Looking back on the events of nearly a century and a half of our relations with Germany after the creation of the unified German state by Bismarck in 1870-71. of ways to interpret them. You can draw a line from one climax (in the positive sense of the word) to another, counting the failures and crises unfortunate episodes, deviations from the General trend of development of ascending. This optimistic view has many supporters. But the opposite point of view is quite popular. As a rule, in good times are dominated by optimistic assessments, and in difficult — pessimistic.
The devil's Pact?
The Pact in 1939 is often portrayed something of the main reasons for the outbreak of the Second world war and to the Soviet leadership and personally I. V. Stalin put forward the conspiracy against Hitler. Now, if this Covenant was not, then, say, Germany would not attacked Poland, fearing a coalition of Britain, France and the Soviet Union, and even if attacked, it would be immediately destroyed.
Nor about another war so do not lie and did not lie, as about the Second world war and world war II, because their results did not suit either the defeated Germans or the Western allies. They're teamed up right after the end of the war against Russia and began to put an equality sign between Hitler and Stalin, between fascism and socialism, calling to continue the war — this time for the destruction of the USSR.
To realize this goal the Western powers in Alliance with the remnants of the “third Reich” was not possible half a century. Prevented Soviet nuclear weapons. Millennial Russia in the end was destroyed from within with the assistance of our own Judases. However, holders of the patent for this technology, as shown above, were the Germans, who acted as the assistants of their Anglo-Saxon superiors in establishing a “new order” in Europe.
But now it's not about that. Could the Soviet Union in 1939 really prevent the onset of the Second world war? Was there a Pact in 1939 some diabolical instrument, fundamentally different from other international agreements that were signed in those years? Or, in other words, is whether the treaties with Nazi Germany in the period of a deliberate crime that couldn't go no self-respecting democratic state? Concluded whether the Soviet Union a nonaggression Pact with Germany to push Hitler all the new wars of conquest? All these questions have only one answer. And he is negative.
So, what was the international situation at the time of Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow and signing of the Covenant?
Nazi Germany quickly gained momentum. Its strategic goal was the elimination of the USSR and the conquest of Lebensraum in the East. To achieve the German leadership was required to solve three tasks. First, to arm Germany and to prepare it for war, that is, “shake off the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles”. This problem was solved by 1938, and without any significant resistance from France and England. Hitler surprised by this. He was afraid of preventive military action, at least, the French. They didn't do anything. Since then, he became deeply despise them.
Second, to gather all ethnic Germans under the Reich. The Germans in the Reich was 70 million, if we add to them the Austrians and the Sudeten Germans, 80 million Population of the Soviet Union had 170 million So it was necessary to occupy Austria and Czechoslovakia, and to acquire, in addition to Italians, allies of the Hungarians, Romanians, Croats, Slovenes, Bulgarians, to align the balance of power.
Thirdly, to bring a well-armed Germany together with its allies closely to the borders of the USSR, eliminating all previously existing between us territorial strip, not resorting to war.
In fact, the yield on direct contact with the Soviet Union was the main precondition for the implementation of the proclaimed by Hitler in “Mein Kampf” of the destruction of the Russian state, the elimination and enslavement of its population, turning all of Russia into a colony and place for the settlement of the German race “masters”. The purpose of this was well known in the West. All his actions in the 30-ies was clearly intended to help Hitler prepare for war with the Soviet Union. Hitler pushed East, arguing that in the West it there's nothing to find: there is no living space for the Germans.
Therefore, the West did not oppose the Anschluss of Austria and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in the Munich agreement with Hitler on September 29, 1938. He rubbed his hands at the conclusion of the anti-Comintern Pact and did not see anything reprehensible in the establishment of fascist regimes in Romania and Hungary.
The most important from the point of view of preparation for the attack on the USSR Hitler was Poland. She was lying in the main direction of its future impact on Moscow. Germany tried to negotiate with the poles “good”, considering that for this purpose there are all preconditions. Poland at that time was fascist or semi-fascist government, anti-Semitic and anti-Russian. This opened opportunities for political collusion with her. However, Poland had a mutual assistance agreement with the French, but after Munich, he in the eyes of the poles was a penny.
Hitler in 1934 was signed with Poland a non-aggression Pact for 10 years. Relations with Warsaw was beautiful. With the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, Hitler gave the poles a piece of fat — Teschen, keeping in mind that the poles he may soon need as allies. Therefore, in the autumn of 1938 and early 1939 Germany invited Poland to continue and expand cooperation, transforming the Pact into a Treaty of Alliance against Russia with a validity of 25 years. Ribbentrop intimated to the poles that in the case of consent they are waiting for large territorial increment in the East. He promised Warsaw to help in the solution of the Jewish question, to leave the poles of Poznan and Upper Silesia. The only thing asked of the poles Hitler to return to Germany of Danzig and agree to the establishment of an extraterritorial corridor between this city and Germany. He thought it was a very minor concession to Poland and sincerely believed that Warsaw is easy to agree with this requirement. In short, Warsaw was suggested as an ally of Germany in the manner of Hungary or Romania and to take part in the imminent war with Russia.
If this idea of something happened, the Polish troops, of course, went to Russia as part of German hordes under the leadership of the Polish quislings. But Poland suddenly balked. Why — Hitler could not grasp. He even promised the poles to give a part of Ukraine, and when he didn't answer, became very angry and decided that if the poles do not want to participate in the division of the Soviet pie, then they must punish, turning Poland, and Russia, in the experiments of the SS to eradicate the Slavs. In the spring of 1939 Hitler decided on war with Poland — Danzig and not in the corridor, and the war of annihilation.
Why do the poles have shown intransigence? Still the end is not clear. It is known, however, that Warsaw did nothing without first consulting with the Paris and especially London. Apparently, there is assured the poles that they can rely on the defense of its allies, and advised to continue to bargain with Hitler. In fact, neither France nor England for Poland were not going to fight. They deliberately provoked the conflict between Poland and Germany, the outcome of which was obvious in advance. This outcome meets the intentions of the British and French, who sought in every way to expedite the time of collision of the Soviet Union with Hitler.
These days, Hitler decided to offer a non-aggression Pact to Stalin, knowing full well that the position of the Union is crucial for the development of events in Europe. However, he wanted one shot to kill three birds with one stone: eliminate Poland; to show the West that if he will continue to show intransigence and unwillingness to share with him their colonies, it is quite possible Alliance of Germany with Russia; to drive a wedge between Russia and Western democracies. The latter was particularly important, because Hitler believed that the West will not forgive Stalin collusion with him and later, after the war with the Soviet Union will remain neutral.
What was the position of the USSR at that time? It was extremely difficult. The Munich agreement demonstrated to the international isolation of the Soviet Union, the West's unwillingness to take joint steps against Moscow's continuing aggression of Germany, with the explicit desire to push Hitler to the East, when the Soviet Union was not ready for war. We need to try to buy time and to split the actual coalition of Hitler and his Western supporters-“appeasers.” The opportunity suddenly opened in 1939.
Stalin, however, lingered for several months. But man he was tough, realistic and determined. His choice was quite natural. The fact that Germany would attack sooner or later in Poland, it was obvious. It was obvious that the poles will be broken. What military Alliance of the USSR with the Western powers is unlikely to deter Hitler from attacking Poland, it was obvious, too. The French have just betrayed Czechoslovakia and probably would have done the same against Poland. But the French were at least army. The British also betrayed Poland, as before Chamberlain betrayed Czechoslovakia, but unlike the French and the army-that they had. Subsequent events have confirmed the validity of these considerations.
If Stalin had chosen the Alliance with the Anglo-French, the war would have one Russia, and is still not ready for war. The fight would have on its own territory, as the poles refused to allow the Red Army to his country. The French would have sat idly by for his “Maginot line”, and the British told us about the difficulties of landing on the continent.
“How many divisions in case of war you can deploy on the continent?” — asked the British to Stalin. “Two immediately and two later”, answered those. “That's how! — ironically Stalin. — "the two immediately and two later. Do you know how many divisions the Germans?”
And that offered us Germany? She was offered the main thing — peace for some time. But this was not all. For refraining from hostilities, the Soviet Union received large territorial increments in the West — Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukrainian and Belorussian lands of Poland, Bessarabia. It was all the territory that was lopped off at the Russian Germans in the bawdy world at Brest-Litovsk. Of course, Hitler has been so generous since the was going in the near future to deprive us all of it back, but we created a very important strategic assumptions, covering the Central regions of the USSR in case of war.
Played the role one more consideration. Of course, the West did not want to fight with Hitler and with bated breath waited for its attack on the Soviet Union to Germany and Russia completely bled each other, and then the West would act as an arbitrator. But it was just one of the possible scenarios. If, however, the West still would have acted in the support of Poland and at least formally declared war on Hitler, it would distract the attention of Germany at least for a while from Russia. Opens a real chance that the war with Germany, the Western powers will be delayed. After all, France was a major continental power, and nobody in that moment could not imagine that she is in a few weeks will crumble like a house of cards. The English on their Islands was separated from Germany by sea, had a strong fleet and was able to hold out long enough. So Hitler could seriously bogged down, and we won time and could count on a significant strengthening of its foreign policy opportunities in the face of conflict between the leading imperialist powers themselves.
The rest is known. England and France for the forms declared war on Hitler, but did not fight, calmly watching the defeat and occupation by the Germans in Poland. The USSR, in response, moved its borders West to the Curzon line, to restore the former borders of Russia. It seemed that all was going according to plan. But the situation changed dramatically after 9 months. Hitler defeated the French and British, and occupied the whole Western part of the European continent, taking even the Balkans, Denmark and Norway. Without France, England ceased to be a serious military factor in Europe. Calculation of Stalin that Hitler bogged down in the West, did not materialize. The threat of war for us quickly began to grow.
In the summer of 1940, Hitler returned to his plan of attack on the Soviet Union. 2 June 1940 he spoke at a meeting with staff officers of group “A” of the land forces that he “will soon finally have a free hand for the great and real tasks of the struggle against Bolshevism”. On 30 June he spoke to the chief of the General staff Halder that you need another little demonstration at England, to “the British did not hit us in the back when we go to the East.” July 21, he instructed the staff “to deal with Russian problem”, and on July 31 held a meeting with the commanders of the genera and species of troops about the forthcoming campaign against Russia. The main goal of the campaign — “the Destruction of a viable Russia.” Start date — may 15, 1941. In winter you can start a war Hitler did not dare. The preparation of war with Russia, the Fuhrer's devoted their time and energy, though, had to do war against England. But she has little interest, as he was sure that Churchill will not be a hindrance to him.
Until the spring of 1941 the Germans were, however, negotiations with the us. Written thick books that you could avoid war with Germany if the USSR took in 1940 only Bessarabia and did not touch Northern Bukovina, if Molotov during his visit to Berlin in November 1940, less talked about Finland, Bulgaria and the black sea Straits. It's all nonsense. The Germans were just leading us around by the nose. At this time, constitute the “plan Barbarossa”, was finally approved on 18 December 1940. To divert the attention of Stalin, the Germans offered us to engage India, and when he replied them, they stopped talking and stopped talking about it.
In the end, Hitler persuaded himself that delay further the opening of the war against the Soviet Union is not worth it. First, he was convinced, smashing Russia, he would deprive England's last ally on the European continent, and London finally accept its terms. Second, the Soviet Union would be defeated within a few weeks or months. Third, the looming risk of involvement in the US war on the side of the British. So I had to try to bring down the USSR even before the war entered America. All three of these considerations in the end was wrong.
Hitler after the war tried to imagine his attack on the Soviet Union as a preventive war. He is now echoed by some Western scholars, especially our so-called defector Suvorov (book “Icebreaker”), which fueled the relevant materials of Western intelligence. However, all the evidence suggests that it was not provoked by the Soviet Union aggression, and the main implementation of the criminal plan hatched by the Nazis for many years. A non-aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany had inevitably become a victim of this plan.
This, apparently, was clear to the Soviet leadership, which continued despite the conclusion of the Covenant, forced the country's preparation for war. If Stalin something was wrong, it was only in the time of peace a pause which gave him the conclusion of the Pact with Germany. The Pact was definitely the correct and most appropriate in those circumstances the political and military decision.
The art of Soviet diplomacy was that she left at the time of the conflict with Hitler and gave to go to war with him first, the British and the French (contrary to their plans and calculations). It was the decisive prerequisite for the creation of a unified anti-fascist front after the German attack on the Soviet Union. The defeat and occupation of France, the bombing of London and the destruction of Coventry, a huge loss of British and Americans from submarine war in the Atlantic have left Western leaders no choice but to go for an Alliance with the hated Russia. Throughout the war tried to break out of this Union. But to do this and failed. And that is also a huge victory for Stalin's diplomacy, which began the defeat of fascism with the conclusion of the Molotov—Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet Union is not sold in 1939 his soul to the devil. He sat down to play with the devils cards and beat them. Beat outright.
Churchill about Molotov—Ribbentrop Pact, he admitted: “the fact that such an agreement was possible, marks the full depth of the failure of British and French policy and diplomacy... In favor of the Soviets I must say that the Soviet Union was vital to move as far to the West of the original positions of the German army, so the Russians got the time and could gather strength from all parts of his huge Empire. In the minds of the Russian imprinted with a hot iron catastrophe, which suffered their army in 1914, when they rushed to the attack, the Germans not yet finished mobilization. Now their boundaries have been considerably farther East than during the first war. They had by force or fraud to occupy the Baltic States and a significant part of Poland before they attack. If their policy was cold and calculating, it was in that moment are also highly realistic.”
In other words, if, then, our Western allies in the Soviet Union, they would have acted similarly, or even more cold and calculating.
The Great Patriotic
Non-aggression Pact signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in the presence of Stalin, was not destined to live for two years. Revealing a fundamental difference in the approach of the two parties, have concluded this contract to its commitments.
The German side immediately began to prepare to cross it and to strike a treacherous blow to your partner. And here it is necessary to speak not about the maniac Hitler, rootless corporal, the seducer of a respectable Germans, namely the German side. Hitler was not alone, around him was a crowd of helpful hereditary aristocrats “von und zu” from command of the Wehrmacht and the German office, leading German scientists and cultural figures. All of them, despite just signed a Treaty of friendship with Russia, enthusiastically preparing for its destruction and looting. They didn't see nothing unnatural or objectionable in this respect Russia and Russian. Such is was the tradition of the German Imperial policy, firmly nestled in the minds of the German elite. In accordance with it in relation to Russia was acceptable treachery, dishonesty, deception and even crime. If before Germany referred to the need for struggle against tsarism, now — “Jewish Bolshevism.” The essence of this, however, does not change.
