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The strategy of economic sanctions in world politics
Material posted: Publication date: 15-02-2013

The use of restrictive economic measures as a means of pressure by one state against another to force his government to make concessions and to change their policies known since the days of the "megarian psephisma", when in 432 BC the Athenian strategist Pericles imposed a ban on trade with Megaray that was one of the reasons to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war [1].

Since such restrictions from time to time used by different countries for achieving certain foreign policy goals. In XX century their use in international relations has become commonplace. A multilateral mechanism of sanctions related to the activities of major international organizations, primarily United Nations.

In the system of international law, sanctions are one of the most common forms of responsibility of States, which occurs as a result of violations of generally accepted norms that have important value to the global community. Sanctions may affect the various parties of the international activities of state - diplomatic (reduction of Embassy staff, ambassadors, travel restrictions, etc.) to cultural (termination of exchanges, refusal of admission at prestigious events like the Olympic games, etc.). Unlike the diplomatic and political methods of influence, aimed primarily at reducing the legitimacy or authority of the country of the violator, the economic sanctions are meant to induce her to give up which led to their imposition of action by causing her material damage. In its content of economic sanctions, according to U.S. experts, E. Hofbauer, John. SCHOTT and K. Elliott, are "deliberate, government-initiated rupture or threat of rupture of the normal trade-finansovih relations"[2].

The era of the "Golden age" of economic sanctions has become the last decade of the XX century After the end of the cold war in the context of the information revolution, the accelerating processes of globalization and deepening interdependence of national economic complexes the value of "economic diplomacy" has increased significantly. No coincidence that of the 14 cases of economic sanctions the UN 12 occur in the period after 1990, the more pronounced this tendency is manifested in the foreign policy of the United States of America that was left after the collapse of the USSR the only "superpower", has used sanctions as a tool in shaping a favorable world order. According to the National Association of manufacturers, only during the first term of presidency of William Clinton from 1993 to 1996 Washington, more than 60 times resorted to sanctions[3]. In the beginning of the XXI U.S. sanctions spread to 75 countries, the population which is 52% of mankind[4].

Modern international law permits the use of economic sanctions by intergovernmental organizations of the world, as the United Nations, and regional, such as the Organization of American States, Organization of African unity, etc. - as well as groups of countries and individual States. However, despite the wide use of the notion of "economic sanctions", international documents do not contain any clear definition, limited, as a rule, by simple enumeration of concrete measures. So, in the UN Charter, the terms "sanctions" or "embargoes" are not mentioned, although article 41 provides the possibility of application against the wrongdoing state "enforcement action", which include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio or other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations"[5]. In the General spectrum of coercive means, which are used in the event of a conflict in international relations, ranging from simple verbal note and ending the use of armed force, economic sanctions are placed closer to the latter, giving place only to the blockade.

At the level of the world community the authority for the imposition of sanctions given to the Security Council (UNSC), which during its almost sixty years of activity has developed and tested various methods and forms of action and impact on world events. However, the experience of the use of economic sanctions is extremely limited. The predecessor of the UN - League of Nations - only once, in connection with the aggression of Italy against Abyssinia in 1935-1936, established a Coordinating Committee, which limited its activities General recommendations on the adoption of economic coercive measures against агрессора6. For the first 45 years of the UN due to the specific conditions of the cold war, the Council had introduced them only twice - against southern Rhodesia in 1966-1979 and South Africa in 1977-1994. In both cases, their use was found to be successful: in the first, they contributed to the downfall of the racist government and the proclamation of the independence of Zimbabwe, and in the second the elimination of the apartheid regime. In fact in the 1990s there was a formation of the mechanism of using of economic sanctions of the UN security Council.

The "new era" in the history of the application of multilateral economic sanctions was opened by Resolution 661 adopted by the Security Council in record time - four days after 2 August 1990 Iraq sent troops to Kuwait, thereby committing a direct act of aggression. In subsequent years, the UN security Council is still 11 times resorted to sanctions. For their imposition, change or remove it in each case has issued a separate resolution, and to monitor their implementation by the appointed representatives of its member States, the subsidiary bodies, for example, the governing Council of the Compensation Commission, a Special Commission on Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations and the sanctions Committees in relation to Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Tahiti, Afghanistan and other violators. In total since 1990-and 2003, the sanctions committees held sessions 717[7].

