Interpreter blog have read all 117 pages of the report (about 230 thousand characters), and made him squeeze for 20 pages (without changing the essence and content of the study). We make no comments to the report, the conclusions are fairly easy to there.

The nature of the changes
With the highest degree of certainty we can speak of two tendencies, at first glance, is the opposite: the weakening of the protest movement in Moscow and the fall of ratings of trust to the authorities, what is happening across the country. However, the real processes are, apparently, more complex and interconnected, requiring a detailed study.

1. The exhaustion of older forms of Moscow street protests.

Obvious fact that every new protest is going to fewer people. On this basis many experts have put forward the hypothesis that the damping motion. However, this is not the only possible and rather less likely hypothesis, as clearly visible restructuring of the movement to segments on the basis of certain ideas or interests. As a result, rallies are formed as separate columns with their banners and sometimes even with your speakers. It is highly likely that many mass protest in Moscow segments of society not represented at the meetings because of the lack of political representation of their ideas and/or interests among the leaders and organizers of rallies. If this assumption is true, then the result of the restructuring, which is currently not yet completed, will be the disengagement of the ideological positions of the protesters and a new upsurge of the traffic on the more developed policy framework. Arises spontaneously a competitive political environment and political subjects, potentially capable of conducting a dialogue with each other.

2. At the same time as the decline of mass protest activity in Moscow has been a sharp decline of public confidence in the institutions of government first and foremost to President Vladimir Putin.

The velocity of the lower ratings for trust and distrust ratings growth since the beginning of the two thousandth's unprecedented. The most obvious reason for this phenomenon is that "the Roman people with the power" ended. Ratings of trust and distrust rapidly converging in magnitude, and at the current pace in 2013 can be compared. The causes of this phenomenon are far from clear, considering that Moscow does not have sufficient electoral weight to form a nationwide trend. On this basis, raises important questions about the causes of the massive drop of confidence in the government.

From a political point of view the important question, what ideological centers, emerging in Moscow, can have the greatest influence on the formation of political attitudes of the population in the Russian regions. Perhaps such ideologies will be few. Of particular importance are the competing Soviet-socialist ideology and modernization, in respect of which expert opinions differ, proposing two opposing hypotheses: some fear a return to socialist requirements, others believe that modernization ideology is so entrenched in society that it will become the leading political idea. This question requires serious consideration, because on it depends the future of the country.

3. In the context of growing political uncertainty, great importance is the question of new political leaders and their electoral potential.

The main hypothesis of the research

1. The first hypothesis is that the weakening of Moscow's protests is a temporary phenomenon associated with the processes of the reformation movement. In this case, if at the moment the leaders of the protests of the struggling groups that currently have the greatest organizational capacity, then the leaders will be poorly represented while the group with the greatest number of supporters. This will radically change the configuration of the protest. We assume that, at least in Moscow, the biggest impact will gain political groups that advocate the modernization agenda.

2. The second hypothesis is that the drop in ratings of confidence in the government has the fundamental causes and is a transition stage between a dying ideology of Putin's stability and those ideologies that are to be replaced. This trend and the motivation of the changes remain unknown. An optimistic hypothesis is that the modernization agenda (possibly with some adjustments in comparison with Moscow) will be able to take if not dominant, powerful place in the political balance of the country.

All studies were performed in the period from 22 September to 8 October 2012

The rating of trust to Putin and its dynamics

The reasons of falling of trust to Putin before the Duma elections 2011

Since 2009 there has been a steady falling of a rating of trust to the current Russian President Putin and other indicators of confidence in the government. This trend was reported by all Russian sociological organizations and analyzed in detail in previous reports of political CSR.
Between 2009 and 2012, there was only one significant deviation from this trend is the election campaign of the President of the Russian Federation from December 2011 to March 2012, when the rating of trust to Putin and his electoral rating was temporarily increased. The cause of this anomaly were analyzed in a previous report CSR. On the basis of this analysis it was concluded that the effect of the campaign would be short term and a further fall of ratings of trust to the authorities will be resumed. For the period from March to September 2012, this forecast was fully confirmed, as evidenced by the graph.

