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In the archives of the "world government"
Material posted : Administrator Publication date: 22-11-2013

Trilateral Commission, Bilderberg group, club of Rome ― an informal political structures that from 1950-ies unite Western financiers, diplomats and prominent intellectuals. They became the prototype of the "shadow world government", in whose existence you believe the conspiracy theorists. No world government, of course not, but the results of the international elite groups should not be underestimated, says Danish researcher Dino Knudsen.

In mid-November 2013, he defended his thesis on "the Trilateral Commission: the global origins of government and the diplomatic elites in the 1972-1982 years." What the Trilateral Commission has achieved, for example, that Japan in the 1970s, the years have taken the club of great powers. Knudsen is the only scientist who received from the Rockefeller brothers Fund, the right of access to the archives of the Tripartite Commission. .<url>" I talked to him about the activities of this international organization.

In the spring of 1972 David Rockefeller, grandson of the founder of the oil Empire of John D. Rockefeller and Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, arranged a friendly meeting. She was an invited member of the Council on foreign relations Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the Institute Bruckengasse Henry Owen and Harvard Professor Robert Bowie, all three of the largest U.S. experts in the field of foreign policy. The only topic of the meeting was the question of creating an elite expert group, which included the Americans, the Japanese and the Western European States. The fact that shortly before that Rockefeller one of the richest men in the United States, which is closely connected with political circles (suffice it to say that one of his brother was Governor of new York, and the other only just lost the fight for re-election as Governor of Arkansas) — came to the sad conclusion that Washington is "losing his grip", America and its allies are no longer able to adequately analyze a wide range of economic and political issues to meet the challenges of the time. According to Rockefeller, the situation can be corrected, inviting discussion of the vital issues of world politics Japan — the rising Asian country, first off, from the participants of the international expert community.

Earlier in the same year, Rockefeller has already proposed to the Japanese was invited to another "international club of elite interests" — the Bilderberg group. Then he refused, explaining it by the fact that Japan, a former enemy of the United States during world war II and since it is impossible to discuss strategic issues of world development. Then Rockefeller decided to act independently. With the agreement of American experts in the face of Brzezinski, Owen and Bowie, he invited his friend Harvard George Franklin to travel to Europe to learn, sit down Europeans shared a discussion table with the Japanese. Franklin managed to convince the European experts, and then there is the Rockefeller who attended the meeting of the American chamber of Commerce in Tokyo, appealed to the Japanese. Finally, on July 23, 1972 in the estate of the Rockefellers in Pocantico hills (new York), the first meeting of a group called the Trilateral Commission.

.<url>: In your work you talk about the fact that David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski, creating the Commission, feared that the United States did not lose the role of international leader. How America really had to consider the interests of Japan and Europe?

Dino Knudsen: From the beginning of the cold war among the Western countries there was a consensus to work together to fight against communism, to contain the Soviet bloc. However, by the early 1970s, this consensus proved hard to maintain: the war in Vietnam went completely in the wrong direction, which was supposed to be U.S. residents even more fiercely criticized the foreign policy of his government. The situation demanded that we find a new consensus for international diplomacy. The trilateral Commission and has become the platform where you run in such a consensus.

All, obviously felt the changes. David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank and other financiers have seen how the economy, saw that the U.S. is losing its privileged position. After the Second world war for the past 20-25 years, the United States in economic terms remained the global hegemon. But by the early 1970s as a new economic force began to emerge as Japan, Western Europe began a process of integration that led to the creation of the European economic community and ultimately the European Union. There was growing concern that America is losing its position, and all the clearer it became that the United States needs to adapt to new conditions, to bond with their natural allies in Europe and in the Pacific region. Such was the position of Americans who joined the Trilateral Commission.

The American co-founders of the Commission were very concerned about the policies of the Nixon administration. US diplomacy, with the President often acted in a unilateral way, there were concerns that this approach may turn into a new isolationism. The Commission, therefore, can be interpreted as: part of the political and financial elite in the US is not that rebelled against the policies of Nixon, but still challenged her.