Of all established by the UN Security Council regimes the most extensive, stringent and consistent were the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. From August 1990 to June 2003, the security Council approved 24 resolutions concerning that country. As in the case of Iraq there was a direct act of aggression, which is considered a particularly serious international crime, hastily assembled by the administration of Bush the UN security Council on 6 may 1990, approved a resolution condemning Iraq for aggression and demanding from him an unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait. In support of their demands, the Council imposed an embargo on arms sales to Baghdad, imposed a ban on supplies of all goods except food and medicine and allowed in order to prevent illegal exports of oil to block Iraqi порты8. Without waiting for the effects of economic sanctions, the United States achieved adoption of another resolution, which gave them led by a multinational coalition carte Blanche for a military operation "desert Storm". In the spring of 1991 it ended in the expulsion of the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait and a new Security Council resolution, keeping all sanctions against Iraq. In the autumn they were somewhat weakened when that country received permission to sell him some oil for the purchase of food.

As a result of collective economic sanctions dependent on supplies from outside Iraq was on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe[9]. Many States demanded that the UN Security Council to mitigate them, but the American and British representatives for three and a half years have persistently blocked all attempts to amend the sanctions regime against Iraq, insisting on the consent of his government to allow inspectors of the UN Special Commission and International atomic energy Agency (IAEA) to nuclear objects of the country. In April 1995, the Security Council adopted Resolution 986, which in exchange for Iraq's agreement to such inspection was allowed to him every three months to sell oil for $ 1 billion. and use the money to purchase food and medicines[10]. After much hesitation, Baghdad 20 may 1996 signed an agreement with the UN. But the Clinton administration suddenly announced that it rejects the proposed terms of the contract. A storm of indignation in the UN forced her to retreat. However, referring to the concentration of Iraqi troops near the Kurdish regions, the US and Britain obtained an extension of the sanctions regime, however, had to accept the continuation of the scheme "oil in exchange for food".

In November 1996, Iraq was granted the right to sell oil at $ 2 billion. under the scheme "oil in exchange for food". In early 1998, the Security Council has raised the bar to $ 5.2 billion. and was ready to go and further towards the easing of sanctions[11], if not for the opposition of Saddam Hussein international monitoring of Iraqi nuclear facilities. Actions Baghdad has allowed the US to block possible changes and gave Washington an occasion in December 1998 to bomb nuclear facilities in Iraq. The program "oil in exchange for food have continued, albeit with the arrival in early 2001, to power a Republican administration headed by George Bush the US position in Iraq even more tougher. Washington imposed a ban on the transfer to Iraq of vaccines for the treatment of child hepatitis b, and diphtheria, under the pretext that the Iraqi government can use the contained bacteria for the production of biological weapons[12]. The debate about the vaccine aggravated relations between the members of the Security Council, and a few months, the US lifted the ban.

After the events of September 11, 2001 the United States had to turn to the UN security Council, from which they can easily get the necessary support in the form of two resolutions. With the deployment of the "war against international terrorism", the Bush administration moved quickly from the requirements of the further tightening of collective economic sanctions against Iraq to develop a military solution "to the problem of Iraq". In the notorious "axis of evil" Iraq initially was "the weakest link". The task of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime took shape in American society as a national consensus as the logical conclusion of "operation desert Storm". Protracted debates in the Security Council on the backdrop of White house efforts to demonstrate an urgent need for military action against Iraq caused a rise in hostility to the UN in the public opinion of the United States. 2 October 2002 Congress passed a resolution authorizing the administration to use force against Iraq without prior UN approval.

A military operation was hindered by the lack of evidence linking the Hussein regime to the attacks of September 11, or his ties to al-Qaeda, and fear to destroy the international antiterrorist coalition, as against the attack on Iraq objected to many of America's European allies, Arab countries and Russia. But in the end it was carried out. The solution of the problem of elimination of the regime in Baghdad is greatly facilitated by the weakening of the military power of Iraq as a result of sanctions and the presence of impressive international legal framework in the form of UN resolutions, the failure of which constantly referred to Washington. 22 may 2003 the UN Security Council had lifted the economic sanctions against Iraq, keeping in force only the ban on the supply of arms and military supplies. A year later, June 30, 2004, on the lifting of us sanctions announced Bush.

The example of Iraq, which because of its deformed oil export economy and strong dependence on imports of consumer goods and foodstuffs was almost a "perfect target" for economic sanctions, shows that the establishment and the regime of collective coercive measures at the UN level is associated with difficulties. This is partly due to the specifics of the functioning of the UN Security Council. First, they imposed sanctions may be taken in a very restricted range, only for "the prevention and removal of threats to peace and suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Secondly, for the adoption of the relevant decision requires the consent of nine of the fifteen Council members "including the concurring votes of the permanent members - Britain, China, Russia, USA and France. Enough one of the five powers mentioned to speak out against, and any resolution will be automatically rejected. Thirdly, although all the member States of the UN and obliged to fulfill the decisions of the Security Council, in practice they are often guided by their own goals and interests, and SB does not have sufficiently effective levers of influence on those who ignore or directly violate its prohibitions.