The main thoughts expressed by the respondents of the focus groups on this graph, was as follows.
According to the respondents, the years of Putin's rule, including conditional and the reign of Medvedev, there has not been any significant results. Were endlessly repeated words and promises. In this sense, before the March 2012 elections and after them, nothing has changed. Therefore, the continuing decline in ratings of respondents considered natural.

The majority of participants in the focus groups explained the reason for the falling ratings, the fact that over this period the country has not taken any action to improve the situation, the solution of the most acute and urgent problems of the country. This unresolved socio-economic issues, mainly focused in a certain circle of problems: the poor state of education and health, personal security and the rule of law, the quality and availability of infrastructure (especially housing), corruption, lack of industrial growth and development in most industries, etc. a Particular concern of many respondents is the so-called "spirituality" of the society and indifference of the authorities to the needs and problems of the population.

In the period after the elections to the State Duma in December 2011 and presidential elections in March 2012 the trust rating increased by 10%.

Speaking about the reasons of this phenomenon, the participants in the focus groups noted the lack of alternative elections, tipped the political space "nobody to vote" for "candidates are specially selected," etc.), as well as the fact that people voted with very mixed feelings.

Also, respondents talked not only about the absence of other candidates, but some stability is expected to continue in case of choice of Putin as the President of the country. Unwillingness to change for the worse, the choice of "the lesser evil" has led to a particular rating increase during this period.

As the second main reasons for the growth of Putin's rating the majority of participants in focus groups also noted the powerful propaganda campaign launched by Putin. The question about the reasons short-lived, but the real effectiveness of the campaign. The respondents were only able to state this fact, but not to explain it. This is not surprising, given that respondents are not experts in the field of the theories of advertising communications.

However, the growth of broadcasting within certain limits of efficiency, so-called "plateau", after which the growth stops, regardless of ratings growth in broadcasting. When excessive increase in the volume and duration of the broadcast is "wear" advertising exposure and falling ratings. Apparently, it can be stated that from the point of view of duration and intensity of the broadcasting campaign was planned correctly, and the peak efficiency of the campaign came on election day.

The main changes that have occurred in the political consciousness of Russians between March and October 2012

This study allows to conclude that in the short period since the spring of 2012 in the mass consciousness of the Russian population there was a noticeable change, the pace of which approximately correspond to the rate of decline in Putin's ratings. The main of these changes are as follows.

In almost all focus groups, respondents spontaneously talked about the possibility and desirability of revolution, the prospects for which are being discussed as the only possible alternative to upgrading the power in case of refusal from the authorities from voluntary update, i.e. how failures of power from the voluntary rotation of the leadership. The change of leadership through elections by electoral is not considered by the respondents as a realistic option. This opinion can be considered almost unanimous.

Concerns and fears of revolution with its possible excesses are expressed significantly less frequently than in the spring. In a sense, we can speak about a kind of law of political preservation: the less possible it seems a legitimate change of power by election or voluntary self-updating, the more legitimate you begin to introduce yourself to the people forced (or quasi-violent type of mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, etc.) shape change of the personal composition of the government. All these forms of pressure on the government now presented to respondents as forced, legitimate and necessary.

At first glance these results contradict the results of quantitative surveys conducted by the Russian sociological companies. The results of these surveys show that the actual willingness of the population to participate in the protests, at least, not growing. About same tell also the psychological results of focus groups conducted in this study.

However, on closer examination it turns out that we are talking about several different things:

• personal participation in activities, perceived partly as a threat and partly as meaningless, since there is no adequate ideas and speakers;
• on the recognition of the legitimacy of various forms of active resistance to the authorities, ranging from civil disobedience and ending shares of type "orange revolution".

It is important to note that in the focus groups sounded a different point of view, however, remained in the minority and criticized by many other participants, as utopian. We are talking about voluntary self-renewing power, which in this case is considered a conditional option – Putin prematurely and voluntarily gives up power, as Yeltsin did in 1999, and this time puts forward is the real successor able to effectively run the country. Despite the fact that Putin is very much discredited this option the nomination of Medvedev, wishes of this kind is still heard in the focus groups.
Unfortunately, according to the respondents, the realism of the previous scenario is greatly reduced due to the fact that there has been a marked growth of mistrust to all political leaders, both in government and in opposition. Promising leaders respondents find it difficult to name.

