artillery, engineering troops, other forces and means.

7) the demoralization of the troops and civilians of the enemy. The war is won for dead, but always play it live. Not yet broken national will of the enemy to resist, victory can be achieved. The application of information-psychological defeat of the personnel of troops and the enemy population is a necessary rule of modern warfare. The ability to conduct such work among the population and troops of the enemy on its territory the necessary rule for arranging and conducting special operations behind enemy lines or in territory under their control.

8) the Disorganization of government troops and weapons. This principle — the antithesis of the principle of hard and continuous control. To deprive the enemy of sustainable management of troops and military means in modern terms often means to deprive him of the ability to organized resistance. The standard requires the organization of purposeful influence on the authorities and command posts and weapons of the enemy. Special attention in the initial period of war, or operation should be given to the disruption of warning systems. An important role belongs to the systematic destruction of the command personnel and specialists.

9) Disruption of all types of welfare and work communications. This principle — the antithesis of the principle of comprehensive and uninterrupted support of combat operations of the enemy. To reduce the combat readiness of troops and forces of the enemy through systematic violations by supplying it with arms and ammunition, fuel and lubricants, food, other material resources is one of the foundations of special actions. The disruption of technical support of the enemy reduces the reliability of weapons and military equipment, slow its recovery, repair and return to operation. Special actions on enemy communications force him to allocate significant forces to protect them and support columns.

10) Unlimited use of all elements of the environment for successful execution of assigned tasks. Special action forces are usually not bound by the strict indication of the time and place of the special promotions. Countless possible variants of the situation in the enemy rear, the coincidence of many circumstances and relations of its components make it impossible to advance and detailed planning of each special promotion. The commander of the formation often chooses the object or the element to be exposed, method or technique of destruction or withdrawal of its failure. When deciding it is not limited by almost any other circumstances, except the content assigned task. This principle imposes special requirements on volitional qualities, initiative, determination and intellectual level to the commanders of groups of a special purpose or other units that perform a special task.

11) a Special procedure for the preparation, management and support special operations. Making decisions on the combat use of forces and means in the rear of the enemy with special tasks require a special regime of secrecy and conspiracy. The withdrawal of forces behind enemy lines and create the required special groups are separate, independent step in the organization of combat use of forces and means. In contrast to the usual action of the output groups and the establishment of groups of special forces is an intermediate stage between the preparation of the special actions and their conduct. Output for each formation in the enemy rear requires a separate vehicle. Manage custom actions has a different leadership structure. So, if the division control scheme provided by the division — regiment — battalion — company — platoon, squad, brigade commander special purpose provides direct management of each formation operating in the enemy's rear, regardless of its size. Since the full implementation of the special action behind enemy lines is out of range of combat systems, logistics and technical support of troops and forces on its territory, their organization and implementation require special order.

Thus, the formulation of special principles of action allows to develop common rules and recommendations for the practical activities in the preparation for and conduct special operations. The special principles of action are not opposites but complement the General principles of the military art in relation to special methods of warfare.

Legal support of special operations

In accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "About safety" the government, as the Central subject of security, holds the function to ensure the safety of every citizen in the territory of the Russian Federation and to guarantee the protection of Russian citizens outside its borders. Security under article 4 of this law, is achieved by carrying out a unified state policy, a system of measures of economic, political, organizational and other measures, with military action not mentioned in the text, even in its most General form.

One of the most important functions of the state and the security element is also defense, which according to the Law "On defense", organized and carried out in accordance with international law, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the current legislation and military doctrine of the Russian Federation. In this case the Law "under defense refers to a system of political, economic, military, social, legal and other measures to ensure the state's readiness to defend against an armed attack, as well as the actual protection of population, territory and sovereignty of the Russian Federation".

Thus, if in the first act, the state declares on their responsibility to protect every Russian citizen, including those held abroad by the system of non-military measures, the second the right to protection with the use of military measures has already only people, not citizens of the Russian Federation on the territory of Russia and abroad.

The law "On foreign intelligence" generally excludes the use of any violence for solving issues of foreign intelligence, which States that "methods and means of intelligence activities should not cause damage to life and health of people and the environment."

What in practice is that the legal provision of security, defense and intelligence shows the situation with the Russian prisoners of war, hostages and other citizens of the Russian Federation, held by force for other reasons, including abroad. To which category belong the soldiers and officers who were captured in Afghanistan and Chechnya, who were Russian pilots in Kandahar, who are taken hostage in Chechnya, other Russian citizens? They — the citizens of Russia or the population? Which Laws should enter into force as legal basis for their release? Which Agency should implement the relevant requirements of the laws on rescuing pilots, if the Ministry of foreign Affairs its possibilities have been exhausted? Is there any such requirements of the law?

Many such questions arose in connection with the domestic armed conflict in Chechnya. It is now clear that the special operation conducted in the first campaign against Chechen rebels, their content was combined, with the involvement of forces and means of various branches of the armed forces, the armed forces. No police or FSB is unable properly to organize and conduct. Such operations successfully could spend only the Armed Forces, however, neither the tasks themselves nor the legal enforcement yet. Therefore, not only the laws themselves but their implementation that needs significant additions.

These additions affect:

• some conceptual issues of security and defense;
• the organization of counteraction to threats to the military security of the state, society and the individual;
• legal, informational and psychological operations of the regular troops and also forces and means of special purpose in Russia and abroad.

The solution to the stated problems must take on all the state authorities and not the army. The absolute content of military reform should be to work on forming the legal framework of the special action. Discussion and adoption by the State Duma of the Law on the special operations of the Armed Forces and other troops would make this kind of action by the armed forces the status of a form of public policy, and deliver, finally, the leadership and soldiers of the special forces from the need in each case, by giving a legal assessment and to take political decisions.

The U.S. Senate recently approved the legislation a list of the special operations in which sabotage, sabotage and other subversive acts recognized by the function of the armed forces.

Therefore, legal activity in this direction includes the development of the Law "About special methods of prevention of military conflicts and ways to use Armed Forces and other troops".

The law should provide for the legitimacy of the use of groups of Armed Forces, including special forces, to eliminate sources of military danger from the outside and inside of the Russian Federation; counter encountered direct threat to the security or vital interests of Russia in peacetime and in a period of threat.

The Law shall stipulate the right of the President of the Russian Federation to apply the necessary contingents of the Armed Forces and other troops on the territory of foreign States, and also in Russia. Must specify the period of time during which the President has the right to apply this force without a Declaration of war and the imposition of martial law or state of emergency. It must be listed special purpose use of the Armed Forces and other troops and set out a list of special tasks, the procedure of making decisions about the conduct of secret special operations.

In the Law, in accordance with the Geneva conventions, should clearly indicate the status of the personnel of special forces of the Russian Federation as combatants. There is need to bring into line with the Hague Convention, the order of application of forces of a special purpose mines, booby-traps and other devices...

Vladimir Kvachkov

Source: Kvachkov V. V. Russian Special Forces. @ Military literature, 2004.

Tags: assessment , strategy , armed forces , Special Forces