Difficulties with the imposition of collective economic sanctions, which felt the United States in the 1990s, led to Washington's desire to act unilaterally only in accordance with us law. Until the late 1970s, the legal basis for the application of sanctions against foreign States served as the law on the trading with the enemy 1917 In 1977 it was replaced by the now valid law on economic powers in terms of international state of emergency. In contrast to the act of 1917, which actually restricted the President in a question on sanctions, the new Statute required him to apply them only in the case when there is "unusual or extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States, the source of which in whole or in significant part is outside of the United States"[13]. Each time the imposition of economic sanctions, the head of state had to issue a special decree and to declare a state of emergency, which remained in force during the year.

The vagueness of some of used in law concepts, in particular, the term "threat", the uncertainty of the conditions under which we should impose sanctions, led to its use even when the safety and welfare of the United States is clearly not threatened. So, September 9, 1985, Reagan applied the Statute by banning the import of gold and financial transactions with South Africa "because of the policy of apartheid." October 4, 1991, Bush the elder ran up to him to counter the illegal deprivation of the power of the democratically elected government of Haiti"[14]. In may 1997, Clinton imposed sanctions against Burma in response to "extraordinary threat" to her security. In an effort to minimize the restrictions for American citizens, protekauschie of the establishment of the sanctions regime against any country, the Congress in 1988 and 1994 was amended the law on economic authority in a state of emergency.

In 1970-1990-ies in the development of the mechanism of economic sanctions the US has tended to address the adoption of legislative measures aimed against specific abuses by individual States. So, the desire of a number of countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals led to the adoption in 1978 of the Statute on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to him, in early 1979, some limits have been imposed against Pakistan, which according to intelligence reports led the construction of a plant for uranium enrichment. But after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the sanctions were frozen. During the discussion in 1985 of the aid package to Islamabad, Senator Larry Pressler introduced an amendment that required the President annually before allocation of the next tranche to assure Congress that Pakistan did not "possess any nuclear explosive device". When in October 1990, Bush refused to give such an assurance, Washington, in accordance with the amendment of Pressler stopped assistance to Pakistan. In 1994, Congress agreed to amend the Statute on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons an amendment by Senator John Glenn about the automatic imposition of sanctions, if a country not belonging to the five nuclear powers (USA, Britain, France, Russia, and China) will experience after April 30, 1994, the appropriate device.

Among the accepted in the 1990s in the United States laws that directly or indirectly establishes the legal norms for application of economic sanctions, of particular importance are two Statute of liberty and democratic solidarity with Cuba (Helms-Burton) and on sanctions against Iran and Libya (the law of damato), adopted in 1996, the First of these legalized all existing sanctions against Cuba and gave the President the power to reduce US aid to those countries that provide it to Cuba. Innovation was his third section, which allowed U.S. citizens to sue in the courts of their country against foreign companies and individuals having to deal with the revolutionary authorities nationalized American property in Cuba. It is true that President could every six months to postpone its entry into force[15]. The extraterritorial nature and the provisions of the law on sanctions against Iran and Libya, which Washington accused of supporting international terrorism. The Statute provided for the imposition of sanctions against those foreign companies who invest more than $ 40 million. in the development of the oil resources of Iran or Ливии16.

Despite an extensive legislative framework prevailing in the United States the mechanism of using of economic sanctions is extremely complex. In the structure of state bodies there is no special Department, which would be entirely responsible for their implementation. The corresponding functions are dispersed among different Federal agencies. Except as provided in the statutes of the cases the automatic imposition of sanctions, the legislation details are not reglamentary against whom, when and what enforcement action to take, leaving it to the discretion of the President. His decision in each case may depend on many factors, ranging from the international situation and the situation in the country, and ending with the domestic political situation and even considerations of a procedural nature. In the end, the practical use of Washington's economic sanctions always carries a lot of improvisation.

Due to the lack of a global "enemy", the battle which determined the goals and direction of sanctions in the era of the cold war, after the end of the American ruling circles had used them, based on their assessment of threats to US national security and the desire to use trade and financial restrictions as a means of conflict management at the regional level. The basis for their imposition against a state can serve as a form of socio-political structure, the character of the regime or the action that us law classifies as illegal. The latter are universally recognized as international crimes and torts, involving the interests of the United States - trade restrictions, the confiscation of American property, etc.