Especially negative response of such a PR campaign of Putin, as finds of amphorae, flying cranes (before such shares were seen playfully good-natured, set up of respondents in a fun way). Typical mass reaction of the population to such shares in 2012 is as follows: President, instead of to solve important public problems, "knows what deals". Still not solved the problems of health, education, industrial complex and many other issues.

Respondents rather negative view of the laws toughening rules of holding rallies, libel laws, the activities of non-profit organizations, etc., impede the actions of the legal opposition. Many participants in the focus groups negatively evaluated the adoption of the law on rallies and libel, describing it as another step in the elimination in the country of freedom of speech and expression of citizens. It is important to note that these laws well enough awareness not only Muscovites, but also inhabitants of regions, including respondents from the so-called "heartland".

Sharply changed attitude to Medvedev that in the spring it was ironic, but quite good-natured. It's impossible to talk about negative or embittered attitude towards Medvedev. Observed phenomenon: the figure of Medvedev, Chairman of RF government, was not heard in the focus group discussions (specific questions about Medvedev not asked, and spontaneously his name was mentioned very rarely and in a rather humiliating for him the context: several times it was suggested that Putin return actually did one useful thing, namely, to deliver us from Medvedev).

In all of the focus group was the unanimous and unequivocal negative attitude towards United Russia. Earlier (in spring), it was not so clear.

In all the focus groups (not only in Moscow but also in regions) respondents said nothing about Putin's past endeavours, although in the spring he recalled them often enough. Now about them actually forget, although the actual 12-year term of Board of Vladimir Putin the standard of living of the mass of populations have increased significantly.
As shown by the results of the Moscow focus groups of the middle class, the attitude to Putin in this environment has changed from negative to hostile and otchuzhdeniya.

Especially it is necessary to touch upon the subject of the role of the ROC in society. This theme was not incorporated in the program of this study. However, when discussing the question of why Putin's ratings are down, in addition to other answers, spontaneously emerged the theme that the rating reflected Putin's many scandalous situations connected with the clergy, including the history of the clock of the Patriarch and the trial of "Pussy Riot", which occurred when the apparent intervention of the ROC and the Federal government. These and other stories had a negative impact on the image of the ROC (or rather, its leadership), and the image of power itself.

The effect of the growth of distrust to the leadership of the ROC evident, particularly in projective (psychological) focus groups. Thus, the respondents compared the Ministers of the Church with the foxes – 12 references, jackals – 9, dogs – 5, hyenas – 3, ravens - 4, wolf – 3, crocodiles – 1, a psychiatric hospital 1. There was also statements that the government is trying to turn the ROC into a modern party, unsuccessfully trying to fill the ideological void.

On the basis of these statements we can conclude that the power itself and the ROC took the wrong course to determine its role in society. This has already been discussed in a previous report CSR: the perception of the ROC as one of the most important public institutions, combined with a clear view of his social boundaries. The vast majority of Russians shared the view that the Church should stay out of politics and that its role should be primarily to strengthen the moral foundations of society. Direct influence of the ROC on political attitudes of Russians, as mentioned in the previous report, is not only very limited, but, as shown by this study, is counterproductive.
The attitude to the ROC, described above, has been demonstrated in psychological focus groups. Positive perception of the Church noted 68%, negative attitude – 32%. Thus, it can be stated that in respect of the ROC mass consciousness was split. And although all the polls show the majority of respondents still trusts the Russian Orthodox Church, in the public mind formed a significant segment of the opposite opinion. Judging by the above quotations from the focus groups, the formation of this segment is due, in the opinion of the respondents, with the nationalization of the Church and turn it into a "new party".

The perception of the situation in the country is the Russian "middle class"

Although the share of the middle class in Moscow is considerably larger than the proportion of similar segment of the population in the regions, in General the Russian middle class based on the commonality of their position in society and the similarity of political views.

If we talk about the specifics of the middle-class perception of the current political situation in the country compared to the rest of the population, is possible, apparently, to point out the lack of fundamental differences in these estimates, with the caveat that the statements of the representatives of this class was affected by two factors:

• a high level of education, advances the opinion that part of the population to the expert;
• higher financial capabilities with varying degrees of seriousness to talk about the advisability of leaving "the country".

Unlike other segments of the population, the majority of middle class gave a qualified assessment of the situation in the country, including the economy and domestic and foreign policies. There was obvious involvement of high information and high awareness of developments in the country and in the world. It's safe to say that the middle class across Russia fully fell under the influence of television.