Russian (Soviet) side to the end, until the very moment of the German attack, and may be many days after it clung to a nonaggression Pact, wanted to believe that the invasion of our country may be a misunderstanding, gave the face rushing at her tank Lavin strange orders not to succumb to provocations. Once again, Russia has ruined faith in the German partners. Past experience was not for us for the future. It seems, however, that it is our policy never from this belief and illusion and not get rid of. In any case, on 22 June 1941 we slipped on the same water-melon crust and in the same place as in the days of Biserkov, emperors and other leaders of the German nation.
Stalin summed first and foremost belief in their own infallibility and the belief that the USSR still have enough time to complete the preparations for war. He wanted to hope for is that he refused to see things obvious, to do the only possible conclusions from coming to him intelligence and other information. Known his resolution on the note of people's Commissar of state security Merkulov, which was attached to the message agent from Berlin that “all military measures in Germany for the preparation of the armed uprising against the Soviet Union fully completed and the impact can be expected at any time.” The hand of Stalin on the note inscribed: “T. Merkulov. Maybe send your “source” to hell. It is not the source, and disinformation”.
This overconfidence in assessing the international situation, opportunities and intentions of the enemy, however, is not so unusual in our history, especially when Russian leaders overestimate personal contacts with leaders of other countries. Many, as we have seen, like Alexander II, was burned by this belief and continue to get burned today. So Stalin's error in some sense typical of our leadership. Anyway, in history, he is not alone.
The attack of the Germans on 22 June 1941, was unexpected and devastating. To deny it does not make sense. Stalin did not expect troops of the order of embattled had. Russia rushed from 152 29 German and Romanian and Finnish divisions with 4950 aircraft, 2800 tanks, 47,000 artillery pieces and mortars — only 5.5 million people. Behind them was an economic and military power all over Europe, Hitler conquered. The red Army, numbering at that moment, 4.6 million people, is rapidly rolled back. Despite the desperate heroism of our soldiers over the Soviet Union after a few months faced a real threat of defeat. German troops blockaded Leningrad and captured vast territories in the West, and stood only a few dozen kilometers from Moscow. Price of extraordinary effort in late 1941 the Germans were able to throw from Moscow. But they soon resumed the offensive on the southern front. Over the country then was in mortal danger. A further retreat was fraught with the collapse of our state and the tragedy of all its people. The order “not one step back”, the organization of detachments and other draconian measures indicate that the situation was close to desperate, the Germans, and in 1918, overcame us.
The situation was forced to look into the possibility of respite. Losses in troops and equipment was a huge trained reserves had very little defense companies remained in enemy-occupied territories, weapons were produced in insufficient quantities, the allies were minor, the soldiers had to send into battle with orders to get the weapons of the enemy or to take a rifle of a dead comrade. Probably, in those days, Stalin thought of the Brest peace and decided to check out whether it is possible to buy much-needed for the USSR a break by agreement with the Germans, albeit, again, a shameful and obscene. In any case, according to the documents cited for the first time V. Karpov in his book “the Generalissimo”, the NKVD was given the task to make contact with the Germans and to probe the possibility of an agreement. This was done, by the way, is not the first time, if you remember taken immediately after the outbreak of war attempt to start a conversation with Germans about the suspension of hostilities through their allies and sudoplatova meeting with the chargé d'affaires of Bulgaria in Moscow at the restaurant “Aragvi”. Our willingness to negotiate with the Germans, no matter what dirty tricks and crimes they may commit, was indestructible and in these fateful moments of Russian history.
Meeting with the chief of the personal staff of the Reichsfuhrer SS gruppenführer Wolff and representatives of the command of the Wehrmacht took place in Mtsensk 20-27 Feb 1942 in German-occupied territory and the results given. Did not help any suggestions after the armistice to start a joint venture with Germany's actions against England and France, nor the willingness for territorial concessions, no threat in the event of failure of the Germans to accept the Soviet proposals to defeat the German troops and to terminate the existence of the German state on the world map as such. In support of the latest threats, Stalin ordered against the military to begin a winter offensive on all fronts. It was not prepared and soon petered out.
The Germans, like in 1918, did not want to give up the vast territories of the Soviet Union, which had seized them at the time. As then, they were confident in their own invincibility, that war after some time will inevitably end with the victory of Germany and then the Soviet Union would be forced to return to the peace negotiations on more stringent conditions. They soon launched an offensive in the South, the invasion of the don, the Kuban, the Caucasus and access to the Volga, of course, only strengthened their conceit and arrogance, the belief that Stalin was only bluffing, trying in vain to escape from the inevitable defeat.
As to Stalin, then, entering into secret negotiations with the Germans, he came on great and hardly justified the risk. In the case of disclosure of the fact of the negotiations could cause serious complications in the relations with the allies that would have created great difficulties for the further conduct of the war against Nazi Germany. Giving the Western territories of the USSR and expressing readiness to go to war with England and the United States on the side of Germany, Stalin risked seriously to demoralize the Red Army and to restore the Soviet regime against the population of the USSR. His proposals to Hitler to ally with the red Army that the Germans had already almost broken, could not have in the eyes of the Berlin appeal. To reinforce his position by success at the front, Stalin at that time was not.
After receiving German denial of Mtsensk, and Stalin tried to securely hide the ends in water. As noted by Karpov, there is no evidence showing that his risky initiative was discussed at the Politburo and approved there. Mindful of the difficulties of Lenin and his practical isolation in the party leadership before signing the Brest peace, he apparently decided not to expose themselves to such danger and acted in secrecy, relying only on state security organs. It is significant that we still do not know anything about the witnesses or about the parties to those negotiations. They all seem to have disappeared. Merkulov after the war were shot, and Sudoplatov jailed on charges of unauthorized contacts with the Germans. Disappeared or muffled silence and German witnesses.
Attempt the resumption of negotiations between Germany and Russia after, as far as we know, took place in 1943-44 in Stockholm. She was made the German military intelligence and counter-intelligence — the Abwehr. By the time the position of the “third Reich” beginning to deteriorate rapidly. Stalingrad and battle of Kursk, scared, above all, the German military, who felt that it is a disaster for which they will have to answer, and allowed himself strongly doubt their Fuhrer. Not coincidentally, Canaris is chief of the Abwehr began probing capabilities out of the war, conclusion of peace on a more or less decent conditions, in order to prevent the invasion of foreign, especially Soviet troops on the territory of Germany. The extent to which his efforts were supported by the Nazi elite, it is not clear. In addition, the Abwehr, all the time faced and competed with the SS, which not without reason were afraid of direct collusion with the generals fighting against the German powers at the expense of the “surrender” of the Nazi leadership and otherwise interfere with Canaris.
SS confirmed the fears of the unsuccessful military conspiracy against Hitler in the summer of 1944. The plotters had connections with the Anglo-Saxon powers had hoped after the armistice to join with them in Alliance against the Soviet Union.
About the Stockholm “German-Soviet” episode known for certain only one thing: it came to nothing. Our contacts with the Germans were known to scouts Rybkin (Yartsev) and his wife Zoya Voskresenskaya, as well as our military attacat. Rybkin soon after the war, died in a car accident, and the resurrection nothing about these things and not told. Knew something about these contacts, and V. S. Semenov, worked in the counselor of our Embassy in Sweden. Anyway, he told me that abgarowicz, which from time to time been sent to him in Stockholm, was a secret agent of the Soviet intelligence services recruited in his time in the Baltic States. “We, therefore, know what they're plotting in Berlin and really want from us, it is usually added with a satisfied smile. We all order after Kursk was given, and the German disinformation is not believed. Nothing the Germans did not work”.
Stalin after the war there was a clear fracture, haven't been interested in any re-release of the Brest peace. In Berlin, still indulged in the delusion that the ability to negotiate with Moscow from a position of strength, persist. Actually, any German proposals are unlikely to have had any chance of success. Stalin understood that there comes a moment when you realize the Germans made in Mtsensk warning: don't want to talk, so know what will be broken, and your Reich wiped off the face of the earth. Such an opportunity was provided to Russia for the first years after the unification of Germany, and Stalin was not going to miss it. Who knows, not whether he thought even then that the result of the victory, which has given us such incredible sacrifices and hardship, Russia will be able to get either socialist Germany, and thus finally realize the cherished dream of a Leninist revolutionary Alliance with the Germans, or at least to achieve neutralization of Germany, with a more or less close the reference to the Soviet Union. Neither of these things ultimately did not work. But we were — and not once — tempting close to achieving this goal.
Retreating on all fronts and trying to enter into secret negotiations with the allies and with us, the Nazi leadership of Germany in the best traditions of German Imperial policy were not aware of the hopelessness of the situation and believed that Germany retains the ability to dictate the terms. Suffice it to recall the enthusiasm with which it had planned to begin the occupation and the partition of Russia in August 1918 — just a few months before the complete defeat in the First world war, to not feel much surprise at the fact that the Germans in February-March 1945, behaved as if the fate of their country was not threatened. They continue to develop plans for redrawing Europe tried to create a “wonder weapon”, designed to change the course of the war, etc. During the First world war the role of “wonder weapons” was to play the poison gas and giant gun of “Berta” in this war was carried out works on creation of rockets of the big radius of action, stratospheric Intercontinental bombers (the forerunner of the American “Shuttles”), the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.
There is nothing in the German thinking and German politics, that somewhere and sometime had no place in the German past. Fidelity to the tradition is his Foundation, his strength and at the same time, his weakness and limitations. The German success, as a rule, is not based on searching and finding some fundamentally new ways and schemes, and on repetition and the use of already established, but every time with improvements and additions. Angry French joke that the new German “Mercedes” — it is the same car of the early twentieth century, to which only fastened some modern devices and Nickel-plated jewelry, there is a lot of truth. Not by chance the famous German machine tool industry is not so strong that supplies the market with machines all new designs, and the fact that engaged in an endless improvement of previously created machines in accordance with the individual needs of new customers.
Knowing this peculiarity of the mental warehouse of the Germans, it would be difficult to expect from them that they will not repeat during the Second world war, those tricks and techniques that were already used by them in war first. Then, hopelessly bogged down on the Eastern front, they are known to have decided to defeat Russia hands of the Russians, starting from the us civil war. Something like the Germans up to and during the great Patriotic war by the Soviet Lieutenant-General Vlasov, who surrendered to them in captivity in 1942 and agreed to go into the service.
Of course, Vlasov was not much of a major figure, rather, in fact, no political figure he never was. As for his qualities of military leader, by the Germans themselves in his performance, acknowledged that he is a weak strategist, more a tactician, as a good division commander, but no more. They are very ambitious and unscrupulous. Hitler and Himmler did not want to see partner in the General, betrayed their oath and country, called him “a pig”, laughed over how he traded his honor the military for schnapps, cigarettes and women. For almost the entire war he was kept in a black body, only allowing to sign leaflets with calls to surrender in German captivity and train near Berlin “politoffizier” for units formed from Soviet defectors and prisoners of war who had agreed to the harsh conditions of German concentration camps to go into service by the Germans. The proposal to create under his leadership the army for the liberation of the Soviet Union from the Bolsheviks until the autumn of 1944, Hitler's support of not met. He was confident in the victory of the Wehrmacht did not consider it possible to share this victory and its fruits with some Russian General and his army. Germany waged war on the destruction of Russia and its peoples. In this concept, of course, did not fit any Russian, even the anti-Bolshevik army, no Russian anti-Communist government and no Union of Germany with them. Vlasov's just used for the Grand deception.
Where, however, did Vlasov and his movement in this approach to the case of Hitler and the senior German leadership? It opened, recruited, nurtured and included, in modern terms, not a Nazi “partsize” and pillars of “respectable” German society, especially the aristocratic officers of the Wehrmacht, true to the traditions and experience of their predecessors, had a lot of energy to the organization of the revolutionary upheaval in tsarist Russia.
There is every reason to believe that the idea of the repetition of the experience of 1917 lingers in the minds of the German General staff long before the start of the war with the Soviet Union. But this required a major political figure, which would be to oppose Stalin. Such an authoritative figure, in the opinion of the military, would be Trotsky — hero of the October revolution and the civil war, which had many supporters in the USSR and openly put the problem of revolution in Russia. However, Stalin managed to liquidate Trotsky before the war. Other pieces of this caliber, the Germans in mind was not. Bet on the remains of the Romanovs or of the generals of the white emigration was considered futile, given the sharply negative attitude to them of most of the population of the Soviet Union. In short, the war was started without a suitable candidate for “revolutionizing” of Russia. Yes, at first, and need it not felt — the Wehrmacht entered the body of the Soviet Union like a knife through butter, and the victory seemed very close.
The mood of the German command, however, began to change rapidly after the defeat near Moscow. The war clearly took a protracted nature, the policy of terror against the population of occupied areas were all the more unreliable the German rear, the prospect of entering to the Urals on the line Astrakhan—Arkhangelsk became more elusive. Mind began to receive warnings of Bismarck about the fact that until now nobody has been able to take control of the entire Russian territory.
At the same time at the disposal of the Germans got hundreds of thousands of our prisoners and deserters, defectors and individuals willing to volunteer to serve them. Their number is rapidly growing. The fact that this potential was not used or was used quite insufficient, for the command of the Wehrmacht was obvious.
And that's the end of 1941, the Wehrmacht officers, particularly from among the Baltic barons, who imagine themselves to be great scholars of Russia and the Russian soul, begin to send notes “to the top” proposals to organize under the control of German anti-Bolshevik movement, to bring Soviet citizens from among the prisoners of war, defectors and volunteers to serve in the ranks of the German army, and maybe in the future, to create the Russian army and throw it against the red Army, turning waged by the Germans against the Soviet war in fratricidal and civil.
Rushed to pow camps to search for artists including Soviet generals, but they, to their credit, to be traitors refused and spat the German mefistofele-seducers in the face. Had at first to do small fry — majors, colonels Yes, unknown battalion commissioners who could be commanders of the punitive detachments, but not suited for the role of anti-Bolshevik national leaders. In the end, I stopped on the Vlasov — just bigger nothing caught. And this is still the former commander of the army and front, hero of the defense of Moscow and also prepared to declare themselves an ideological opponent of Stalin and the Soviet government.