During my research I found some reviews on the work of the Tripartite Commission, made in the USSR. It was stated that the Commission is reactionary conspiracy designed to undermine the policy of detente, which was led [in relations with the Soviet Union] the Nixon administration. This was the Soviet interpretation. In fact, in the Tripartite Commission was concerned that Nixon's meetings with Brezhnev forced the Europeans to feel alienated — they just were not invited to the talks, not allowed to make decisions. In Asia felt the same way. When Nixon "opened China" for Japanese-American relations it was a disaster. No pre-negotiations about the change of policy towards Communist China was carried out. So there were a few reasons because of which a number of us diplomatic and economic circles came to the conclusion about the need to bring relations with Western Europe and Japan to a new level.

One of the main members of the Trilateral Commission from the United States, former national security adviser in the administrations of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, argued that in the future to open this "club" for the Soviet Union. Almost the same was said back in 1971, before the creation of the Commission, Brzezinski, at least, in his book "Between two ages" it was argued that the once developed Western countries and socialist countries are aware of the commonality of their economic problems and it will seat the USA and the USSR at the same table. What role he assigned the founding of the Tripartite Commission of the USSR in the project of a "new world order" that they built?

The tripartite Commission was very concerned not to be held hostage to the antagonism that divided the capitalist and socialist countries. At the basis of the Commission of the Soviet Union after some members of the diplomatic community were informed that this group is not a new anti-Communist Alliance, which comes from the confrontational task or intended to contain the Soviet Union in any respect. The same message was also communicated to the Chinese.

The Commission consciously in his research, which were published two or three times a year, avoided questions of international security. It was about energy, international trade, but not security issues. They understood that this issue is too problematic that it would be difficult to find mutual understanding even within the Commission itself. In the future, the Commission published two or three studies on the relationship between the West and the East, and they were presented a variety of opinions about the basis on which to build a relationship with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski, for example, spoke in support of the discharge, but, in his view, Nixon's approach was erroneous because it gave the Russian too much advantage to the Americans. Brzezinski was not satisfied and exclusionary nature of the negotiations that were supposed to be more transparent.

In 1976, the Trilateral Commission tried to get a meeting directly with the Soviet leadership. Was a planned meeting with Soviet diplomats in Vienna, but then the parties are unable to spend. Two years later there were new contacts, the talks were about a possible visit of the Commission's co-chairs in Moscow, these plans have become more concrete than the meeting in Vienna, but when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Thereafter, the Commission canceled his trip and the meeting never took place.

The Commission also did not want to alienate China. Similar negotiations were initiated with the Chinese leadership. In 1981, the Tripartite Commission representatives visited Beijing and held talks with Deng Xiaoping. So we cannot say that the Commission was set up anti-Communist. Brzezinski, for example, believed that the policy of detente useful because it supports the dialogue between the two blocs, it is believed useful "exchange of elites" between the USSR and the countries of the Trilateral Commission, considered that it was appropriate to discuss not only diplomatic issues, but also issues of social, global development issues. But these ideas never materialized.

Another interesting issue is the arrival of the members of the Tripartite Commission the power, the same Brzezinski, Robert Bowie, who enlisted in the CIA. The Carter administration the American left criticized just for the fact that she became the property of the Tripartite Commission. How did a group of intellectuals and representatives of big business was able to get that kind of power?

In General, of the U.S. Trilateral Commission in the Carter administration went to work for 23 persons while the total number of representatives in North America, including Canadians, of 60. This one-third, and this is a very big number. Many of them have become very important figures in the Carter administration, they were all connected with foreign policy. Sam Carter was a member of the Commission since its creation. This, of course, gave the conspiracy theorists and sensation-seeking press is a cause for concern. They believed that the founding Committee has selected Carter because he believed that I could influence him to turn him into a President-puppet. Of course, this is not true.

He was invited to the Commission because he represented the part of the American political elite, with whom they wanted to bond. He was from the Deep South. In those days, Atlanta has experienced economic boom, there just opened representative offices of multinational companies, he was Governor of Georgia. Carter was the perfect candidate in order to dilute the typical dominance of political elites from the East coast of the United States. They wanted to find someone who would represent the interests of the heart of the country. Carter was introduced in the composition of the Commission, and when he announced that he was going to nominate his candidacy for the presidency, people in the Trilateral Commission simply could not believe their ears, that they had the chance.

Carter equally have used the resources of the Commission, and Vice versa. From its members it has received the amount of knowledge on foreign policy issues, which he did not possess. And only when it is necessary for the future President's knowledge, he managed to claim the White house.