Many members of the middle class, especially in Moscow, noted that cater to emigrate, not necessarily soon, but over the longer term. In this regard, they are actively engaged in teaching children foreign languages, buy property abroad, noting that property prices in comparison with Russian far below. Some respondents have grown children who graduated from Western institutions and "entrenched" in their respective countries. These people are quite seriously going to leave to their children.

In addition to these, there is another issue, which was actively expressed in focus groups middle class and almost no sound in the other focus groups. Many respondents from among the middle class talked about the growing split in the elites and that this may lead to a new wave of protests and public disturbances and other unpredictable consequences.

The psychological part of the study consisted of two parts: 7 psychological focus-groups with a total of 70 people and 2 qualitative studies, one of which was interviewed 180 people and the other 1000 people.

People's perception of modern Russian power and its performance goals

To the question, what is the purpose of today's Russian authorities 29% said that the authorities cannot explain their goals to the people, 26% of respondents said that the purpose of government is the personal enrichment, 22% believe that the government does not want to explain your goals people 15% believe that the government wants to build a strong authoritarian state, and 12% think that the government wants to build a strong democratic state with liberal values. As a result, if we sum the first four positions, it turns out that 88% of respondents believe that the government somehow works to their advantage, and only 12% in interest of all the people by building a democratic state.

In accordance with the method of assessing positive and negative characteristics of the Russian authorities, the following results were obtained: the merits of today's Russian authorities, noted more than half the respondents, are:

• the desire to solve the demographic problem – the payment for the birth of a child, maternity capital, attempt to raise the birth rate in the country (57%);
• the ability to speak beautifully (54%);
• the fight against terrorism (53%);
• the development of high technologies (51%).

To the worst aspects of the Russian authorities, also mentioned by half or more than half of respondents, include:

• constant growth of prices for housing and communal services (94%).
• bad housing (81%);
• the collapse of the economy and agriculture (75%);
• the constant talk about fighting corruption and the absence of real action (70%).

Noteworthy also that the average value of positive characteristics was 22%, and a negative 48%. There is a sharp predominance of the latter.

By 2012, the confidence was lost. The strongest stratification of society has led to bitterness (it turns out that we can achieve prosperity, not all, and those who can achieve only through connections, cronyism, corruption, in which reproach the authorities). Thus, since 2000, managed to get up those who in 90-e years was in the "losers" – state employees. And if in 90-e years the owner of a couple of vegetable stalls feel much more comfortable teacher, a doctor, a researcher, in the 2000s the trend has changed to the opposite. Now people really want change for the better, but he is afraid of the possibility of losing what you already have. And there is such a possibility ("what can we do if Khodorkovsky, with his money, nothing could").

The main pillars that underpin any democratic society, the law, elections, free enterprise, private property rights, in the focus groups almost never mentioned. Partly mentioned only the law, and in the context of what the government must abide by the laws made by itself. Moreover, freedom of entrepreneurship and private property will cause irritation.

The people requires increasing government controls. The population is not aware that the increase of state control over all will require expansion of bureaucracy that is totally incompatible with hatred of the officials.

The state has to control everything and pay for everything. The question "where is the money?" people don't care, because he was sure that if many officials are not plundered the country, then money would be enough for all in abundance.

In projective methods (drawing tests) – modern power is mainly associated with predators (in 88% of the respondents), or with other aggressive creatures or objects (such as wild boar, black goat, a tank (8% of respondents, only aggressive images 96%). Another variant of perception, constituting a clear minority (4%) compare the power of such "frivolous" objects, like a bubble or a bat, which probably symbolizes the futility of power.

According to the same psychological tests, you can say that people, generally feels like a victim – "the power of the wolf – people are sheep", "the power of the eagle – people Sparrow", which the authorities (indifferent, irresponsible, unfair, dishonest, but at the same time, active, intelligent, strong-willed and evil) can at any moment destroy.