In the 1990s the Bush administration and Clinton easily used economic sanctions against "unfair States", i.e. countries with "totalitarian, expansionist regimes by anti-Western orientation (Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Cuba, etc.), and against their "trading partners" (Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Brazil). The main difference was in the nature of the implementation of the sanctions regime. They most rigidly applied in cases where, in the opinion of Washington, there was a threat to national security and US interests, associated, for example, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support of terrorism. Although, as practice shows, the degree of rigidity and consistency in the implementation of economic sanctions depended not so much on the gravity of the offence committed by a country, but from the nature of its relations with Washington. The principle of equality of all before the law (in this case American) is not operated.

Quite sharp U.S. reaction to the prospect of the emergence of new nuclear States is understandable. In principle, any expansion of the "nuclear club" narrows the possibilities of their intervention in a specific region and creates a physical threat to us troops and bases abroad. But in early 1994 the Clinton administration on the basis of the criterion of "hostility or RewriteBase" the United States divided the country proliferate to those with the presence of nuclear weapons in which it was prepared to accept (Israel, India, Pakistan), and those which in any case should not be allowed to it (Iran, Iraq and North Korea). The presence of the United States of sharp contradictions in the relationship with the latter led to differences in the sanctions regime specific proliferant. "Double standard" in their application clearly evident in 1998, when first India and then Pakistan conducted tests of nuclear explosive devices.

May 13, 1998, President Clinton, first turning to the Glenn amendment imposed sanctions against India. A day later the UN Security Council also condemned it, but has not made a decision on the application to it of the restrictive measures[17]. In an effort to convince Islamabad not to follow the example of new Delhi, Washington has offered him to cancel the amendment of Pressler. However, on 28 may Pakistan still tested. Clinton, again using the Glenn amendment, announced the imposition of sanctions. A day later Pakistan made two more explosions, but the reaction of the world community and this time limited only to the appeal of the UN Security Council to Delhi and Islamabad with a demand to stop further testing. On 18 June at a press conference in the White house representatives of the Ministries of Finance, trade and the US Department of State explained the objectives of the Clinton imposed economic sanctions. They consisted in the fact that India and Pakistan refused new tests, immediately and unconditionally signed opened in 1996 for the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive test ban Treaty, cease the production of fissile materials, refrain from testing missiles, adhered to the non-proliferation regime and made efforts to normalize bilateral relations[18].

Given the degree of dependence of Pakistan and India from external funding sources[19], achieving Washington's goals seemed quite real. However, shortly after the imposition of sanctions, the Clinton administration faced a number of difficulties. In mid-1998 under pressure from farmers ' organizations, Clinton had to sign passed by Congress a law removing the ban on credits for agricultural exports to India and Pakistan. In the fall of 1998, Congress approved an amendment to the act on the costs, which gave the President the right to postpone the application stipulated in the Glenn amendment sanctions against Pakistan and India. Based on it, Clinton has removed almost all restrictions, keeping in force the suspension of assistance programs, bans on arms sales and the export of dual-use technologies. In October 1999, despite an India-Pakistan test series ballistic missiles, delaying their signing of the Treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests and even on the 12 October military coup in Islamabad, Washington was further extended delay in the application of the Glenn amendment. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration lifted sanctions against India and Pakistan in exchange for their support in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. At the same time accused of the same "sin" of North Korea came the "axis of evil".

Since the late 1970s as a threat to national security and interests of the United States and its allies in Washington began to consider international terrorism. In adopted in September 1979 a law on the regulation of exports was made a special amendment that required the State Department list of countries that provide safe haven and support to international terrorist organizations. Against such States, including the Clinton administration took Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, North Korea and Sudan, economic sanctions were mostly used unilaterally. The only exception was Sudan and Libya against which the United States managed to achieve the adoption of collective coercive measures.

Us unilateral sanctions against the government of Muammar Gaddafi were introduced in 1978, when President Carter has restricted the export to Libya of certain goods. In 1982, Reagan banned the import of Libyan crude oil and the supply of its equipment for the oil industry. Relations between the two countries became more acute in December 1985, after the explosions at railway stations in Vienna and Rome, when one of the leaders who organized them terrorists declared "significant assistance" from Gadhafi. In January 1986 Reagan, using the powers under the act of 1977, announced the introduction of comprehensive trade sanctions against Libya and the freezing of its assets in the United States. In March, the American ships sank two Libyan boats, and on April 15 - a few days after an explosion at a discotheque in West Berlin - bombers from the ships attacked airfields in Libya. But to convince allies to support their actions the US could not смогли20.

