Dmitry Kornev in the article "the Missile geometry", published on December 1, 2017 on the website Iz.ru that draws attention to the fact, why not threat the European missile defense and the growing potential of sea-based systems Aegis complexes.
Some of the provisions of the article prompted the comments.
First of all, the juxtaposition of the European missile defense system and Aegis cannot be considered as correct, because the real basis of the European missile defense are complexes systems Aegis: permanently based in Europe to the naval base of Rota in Spain 4 the American destroyer Arleigh Burke and 2 ground complex under construction in Poland near the town of redzikowo in the district of Gdansk, which should be commissioned before the end of 2018, and already put into operation complex in Romania, near the town of Deveselu, technically represents the same ship's systems, but placed in permanent positions. Really other means ABOUT NATO not, except as a means of defense against tactical and operational-tactical missiles such as the Patriot and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, available in small quantities from France and Italy, and is able at the moment to combat ballistic targets class a OTR with range of up to 600 km, that is, of Scud. Now we leave aside the debate about how these complexes are efficient.
Read more about the missile defense systems of NATO countries, Israel, the history of missile defense systems USA and the USSR, see Chapter 1 of "Missile defense" (Oleg Valetsky, O. Ponomarenko, A. Girin) in the collection: Valetsky, O. V. "Weapons of modern warfare. Practice of application" / ed. by Ponomarenko O. Yu., Ponomarenko V. M. City: Publisher Vorobyov A.V., 2017. 332 p. ISBN 978-5-93883-334-0
Dmitry Kornev points out: ...the distance from us antimissile bases in Poland and Romania to the areas of deployment of Russian ICBMs cannot be intercepted. Even theoretically. The distance from these databases to the closest point of the hypothetical trajectories of our missiles in case of attack their targets in the United States also far exceeds the range of SM-3 interceptor missiles. ...
In the near future is possible to implement the following scenario. Starting from the Russian Federation rocket detected by satellite or any radar system is included in a common information space. From the ships platform system "aegis", located in areas over which passes an active part of the trajectory, by intercepting a certain number of ICBMs launched from the Western regions of Russia.
Note that the positions of the Aegis Ashore in Poland and Romania, located almost as close to the Eastern border of NATO and Russian respectively. Thus, the nomination of destroyers to the area of the Baltic sea is closer to Kaliningrad or to the area of the Black sea coast of Bulgaria and Romania significant advantages over ground-based complexes of the ships with Aegis systems have not. Thus, missile defense is, in fact, Aegis.
Noted the Root system's ability to receive target information from different sources characterizes the greater flexibility of combat use, but not in this case fundamental importance, as the question is put to them as the issuance of targeting missiles on the platforms, i.e. ships, are located in areas that are on the trajectory of the booster phase ICBM Russia. And closer, as has been said, practically impossible, since it is doubtful patrolling destroyers in the North sea route, and the area of the Gulf of Riga, Tallinn or the Black sea removed from the strategic missile forces in Western Russia on 1000-1600 km, but the locations of connections to other parts of the country – for much longer distances. You should also consider different options for launching missiles in areas as launch range allow ICBMs to not fly over the North direction, but not necessarily across the South pole, as indicated by D. Kornev and trajectories depending on the potential threat from missiles is likely implemented are also different, not just grazing. It should also be noted that the claimed range of the ICBM, including past generations, can only be declarative and in fact they are much more precisely to ensure the flexibility of combat use.
Recall that the development of American missile variant, the SM-3 Block IIB, which would have greater range and speed of flight compared to just coming into operation of the Block IIA, was discontinued, and in the near future weapons will come it is the latter, and in very limited quantities (deliveries to begin this year in single copies; less powerful SM-3 Block IB is also released in very limited quantities – a few dozen per year; missile SM-6 not considered in the context of this article as intended and structurally executed, - for the decision of tasks of air defense, and is able to solve problems ABOUT only a "part-time", in the terminal phase of flight of warheads and limits on the types of goals). Its improvement remains an open question – we need to understand that the missiles of equal mass-dimensional parameters are very different from each other, but this is unlikely to be the case the next few years.