Presentation of the Russian population about the perfect power

Offering respondents to select the qualities of an ideal government, it was obvious that the total score will be dramatically shifted into the region of positive qualities. However, the degree of "positivity" of different characteristics were not the same. Identified characteristics that were more and less relevant for respondents in their view of an ideal government. The most significant characteristics, according to the study, include: fair (105 points), smart (104 points), Patriotic (98 points). Intellectual growth – safe (55 points), providing free (53 points), good (46 points).
The data obtained in the first place say that if the government is fair, intelligent and Patriotic, the other quality, according to the respondents, so to speak, will follow. In other words, in the view of the people is a key quality that should be possessed by the Russian authorities and to correlate them with their actions.

It is noteworthy that such qualities as strong-willed and strong too was at the bottom of the scale. Obviously, this reflects a popular idea that will and force should be used as a means of ensuring justice, patriotism, and (although this feature was not included in the methodology) love for his people. It is important that the will and force should be used wisely and not like a "bear province".

Modern psychological state of the Russian people

The syndrome of learned helplessness predisposes to dependence. Helpless need protection, you need to have someone strong guarding him from the dangers of life. In the case of people it may be power, it could be God, it could be alcoholism, it can be hoped that somewhere, where we do not live well.

God, in the form of a modern Orthodox Church, does not solve the problem. Power, unfortunately, also problems are not solved.

One solution is to alcoholism. Finally, there is the hope that moving to another country will help solve the problem.

Thus, in the focus groups identified social severe depression, from which people cannot find a constructive outlet. Destructive outputs is alcoholism and fantasies about leaving, really accomplished which only a few members of the middle class.

The presence of this syndrome allows to draw the following conclusions. Since, in the opinion of the population, useless any attempt to change anything, today the public is not ready for confrontational (to the authorities) development scenarios, but such scenarios are beginning to gain probability, since both the sociological and psychological part of the study clearly show that in the perception of the people has dramatically decreased the legitimacy of the legal (constitutional) ways to upgrade the power.

The opposition, having no political, social or other influence, can't offer anything but words, in which the people have not believed, therefore, opposition results in the struggle against power, not for the support of the population. This fundamental weakness of the Russian opposition, of which the population finds that the opposition just "wants to grab a piece of power or to cling to the feeder", so there is no reason it (the opposition) support. Thus, dissatisfaction with the government kept growing, but the opposition is not supported, because in fact offers nothing.

Perceptions of the existing and the ideal authorities among the representatives of other nationalities living on the territory of Russia

Many political analysts believe that the ethnic communities of different ethnic composition may play a significant role in the political future of Russia. The cultural mentality of these peoples differs significantly from the mentality of the Russian population, which is evident even at the household level.

It is important to note that earlier the North Caucasus regions of Russia belonged to the regions with the so-called "controlled vote." The question of by what mechanisms this is achieved, is complicated and practically not studied. It clearly contradicts the results obtained in our study. However, almost simultaneously with this study in Dagestan there have been major changes in the electoral behavior of the population, which practically coincides with the findings of our study.

As an experiment, and as groundwork for the future, we conducted one pilot focus group with representatives of the Dagestani Diaspora in Moscow. The criteria for selection of respondents served not only as belonging to Dagestani nationalities, but the experience of living in Moscow (5-10 years) and the existence of real connections with Dagestan, as well as regular trips to the Republic.

The results of the study showed very large differences in the cultural and political mentality of the Russian and Dagestani peoples.

Noteworthy that in this group none of the respondents suggested that the government wants to build a strong democratic state with liberal values, and the share of those who believes that the government wants to build a strong authoritarian state is much higher than among the Russian population (40% vs. 15%).

Overall, the Dagestani authorities ascribed the same positive traits that the Russians but if the Russians have in the first place overlook qualities such as (in descending order) – active, smart, strong-willed, strong, Dagestanis and strong – willed, optimistic, intelligent, brave.

It is also interesting to note that if the Russian population believes the authorities are manifestly evil, the Dagestanis evaluate the power, rather as good, although on this scale the value is close to zero.

The most pronounced negative qualities of the Russian authorities to the Russian population – the injustice, indifference, dishonesty, irresponsibility, and danger. Representatives of Dagestan called qualities such as injustice, dishonesty, dependence and inconsistency. If the first two characteristics coincide in General with the views of the Russian population, the second two diverge sharply. Especially noteworthy that the Dagestani people do not see the Russian government is dangerous.