The attitude of European States to the Gaddafi regime changed dramatically after the explosions in the air aircraft of the American company "Pan Am" at the end of 1988 and the French UTA" in September 1989, in involvement to which were suspected Libyan citizens. The refusal of Gaddafi to cooperate in the investigation of the circumstances of both explosions was the basis for the adoption in March 1992 the UN Security Council resolution banning air travel to and from Libya and the sale of her weapons. In November 1993, the Security Council imposed an embargo on the supply to Libya of equipment for extraction and processing of oil and froze its assets in foreign banks[21]. For its part, the US passed a law, damato. In August 1998 Secretary of state Madeleine Albright and British foreign Secretary Robin cook in the ultimate order demanded that Gaddafi extradition of suspects to the court in the Hague, threatening otherwise to impose additional sanctions, including a complete embargo on the sale of oil[22]. The efforts from all sides the pressure on Libya eventually forced Gaddafi to agree to the extradition of suspected in preparing a terrorist act against Pan Am, and 5 April 1999 they were transferred to the Hague. The UN Security Council immediately canceled all economic restrictions against Libya. The United States formally lifted its sanctions on 20 September 2004

Focusing mainly on "unfair States, Washington made it clear that the problem of violation of legal norms is rooted in the very nature of the ruling political regimes. Hence the real purpose of the use of economic sanctions was the international isolation and the depletion of "hostile" governments, their overthrow and replacement by "democratic". Indicative in this case is the example of Cuba. Unilateral sanctions were first imposed in October 1960 with the aim "to destabilize the Castro regime, causing its overthrow, or at least causing him the greatest possible damage, to teach a lesson to others"[23] With the collapse of the Soviet Union and cessation of Soviet aid to the island, the sanctions could no longer be justified by "the threat to U.S. national security", and since the need for their conservation in Washington to explain the requirements of the protection of human rights and in promoting democracy and market reforms in Cuba, although the main goal remains the same - the change of the ruling regime.

Similar objectives pursued sanctions against Burma, North Korea, Serbia and many "unfair States", accused by Washington to political repression, massive human rights violations, harassment of opposition, etc. And in the case of Serbia they were imposed after the start of the NATO operation in Kosovo designed to stop the "genocide of the Albanian population" the edge of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. It is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia and Turkey, were also compiled by the US State Department list of the worst offenders of human rights in the world, has maintained normal trade relations with the United States, despite the fact that formally against them, too, were introduced to the American sanctions.

A relatively new phenomenon in the 1990s was the use of economic sanctions against foreign countries subnational authorities in the United States. Because state governments and municipalities may not impose comprehensive economic sanctions on other countries, their actions are mainly "supply-side constraints" which prohibit the authorities on the ground to use the services or purchase products from companies who trade with the responsible state and "investment restrictions" that prohibit the granting of loans from public funds. Thus, the company needs to choose who she can or cannot deal with. As population and production capabilities are superior to many States, some States, such a choice is often made in their favour.

Meanwhile, such a kind of output of subnational authorities on the international arena creates a lot of problems. "To attempt to control the foreign policy of 50 States and 7284 municipalities," wrote journalist Kevin Whitelaw, - is, to put it mildly, a nightmare for companies and national governments"[24].

Besides the fact that such actions of local authorities are contrary to the Constitution of the United States, which considers political connections and the regulation of trade with other countries, exclusively the purview of the Federal government and Congress, they violate the integrity of American foreign policy. The worst compared to the President and Congress of the awareness of officials on the ground often does not allow them to correctly assess the possible consequences of sanctions imposed, which they also tend to consider as a way to accommodate the demands of their constituents.

The diversity prevailing in the 1990s, the economic sanctions, along with the lack of clearly defined limits on their use and are often very vague wording of the goals, seriously hampers the assessment of their effectiveness. Usually the application of coercive economic measures was considered successful if exposed to them the state to perform against him demands. The arbitrariness of such a criterion is obvious, since, in practice, trade and financial restrictions never led to the desired result immediately after the imposition of sanctions. Their impact, as a rule, affected only after a certain period of time during which the adjusted initial purpose of the sanctions, had developed a different international environment has changed foreign policy priorities established in their countries. In addition, they were rarely used apart from other means of pressure on the wrongdoing state, including the use of armed force, it would therefore be wrong to attribute all changes in its foreign or domestic policy only at the expense of penalties.