In the end, Vlasov gave his name to treason, all that we are to this day called “vlasovskiy”, and ended his life on the gallows in the Taganka prison. No significant role in the fighting against the red Army he never played. Signed anti-Soviet proclamations on behalf of the mythical Russian community committees (so-called “Smolensk Manifesto”), helped to recruit zafrontovym agents to work in the rear of the red Army, composed of German intelligence plans for the organization of uprisings in the Soviet concentration camps, traveled to the occupied areas, urging to obey the Germans, at the end of the war at the behest of Himmler founded in 1944 in Prague, “the Congress for the liberation of the peoples of Russia”. No Russian army him to create hard is not allowed.
When the Germans became very very tight with people, Himmler took Vlasov from his patrons and mentors of the Wehrmacht and instructed him to proceed with the formation of two divisions on the rights of the same SS units composed of Estonians, Latvians, Belgians, French, Bandera and other bastards. The first division of his “Russian liberation army” were involved in the spring 1945, near Frankfurt on the Oder problem is not solved, and then voluntarily left the position to go to Czechoslovakia in the hope of finding political asylum and to escape responsibility before the Soviet courts. The second division was never fully formed.
The attempt of the Germans to repeat in Russia in 1917 ended ingloriously. There was in the Soviet Union during the great Patriotic war the revolutionary situation of mass discontent with the existing regime. On the contrary, the war against the German aggressor was facilitated by the rallying of people after a hard 20-ies and 30-ies and its reconciliation with the government. The Russian army after a period of setbacks in 1941 and 1942 is not an example of 1914-1917 were able to take the initiative in their own hands and almost single-handedly to break Germany, which could not cause a high tide of patriotism, national pride and confidence in the future.
Thus, the “third Reich”, unleashed a war against us with the outspoken aim of ending the Russian state and to colonize the territory, has not been able to achieve this strategic goal, nor to escape defeat with the help of secret negotiations or internal conflict in the Soviet Union. In 1945, the Reich was brought to its knees, and the rulers of Germany were not even allowed to develop conditions later in life and existence of the Germans. The German high command surrendered unconditionally and turned in all the Supreme power over Germany by the Soviet Union and its Western allies. The fiasco of the German Imperial policy was complete.
We have decided to emphasize that it was a fiasco only Nazi policies, like the Nazi policy was radically different from that which Germany has on the rise after its unification in 1871. Yes, an important part of Nazi policy was an animal-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism, the theory of racial exclusiveness and the line on the eradication of the Slavic peoples. Minus these components of look East policy of Nazi Germany, however, differed little from the policies of its predecessors. In Yalta and then in Potsdam, as it seemed, this policy was sentenced to death. Germany never had to threaten its neighbors or the preservation of world peace. So decided the four great powers.
But if Hitler had won?
Yes, indeed, what would happen if in the last war we did not win, but Hitler? The easiest way to answer this question, refusing to discuss it. Not won, so to speak, say, about.
Nevertheless, the question is not empty and idle. When there was a war, and then after the years of rebuilding the country, the response from our people was the same: victory of Hitler would have for all of us irreparable disaster. To prevent it to save the country and the people, and had to go to unheard of privations and sacrifices. We needed a victory — one for all. And the people pay the price stood. There was no other choice. War has United everyone — from small to large and white, and red, and fans of the idea, and indifferent. Wailing streets in day of funeral of Stalin was not grief accustomed to slavery “cattle” mentally defective “scoop” crying in the Gulag and the repressions of 1937, as we try to convince others and their own historians. The people never forgets, but has the unmistakable and basic instincts. He was crying in those days sincerely. Cried the man to ensure the victory in the great and terrible war, when they decide to be or not to be. So then the question was, and nothing else.
Dashing guys who have seized power in Moscow in a coup in 1991 and the overnight collapse of the Russian world power, dividing among themselves the territory and wealth, knew that committing an unprecedented crime against its people and its history. They could not understand or, given their intellectual misery, in any case, at least not instinctively feel that act as performers of long-cherished in the West, ideas of destruction and enslavement of Russia. During the war, these ideas found their most complete and cynical incarnation of the Nazi master plan “OST”, and the relevant performers in the face of the Sonderkommando of the SS, Hitler's generals, our policemen and other Vlasov scum. And not coincidentally, almost came to power, they rushed to throw mud at the great feat of the Soviet people in the great Patriotic war, to play the tar and feathers the names of our heroes and martyrs, to defame the Soviet Army and its generals, to exalt traitors of the Motherland, to put an equal sign between fascism and socialism, between Hitler and Stalin, between the criminal “third Reich” and the Soviet Union. These people had the courage even to demand repetition of the Nuremberg trials, this time over the Communists and the Soviet government, apparently, knowing in my heart that it's him crying by the dock.
Ensured his power in the Kremlin and feeling more confident, the Russian elite in a few years replaced the nasty political Striptease to show patriotism. Continuing to keep the country on a starvation diet and to get the last penny from the pockets of his generation, won a great victory, they are not averse now to portray themselves as the inheritors of this victory.
However, we will not be deceived. The poisonous seeds scattered detractors of the Fatherland, gave their shoots. And then we hear “naive” question: “And would it not be better for all of us if the Germans won? Now if from the belly of Bavarian sausages and drink German beer. Long went to Europe...”.
Akin to this logic, and everything that rolled on us like a murky wave on the theme of the great Patriotic war with the West. I'm not even talking about that soon in our schools the children will be taught that the war was won by those very “modest” 60 allied divisions, which in the end, “under the curtain” decided to land in Normandy not to miss the moment of victory. Moreover. Neither the film, nor the series, that no scientific book — some descriptions of the Nazi massacres of Jews and angry condemnation of the Holocaust. Of course, it was all that. But not all in the past war was limited to saving only the Jews? Involuntarily the question arises: gentlemen, well, if Hitler had not destroyed the Jews, and was limited to only the extermination of the Slavs and the Communists, as if in this case he was treated by our Western allies and partners?
Caesar's wife, above suspicion. Only if she was blameless? Unfortunately, the present generation something of the history of the war must have forgotten, if ever known. In this connection it is appropriate to quote a document of the British Ministry of defence, written on 27 July 1944: “Sooner or later our interests collide with the interests of Russia, and in these conditions the position and power of Germany will be vital”. On 15 August of the same year, the joint Committee of the British intelligence services provided the guidance Memorandum “Security in the North Atlantic and Western Europe,” with thoughts on the conduct of hostilities against the Soviet Union and with the requirement not only to refuse to disarm Germany, but also to provide conditions for the speedy equipping it with the most modern weapons.
You have to imagine when and in what circumstances it was written. Smoked black oily smoke of the crematorium chimney of Auschwitz, where in the summer of 1944 was murdered in the gas chambers 400 thousand Hungarian Jews. The SS were arrested and hung on the hooks of participants in anti-Hitler conspiracy, which is closely associated with the British. The Soviet Union, bleeding, for the third year in a row milled on the Eastern front, hundreds of Nazi divisions, having lost more than 20 million people. But neither the Jewish tragedy nor fascist terror, which lasted throughout most of Europe, nor the millions of dead Soviet citizens did not interfere with our Anglo-Saxon partners to count, like with the Germans to finish the work that Hitler started alone and which were becoming clearer, he couldn't do it. Here is one of the reports of those days the British foreign Minister Eden: “the Partition of Germany, from the point of view of further prospects, would be strategically beneficial to us in case if we needed German support against a hostile Soviet Union. In our opinion, such support from the unified Germany's highly unlikely... At least, section (Germany) would reduce the likelihood that Germany will fall into the Soviet sphere of influence and will enter into an Alliance with her against us... From a purely military point of view, the size of the contribution that could be made by Germany in support of us, depends on: a) extent of destruction of its military capacity as a result of our current policies; b) speed, with which Germany in the period between the turn of our politics and the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union can be rearmed with our help”.
Looked away in London and excessive fastidiousness did not suffer. This is food for thought for those who think the destruction of the Soviet Union, entirely the result of his own inner development and the errors of the Soviet leadership.
However back to the actual question of what the fate prepared for us by the German Nazis in planning the attack on our country, its defeat and capture. So, how many and what kind of beer and sausages they have in store for the fathers and grandfathers of the current political dunce and ignoramus, talking about it from TV screens and pages of the Russian Newspapers?
Let's start with the most authoritative source, the Bible of German fascism “Mein Kampf”. “When we speak today about new lands and territories in Europe, we draw his attention primarily to Russia, wrote Hitler.— This is a huge country in the East is ripe for destruction... We are chosen by fate to witness a catastrophe which will be the most compelling confirmation of racial theory”.
Thus, the strategic goal of Germany was to organise the death of Russia, its national and state disasters. On the eve of the attack on the USSR, the Imperial Minister of the occupied Eastern territories, Rosenberg said that the Soviet Union should “cease to be a subject of international law and European politics and becoming the object of a foreign (German) politics.” Shortly after the invasion of 22 June 1941, Hitler spoke in the circle of his confidants: “These people (of the Soviet Union. — Y. K.) have one-the only justification of his existence is to be useful to us in economic terms”.
The war with the Soviet Union in any case not conceived as a “civilized” conflict. The leadership of the Supreme command of the armed forces of Germany have returned from the führer after the report of 3 March 1941, the notorious plan “Barbarossa”, with the following note: “the Forthcoming campaign is more than just armed struggle; it is a conflict of two worldviews. Given the size of the Russian space, for the end of the war not enough to defeat the armed forces of the enemy. The entire territory of Russia should be divided into several States with their own governments, willing to conclude peace treaties. The creation of these governments will require a very great political skill and well-designed General principles... Must in all circumstances to avoid the replacement of Bolshevik Russia, nationalist government. The lessons of history teach us that such a state will again become an enemy of Germany.”
This was the source of the first and most important objective is the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and Russia, creating in this space conglomerate of small state formations of the colonial and semi-colonial type. In the Soviet Union was created:
a) Great Russia with the center in Moscow;
b) Belarus with a center in Minsk or Smolensk;
to) Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania;
d) Ukraine and the Crimea with its center in Kiev;
d) don (Cossack) region with the center in Rostov;
e) the Caucasus region;
g) the Former Russian Central Asia (Turkestan).
The territory of the Russian settlement as the core of the Russian state is seen as the main object to devastating effect on the Soviet Union. “Acting against the Soviet Union, should be put before a political objective to systematically erode the core of Russia to ensure the possibility of development of other areas,” — said one of the documents of the Ministry of Rosenberg.
Updating this program, reichsführer Himmler wrote in his comments to the General plan “OST”, which will be discussed below that the defeat of the state with the center in Moscow will not yet mean the complete solution of the Russian problem: “we Need to defeat the Russians as a people and divide them.” To do this, divide the territory inhabited by Russian, different political units with their own governments, to provide each of them a separate national development. The peoples of these areas to convince that they under no circumstances focused on Moscow. In this context, were weighed to the establishment of a special Imperial Commissioner in the Urals, were studied secession of Northern Russia, and Central Russia were ordered to maintain a policy at the division and separation of its constituent parts.
“The Gorky of the Russian General Commissariat should be instilling a sense that he is somehow different from Russian from the Tula to the General Commissariat. There is no doubt that such administrative fragmentation of the Russian territory and the planned separation of the individual areas would be one means of struggle against the strengthening of the Russian people... When Kuznetsk, Novosibirsk and Karaganda industrial region will start working at full capacity, would require an enormous amount of workers, especially technical workers. Why Walloon engineers, technicians Czech, Hungarian businessmen and the like not to work in Siberia? — says Himmler, who was going to send to Siberia, Western Ukrainians, Balts and other “racially inferior”, but traditionally hostile to Russian people. In this case, it could rightly be talking about backing the European territory for the colonization and production of raw materials... it is Necessary to stress once again that Siberia is one of the factors that if used properly could play a crucial role in the deprivation of the Russian people the possibility to restore their power.”
However, the main way for the destruction of the Russian people the Nazis considered not so much measures of the separation and the dismemberment of the territory of its habitat, how systematic genocide, that is, its “weakening racially”, “undermining its biological strength.” The same Himmler's task was to ensure that “ on Russian territory with the population in its majority consisted of people proevropeyskih primitive type”. This mass of “racially inferior stupid people” should not have to deliver a lot of worries to the German leadership, which wanted to dispose of crowds of docile and cheap slaves.
Respectively from the date of entry into the territory of the USSR, German troops had orders to “destroy the carriers of the state political ideas and political leaders (the commissioners)”. This order, later christened as the order “about the shooting of Commissars”, actually had a broader meaning. It was about the destruction of the entire elite of the Russian people, not only about the struggle against Bolshevism. Exactly the same thing the Nazis did with the poles and other “non-Bolshevik” peoples, which were to disappear from the face of the earth, giving living space for the German nation lords. Indicative in this respect, the following orders of Hitler to the Wehrmacht: “you Must resolve the Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia as the item that was still “oppressors” of the people. But I will have to abandon use of the old bourgeois-aristocratic intelligentsia, is still extant, mainly in exile. Russian people to be negative, and she ultimately is determined to be hostile to Germany”.
However, as recognized head of the SS and chief executioner Himmler, and the complete destruction of all Russian, which offered him the experts on racial issues, was unrealistic and hardly feasible in a short time. Germany could not immediately absorb all the “released” for her vast and at the same time, was vitally interested in the continuation of their operation under German control, and the hands of Russian “subhumans”. It was necessary to organize the operation, ensuring that both the conditions for the systematic extinction of the Russian population and extruding it to the Urals. In November 1941, Goering candidly explained the ideas of his Fuehrer, the Italian foreign Minister, count Ciano: “this year in Russia die of hunger from 20 to 30 million people. Maybe even good that it will happen: because some people should be reduced.”
Economic plans of the Nazi leadership against the Soviet Union are concentrated in the so-called “green folder” of Goring. Here are some pearls from there: “Many millions will be made redundant in this area, they will have to die or move to Siberia. Attempts to save the population there from death by starvation, can be undertaken only at the expense of supplies to Europe. They will undermine the resistance of Germany in the war and the ability of Germany and Europe to survive the blockade.” The most terrible fate awaited the population of non-Chernozem regions of Russia. They were going to turn into a zone of “the great hunger”.