And, of course, a separate issue counter-measures, including increasing the speed of ICBMs in the initial phase of flight and a reduction in time of this plot. All this together brings us back to the 60-70-ies of the last century, when, according to the memoirs of V. G. Repin, chief designer of the EWS, and SCCP from 1972 to 1987, a group of scientists and engineers domestic production is at the stage of conceptual elaboration of the new missile defense system, a later system A-135, made a fundamental conclusion about the unreality of creating a missile defense system to protect against bulk use of ICBMs in the foreseeable future. As radical measures of neutralization of missile defense systems, it is impossible to exclude a purely quantitative variant in the form of exit of the parties from the start with increasing the number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, and the number of carriers themselves.
As for quantitative indicators, we note declared on July 17, 2018 Raytheon company net purchases of interceptor missiles SM-3 Block IB. Within the military budget for 2018 funded the purchase of 44 missiles in the amount of $ 466,9 million. The total amount of funding for purchasing these missiles for 2015-2018 gg under the original contract amount to $ 2.3 billion. This confirms the above estimate of the pace annual revenues of missiles in a few dozen per year, in conjunction with the following circumstances indicates very limited capacity considering the U.S. marine ABOUT.
To understand the simple quantitative ratio of the means of defense and attack we will remind that as of 2017 as part of the strategic offensive arms, Russia had deployed a carrier 501 and 1561 nuclear warheads, the United States deployed 660 of 1393 carriers and nuclear warheads. On both sides it is predominantly warheads on ballistic missiles.
Note such an important point in regard to Aegis BMD. Just at the moment the US Navy has more than 30 ships equipped with missile defense system Aegis BMD (not to be confused with Aegis – not all ships with this system can solve the tasks of missile defense). You should also be aware that not every ballistic target can be affected by the system. At a hearing in Congress in June 2015, Vice-Admiral P. Fanta noted that the need of the fleet is 40 ships, able to deal simultaneously with both air and ballistic targets. The required number of 40 units includes 27 ships for operations as part of carrier strike groups on a rotating basis, as well as 9 and 4 ships respectively to embed in the area of East Asia (Japan) and in Europe under the allied agreements on missile defense.
At the end of June 2018, the publication Defense News has quoted the commander of U.S. Navy Admiral George. Richardson that in the this moment he has 6 cruisers and destroyers with the latest version of the system, which are deployed at sea in different regions of the world. But they have 18 more similar vehicles that are in various stages of the rotary cycle in preparation to change combat service. No matter whether understated the number of ships, because if understated, slightly. Important the order of the numbers in relation to the operational deployed in certain areas of media Aegis BMD.
Thus, the number of ships with missile defense systems Aegis limited, they are scattered in different regions, most of them unrelated to the probable trajectory of Russian ICBMs and you should cover in the USA, not all are in standby condition and in the right place, the number of modern missile – as produced, and especially on ships, is also very small, the characteristics are not unlimited, practically provides for the application of at least two missiles firing at one target, and there is reason to believe, they can't create obstacles to the use of Russian ICBMs in case of a certain situation.
But the process of creating, deploying, and improving any of the weapons systems objectively is disturbing and leads to countermeasures by the other party, and the statements of the Russian General staff are a natural consequence of this course of events. In line with this logic, they voiced concern that the two divergent processes – reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles and warheads on them, especially the United States and Russia, and the active development of the missile, particularly of the American system of Aegis – can lead to a situation when nominally yet so will evaluate the means of protection from attack will allow to count on impunity first strike, undermining strategic deterrence. In the General staff sees the potential danger of the development of such missile defense systems like Aegis, especially given the fact that the number of ships able to solve the problem, will increase as well, according to the information received will be ground to release the ships from performing rescue missions in regions where the threat posed by ballistic missiles is considered to be constant.
But in reality - given the pace of development and practical deployment of US missile defense systems, especially the Aegis BMD, condition and improvement of the Russian strategic offensive arms (even without the latest systems available in the spring of this year), - this system should rather be viewed as performing a purely rational task of ensuring neutralize the threat of ballistic missile attack on forwarding groups and allies from the most likely US adversaries, namely third world countries with appropriate means of attack and actively expanding their Arsenal or a limited strike from an opponent, like North Korea.
1. Dmitry Kornev. Missile geometry. 1 December 2017. / / https://iz.ru/677405/dmitrii-kornev/protivoraketnaia-geometriia
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