The effectiveness of economic sanctions depends on many different factors associated, on the one hand, with the character of the established regime of coercive measures, and on the other, with the position of the country against which they are directed. Collective sanctions are more effective than unilateral, because look much less biased towards the responsible state and their strict implementation seriously restrict it. However, to achieve consensus on their adoption extremely difficult, in particular, by the small number of cases of their use by the UN Security Council. The most effective among them is the use of collective sanctions against South Africa, Haiti and Iraq, although their impact should not be overestimated. For the elimination of the apartheid regime it took seventeen years, and it only collapsed once inside the South Africa has deployed a powerful protest movement. Not sanctions, and military operation of the multinational coalition headed by the United States forced Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, as well as a threat by Washington to use force returned power to President Aristide in Haiti in 1994

With the sanctions that the US imposed unilaterally, the situation was worse. According to the estimates of K, Elliott, for the period 1970-1996. Washington imposed sanctions have not achieved the officially stated objectives in 87 % of cases[25]. Even taking into account the specific conditions of the cold war, when the Soviet Union came to the aid of those countries that came under pressure from the United States, such figures are not impressive. It is hardly possible to speak about significant improvements in the effectiveness of sanctions and after the end of bipolar confrontation. Under the impact of us sanctions on the Iranian economy, for example, looked at the end of the 1990s, much more healthy than the economy of some countries, which the United States helped. Iran exported 2.6 million barrels of oil per day, directing the revenues from the sale of the development production and servicing of external debt. According to former Iranian Finance Minister, it is obvious that economic, psychological and political impact of us sanctions have not led to the expected results and transformed the regime"[26].

In order to be an effective means of political pressure on a sovereign state, economic sanctions should, firstly, create a visible or a threat to inflict real damage to its economy and, secondly, to convince his government to the inadmissibility of such losses. Although the absolute data of the damage are sometimes quite impressive, unilateral restrictive measures suffered usually the failure is the first level. According to experts, these sanctions caused the loss was about 1% of GNP affected countries, while collective sanctions - approximately 5%, and in the case of Iraq -even 10 %[27]. They cause moral damage is more aspirational than actual. In addition, it is virtually impossible to assess, especially in view of the fact that each country has its own "pain threshold", i.e. the ability of the population to endure the hardships and privations associated with the application against it economic sanctions.

However, the economic damage caused by sanctions, does not always guarantee success at the second level. "Trade sanctions," wrote one of the former members of the Bush administration-the senior, - can act like a neutron bomb, destroying the economy, causing poverty, but leaving untouched the political establishment"[28]. The hardest sanctions hit the most vulnerable - the poor, the elderly, the young, and those middle class groups that are associated with foreign trade. No resolution of the Security Council nor the UN Charter does not contain guidance on how to reduce the harmful impact of sanctions on the lives of ordinary citizens and how they relate to humanitarian objectives of the international community, as reflected in the universal Declaration of human rights 1948, the International Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, 1966, the universal Convention on the rights of the child 1989, and similar documents. "Related", in the language of the military losses and the States that are neighbors or trading partners of the offender. The question of compensation for their losses, the UN Charter makes provision for "the right to consult the Security Council for resolution of such problems" (V. 50).

Economic sanctions almost never "work" in relation to the large States and those countries that followed a policy of self-sufficiency. Suffice it to recall examples with "grain" embargo in January 1980, President Jimmy Carter, to "make the Soviets pay for aggression" in Afghanistan, or with a similar ban on deliveries in the USSR of pipes for the construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe in the summer of 1982 with the aim to achieve the lifting of martial law in Poland. In both cases, the reaction of U.S. allies has been sharply negative, and every time Washington had a few months to heed the imposed restrictions[29]. A more recent example is the sanctions imposed by the US and EU on China following the events in Tiananmen square in June 1989, the Most effective way of putting pressure on Beijing would be the refusal of the United States to extend most favored nation treatment in trade, which was used by China. This possibility was discussed in Congress, but the White house has done everything to avoid extremes. The West announced sanctions against China on the matter have not earned and pretty soon were dropped.

Enhancing the effectiveness of economic sanctions is not helping the nomination of too high goals, such as the elimination of the ruling regime, which in principle is extremely difficult to achieve through the application of some only of trade and financial restrictions. The original purpose of the introduction of collective sanctions against Iraq - the expulsion of his forces from Kuwait - had received wide response and support of most countries of the world. However, the actions of the American administration after the Gulf war, aimed at recognition of Madeleine Albright, the removal of Saddam Hussein, was inappropriate[30].