Our citizens who were in the occupied areas, I still remember those food requisition, which was conducted “agricultural Fuhrer”. In the German memo, in particular, said: “Russian people for centuries experiencing hunger, need, and are accustomed to simplicity. Therefore, no false compassion. Do not try as a scale to take the German standard of living and change the Russian way of life”. But it was only the beginning. What awaited us next, clear from the decisions taken at the meeting of the economic staff of the “East” may 2, 1941: “to Continue the war will only be possible if all armed forces of Germany in the third year of the war will be supplied with food at the expense of Russia. While there is no doubt: if we can extort from the country and all that we need, tens of millions of people will be doomed to starvation”.
Our mourners about the fact that because of the victory of the Soviet Army they did not manage to get into a German Paradise, at least for the role of a cash cow, “European masters” apparently did not know that the issue of Russian cash cow once in the Nazi leadership were discussed: the pier, whether to keep it, if it will still give milk. The decision was clear: to milk dry, and then kill. In General, the German leadership of the time were quite carnivorous-and cannibalistic approach to our country and its people. The Soviet Union was called “pie” which had “expertly” cut into pieces and eat. There were plans for the assignment and use everything we had — from coal mines to the treasure museums. Even the corpses of defeated enemies were used for production. Of hair women killed in concentration camps, the Germans were busily weaving high quality ropes, gold fillings and dentures were cast ingots, which were shipped to Swiss banks, from the ashes of the burnt bodies was made the road surface, from human skin was made handbags and lampshades.
That was just the beginning. The industry of death and destruction is still only gaining momentum. Six million murdered Jews was nothing more than a warm-up. The full markup the Nazis wanted to “hang out” in the Soviet Union, in the European part which after 20-30 years should not be more than 15 million people.
What was going to take the “Great thousand-year Reich” to achieve this goal? First of all, sharply reduce the birth rate among Russians. “In these areas, instructed his henchmen Himmler — we have to consciously pursue a policy of reducing the population. The means of propaganda, especially through the press, radio, movies, leaflets, short brochures, reports, etc., we must constantly impress upon the people the idea that it is harmful to have many children. We need to show some large funds is the education of children and that could have been purchased for these funds. We need to talk about the great danger to women's health, which it is exposed, giving birth to children... to Deploy the broadest promotion of contraceptives. To establish their widespread production. The distribution of these funds and abortion in no way should not be restricted. To encourage the expansion of the network of abortion clinics. To organize a special training of midwives and nurse, and instruct them in carrying out abortions. Doctors also must have permission to perform the abortion, and it should not be considered a violation of medical ethics. Should promote voluntary sterilization, to prevent the struggle for the reduction of infant mortality, does not allow the training of mothers to care for infants and preventive measures against childhood diseases. To minimize training of Russian doctors in these specialties, not to provide any support to kindergartens and other similar institutions. There should be no obstacles to divorce. Not to provide assistance to children born out of wedlock. Should not be allowed any tax benefits for large families, not to provide them with financial assistance in the form of wage supplements”.
One word in the East were instructed to avoid all measures that have been used to increase fertility and health of the German nation. In the words of Himmler, for the Germans it was important to weaken the Russian people to such an extent that he “was no longer able to prevent German domination in Europe.”
Gradually diminishing number of people cheap Russian slaves had to be kept at an appropriate intellectual and cultural level. And on this account there was an elaborate program of criminal actions. “According to the Fuhrer, wrote on 23 July 1942 the chief of the party Chancellery Bormann to Rosenberg, is enough to train the local population only to read and write”. Instead of the current Cyrillic alphabet in our schools were planning to enter the Latin script.
On the subject of measures to ensure the cultural and moral degradation of Russian under the authority of the Reich can write and talk long and hard. Easier to quote Hitler at a lunch with the Nazi leadership. To them, as they say, nothing to add and not subtract.
“Take note, gentlemen, that democracy is impossible to hold on to what had once been taken by force. Conquered peoples we must first serve our economic interests. Slavs created in order to work for the Germans, and for no other purpose. Our aim is to settle in their current places of residence one hundred million Germans. The German authorities should be placed in the best buildings, and the governors to live in palaces. Around the provincial centres in a radius of 30-40 kilometers, the zone will be located from a beautiful German villages connected with the good roads. On the other side of this belt will be a different world. Let there live Russian, as they used to. We will take only the best of their land. The marshes are picked let Slavic natives. Best for us would be if they were all explained on the fingers. But, unfortunately, it's impossible. So — all to limit! No prints. The simplest radio. We need to wean them think. There is no compulsory schooling. You have to understand that the literacy of the Russian, Ukrainian and all other harm. There are always a couple of bright minds that will find ways to study its history, then come to the political conclusions that, in the end, will be used against us. So, gentlemen, do not try in the occupied areas to organize any radio transmission on historical themes. No! In every village, in the square pillar with the speaker to report the news and entertain listeners. Yes, to entertain and distract from attempts of gaining political, scientific and in General any knowledge. The radio should be transferred as much as possible simple, rhythmic and fun music. It invigorates and improves the ability to work”.
Unfortunate that the Fuehrer did not have time to speak out on issues of television work in the East.
But its recommendations about the organization of education: “Local people should not get higher and even secondary education. Schools, of course, you can leave. But in school they have to pay. The program is made such that the student knew as little as possible. Tell them that the school should be cleared of Communist ideology and closer to practice. And the rest is enough, if the population is a little bit to be able to read and write in German. Read more five hundred it is not necessary”.
And finally, about the economy and the social sphere in enslaved Russia, as it conceives its new owners. Here, perhaps, appropriate to quote from a secret Memorandum by the Institute of labour of the “German labor front” of 17 November 1941:
“The future economy of Russia needs not only to depend entirely on economic terms from a strong economy of the West, not only have no military industry, but also to undergo a profound restructuring that, on the basis of obvious political considerations, the people of Russia never crossed a certain standard of living. In Russia it is necessary to allow to work only undertakings whose products are required for production of only low and medium skills. Close industries that place high demands on their operating teams, such as plants for the production of optical, aircraft, locomotives. Since Russian is not necessary to require skilled labor to keep their well-being on this basis at the lowest level. The Russians should only be used for the extraction of raw materials, in agriculture and forestry, for the construction and repair companies, and in any case, machine-tool factories and shipyards, tank and aircraft. Huge natural riches of Russia allow to keep intact the natural wealth of Germany and Europe. Vast expanses of Russia allow to relieve our country from hazardous industries. We can, in particular, to close the part of the German metallurgical plants, shifting the burden of metallurgical plants in the East. The same applies to the coal mining collapse due to the importation of cheap coal from the former Soviet Union.”
In concentrated form the entire program of acquisition and development of “living space” in the East and the extermination of the Slavs, was outlined in the so-called master plan “OST”. Until this time the original text of this plan was not found. However, its content is easily visible from a number of accompanying plan documents, primarily from the extensive “Comments and suggestions on the General plan “OST” reichsführer SS”, signed on 27 April 1942.
It would be wrong to assume this plan, like hundreds of other similar German documents, schizophrenic product of a crazed führer and his immediate surroundings. Strikes deep, rigorous scientific study like the General concept and details of this cannibalistic program, which no doubt required a great collective effort of a large detachment of political scientists, anthropologists, geographers, historians, philosophers, economists, agrarians, doctors, etc. Know that the first version of this plan was laid out in April-may 1940 by Dr. Konrad Mayer — a 39-year-old renowned scholar, Director of the Institute of agriculture and agrarian policy of the University of Berlin, SS standartenführer, head of the Reich research Council and so on. and so on. In the company they worked dozens and hundreds of his colleagues and representatives of the army, security agencies, industries, banks, trade unions and public associations.
After losing the war, the German side were quick to say that people like anything about Hitler's plans did not know and that Hitler possessed just cheated millions of upstanding Germans. Fighting for the minds and sympathies of post-war Germany, the Soviet Union, in fact supported such an interpretation: the Hitlers come and go, but the German people remain.
However, everything is so simple? Of course, the Fuhrer had deceived his people, not having achieved the results that were promised him, starting a war. But could the Germans do not understand what they are doing, treacherously invading our territory, carrying out the orders of mass executions, starving millions of Soviet prisoners of war, quietly listening to the daily calls for reprisals against the Soviet “untermensch”, running on stations where the trains were unloaded with the stolen food and the good from the Eastern front and “freshly” Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian slaves, who were forbidden to feed from the same dishes as the Germans? So simple if there were millions of citizens of the Reich, delighted roaring at the meetings about the successes of the Wehrmacht and crying from the emotion from his speeches of the Fuhrer? Let's not forget that Germany, as at the time, aptly written by the famous writer Sebastian Haffner, who defended fascism to their last breath, to the last man and cartridge.
This does not happen by mistake. It was something more. Fascism, with its ideology of armed seizure of the Eastern lands grew out of the centuries-old tradition of the policy of “Drang nach Osten”, and relied on the knowledge and observations gathered, analyzed, comprehended by many generations of German tourists, artisans, entrepreneurs, scientists, politicians and military officers who had close contacts with Russia, who lived and worked in our country. Russia had the opportunity to see that these traditional ties was not only a positive way. Purchase “intimate” knowledge about her business, opportunities, resources and issues in many cases went under the angle of view, Russian absolutely unusual when you look at Germany. In any case, nothing comparable with the General plan “OST” in Russia in relation to Germany were never born. This is clearly seen in the archives of the Soviet authorities, pillaged since 1991 around the world meticulous Western researchers.
“OST” is clearly not accidental dislocation of the German consciousness and is not a monster, born out of nothing. Has had many predecessors and forerunners. Suffice it to recall that on 8 July 1915, in the midst of the First world war 1347 leading representatives of the German intellectual elite signed a Memorandum to the Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. And what was in the Memorandum? The existence of the Russian Empire, whose population in one generation was to reach 250 million people, was called the “greatest danger” for the future of Germany and Europe. Demanded the annexation and territorial conquests to ensure “growth” of the German nation, it was proposed Germanization of the occupied lands, the expulsion of the Slavs, the creation of a “protective” barrier from the Slavic danger, the collapse of the Russian state. 1347 signers! Probably more loyal renowned intellectuals who could afford to sign the Memorandum to Reich Chancellor in Germany just then was not.
This explains how, by whom and why could write of the General plan “OST”, and with diligence and enthusiasm and without any disgust or remorse. Just had the confidence that this time must succeed. But God has saved. Failed.
It remains to add that at the time of entry of allied troops into Germany by the special teams of the British and the Americans were tasked with identifying and capturing the German developments and practitioners of the war against the Soviet Union. Was interested in everything. Assess weak and strong points in the Soviet defence plans to power outages and disruption of transportation, targets for the impacts of strategic aviation, the German intelligence network, experience in psychological warfare and zafrontovym work, the Vlasov movement and the possibility of organizing the internal opposition, etc. there is No doubt that the future planners of nuclear war against the Soviet Union, writing is not one document on this topic were useful relevant developments in the organization of the dismemberment of the USSR, the destruction of its economy, the military industry and army, the dismantling of the social system, science and education, a reorientation of our country to the production of raw materials and energy for the needs of Europe and the West. In any case, calling of the German plans and put them to task with the events of the last century are astounding — and by words, and meaning.
True, the war Russia is not lost and foreign occupation were not exposed. So the question arises, how could happen this to us, despite our victory in the great Patriotic war. Apparently, to answer this question, we will for a long time. Not because I don't understand, but because they dare not admit the obvious.
The game begins anew
The capture by the allies over the Supreme power and the occupation of their troops, the whole of Germany objectively determined its subsequent split into two States: one controlled by the Western powers, the other the Soviet Union. The Foundation for this was laid by the agreements of the so-called European Advisory Commission, which met in 1944-45. in London who broke Germany into four zones of occupation, each of which completely verkhovenstvo one of the four powers, and the special district of Berlin. As for Germany as a whole, then they had to work together. Of course, this soon proved impossible.
In the course of preparing these solutions were put forward different plans to return Germany to the state resembling the situation before the creation of the German Empire in 1871. They initiated the West side. In Tehran in 1943, Stalin was not opposed to the idea of the dismemberment of Germany, and in the spring of 1945 in Yalta, agreed to record as part of measures to ensure future peace and security, along with the complete disarmament, demilitarization, and “dismemberment” of Germany.
Respectively may 10, 1945 Truman signed a Directive JCS-1067, suggesting to prepare the division of Germany into a number of separate sovereign States and education “Southern state” in the part of Austria, Bavaria, württemberg, Baden and Hungary, with its capital in Vienna. Active supporters of this option, for obvious reasons, was primarily the French, who assumed that such a Europe will return to their Imperial position in the time of Napoleon III.
Admit it when the Soviet Union with this option, calculated on the resumption of conflict between the South and the North of Germany, the history of postwar Europe might have been quite different. But it is unlikely that anyone in Moscow, and in 1970-71, he was thinking so far. The restoration of the Austro-Hungarian state under the influence of the United States, who occupied his troops in this part of Europe, probably, does not represent an attractive prospect. And Hungary, inherited the cost of huge losses, no one wasn't going to give. In General, the bird in the hand, as always, seemed preferable to pie in the sky. Victory day 9 may 1945, Stalin said that the Soviet Union “does not intend to dismember or destroy Germany”. Before that, our representative to the European Advisory Commission: F. Gusev informed the British that the decisions of the Crimea conference on the dismemberment of Germany should be used only if necessary as a means to exert pressure on the Germans.
The bird in our hands, which did not want to risk Stalin was primarily East Germany, the Soviet occupation zone. After all it covers one-third of post-war Germany and had a population of approximately 17 million people In its size and potential it is quite suited for the role of the friendly Soviet Union of the middle European States, if you negotiate with the allies about the fate of a unified Germany in the end would be impossible. But the London decision on cutting the occupation zones had one hidden flaw. Unlike Western countries, the Soviet Union full and undivided owner in the area was not. Berlin as the capital of Germany was divided into four sectors, three of which were occupied by Western powers, had a special quadripartite status, that is, was to be governed jointly. The inconvenience of this situation the Soviet Union soon began to feel more acutely and repeatedly tried to squeeze the Western powers out of Berlin. The success of these attempts had not. And West Berlin was turned into an increasingly painful thorn in the body of the GDR, as they said then, was “the cheapest atomic bomb of the West”, the “toe”, which he stuck in the door of the Soviet possessions in Europe and did not allow her to close all the years of the cold war.
To create the two German States on the site of the collapsed Reich took a lot of time. Already on 8 may 1949 the Parliamentary Council, meeting in Bonn approved the draft of the Basic law (Constitution), which came into force on 22 may 1949, which was the official date of formation of West Germany. 7 October of the same year was the GDR, the Constitution of which was adopted on may 29-30 at the III German people's Congress.