As President, he chose from the Commission, a number of experts, who became his closest advisers, including Cyrus Vance became Secretary of state, Brzezinski received the post of national security adviser. The fact that such a large number of members of the Commission became part of the administration, I explain the fact that the Commission represented an informal group of people from the political and intellectual circles of the highest level of competence. Inside these elites have always existed in circulation: someone who was part of the government, someone came to the Commission, someone retired, someone retired from active work or began working in other organizations. If we think about how government works, we need to talk about how this elite network, which is not concentrated exclusively in formal government circles.

When the Commission was created, its representatives somehow consulted with the us lawmakers and the White house? The Nixon administration welcomed this private initiative on establishing "brain supertest"?

Such consultations were very important to the founders of the Commission, and in the end they got the green light for its creation. But I would not use in its description, the adjective "private". In the end, the Commission was so close to the government that its interests and the interests of the government crossed. So I use the term "informal governmental actor." Informal ― because, of course, she was not part of the official apparatus, but the government ― because in the framework underwent an intensive process of government decision making. I think it's important not to share its character in the state or the public.

In the American context, it is clear that the creation was carried out with the [Secretary of state Henry] Kissinger and indirectly by Nixon. They were given the green light. When the Commission came in contact with Soviet diplomats, for example, she always had a mandate from the government of the United States. They didn't want to lose this bond, compromising the administration's policy or be attacked for independent contacts with potential opponents. So the consultation process with the administration was constant.

The same situation was and with European governments. The only country where the Commission was faced with opposition, was France. When they put Paris on notice about his plans, the President Georges Pompidou agreed to support the project, but the Ministry of foreign Affairs was set up very critical. So in France, the Commission's position was precarious till about 1974-75 year, when the Gaullist tradition weakened and came to power, President valéry Giscard d'estaing. In Japan there was also consultation with the government, which supported the tripartite dialogue.

So the Commission initially maintained close contact with the official authorities, those who make the decisions. This is even evident from its very title ― "the Commission"; the Commission is what constitutes the government, is not an organization of civil society. It was Brzezinski's idea: we are called the Trilateral Commission, and it sounds official.

At the same time, the Commission sought to preserve room for maneuver, because its founders were very critical of the policy of Nixon, just as they criticized the course taken by the administration of Ronald Reagan.

That is, the Nixon administration supported the establishment of the group who acted against its interests, or at least criticized her policy?

We can say that the Commission never said "we are for Nixon" or "we are against Nixon." Always stressed its non-partisan, navdialogdispose character. The only person not in it, so it's radical left and radical right. On the other hand, I think, Kissinger feared that the centre will be established a permanent opposition to his extremely pragmatic foreign policy doctrine.

But he was interested in was the platform for dialogue that it could discuss its policy with its critics, and maybe to influence them. I found a letter, not of Kissinger, but from one of his assistants, in which the Commission proposed a kind of division of labor with the State Department on the question of the response to the oil crisis [1973]. Kissinger hoped thus to reach out to the leaders of the Arab countriesin response to the defeat of the Egyptian-Syrian forces in the Yom Kippur War with Israel, the Gulf States announced an embargo on oil supplies to allies of the Jewish state ― approx. "Of the tape.<url>"). He believed that the Commission, in such cases, it may be very useful. This project remained on paper, but it shows how the Nixon administration belonged to the Trilateral Commission. On the one hand, the Commission could help, on the other hand, it could impede.

One of the books of reports, which was published under the auspices of the Tripartite Commission, was "the Crisis of democracy by Michel crozier, Samuel Huntington, He is Watanuki. In 1975, it sparked a wave of criticism from American liberals: the authors assumed that a responsible government in search of a balance between order and democracy must support in the population a certain level of passivity, especially among minorities suppressed and dissatisfied in order to create stable conditions for long-term development. The book was criticized in the West, for example, Noam Chomsky, and in Soviet historiography. The trilateral Commission called the organization of manipulators, protecting the interests of monopoly capital, which satabase population, floating in the illusions and became dependent on mass consumption. The Board really considered a valid manipulation of public opinion in order to cut off the radicals from the policy?

We need to understand how to write these reports. The Commission itself discussed how to make such reports, recommendations. It is clear that hundreds of people from different countries gathering once a year at the same table, is unlikely to offer one. It was therefore agreed that these reports will be written not on behalf of the Commission and to the Commission, that is, at its sole discretion. The authors may be members of the Commission, and invited experts from each of the three regions. The Commission, as the customer has defined only the theme, but the end result of the efforts of the authors being left out of discussions.