Economic sanctions are often powerless to compel the government subjected the country to abandon what it considers "highest priority". "Every decisive action has its consequences, was claimed in may 1998, Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee. - But if this action is inherently linked to national interests, and I believe that our decision to test is a Supreme national interest - then we need to resist the consequences and overcome the challenge... Sanctions can't hurt and will not hurt us. India is not intimidated by such threats and punitive measures"[31]. In addition, governments that want to retain power, must be able to demonstrate their "invulnerability" to outside pressure.

The credibility of U.S. unilateral sanctions greatly reduced repeatedly occurred the retreat of Washington from his own declared principles. The most "loud" thing is still a scandal "Iran-contra" secret deal involving the sale by the Reagan administration in violation of its own embargo of arms to Tehran. Clinton actually allowed American oil companies to bypass the current regime of sanctions to buy Iranian oil for resale outside the United States. "Occidental Petroleum" received permission to conclude a major deal with the Sudanese government, against which act the collective UN sanctions.

In addition, it should be remembered that foreign economic relations - "two way street". When one state imposes coercive measures against another country with which it has trade and financial relations, it also carries direct and indirect damage. According to the calculations of American scientists, in 1995, losses from the reduction in imports in 26 countries, which were sanctioned, amounted to the sum of 15 to 19 billion dollars. and resulted in the elimination of more than 200 thousand jobs in the export sectors of the economy[32]. Direct losses, however, are only the tip of the iceberg of. Indirect price is much higher because here we are talking about long-term consequences. First of all, they are expressed in those advantages which foreign competitors receive immediately after the departure of some embargoed countries U.S. companies. Solidarity in business - a rare thing.

In the current environment, large consumers, buying complex and expensive systems such as nuclear reactors or aircraft, strives to establish long-term relationships with a supplier to reduce the cost of their maintenance, repair and acquisition of spare parts. Such relationships are usually long, and their break as a result of application of sanctions may result in the supplier losing a customer. In 1993, it has experienced the leader of the American aircraft Corporation Boeing. The trade embargo against Vietnam was she supposed to refuse to lease used aircraft of Vietnamese airlines, which immediately found a replacement in the person of concern "Airbus". The direct loss of the "Boeing" was 211 million. and indirect - about 1.6 billion dollars.[33].

Negative effects of unilateral US sanctions are not limited only to economic losses. Often their imposition leads to political complications with allied and friendly States. The greatest irritation among them is the principle of extraterritoriality provisions of several U.S. laws. Sharp disagreements caused adopted in 1996 statutes on sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya. In August 1996 34 member state of the OAS, including the U.S. partners in NAFTA - Canada and Mexico - adopted a resolution declaring the Statute Helms-Burton, "inappropriate international law"[34]. The EU Council of Ministers in October 1996 issued a decree which not only frees a company outside the EU countries from implementing the provisions of the Statute, but also gave them the right to present contraci in European courts. The EU also filed a complaint with the WTO[35]. The Clinton administration had to conduct difficult negotiations with the EU, and only in may 1998, a compromise was reached regarding the controversial actions of both acts.

Relatively modest and ambiguous results the implications of the Clinton administration to the unilateral economic sanctions as a means of achieving foreign policy goals of the United States sparked a flood of critical comments from congressmen, many public organizations and individual politicians. Not accidentally that at the end of the 1990s, the White house has become much less likely to introduce new sanctions regimes and gradually started to soften already in effect. With the coming to power of the Bush administration in Washington has prevailed advocate the use of military force, in terms of which economic sanctions are too "soft" means of countering "unfair".

* * *

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and the subsequent events ended the era of dominance in international relations, "economic diplomacy", part of which are economic sanctions, acting in three forms - as a coercive measure, intended to change "undesirable behavior" of the targeted state as a punishment for committed actions and as a warning to other countries. However, despite the sharp increase in the role of the military techniques, economic sanctions remain one of the most important tools in international relations. Their meaning does not deny even the current us administration are more likely to use military force than its predecessor. And this is understandable.

In many cases, economic sanctions are the most convenient and accessible tools: their introduction often requires consultations with Congress and mobilize public opinion, does not entail additional expenditures of the state budget, but at the same time demonstrate the inflexibility and the determination of the administration to deal with a particular "evil", despite the possible financial losses of the American companies in the state. No coincidence that the most common pattern is a quick introduction of the initial sanctions, which are then complemented and amplified by a series of follow-up. There is no doubt that in the future economic sanctions will remain important as a means of pressure and conflict management in U.S. policy and activities of major international organizations.