At the head of the GDR stood German Communists United into one party with the social Democrats of the East zone. President of the GDR and was elected a Communist Wilhelm Pieck and Prime Minister — known social Democrat Otto Grotewohl. The head of Germany was Christian Democrat, an ardent anti-Communist, the former chief burgomaster of Cologne, the 73-year-old Konrad Adenauer, who was the head of the West German government until 1963 and is considered its founding father. The first President of Germany was elected as the representative of the German liberals, the free Democrat Theodor Heuss.
If the rise to power in East Germany the Communists were pre-programmed and predictable, the appearance of the figure of Adenauer requires some explanation. The fact that after the defeat of 1945 in the Western zones of occupation, resumed its activities or re-constituted itself a party of the SPD, the KPD, the Christian Democrats, liberals, etc. Their first impulse was to disassociate themselves not only from Nazism, but also from the aggressive Imperial traditions of German policy, to declare the search for new ways of development, to open a “new page” in the history of the Germans. The social Democrats led by Schumacher advocated a policy of neutrality, nationalization of large enterprises and planned economy, in short, for a middle way between West and East, for the United States of Europe, for “a socialist Germany in a socialist Europe”. The first leaders of the CDU Kaiser and Lemmer was going to build a “Christian socialism” and also advocated the transfer of large property in the hands of the people, state control over common areas of production, constructive cooperation with the Soviet Union and the implementation of the Potsdam agreements. They believed that Germany should play a neutral role, to be a “bridge” between the West and the East tried to find a “synthesis” between bourgeois and socialist ideas.
All these starry-eyed dreams, under pressure from occupying powers was soon discarded, and their speakers are marginalized.
German hopes to become a bridge between West and East and in this way quickly to restore the unity of the country in terms of the growing confrontation of the three powers with the Soviet Union was doomed. From the Germans was different: to stand firm on the side of their new masters, and not to invent third ways. The most suitable conductor such policy, the Americans seemed to Adenauer (the British at first drove him from his post as mayor of Cologne in connection with the service unusable). He, in turn, believed that, standing unconditionally on the side of the Western powers in their struggle with the Soviet Union and at the time of abandoning the unity of Western Germany will be able to successfully manage their economic, political and social recovery, regain sovereignty, and then turn to the solution of the national question and the revival of its role as a leading European power.
Adenauer suggested not to look for new ways, and to try to gradually return to normal. His slogan was: “No experiments!”. This choice did West Germany agreed to follow the Chancellor and his program. The country began diligently to work to rebuild their forces, announced the best friends and allies of their Western winners, tried to establish the closest relations with his old enemy and rival in Europe — France, for a time “forgot” about national politics, saying that now has only one policy — European, and the Germans, they say, don't feel like the Germans because suddenly completely turned to the “Europeans”.
At the same time Germany, however, did not fail to indicate that has claims in Eastern Europe. She wanted to restore the German state in the borders of 1937, did not recognize the border with Poland at the Oder — Neisse line, the loss of East Prussia and the Sudetenland. And, of course, she did not recognize the GDR and was willing to pursue its elimination by all available means.
It was a policy which aims to ensure that by relying on the West to the East take revenge for losing the second world war, albeit with the caveat that this revenge was meant to carry out by peaceful means. This noble gesture, however, is not so much cost: power tools to achieve this are emerging new Reich has not yet been. But Adenauer he tried several times to find them, in particular, getting to a nuclear weapon. This zeal seemed excessive even to the new friends of Germany in the West, which in 1962 considered for the benefit of all to dismiss the bursting of the atomic bomb Minister of defence of Germany — then still quite young Strauss.
Characteristically, around the plants of this foreign policy doctrine, as in the history of Germany before, soon there is a consensus of political parties represented in the Bundestag. They, of course, formally to any revenge is not sought. God forbid! They just re-fought for freedom and democracy, again, resisted and rejected authoritarian Russia, this time in the Soviet Union. But the result was to be the restoration of the positions lost by Germany in Central and Eastern Europe. This was understood as if by default. Nobody was supposed to suspect Germany self-interest and attempts to revise the results of losing the war.
It is clear that adenauerallee Germany was a constant threat to the positions of the Soviet Union in Europe. This threat Moscow tried again and again to neutralize. This seemed to be an effective tool, the use of which Moscow was varied depending on the specific situation. Its essence was to try to exchange the reunification of Germany for her neutrality.
The calculation was not so illusory. Germany has always been strong, even very strong nationalism. We tried to deploy it against the three Western powers stranglehold clinging to Germany to knock through the national card West Germany from the system of military, political and economic unions, which quickly created at the time of the United States. In Washington understood the danger of such visits Moscow. The perfect antidote saw there the keeping power of Adenauer that linked the three powers according to the testimony of the late Vice-Chairman of the SPD Venus — agreement not to accept any offers of Moscow and East Berlin reunification, the preference to national unity and membership of the FRG in the Western Alliance.
It is considered that the role of personality in history is relative. If objective conditions dictate a decision, supposedly for its adoption and implementation, the personality is always there. Only it's not so simple. Historical development never proceeds clearly, following a clearly visible line. There is always an alternative or several alternatives, and the choice of the path depends on the Manager. It depends on where events will go. Without Lenin there would be no October revolution, the decrees on land and peace, the Brest peace, the NEP, and it is highly likely it would be something else. Without Stalin there would be no reprisals 30-h years, but there would be no industrialization, cultural revolution victory in 1945. No Adenauer, most likely, there would be no rejection of the Soviet proposals on national reunification of Germany and turning it into a neutral state. In any case, with regard to Austria, this scheme worked perfectly in 1955.
The proposal for the neutralization of Germany was made by the Soviet Union in his famous note of 10 March 1952. To this day the debate continues whether these suggestions are made seriously, not bluffing Stalin. The Soviet note was a bold and unexpected step which could appeal not only to the West side, but, probably, the leadership of the GDR. The first decided that the Soviet Union aims to disrupt the connection of Germany to NATO and the future of the EEC. Second, of course, quickly realized that under certain conditions the Soviet Union would be willing to abandon just proclaimed the GDR.
The West rejected the Soviet proposals without consideration. High commissioners of the three powers in Germany the next day after their appearance have announced that they will continue to act as if no Soviet note was not. Hastened to declare the inadmissibility of the Soviet proposals and Adenauer. As he wrote later Brandt, the Chancellor did not want to understand their essence and perceive them as a nuisance. Any perturbation law-abiding and in the mass anti-Soviet-minded of Germans about what happened in their eyes, the abandonment of national unity followed. They were willing to continue in the Wake of adenaueralle policy “from a position of strength”, seeking reunification by confrontation with the Soviet Union and the GDR.
This was clearly demonstrated in June 1953, when an attempt was made to support performances by unhappy construction workers in the GDR, in this order from West Berlin, and then spread the unrest in the whole country. Moscow realized that the three Western powers and the FRG is not only not going to seek compromise with the Soviet Union on the path to creation of a neutral Germany, but obviously relied on it to expel the Soviet Union from its part of Germany. These days was established by Adenauer and the task is to shake off Yalta and Potsdam without concluding a peace Treaty. Why he was needed in Germany? Only would impose on it all sorts of unpleasant limitations.
Directing his note to 1952, the Soviet Union was hardly bluffing. From such detailed and far-reaching proposals, Moscow would be hard to give up, admit the West to accept them. Moreover, each step in the chain of their implementation — carrying out all-German elections, the creation of an all-German government, the convening of an international conference to consider the draft peace Treaty would be the exit point, the return from which would be very difficult. If there was a calculation, then only that Adenauer and his Western mentors a note from a threshold rejected, than take the brunt of the blame for the division of Germany for many years. If this calculation is not justified, it would have to implement their suggestions, and Stalin knew it. Prepared together with this note Beria V. S. Semenov was told that a few days after sending it he lived in the extreme tension. “It was not clear where it eventually will turn and you do not have to sit in the Lubyanka. And then there was some kind of indifference — remember how many comrades have suffered before me. Well, added to them and me. What? However, the old man Adenauer did not disappoint. Arrived exactly as predicted by our intelligence. Then you can breathe a sigh of relief”.
However, with the idea to exchange a GDR for the neutralization of Germany, Moscow was worn for some time. Arrived in the GDR in the beginning of 1953, Ambassador Semenov admitted that he had definite instructions from Beria. Berlin has been a group known to security officers of international, including those already known to us, the Zoe resurrection-Rybkin, the tasks which were easy to guess. All cards, however, completely confused by the Berlin putsch of June 17, 1953. If the plans of Moscow and was still something to negotiate with the West on Germany, in these plans certainly wasn't to allow using of the coup simply to expel the us from East Germany and nothing to pay. Intervened military, strikes in the GDR was suppressed, and the KGB team withdrawn. Beria was arrested along with his closest associates. Ulbricht sighed with relief. The GDR could now proceed to the construction of socialism. The question of reunification, it became clear, were removed from the agenda by both parties.
Began a period of intense positional struggle for Germany, which ran almost to the end of the twentieth century. This struggle, wanted or not wanted the great powers, objectively led to a rapid restoration of political weight and power yet split into the two parts of Germany. The Soviet Union and the West diligently competed with each other, helping the Germans in this matter. The West is a historical competition gradually won, as was to ensure the best preconditions — economic, cultural, and advocacy. The Soviet Union gradually lost, yielding to the West in all these areas. But to realize its benefits, the West nevertheless for decades could not — interfere with the equality of forces with the USSR in the military field. This was the defining moment that ensured the preservation of the status quo in the German Affairs, polupodzemny inviolability of borders and the maintenance of the schism of the German nation.
Rotate by bringing together
The twists and turns of this competition are well known. Written about them hundreds, maybe thousands of books, films, theatrical plays. In this abundance of information — true and false — is often lost, and sometimes deliberately obscured the essence of the unfolding process. Let us therefore follow at least some basic dotted line.
In September 1955, the FRG established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The initiative in this matter formally came from Moscow, which on 7 June via the German Embassy in Paris sent a note to Bonn from Adenauer to visit the Soviet Union and normalize relations between the two countries. For this reason, it is customary to portray the incident as some sort of victory of the initiative of Soviet policy over the obstinate and inflexible in its revanchist dreams Adenauer. At first, he supposedly didn't want to go, then rowed in Moscow, demanding to grant the Germans the right to self-determination and wanted to leave, but Khrushchev showed him the “gruel” and strongly warned that the entry of Germany into NATO “will close in the future ways of solving the German question”. I won realism, an agreement was reached about the restoration of diplomatic relations without any conditions, but the Soviet side has shown magnanimity and released in Germany for the last 10 thousand prisoners of war and about 20 thousand civilians, we are serving punishment for war crimes and other sins. In fact, why they were more needed? And so we kind gesture made, and the number of its agents in West Germany increased.
In reality, no real hope to persuade the Kremlin to give East Germany from Adenauer could not be. It is, as they say, was simply carrying out in Moscow the mandatory exercises on this topic, and then calmly agreed on why, in fact, come exchanged embassies with us and at the same time, rescued their prisoners. Relations with the USSR was necessary bonno primarily to improve their status, gaining greater freedom of arms in international Affairs and consolidate the international isolation of the GDR. She three powers, in contrast to the Soviet Union to recognize German, no diplomatic relations were not established, thereby stressing the inferiority of the socialist German state. Moreover, after returning to Bonn, Adenauer immediately declared a broad program of further discrimination of the GDR, known as the “doctrine of Hallstein” (state Secretary of the German foreign Ministry). Its essence was to ensure that Germany threatened to impose sanctions up to the rupture of diplomatic relations to any government that would dare to recognize the GDR.
During these years, Germany went to great strides to achieving its goal of becoming international pariah, despised by the international community for the crimes of the Second world war, full member of the community of Western States. May 5, 1955 in connection with the entry into force of the Paris agreements it has received from the hands of the three powers in full sovereignty, became a member of NATO and the WEU, restored the German Ministry of defence, regained the Saar region, introduced conscription and began the creation of the Bundeswehr, became a member of the EEC and of Euratom and banned the Communist party. Lieutenant General of the Bundeswehr Speidel in April 1956, took up the prestigious post of commander of land forces of NATO in Europe.
However, these successes in the West had negative long-term plans of the German side. The response was rapid integration of the GDR in the socialist camp. She held her reception in the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, was proclaimed its full sovereignty, it was recognized as Yugoslavia and Cuba, while Germany and ripped in retaliation of the relations with these countries. The ditch that separated the Germans was deepened, and the GDR thanks to the generous Soviet aid was a major industrial state, was actively implemented on the Soviet market and the markets of Eastern Europe, and also began to make rather serious competition to Germany in the markets of developing countries. Of course, in many cases, the level of East German products were lower than West German, but there are often high West German level is not required, and the prices and conditions of export credits “expensive” Germany could not compete with the GDR.
In addition to all these troubles the doctrine of Hallstein turned into a trap for the German strategic plans which, of course, was to return to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, i.e. the traditional areas of German influence and colonization. Remember Bismarck's words: “My Africa is Europe!” Think of Hitler: “Germany has no living space in the West. It is in the East.”
But as a result of the doctrine of Hallstein the way back to Germany was closed. In subsequent years, when Germany decided to reconsider and abandon this doctrine, it turned out that the Soviet Union and the GDR vigilantly to Bannu was not allowed to establish relations with States of the Warsaw Pact until, until he will refuse requirements of the revision of the postwar in Europe. Attempts of Germany to exercise economic pressure on the Soviet Union (a well-known story of the rejection of contracts for the supply of pipes for our pipelines) were not successful. The promises of the Western powers, the data for the Paris agreements to help Germany achieve the reunification turned out to be paper returns. Moreover, in Bonn could not understand that neither France nor England is in fact no reunion don't want to, fearing the excessive strengthening of Germany and the possibility of its exit from-under control. In this respect, a typical were the statements of the French Minister of culture Malraux, who later became attributed to de Gaulle that the French love so much Germany that prefer to have not one, but two Germany.
In General, reduced as a result of the Potsdam and education of the socialist GDR adenaueralle state lacked power to implement the planned programme to restore the position of the Reich. 10 November 1958, Khrushchev attempted to move in a new offensive in the German question, publicly demanding that the Soviet-Polish friendship between three powers to start the negotiations on a peace Treaty with Germany with the participation of representatives of the two German States and to liquidate the occupation regime in West Berlin. It was proposed to turn into an “independent political unit” — a free city.