The attitude of the people of Dagestan living in Moscow for the Muscovites

Characteristics of Dagestanis bright highlight in another aspect. Namely, in their attitude to the Muscovites:
— Muscovites – they are bears in hibernation, and Dagestanis are evil dogs that they are sick, injured, so they behave wildly. Muscovites in hibernation, because they have strength, fat stores, but it is of no use, just sleep, live happily too.

The people of Dagestan consider themselves stronger and more aggressive Muscovites (Russians), and if desired or necessary, a forced (Dagestanis sick, hungry) will eat them. Many said that in the future it will be so.

View Dagestanis about perfect power

Ideas about the ideal leader of the representatives of Dagestan and the Russian population also differ. If the Russians have the most important for an ideal leader are qualities such as a fair, intelligent and Patriotic, Dagestanis called responsible, strong-willed, competent, justice significance is at the 6th place and patriotism – 10.

Interestingly, the least important features of an ideal leader is for people – kindness (7 points), safety (9 points), honesty (7 points), optimism (0 points).

Dagestanis and Russians, agree that the legitimacy of the refresh power is reduced. They also agree that the government seeks to build an authoritarian state. Combined with more pronounced aggression towards the authorities than the Russian population, these data make us think that a commitment to revolution or other violent acts of the North Caucasian peoples already present, and is not latent, as in Russian.

Perceptions of existing and ideal authorities in Moscow teenagers

The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of modern Russia was a culture shock for people of all ages, past socialization in the Soviet Union.

In the 90 years was put forward the hypothesis that the effects of this culture shock refers particularly to the elderly, and that new generations coming into working age will have a different mentality, more adapted to the market conditions and democracy. This hypothesis was not entirely accurate. Apparently, the factor of parental influence (and possibly some other factors) was so powerful that the process of change of mentality of the new working generation lasted for 20 years and currently is far from complete.

In the view of teenagers today the power is strong, strong-willed, providing freedom and independent, but it is dangerous, dishonest and irresponsible.

Projective drawing tests revealed the following perceptions of the people and government in the focus group of adolescents.

Modern the authorities are associated with predators (40%), including dangerous animals like boars – 20% of respondents, with nasty animals (rats, goats) – 30% of respondents. The people perceived as the victim in 30% of hedgehogs, rabbits, gerbils. 60% people seems to be adolescents also evil, and only 10% of the people are ants-workers.

Ideas about the ideal leader of teenagers give two scales with a negative value (in the Russian population – one in Dagestan – one – restriction of freedom). According to adolescents, the ideal leader should be more impulsive, than a calm and indifferent rather than sympathetic, because "if he is indifferent to all who came to complain about life, it will be impossible to work" and "his job is not to pity the sufferers, and to govern the state, it needs the stiffness of a kind".

The most significant features of an ideal leader for Russian teenagers – patriotism, honesty, competence, the provision of freedoms. These data coincide with the data of the adult Russian population only in terms of patriotism.

The least important features of an ideal leader is for Teens – kindness (0 points), optimism (0 points), courage and conviction (3 points). The kindness of the perfect leader is not significant for any of the respondents, and that adolescents give similar results with adults.

A significant difference in the responses of adolescents is the importance of providing freedoms that were not significant for the adult Russian population and moved to the negative pole – restriction of freedom – in Dagestan.

Overall, the findings of this pilot group, we can assume that in Russia a generation is coming up, more than ready to the ideas of market and democracy than all previous. This generation demonstrates patriotism and a desire to work in a single team "power to the people", and expresses ideas about what the duty of government is to feed the people and to think for him. Therefore, the authors consider plausible the hypothesis that the change in political attitudes in the process of generational change is both real and irreversible, although it is slower than previously thought.

Be aware that teenagers, who are now 12 to 16 years, by 2018 (the next presidential elections in Russia) will be 18 years or more, i.e., they will be a certain cohort of voters, though not very numerous, but quite possibly politically active.

According to the results of the study creates the impression that the national consciousness of the people is very childish. People disgruntled with the government, complains of the injustice and dishonesty of authority, social insecurity, feels cheated, and believes in nothing. The idea of the ideal power, the people willing to serve as a fair and Patriotic leader, even limiting the freedom to watch over him, feed him and think for him.

Two-thirds of respondents feel social syndrome of learned helplessness, believe that have no influence on the events taking place in the country, and do not want any effect, demonstrating the passivity and fatalism.