This separate report was unique in its kind. It has not been common, it had three authors, each wrote his part ― Japanese, Western European and American. And that's the American, which was written by Huntington, was the most controversial. In the Commission itself had many disagree with his conclusions, so we cannot say that this report corresponds with the General opinion of its members. But we can say that this was not the opinion solely of Huntington: Brzezinski in the course of writing several times pushed him to make those conclusions, which appeared in the text. In the initial version of the report brought in an expert Brzezinski talked about how difficult it is in a democratic society to start a war. Remember: it's the mid-1970s, in the USA lively memory of the Vietnam war, the population is set against elites, The New York Times had already published "the Pentagon Papers", and this experience has a political elite. At the same time increasing the influence of the movement for the emancipation of blacks, women, gays...

This report can be interpreted as the Commission's response to the whole situation. This attempt to stall the policy in closed government offices, where it was made until now. But, in General, is the meaning of the existence of the Tripartite Commission ― the public is kept on the other side of closed doors, discussions are underway between the participants openly since they were not invited the press.

Kissinger, who in the end he joined the Commission, said that its members should not follow public opinion, they should formulate it. So, obviously, this trend in the Commission was.

But there was another ― Carter has personally criticized the findings of Huntington, who noticed in one place that sometimes the government has the right to lie to its citizens. The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke also criticized the report, many in Western Europe and Japan did the same.

Written by S. Huntington, the ideology today has become common place. The idea that the radical opposition hinders the controllability of the state, close all the apparatchiks: the technocratic bureaucracy of the United States, and the Russian security forces. "We are not manipulators ― we're just responsible administrators." The Commission ultimately holds to this opinion?

Today's Trilateral Commission ― the organization has a very different kind. Her idea has nothing to do with manipulative technology, but first and foremost — finding a consensus that will allow for effective public policy. The Commission became a forum, a platform for dialogue and now it is too big — 320 people — in order to formulate any unanimous recommendations.

The fall of the Carter administration and the rise to power of Reagan and preceding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — all this became evidence of the strategic failure of the Trilateral Commission?

We can say that when Carter came to power, he was completely willing to follow the doctrine of trilateralism [triple Alliance], which was professed by the Commission, that is, to strengthen ties with Japan and Western Europe. He immediately sent his Vice-President Walter Mondale in those countries with a tour. But in the end he failed to carry the idea of this cooperation throughout his presidency ― and the Europeans and the Japanese began to criticize the Carter administration. A large role was played by the second oil crisis [1978-1979]. Japan was very dependent on energy sources ― is much less dependent, the Europeans had a special relationship with the middle East region, France, for example, Iran, where in 1979 the Islamic revolution]. Over the fact that Rockefeller said: the Commission no longer supports the case.

Reagan also used this situation. When he ran for President, he attacked his rivals for the Republican party, for example, George Bush Sr., who was a member of the Commission. He accused them that they ignore US interests that they represent typical elitists circles. This campaign has been very painful to the Commission.

But as soon as Reagan was elected President, relations between the administration and the Commission immediately returned to normal, someone from the Commission has even entered the presidential team. So we must not exaggerate the degree of strategic failure of the project to create a solid block of post-industrial countries. The Commission is very critical sometimes took some steps his administration, for example, the policy of deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. But at the same time, the administration and the Commission continued its cooperation.

If the Commission is a product of the era of the cold war when the capitalist countries Willy-nilly had to stick together, to work together to respond to the Communist threat?

I do not think that the Commission was too tied to the era of the cold war as such. It was created in the discharge period, when American foreign policy has varied considerably, and on the agenda stood the question of its further articulation. At the same time, for the past 20 years, the Commission is in a state of identity crisis.

In the 1970s she had some predictive potential, she could talk about where this world, she analyzed how the unipolar world turned multipolar, she was able to predict where the formation of new centres of economic power. It was a pioneering breakthrough.

Now ― this question is in the archives I have not studied, but can Express their opinion very difficult to come to some consensus within the Commission, which included representatives of China, India, Mexico, and other countries that no longer share common interests. Now it is common forum involving informal meetings, during which it is possible to avoid misunderstandings.

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