The meaning of this step was obvious — to ensure international recognition of the GDR, to consolidate the division of Germany, and to obtain international guarantees of its new, actually existing external borders, to neutralize West Berlin “atomic bomb” in the center of the GDR. The most important lever for the implementation of this program was designed to provide West Berlin, entirely independent in the exercise of its ties with Germany from the transit communications GDR. Its existence for a long time and greatly annoyed us, since the city essentially was an open gate for the departure of East Germans to the West. At certain moments the number of refugees reached 30 thousand per month. The economic and political life of the GDR because of this was constantly in a state of unstable equilibrium, which is supported by all major new infusions of material and financial resources from the Soviet Union and the imposing presence of the Soviet troops. Khrushchev was tired of putting up with this situation and he decided to try to turn West Berlin from springboard for an attack on Soviet positions in Europe, a burden for the West. In private conversations during those dramatic months, he liked to say, revealing the palm of his hand, in West Berlin, the Soviet Union holds the FRG and the three powers for their manhood: I want press so that they light not vzvidit and any agreement will be ready to sign.
Despite the extreme aggravation of the international situation caused by the initiatives of the Soviet Union in the German Affairs, the West side of the concessions did not go. Crisis, in the end, was resolved by the construction of the Berlin wall on 13 August 1961. In fact it was a confirmation of the previous position in German Affairs, and a concrete wall as if symbolizing that there is no hope for his review nor the Western nor the Eastern side. Closing the border in Berlin was perceived in Germany as a heavy blow to the entire commitment to date policy in the German question. All saw that the allies did not take any measures to counter this step of the Soviet Union and the GDR. Moreover, the construction of the wall was regarded with relief — because it meant that the Soviet Union withdraw its demand for the immediate conclusion of a peace Treaty with two German States and refusing from the plans of turning West Berlin into a free city. To fight for the unity of Germany, the West is clearly not going to.
Undertaken via West Berlin, which at the time the rules of the social Democrat Brandt, attempts to bring the situation to such a pitch, that the four powers “in the interests of its own security” had to meet the requirements of the West Berlin Senate and the German government and to remove the wall, came to nothing. To continue the policy of recreating a United Germany was clearly a need for other methods than those used so far Adenauer.
The elderly Chancellor in 1963 dismissed, however, the transition to a new Eastern policy did not happen immediately. The CDU, represented by Chancellor Erhard, and then Chancellor Kiesinger some time to maneuver, clinging to the policies of Adenauer, and was involved in these manoeuvres of the social Democrats. Turn in East German politics came only in 1969, when came to power the coalition of social Democrats and liberals led by Brandt.
By the time it became clear that the use of force to open the road to the East, not only futile, but also counterproductive. In March 1962, the national Council of National front of the GDR has produced a document “the Historical task of the GDR and Germany's future”, in which it was announced that the socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG cannot be combined. In August 1968, Soviet troops crushed the “Prague spring,” Dubcek. The solution to their strategic questions, as he began to understand in Bonn, it was necessary to look at ways of discharge, not refusing, however, from their fundamental goals.
The way to do it, offered a Bar, a close friend of Brandt, who was destined to play an important role in the relations of Germany with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Bar did not come up with anything new (remember the French joke about the Germans, renovate your “Mercedes”). He just adapted one of the traditional methods of German policy in relations with Russia to the realities of the second half of the twentieth century. When Germany failed to make Russia a desirable either through economic pressure or military means, she tried to bring mine under Russia from the inside. So it was in 1917, tried to act the Germans during the great Patriotic war.
In 1963 a Bar was offered to go to the rapprochement with the Soviet Union, it is possible to remove the separated state the disputed issues, develop the maximum political, economic, cultural and other ties and contacts between people. For what? To achieve such a gradual change of the internal situation in the USSR, GDR and other socialist countries, when there began the reform would lead to the fact that the Communists with their hands dismantled their structure and position in the international arena. This policy convergence has been called “Wandel durch Applied” that we, with the light hand of the then counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin Bielecki, translated as “rotating through rapprochement”. In fact, the German word “wandel” does not mean a sudden sharp turn, and involves the gradual accumulation of changes that lead to a specific result.
With hindsight, the question should be, probably, translated as “restructuring through rapprochement”. But the Bar, of course, could not dream then of the appearance at the head of the Union of such figures as Gorbachev, and thought a more modest categories. Anyway, in one of the conversations after 2000, the Bar admitted that, from a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, he had in mind the disastrous consequences for the Soviet Union that began in 1991 and continued in subsequent years.
I think that it wasn't out of mere politeness. Rapprochement with the Soviet Union meant not only the decay and absorption of the GDR and the liberalization of the domestic regime in our country is one thing, but the possibility to rely on a friendly Soviet Union to restore the role of Germany as an independent force in the world. But after a disorderly flight of the Soviet Union from Europe, and then collapse in the Bialowieza forest, a United Germany was not one to rely on in the East. Contrary to the calculations of the Bars, she remained clad in the same system of geopolitical coordinates. However, it is not alone. After the Bialowieza forest the French, with such aplomb proclaimed under de Gaulle that goes from NATO's military organization and want to create an independent Europe, with rushed life-saving under the canopy of the Alliance. Without the USSR the balance of power in Europe broke, and to remain alone with the newly United Germany France no longer wanted.
How was the attitude of Moscow to the concept of “turning through rapprochement” and its ideologues Brandt and Bar to power in Germany? Very positive. The willingness of Germany to accept, as I thought then, post-war realities and to draw a line under adenauerstr period of hostile confrontation with the Soviet party hoped to use in order to finally cement the Soviet position in Europe. To have a partner of not one, but two German States meant to get more leverage on the international situation and the development of political processes in Europe. The thought of collaboration with the Germans and the possibilities that open to us (for the umpteenth time) again sweetly dizzy. Moscow is going to lead the construction of a “new European house” without asking Europeans if he needed it, enthusiastically spoke about the various stupidities of the architecture of the house, number of floors, roles, partitions that do not share the more people and at the same time allowing each of them to live comfortably in their national apartment, a large European family.
On the strategic goals you set yourself German Eastern policy, closely coordinated with the United States and the Alliance responded with a smile. In fact, who could then in the USSR to think that the CPSU will begin to destroy itself and the Soviet system? If the Bar, Brandt and another ideologist of convergence of Austrian Chancellor Kreisky had to cover such an ambitious slogans its inevitable capitulation to Soviet policy, to stop them had no meaning. What would the child have anything he wants... It must be beyond doubt that socialism has been established for centuries, not to mention the fact that there was no force in the world, able to crush the Soviet Union.
The then social-democratic leadership of Germany had to work hard and compete with opposition parties in the Bundestag to convince the political class of West Germany that the partnership with the Soviet Union and normalization of relations with the GDR does not mean refusal of struggle for the revival of a greater Germany, and give it a breath of life out of the impasse in which she found herself.
12 August 1970, during the visit of Brandt to Moscow, was signed the famous Treaty for a long time after that mentioned in Soviet speeches and official documents with the prefix “historic”. Engaging in negotiations with the Soviet side for the elaboration of this Treaty, the German government has offered to reduce its content to the mutual renunciation of the use of force. Actually, this is a basic understanding of Bonn fact, the Moscow Treaty did not change after it is signed and difficult ratification, which took place on 17 may 1972. However, during negotiations, Germany had to go step by step to the satisfaction of many, as it seemed, a very significant requirements of the Soviet side on certain issues.
There were several reasons. First of all, U.S. policy during the reign of President Nixon has been oriented to discharge in the sense that the world recognized is divided in two and established spheres of influence, where it is not supposed to meddle other side. For that part of the world that had not yet been divided, and it was mainly the third world countries, can be overcome, however, while retaining control over the conflict so that they do not lead to a direct confrontation of the two superpowers. The policy of Germany in Europe had to reproduce this tacit agreement “in German language”.
Another important point was the fact that after the construction of the Berlin wall, the Soviet Union continued the line to build pressure on West Berlin. Formally recognizing the rights of the three powers in the Western sectors of the city, the Soviet side, first, they demanded strict adherence to harsh laws, decisions and orders of the occupation, which long ago lost its power in the FRG and the GDR, and secondly, it was insisted that the three powers were expelled from West Berlin Germany and its organs. As soon as the three powers to justify its presence in West Berlin, referred to the fact that they as occupiers carry out there is the Supreme power, no basis for claims of Germany to consider this city as one of its lands and to exercise acts of sovereignty, like the meetings of the Bundestag and elections of the President, government meetings, etc.
Attempts of Germany to insist on maintaining the same dissemination practices de facto its sovereignty in this city have lead to new complications on communications, which linked West Berlin with West Germany. The protests of the three powers remained without result: for the quadripartite agreement, the Soviet Union had certain obligations in terms of access to West Berlin of the allied forces. As for the West Germans, there are no commitments to them, the Soviet Union did not accept. Transit to West Berlin was in the hands of the GDR, which soon introduced a visa for travel there and back, began the inspection on communications of transit cargo under the pretext of fighting smuggling of military goods prohibited by law allied to production in Germany. The FRG and the three powers, refused the recognition of the GDR and formal contact with her, he found himself in a difficult, not to say stupid position. With the GDR, they did not wish to speak, the Soviet Union refused to speak with them on matters concerning the competence of the GDR. As admitted later Brandt, the West Berlin situation was continuously deteriorating and the effective means to counter further developments in this direction at the FRG and the three powers were not.
To ensure the safety and viability of West Berlin was required for urgent talks. From the outset, Bonn insisted on violent conjunction between the Moscow Treaty and the quadripartite agreement on Berlin. Signed to our great joy, the Moscow Treaty, as it was immediately explained to Brezhnev Brandt, could not be approved by the Bundestag without a satisfactory solution on West Berlin. If Moscow wanted an agreement with Germany, she had to give way in Berlin's Affairs itself and be forced to make serious concessions of the GDR.
The carrot was hung in front of our noses, was so sweet and longed for, that the Soviet leadership is not something that was ready to concede anything at the quadripartite talks in Berlin, but in a pinch were going to do to give West Berlin Germany guts, declaring it Federal land. Brezhnev was terrified of failure of ratification of the Moscow Treaty, which was essentially his first major foreign policy success and evidence of the scale as a statesman of international class. “In no event it is impossible to prevent the failure of the Moscow Treaty, said on the eve of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, his assistant I. A. Blatov. — You represent, than it can threaten the Secretary-General on the Plenum? Then me and you (that is executives) will not find it!”
In the end, the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin of September 3 1971 was signed. The wall in Berlin, the allies and Germany was not removed, but they received guarantees smooth and virtually uncontrolled civil transit to West Berlin and it opened for West Berlin residents the opportunity to revisit the GDR, preserved, albeit in abbreviated form, the presence of Germany in this city, we got our recognition of the right of the FRG to represent West Berlin in international Affairs. The GDR, of course, were all in this reluctantly and only under great pressure from the Soviet side. The bait that was intended to justify political and moral costs of the return of West Berlin to its role as a “festering boil” on the body of the GDR, was the establishment of official relations with Germany on the level of permanent representative offices (not the Embassy!), and the admission of both German States to the UN.
Happy and other European socialist countries. 7 December 1970 the Treaty was signed Germany with Poland, which although had no border with Germany, attached great importance to Bonn reaffirmed the inviolability of borders at the Oder—Neisse line. After a long trade of Germany agreed to recognize the “void” the Munich agreement and restored relations with Czechoslovakia. Were allowed to establish diplomatic relations with Germany, the Hungarians and the Bulgarians, have long longed for this. In short, it seemed that Soviet foreign policy could celebrate a great victory. A. A. Gromyko at a meeting of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of foreign Affairs spoke about the victory about in these terms: “we gave the West Germans? Nothing we didn't give them that have. But strengthened its position in Europe and the position of our friends. Once plowed a deep furrow along the Elbe river (where the border between the FRG and the GDR), and finally screw the lid of the coffin to claims of Germany to revise the post-war device of Europe.”
But screw you, and screw and if, finally? It's only been 20 years, time by historical standards, quite short, and the coffin lid opened again. Looking back, I must admit that coming to Moscow, the euphoria of the Moscow Treaty was, to put it mildly, excessive and turned out to be short-sighted. It became increasingly clear with each new year, held after its conclusion. However, to say it out loud was not supposed to. “Historical” the Moscow Treaty was to remain on a high pedestal, that whatever is said or done in Bonn for its gradual demagnetization and intensify attempts to prepare the collapse of the GDR and the position of the Soviet Union in Europe. For us good relations with Germany turned into a kind of a goal for which the Soviet side was ready to make further concessions. It was called “prevent loosening” of the Moscow Treaty.
The cornerstone of this agreement was considered to be an agreement on the “inviolability” of borders. The Soviet Union wanted a guarantee of the inviolability of his position in Europe. In fact, the wording on the “inviolability” was court ploy of Russian diplomats, who wanted to please an inaccurate translation of the hopes of the leadership of the Kremlin, nor in any foreign language, not spoken. The German text says that borders are “unverletzlich”, that is, will not be violated in the context of mutual renunciation of the use of force. And nothing more. At a time when the Berlin wall fell and then the Soviet Union itself, from the Moscow Treaty, the Soviet Union was not any good. No stability in Europe he is, however, built on this basis, in 1975, the Helsinki Final act did not provide and could not provide. Not he brought to the inviolability of the postwar. Triumph of the West German policy of revision of results of world war II and the destruction of the Yalta and Potsdam and not Soviet policy of preservation of the status quo.
On the way to the fall of the GDR
The day Germany was closer as I could. The main direction of its attack on the Soviet positions were in the GDR. Forced to go on a partial normalization of state relations with her, Germany made the most of detente between the two German States to enhance its influence on the population of East Germany, development of human contacts, entangle GDR economic ties and financial obligations. Emphasis to relatively high living standards in the GDR was heavily dependent on the goodwill of Germany to the GDR leadership was forced to buy the well-being of East Germans and their loyalty to the regime, all the new political concessions in mergermania relations and the gradual withdrawal of Soviet policy in German Affairs.