 

Notes

  1. History of Europe: In 8 t. T. 1. Ancient Europe. M., 1988. P. 267.
  2. Hufbauer G. C., Schott J., Elliott K. A. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Washington, 1990. P. 2.
  3. National Association of Manufacturers. A Catalog of New U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions for Foreign Policy Purposes, 1993-1996. Washington: NAM, March 1997. P. 1-2. http://www.nam.org/ECO/ UnilateralSanctions/SanctionsCatalog.htm.
  4. Sardar Z., Davis M. W. Why Do People Hate America? Cambridge, 2002. P. 79.
  5. See: The Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of justice. M., 1978.
  6. See: Voblikov D. R. Ethiopia in the fight for the preservation of the independence, 1860-1960. M., 1961. S. 78-84.
  7. U. N. Secretariat. Meetings of Security Council Sanctions Committees, 1990-2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/sancmtgs.htm.
  8. U. N. Security Council. Resolution 661. Adopted by the Security Council at its 2933rd meeting, on 6 August 1990. http://www.mideastweb. org/661.htm.
  9. Appeared in the spring of 1999 UN report on the situation in Iraq was noted that as a result of economic sanctions between 1990 and 1995 the price of Essentials went up to 850 times; from malnutrition 70 % of Iraqi women suffer from anemia; almost one in four newborn weighs less than 2.5 kg; the mortality rate among children under 5 years increased from 1989 to 1997 by almost 3 times. United Nations Report on the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq. March 30, 1999. http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/panelrep.htmI.
  10. U. N. Security Council Resolution 986. Adopted by the Security Council at its 3519 meeting, on 14 April 1995. Gopher.//gopher.undp.org:70/00/undoC5/5cd/5coimcil/s95/986.
  11. The UN Security Council. Resolution 1153, adopted by the Security Council at its 3855 meeting, February 20, 1998 http: //www.un.org/russian/documen/sci-esol/resl998/res And 53.htm.
  12. Gordon J. Cool War. http://www.harpers.org/CooIWar.html.
  13. International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Public Law 95-223 (28 December 1977), 50 USC Chapter 35 (1701-1706). http://uscode.house.gov/DOWNLOAD/50C35 DOC.
  14. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Haiti. Executive Order >6 12775 of October 4 1991. http://uscode.house. gov/DOWNLOAD/50C35.DOC.
  15. Public Law 104-114.1996. http://frwebgate.accesS.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname"104.cong.publicJawsfcdocid"f:pubH14.104.
  16. Ibid.
  17. The New York Times. 1998. May 14. P. A13.
  18. The Washington Post. 1998. June 19. P. A29.
  19. Suffice it to say that in the summer of 1998, the external debt of Pakistan amounted to almost 42 billion dollars, foreign exchange reserves are only USD 500 million. India ranked third in volume of loans at the World Bank (Financial Times. 1998. July 23. P. 5).
  20. See: Schumacher E. The United States and Libya // Foreign Affairs. Winter 1986/1987. P. 329-348.
  21. The Washington Post. 1993. Nov 12. P. A39.
  22. Financial Times. 1998. August 25. P. 5.
  23. CIT. in: Barber J, Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument // International Affairs. 1979. July. P. 369.
  24. U. S. News & World Report. 1996. October 14. P. 34.
  25. Elliott K. A. Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions. Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, October 23, 1997. http://www.iie.com/sanctns.htm.
  26. J. Amuzegar Adjusting to Sanctions // Foreign Affairs. 1997. May-June. P. 31.
  27. Raul J. A., Akhtar S. Sanctions: An Analysis. Global Policy Forum. August, 1998. http://www.globalpolicy.org.
  28. Frank L. Lavin by asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma // Foreign Policy. Fall 1996. P. 146.
  29. H. Moyer, L. A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases // Law and Policy in International Business. 1983. No. 1. P. 69-84.
  30. The Washington Post. 1997. March 27. P. A28.
  31. India Today. 1998. May 25. P. 38.
  32. Hufbauer, G., Elliott K. A., SYRUS, T., Winston E. US Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages. Washington: Institute for International Economics, April 16,1997. P. 3.
  33. USA Engage, http://www.usaengage.org.
  34. Financial Times. 1996. August 27. P. 4.
  35. The Washington Post. 1996. December 17. P. Al.

Source: http://www.obraforum.ru/Mirovaja_politika/chapter11.htm

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