Despite the fact that in the last twenty years, the government and the media constantly talk about the value of democratic ideas, moreover, the population also gladly uses the term "democracy", what really draws any democratic society, the law, elections, free enterprise, private property rights, in the focus groups is hardly mentioned. It is not only about the law and in the context of what the government must abide by the laws adopted by itself. Moreover, freedom of entrepreneurship and private ownership even cause irritation. Thus, over the years, the country has not been constructed democratic state, which could be interiorisation society. Without internal sample democratic state, the population is not able to compare the proposed ideas varying orientation with the sample.
We can assume that the Russian elite also emerged from the Soviet Union, realizing what democracy is in theory, however, has no internally generated intracta democratic society. It seems that for such intract was formed, it would take at least a generation.

Population dynamics of opposition movements in Russia

As the results of interviewing the participants of the protest rallies, the respondents ' opinions about the extinction of the opposition movement was divided.

According to the first group, the mass opposition movement in the country fades out, comes to "no". To people it's disappointment, the understanding of the senselessness of the events, the rallies and opposition protests in what have not resulted. The government does not respond, and the opposition is exhausted. On the wave opposition movement, no one appeared, and now again came a stalemate. Among these respondents was 54%.

The other part of the respondents thinks that mass protest is not damped, and transferred to another plane that is still undecided. Their opinion is based on the fact that the number of people dissatisfied with the existing government and what is happening in the country, is not reduced, but growing. And the opposition movement (although not very successfully) looking for other forms of expression of their activity. Among such respondents was 32% (16% undecided).

Both these groups agree that there are no new charismatic politicians, and those opposition leaders who have, do not propose specific solutions, do not have the program, indistinctly Express the mood of protest, do not have clear objectives.

The ideological direction of the opposition movement

The majority of respondents agree with the opinion that in Russia today there is no certain ideological directions of the opposition movement expressed a clear programs, presented policy new or old wave. The interviewed participants were able to identify only a small number of opposition leaders, among which primarily are distinguished A. Navalny, S. Udaltsov, Gudkov, G. Gudkov, E. Chirikova, Boris Nemtsov and others.

To the right of the opposition, namely the liberal for to a greater extent attribute A. Navalny, Boris Nemtsov. Then highlight the strengthening of the role of law, combating corruption and illegal use of official position.
The left front S. Udaltsov presents, although he is considered a young politician, without a lot of experience. Referred to the nationalist Eduard Limonov, although he is now gone from the horizon of political life. As a special direction of the opposition movement allocate the environmental movement, including E. Chirikov. These main directions limited to the ideological field of the opposition movement.

Conclusion. Will Russia revolution?

Armed rebellion and legitimate electoral revolution, apparently, can put to rest immediately. They do not believe neither the people nor the power (it shows the present and many other studies).
Armed rebellion does not have the resources to implement it. On the other hand, in the realization of the legitimate electoral scenario people don't believe, expressing an opinion popular expression "they've got it covered", referring to mass mutual responsibility of officials, targeted repression, the monopolization of television, control over the selection of candidates for elections and much more. It is people's unbelief is shared by the authors of this report.

Emigration to other countries, is available only a small (though very significant for the country) the minority should not be considered as having a direct influence on the internal political situation it has not.

Throwing an exception basis incredible, three options remain:

1. Mass civil disobedience caused by those or other reasons that played a role trigger. Along with the growing economic and social problems, and as new generations this scenario should be considered as realistic, but its effects can be unpredictable. If the Russian people finally run out of power, this option can be considered the most realistic, especially considering the impending protracted economic crisis.
2. Voluntary self-refresh power under the pressure of mounting problems and people's distrust to prevent worst-case scenarios. This option does not necessarily imply a change of President. A viable option may be to change the current unpopular Prime Minister in more competent and capable. The probability of such an option are difficult to estimate, but for the authorities it would be the most reasonable, and for the people is the most smooth, mild and promising.
3. Barring none, the most realistic the scenario becomes a national of extinction, marked by the strengthening of the syndrome of learnt helplessness, loss of skills, alcoholism, declining fertility rates and massive importation of labor migrants, whose share will increase rapidly to a critical level.

Source: http://ttolk.ru/?p=13892

Tags: assessment , Russia , forecasts , national idea