This policy, contrary to popular belief, was not groundless. Erich Honecker, who replaced on a post of the head of the GDR Walter Ulbricht and did not enjoy in the Republic a comparable authority, aiming for a quick and conclusive success started with, which allowed the GDR to live beyond their means. In the years of his reign, the GDR began to consume more than it produces. Views Honecker began increasingly to turn to the West. Understanding permanent danger which threatened the GDR from the FRG, the leadership of the SED initially tried to obtain the missing commodity and financial funds in France, Japan and other leading capitalist countries. But the leadership of Germany quickly restored order in this matter. All trade, loans, technical and scientific cooperation with the GDR, Germany has closed on itself. The largest plants of the GDR, such as lane and Zeiss, soon could no longer operate without a supply of components from Germany. GDR borrowed in Western Germany, all new money, pledging instead to reconstruct the road and railway communications, which linked West Berlin with West Germany. Her control of these communications is increasingly a formality. The West Germans began unrestricted travel to East Germany and the GDR citizens, mostly of retirement age, the flows were directed to Germany. The contacts of the GDR with the FRG was in a cloud of increasingly thick veil of secrecy.
Accordingly, there was a steady cooling of relations between the GDR and the Soviet Union. The GDR leadership did not react to the warnings of Moscow, that his flirtation with Germany will end badly. Since the mid-70s years, it has increasingly acquired a taste for politics, suggesting an increase in the weight and independence of the GDR in the socialist camp and the weakening of the binding to the Soviet Union, which was sarcastically critical. It was felt the desire to act as a kind of socialist Prussia, the major powers setting the tone in ideology, economic and cultural development and has, in addition, their particular face in international Affairs. Historical, cultural and political heritage of Prussia ostentatiously revived and promoted as the basis for a socialist East German state, clearly not wanting to be more rootless creation policy of the USSR. By the time of the collapse of the GDR in 1989, the ground for its state of collapse was quite prepared not only by the efforts of Germany, but the actions of the East German elite, increasingly break away from the real situation within the GDR and its possibilities in the international arena. This situation was the undoubted success of the West German policy of “turning through rapprochement”.
But in order to enable the centrifugal mechanism in the GDR and of the socialist camp, it was not enough just “convergence”. Needed to weaken the force that a solid Hoop clutched the socialist countries in a single space with the center in Moscow. And it was primarily a military force. Attempts to force the Soviet Union to unilaterally reduce their armaments and armed forces in Central Europe that had been made in Vienna since 1973, the results did not bring. Moreover, its superpower status and the inviolability of the spheres of influence of the Soviet Union provides not only conventional weapons, and above all the Soviet missile-nuclear shield.
In this area Bannu little Shine: talks of the USSR and the USA on strategic offensive nuclear weapons was limited only to fixing existing parity, as well as minor restrictions or prohibitions on outdated or unpromising types of these weapons. The task was to make the Soviet Union really substantial and unilateral reductions in its nuclear Arsenal with all the political and psychological consequences for the situation in Europe. Germany was in a hurry. She feared that to restore the unity of Germany in 30-50 years it will be almost impossible. The Soviet side in every way proved that in Germany comes from the existence of two States for two of the German nation. In this, as the events after the absorption of the GDR, was a lot of truth to it.
The Cabinet of Chancellor Schmidt, who succeeded the government of Brandt, decided to launch the offensive on the Soviet Union, almost seeking to stop its nuclear programs. Thus was triggered an international crisis. Brandt's successor, while not in the least embarrassed by the presence of a recently concluded with the USSR, the Moscow Treaty and the danger to spoil zapadnogermanskaya-Soviet relations, which, as a chicken egg, continued to be worn in Moscow. Using the fact that the Soviet Union was a planned replacement of obsolete medium-range missiles to new solid-fuel SS-20 (“pioneer”), the West Germans in 1978 in the form of an ultimatum demanded that the US and its other allies to get the repeal of this program, and in case of failure to deploy in Europe a new high-precision American nuclear missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union, including Moscow, 10-12 min. for medium-range Missiles in Europe, the US at the time did not have, the same who had earlier in Turkey, agreed to remove in the context of agreements with the Soviet Union to overcome the Cuban crisis. Using the coming to power in the U.S. “hawk” Reagan, Germany showed great persistence to win the support of the U.S. and then seek adoption, and all NATO decisions, meaning an attempt to break the existing balance of power in Europe for this type of weapons. It is significant that in case of refusal of the allies to support Germany, it threatened to violate the Paris agreement and to begin production of its own cruise missiles of the appropriate class.
Around the issue of so-called “rearmament” NATO American medium-range missiles sparked a serious political struggle that caused the massive antiwar protests in Germany and ultimately led to the fall of Schmidt, having lost the support of his party. However, the initiative of Schmidt had far-reaching consequences, serving as the detonator of the extreme aggravation of relations between the USSR and the USA. After the breakdown of negotiations in November 1983 and the beginning of the deployment of American missiles as they approached the critical point.
The parish in 1985 in the Soviet Union to power, Gorbachev did not immediately lead to attenuation and resolution of the conflict. At first, Gorbachev was not inclined to make unilateral concessions to Reagan and West Germans. However, entangled in their ill-conceived reforms in the country, he soon began to look for face-saving at the expense of ostentatious “success” in foreign policy, especially in matters of arms reduction, suggesting that the stock is defensive strength of the Soviet Union is so great that the interests of the country will not suffer from disproportionate concessions to the Americans and NATO. Soon the last General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee surrendered to the Americans not only medium-range missiles, but also tactical missiles, ordered to drastically unbalanced reduction of Soviet forces in Europe, spoke about the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, etc. of the Case in the Soviet Union were getting worse. Confusion in the capitals of the Warsaw Pact increased. Pressure from the West increased.
I was approaching the interchange. No one in Germany, however, did not anticipate that it will come so quickly and that the collapse is so radical. During visits to the USSR of German President von weizsäcker in July 1987, and Chancellor Kohl next year, and then to the arrival in Germany of Gorbachev in the summer of 1989, West Germans are quietly accepting the thesis that the German national question it is necessary to provide to solve the story and that reunification is not true in the next 50 or even 100 years. No 50 or 100 years, of course, was not satisfied, but also opportunities for the upcoming liquidation of the GDR they had not seen. Main the West German “hawk”, the Bavarian Prime Minister Strauss, I remember, said before his flight to Moscow in December 1987, that the best solution would be the transformation of the GDR into a kind of neutral Austria. Shortly before that, in September, Kohl took the official visit of Erich Honecker, spreading before him the red carpet and hanging the flags of the GDR along with flags of Germany. Nevertheless, the GDR soon became, and the Soviet Union had to withdraw from Europe. What happened was the fruit of active effort of Germany, the tandem Kohl—Genscher. They managed to grab the coattails flying past them fortune. The ability to do it bequeathed to German politicians all the same great “friend of Russia” Otto von Bismarck.
The moment of truth
The rustle of these tails of fortune in Bonn suddenly caught in the late summer of 1989, when the German delegation arrived still nominally socialist Hungary. The Hungarian leadership throughout the post-war history was engaged in some mysterious reforms that were failing every time, but gave grounds again and again to contact us for emergency economic assistance. This assistance Hungarians regularly and generously “rolled”, after which their heads were crying with emotion, along with Brezhnev, and we swore eternal friendship until the next failure. In 1989, the Hungarians again experimented, this time on the subject of market economy and got game. Their economy was on the verge of collapse, and in Bonn they were to ask of loan, because the Soviet Union is the result of restructuring was already insolvent. They had something to offer in return bonno — betrayal of the GDR. They promised to open its border with Austria to thousands of holidaymakers from the GDR were able to escape to the West. In this way, the Hungarians offered the West Germans a “hole” of the Berlin wall, to unseat the GDR and wanted to get it for billion West German marks. This billion was given to them.
It is difficult to judge, I did this step in advance of the Hungarians Moscow, and if you did, I understand its far-reaching implications. Now all involved say that the Hungarians and the Soviet Union were not consulted, not to mention the GDR. She was immediately in a difficult position. To close the trip to Hungary was possible, but it never would give, as in Hungary, the GDR citizens could then penetrate the other socialist countries, between them operated a visa-free regime. Retreating from all countries of the Warsaw Pact a new wall, the GDR leadership could not.
The Kremlin's influence on the Hungarians refused. Feeling the weakness, the West Germans began to take to their Embassy in the socialist countries, and hundreds of thousands of GDR citizens seeking political asylum, and then to demand their unrestricted emigration to the West. In such provocative operations involved senior political and public figures of Germany, including foreign Minister Genscher, West Germany. The Soviet Union re-occupied the position of an ostrich, preferring to bury your head in the sand and declaring the unfolding conflict in the case of the GDR and the respective socialist countries. The situation in the GDR quickly escalated, and arrived in Berlin in October 1989 at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the GDR, Gorbachev added fuel to the fire, demonstrating his sympathy with anti-government demonstrations and accusing the leadership of the GDR in rigidity and unwillingness to reform socialism following the example of the Soviet perestroika. “Those who are late — pointedly said Gorby, punishing life.”
Finally lost my head and pressurises the leadership of the GDR in the end was forced on 9 November to open the border to West Berlin. The Berlin wall fell, after which the question of the death of the GDR was effectively a foregone conclusion. Deprived of support from the Soviet Union, she had started to bleed due to the resumption of the mass Exodus of its citizens to the West, or to collapse under pressure from the opposition and sharply intensified in the GDR, West Germans. The Soviet leadership very late understood the meaning of what happened. During the several months it was in the illusions about the possibility of maintaining “democratized” in perestroika the model of the socialist GDR, headed “updated” guide. Convinced at last that the situation goes uncontrollably out of control, rushed to rescue what could still be saved by connecting to the negotiations and decision-making on liquidation of the GDR and its accession to West Germany.
The reunification of Germany took place 3 October 1991. What was it? The result of a pre-deliberate action or the result of circumstances which developed contrary to the initial calculations and the wishes of the Soviet leadership? If you believe Gorbachev and Shevardnadze and Yakovlev, the idea of the inevitability of reunification has dawned upon them at the very beginning of perestroika. Probably not, or not really, since the reunification, how they got it, they hardly wanted. Rather, it is an attempt to seem smarter than it really is. The reality was more banal. Restructuring has brought to life a force that simply could not cope its initiators and “foremen”. This concerns not only German Affairs, but more extensive and crucial for Russia, questions.
Whether the reunion is the result of well-calculated and deliberate actions of the West? In the long-term strategic plan, perhaps, Yes. In tactical, short-term plan — no. Of course, the West more than 50 years, as “our father” repeated in the statements and communiqués that the German people should regain the right to self-determination in freedom, and when it happened, I began to perk up and heroically to stick out the chest. But it is useful in this context to recall that when 18 November 1989, i.e. several days after the fall of the Berlin wall, Chancellor Kohl at a dinner with heads of EU governments decided — against the advice of Bush — to quote one of the joint communiqué of the 70-ies, which stated the obligations of the West to support the reunification of Germany, I heard in response from Mrs Thatcher: “Yes! But we did write this when I thought that the reunion would never happen.” Yes, and the Kohl, which is then recorded in Bismark XX century, after the fall of the wall was rushing every week changing their views, strategy and tactics. At first he thought of no more than about empowering the travel of GDR citizens to the West, then on a new cooperation agreement with the GDR, then on loose Confederation with her. The fact that the Soviet Union would simply allow him to swallow the GDR, he could not at first and hope!
Freedom didn't last too long
Russia for 15 years, is dealing with a United Germany. During this time there ruled and black, pink and green, and now pink and black, with little difference in volume for Russia was not. Germany has maintained an Alliance with the Anglo-Saxon powers, which still plays a subordinate role, and the Alliance with France, where posing as a humble slave, but actually is a leading. Some of these “special” relationship she has with Russia, in spite of all made on the eve of the reunification of the assurances on forever grateful the German people and the new era of German-Russian cooperation. This phenomenon is quite well known. After the first unification of Germany in 1871 Kaiser also wrote to the Russian Emperor that the memory of the position of Russia in relation to Germany will determine its policy towards Russia, “whatever happens” to a couple of years, as if nothing had happened, to explain gullible to Moscow that “German appreciation may not go so far to permanently dominate the German policy of the Russian policy”.
During the consideration of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in March 1991, the agreements on “the final settlement with respect to Germany” of “good neighbourliness, partnership and cooperation”, the development of large-scale cooperation in Economics, industry, science and technology etc. someone of the deputies asked the question, how viable are these contracts will not go away from Germany fulfil her obligations. Remember I said that every contract is a description of the correlation of forces of the parties at the time of its conclusion. This package of the German settlements, however, promises to be durable, as the Germans accept all the obligations of their own free will. It's not Versailles, and not Potsdam. So the question is whether to keep the Soviet Union his power, he will remain for the Germans respected partner. If someone decides to destroy the USSR (and similar conversations could be heard even then), no agreements with Germany can't help us. Germany will act according to circumstances. But most of the audience the idea of the collapse of the USSR seemed preposterous. The package of the German settlements on March 4, was ratified by an overwhelming majority.
However, the Soviet Union was destroyed. Yeltsin, Kravchuk, Shushkevich with the celebration of mad men told the world that the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a subject of international law, and its territory and wealth will be divided among the first secretaries of Republican Communist party, some of which managed to rename the presidents, and will they rule the Soviet Union as its feudal principalities or fiefdoms. If in the minds of German politicians to Belovezhskaya Pushcha the Soviet Union was drawn as a potential partner in the big political game for the revival of the former Germany's role in Europe and the world, after it he could only be presented as an object of development and use to their advantage.
If Russia itself is committed a second Brest-Litovsk or Versailles, and treat her now, the Germans could only respectively. However, to turn it fully prevented the USA and their other allies, to claim the lion's share in the section “the Soviet pie”. But the Germans hastened to take an active part in the General feasting, trying to grab what they could, and in the Baltic States, and Ukraine, and the Caucasus, and Central Asia. This was used as an alibi the sign of NATO, the sign of the EU. Say, we are very good and the Germans love Russia, but as the members of these unions can not participate in the collective action for the expansion of spheres of influence and possessions in the East. So don't blame me.
Reluctantly the leadership of Germany staged a hypocritical show with wires prematurely withdrawn from the GDR Soviet troops, with the participation of hammered drunk Russian President. Something else was said about German gratitude and partnership with Russia. After a couple of days in West Berlin, the Chancellor made a second is a real feast for the departure of the allied troops. There was proclaimed the victory of Germany and the three powers over the common enemy — the Soviet Union in the “cold war”. The duplicity of the German leadership made in those days embarrassed to curve many honest Germans knew perfectly well that received its unity from the hands of the Soviet Union, Germany ought not to care after their benefactors. Did not understand or unwilling to understand what was happening, perhaps, only the Russian “demise”, it is believed that the spittle fly in the face of Russia, and the hated “commies” and the Soviet Union, and their friendship — the Russian Democrats — with Germany now bloom with the most magnificent color. But disappointments were not long in coming.
United Germany not like to think about the treaties that led to its unity. She clearly wanted to behave as if any conditions or reservations related to its existence in its current form, was not there. There is no commitment that its territory shall continue to bear the world, there are no restrictions on the size of the army, there is no ban on weapons of mass destruction, in a word, there is nothing that would be forbidden Germany in comparison with other States. Any mention of these obligations you will not find in the speeches of German politicians, nor in the works of political scientists, historians, and public figures. Silence is quite meaningful. But there are arguments that Germany could not be bound by agreements with the “disappeared state” — the Soviet Union.
Germany completely forgot about those provisions that formed the basis of the “Big Treaty”. Any consultations with Russia regarding the many international crises that occurred after 1991, it has not led, and joint steps to overcome them with Moscow was not developed. The aggressive action of third States, such as the bombing of Yugoslavia, not only did not interfere, but actively supported them. Suffice it to recall the triumphant headlines of German Newspapers: “the German Luftwaffe over Belgrade again!” From the middle East peace process Russia, taking advantage of her weakness, of Germany demanded to throw away, replacing it with the German representatives. If not initiated, then at least actively supported all the decisions about the expansion of NATO and the EU, thus cementing the results of ousting Russia from Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union and seeking to return under the flag of NATO and Europe as the traditional regions of influence of the Reich in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. She leads together with the US and other NATO countries active further penetration in the former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine and the Caucasus, supports the policy of creating an anti-Russian cordon Sanitaire on our former lands. Continues in the framework of the EU policy of discrimination against Russian exports. The economic ties with Russia shows clear interest in gaining access to its energy, mineral resources and other natural resources, trying at the same time strongly inhibit the recovery and the development of processing industries associated with modern technology.
The policy of Germany towards Russia is nothing new, and therefore unexpected and all the more encouraging. All that we saw and experienced many times before, hoping that next time will be different. Will not! Will not be until then while Russia will gain power and will not force the Germans to look at yourself with different eyes. We forced them to do it. And this, too, and there will be nothing new. Just need to stop being idealized and demonized Germany and the Germans. Every time they do what you think is the most appropriate in a particular situation. And no more, how would we expect them to romantic feats and miracles for the sake of “special” relations with Russia. We do not expect any such thing from other people. So don't expect it from the Germans. It is true that the said Alexander III: Russia has no other true friends, except army and Navy. It seems to be true, but with the amendment in 1991, when our military left their country in the lurch.
Now Russia again afoot affair with Germany. Timid and unsure, but already generating some inflated expectations, and others excessive fears and concerns. Germany together with France refusing to follow the U.S. and Britain in their Iraqi adventure, object to such ventures in Korea and in Iran. She would like to reform NATO, turning it into a Union of States with an equitable Europe, which would, however, not under us, but under German-French leadership. To add weight to his action, the Germans along with the French took over the fashion for the species to consult with Russia, with satisfaction watching the circles, which differ thereafter, on the surface of the international swamp at the mere mention of the possibility of folding some of the Russian-French-German “triangle” as opposed to the overabundance in this swamp pretty annoying all the Anglo-Saxons.
But we should not deceive ourselves. The Alliance with the United States and the preservation of NATO, albeit with some adjustments in the balance of power within it, remain the cornerstone of German policy. Against the Iraqi, Korean, Iranian adventures she minds not just for the love of the world and not out of a sense of outraged justice, but because he considers it a distraction force on the decision of the Germans unnecessary tasks. Their Africa since Bismarck is, I repeat, Europe. They see absolutely no benefit to themselves to climb the mountains and the Sands of Iraq or start a war with the ayatollahs and Kim Jong Il. Russia is weak and the step-by-step moves to the Urals, is trying to buy off her upcoming all new economic and political concessions, Germany will have to move further East in Alliance with the United States and under the flags of NATO and Europe, to take without wars and conflicts that could not get either by force or cunning for centuries. This is truly exciting for the traditional German policy perspective.
Stop this movement, will run it into a brick wall of resistance— German view on the effectiveness of further Alliance with the US may change. Will change the attitude of Germany towards Russia, as it has happened many times in our history. This will not happen, so the Germans will take part with great pleasure in a further and final section of “Russian pie”. Earlier they thought to do it themselves, now agree to be a member of a collective team. Another is because it is not given.
From this it follows that the key to solving our problems in the international arena, primarily in relations with Germany, is not just anywhere, but in Russia. We have the fastest restoration of Russia as a great power in military, political, economic, information and cultural plan. Only it will allow to re-dot the “I” and to prevent the worst. Conducting any foreign policy only makes sense in order to create favorable conditions for the growth of the wealth and power of the country, to gain time for the achievement of this goal. If the domestic policy is not being directed to it, foreign policy is reduced to an empty vanity, dancing on the diplomatic parquet and antics in front of the cameras. The weakness of our current foreign policy is not the fault of the foreign service, although they are, of course, also make mistakes, but the lack of willingness and ability to concentrate forces and means on how to rise from knees and to get out of the pit into which Russia fell in 1991.
Looking back on the events of nearly a century and a half of our relations with Germany after the creation of the unified German state by Bismarck in 1870-71. of ways to interpret them. You can draw a line from one climax (in the positive sense of the word) to another, counting the failures and crises unfortunate episodes, deviations from the General trend of development of ascending. This optimistic view has many supporters. But the opposite point of view is quite popular.
As a rule, in good times are dominated by optimistic assessments, and in difficult — pessimistic. For all that, one thing is clear: the relations of Germany with Russia have never been a consistently progressive character. Was one of UPS and downs, sometimes it seemed that they only revolve in a vicious circle. Fatal belief that we are doomed by fate to be either friends or enemies, however, are unlikely to be appropriate. She can't be a compass for present and future generations. We must proceed from the fact that it was not and will not in the Russian-German relationship is something immutable and frozen, final. Turns, and in different directions, is possible at any time. Naive passion and enthusiastic views of Germans and Germany peculiar to our intellectual class, as well as hostile nihilism (“the Nazis, they were and will remain!”) ordinary people, quite far from reality.
No the Germans just as good as no Germans is just bad. It all depends on who is at the head of this strong, United and dynamic nation, which however is not only hard work, talent and discipline, but also a deep conservatism, a strong national instinct, strong prejudices, a tendency to overestimate their own strength and constant belief in his superiority over others and the right.
Because of this in our dealings with Germany has always required lots of good will, commitment, and sobriety, combined with a careful understanding of the need to systematically align and then the resulting rolls and distortions. Unfortunately, it was not always thus. Most have turned out differently. However, another recipe of doing business between Russia and Germany, apparently, does not exist, while we jointly present on the maps of Europe and the world. However, the application of this recipe and all other recipes do not necessarily always lead to success. All, in the end, depends on the time and occasion, from who, and how lucky. Man proposes and God disposes, which, incidentally, is consistent with and German: “Der Mensch denkt und Gott lenkt der”. But to hit that line and try to implement it still need us and the Germans, and each in their own interests. They are more likely to converge than diverge, especially if they understand correctly.
When there is any event, then we say that this is the case. When the event is repeated, then it is appropriate to talk about trends. If it is repeated many times, then we can already discern a certain pattern. Let's not pretend to deduce any patterns in the relations of Russia with Germany. But the frequency of occurrence of many situations and phenomena, of course, is obvious. There are some undeniable results and facts sesquicentennial history together. Both will be useful to pay attention to. Especially those engaged Germany preparing myself for it.
1. Germany has always sought to occupy a dominant position in Europe and to play its independent role in international Affairs. To do this, she constantly created and continues to create all sorts of builds international unions and combinations, while acting decisively and quickly, constantly changing partners. This line did not stop after world war II. She still lives with the only difference that now it is ably clothe in the garments of a collective interest of NATO, the EU and other international organizations.
2. Russia, the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation some of the historical nuances and deviations are traditionally inclined to see Germany one of the main, if not the most important direction of its foreign policy. And this is a reason. Again and again declaring it, every time we hope to have a special place in the heart of Germany, we are counting on their gratitude, loyalty and love. But Germany is the first priority for many other States, especially neighbors. The Germans know very well what to choose from willing to love their brides and throwing one, then do another. The only thing that seriously affects their such behavior is the power and determination of the partner, that is, a fear of being punished for inconsistency and deception.
3. For Germany a preferred partner since Bismarck was England (now USA). Russia is the second, less preferred choice. It is done, I checked first, and often only to, once again, to put pressure on the Anglo-Saxons. With this approach Germany usually feels like a master in German-Russian relations, acting as the groom, who comes down the aisle, but with the firm intention to escape, only to get a chance and benefit. Hope that it will keep this step from remorse or a sense of gratitude, almost never justified, and must to finally get rid of. Germany is only possible marriages of convenience and on terms that would leave us enough freedom and the possibility of a serious impact on the German partner.
4. Germany is not “absolutelayout” its contractual obligations. She easily refuses them or sabotages their performance, if deemed beneficial and if it can be expected that the other party fails to insist on their implementation. Excessive faith in the letter and spirit of the treaties with the Germans, especially in the case of major changes of circumstances that led to their conclusion, naive, dangerous and have repeatedly put our country in a difficult position.
5. Sensing the weak spot in the enemy positions or partner, Germany immediately throws all the power and opportunity to extend the gap, while acting prudently, assertive and arrogant. However, she often loses the sense of reality and measure. To stop this onslaught by conventional political and diplomatic means, as a rule, does not work, need other, more sensitive measures of impact. The sooner and more decisively they apply, the lower are the costs of such crises and misunderstandings in the relations of both countries.
6. It is believed that the sharp turns in the relations between Germany and Russia, as a rule, make a right-wing conservative and nationalist forces. Social-Democrats and liberals to such corners able, to a lesser extent prone to incompleteness and indecision. Look like only the right wing is famous for its willingness to negotiate with Russia, however, is not quite justified. We must not forget that they were Zamperini and two wars with us, the architects of the transition of Germany into the role of Junior partner of the Anglo-Saxons in a hostile Alliance against Russia after the Second world war. True, but still in critical, acute situations that require joint action, with the right to communicate easier than with other political forces in Germany. Just need to always keep your eyes open. In fact, German for “black” and “pink” one other stand.
7. Considering not just manifested in the history of unpredictability in the behavior of Germany and its “peculiar” attitude to treaties and alliances, propensity to revaluation of own forces and underestimation of the forces, as well as the spontaneity of decisions should not rely on personal friendships, trust contacts and all sorts of special channels of communication with the German leadership. The Germans, as a rule, reluctant to all of this, using the opportunities available to them not only for agreeing on some joint actions and positions, but more often to push their interests in the bypass prevents them from authorities and experts of misinformation and deception of the other party about their actual plans and intentions. In the Germany it is always important to monitor and analyze the entire complex of what is happening in this country, to get to the meaning of its intent, to be judged not by words but by practical action. Activities of diplomacy, and intelligence on the German area, given the lessons of the past should always be given the highest priority.
8. Hope for the transformation of Germany into a separate power pole in world politics (in varying combinations with other EU countries) currently rather premature. Absorbed eating the remains of the Russian Empire (USSR), she did not want to be distracted and miss his part of the production. The aggravation of contradictions with the US and perhaps other NATO countries because of excessive rapprochement with Russia would be fraught for the Germans serious costs and, in addition, while not dictated by hard necessity. Much cheaper and more profitable to move to the East in the crowd of Western crusaders.
9. Realizing the danger of the strengthening of Germany and alarmed by the first signs of differences between the United States and Europe, the Western allies of Germany on his old habit of trying to channel the growing power of the Germans, guiding them to the East and South-East Europe. In fact, the unity of the Western Union payable due to the joint marginalization of Russia in Asia and the disclosure of its natural pantries for the development and exploitation of the West. While this line will be successful, hope for the differentiation between Germany and the allies is not necessary.
10. The goal of the Eastern policy of Germany received its most complete and cynical reflection in 1918 the Brest Treaty and “Additional agreement” to it, and then in 1941 in the plan “Barbarossa”and “General plan “OST”. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and United Germany was able to realize these goals in the amount of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (or even slightly higher) as the Junior partner of the US and not using this time to war and use of force. Its General line in relation to Russia is that with the support of the United States and other Western allies to gain a foothold in new positions, to cement and make irreversible the change occurred.
11. The most important factor, facilitating the German solution to these problems is the arrival in Russia to power forces that refuse to fight for the revival of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union came to terms with the collapse and dismemberment of our nation and the millennial state and essentially have a policy of promoting consolidation of these unprofitable and humiliating for Russia shifts. Germany together with its allies interested in supporting these forces and as a state, has traditionally oriented its expansion eastward and to strengthen its capacity and power at the expense of our resources and attaches great importance to developing friendly ties with the current new Russian leaders and the support.
12. This situation, however, is temporary and unsustainable. Past the bitter school of Versailles and Potsdam, the Germans can't deep down know this. However, they are likely to resist the inevitable eventually change. Germany can be a significant brake on the withdrawal of Russia from the current “Palabrescia” period in its history, should be considered in building relations with her.
13. The Eastern policy of Germany, and in a broader sense and its foreign policy in General, has always been a function of the power or weakness of Russia. To a strong Russia, Germany were adapted and sometimes acted with her at the same time, a weak Russia, she attacked and robbed her. There is no reason to believe that in the future it will be different. Therefore, the decision of questions of our relations with Germany lies primarily on ways of solving our internal problems. If you stand with the knees, there will be one drawing game, not stand — so it will be different and not good for us.
14. The showdown with Germany and the struggle for Germany will continue to be one of the most important directions of Russian foreign policy. Germany will be objective reasons for us a desirable partner, but at the same time, and a constant latent threat to our interests. The meaning of Russia's policy towards Germany by and large should be to have a Germany that would be strong enough to create a counterweight to other powers of the West, and weak enough not to pose a direct threat to Russia and depend in achieving their goals of Russia and its support.
By the way, this could be the core of Russian policy towards the whole of the EU. This approach is consistent with the rate on the formation of a multipolar world, would be the continuation of politics bequeathed to us by Prince Gorchakov, who knew how to deal with Germany.
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